



# HISTORY OF EUROPE



“BELLUM maxime omniū memorabile, quæ unquam gesta sint, me scripturum ; quod, Hannibale duce, Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello : odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus : et adeo varia belli fortuna ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt.”—LIVY, lib. xxi.





ALL

THE



UNIVERSITY

# HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM

## THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

TO THE

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS  
IN MDCCCXV

BY

ARCHIBALD ALISON, L.L.D.  
F.R.S.E.

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# HISTORY OF EUROPE.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

### RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE BY NAPOLEON

#### DURING THE CONTINENTAL PEACE.

OCT. 1801—MAY 1803.

WHEN Napoleon seized the reins of power in France, he found the institutions of civilisation and the bonds of society dissolved, to an extent of which the previous history of the world afforded no example. Not only was the throne overturned, the nobles exiled, their landed estates confiscated, the aristocracy destroyed; but the whole institutions of religion, law, commerce, and education, had been overturned. There remained neither nobles to rule, nor priests to bless, nor teachers to instruct the people. Commerce no more spread its benign influence through the realm; and manufacturing industry, in woful depression, could not maintain its numerous inhabitants. The great cities no longer resounded with the hammer of the artisan, and the village bells had ceased to call the faithful to the house of God. The chateaus, in ruins, existed only to awaken the melancholy recollection of departed splendour, and the falling churches to attest the universal irreligion of the country; the ocean was no more whitened by the sails of its commerce, nor the mountains enlivened by the song of its shepherds. Even

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1801.

1.  
Deplorable  
internal  
state of  
France  
when Napo-  
leon suc-  
ceeded to  
the helm.

the institutions of charity, and the establishments for the relief of suffering, had shared in the general wreck. The monastery no longer spread its ample stores to the poor; and the hospital doors were closed against the numerous applicants who laboured under wounds or disease. Hardened by want, and steeled against pity by the multiplicity of the objects claiming its attention, humanity itself seemed to be ceasing in the human heart. Every one, engrossed in the cares of self-preservation, and destitute of the means of relieving others, turned with callous indifference from the spectacle of general misery. In one class only the spirit of religion glowed with undecaying lustre, and survived the wreck of all its institutions. Persecuted, reviled, and destitute, the Sisters of Charity still persevered in their pious efforts to assuage human suffering; and sought out the unfortunate, alike among the ranks of the Republicans who had overturned, as of the Royalists who had bled for the faith of their fathers.\*

2.  
Means which  
were at his  
disposal to  
reconstruct  
society; and  
difficulties  
which he had  
to encoun-  
ter.

To restore the institutions which the insanity of former times had overturned, and draw close again the bonds which previous guilt had loosened, was the glorious task which awaited the First Consul. The powers which he possessed for it were great, but the difficulties attending its execution were almost insurmountable. On the one hand, he was at the head of a numerous, brave, and experienced army, flushed by victory, and obedient to his will; the whole remaining respectable classes of the state had rallied round his standard; and all ranks, worn out with revolutionary contention and suffering, were anxious

\* It is not to be supposed that the revolutionary governments had done nothing for education. On the contrary, the Polytechnic School, and many other institutions, particularly a school for medicine, and the Institute itself, were owing to their exertions. But in the distracted state of the country, and when the care of self-preservation came home to every one, little attention could be paid to the education of the young; and by destroying every sort of religious tuition, the Convention had cut off the right hand of public instruction—the only branch of it which is of paramount importance to the poor—See THILBAUDEAU, 123.

to submit to any government which promised them the first of social blessings, peace and protection. On the other, almost all the wealth and all the nobility of the state had disappeared during the Revolution: the church was annihilated: the nobles were guillotined or in exile; the merchants banished or insolvent; and great part of the landed property of the country had passed into the hands of several millions of small holders, who might be expected to be permanently resolute in maintaining their possessions against the dispossessed proprietors. That society could not long go on, nor any durable government be established, without some national religion, or some connexion between the throne and the altar, was sufficiently evident; but how was either to be reconstructed in the midst of an infidel generation, and by the aid of the very men who had contributed to their destruction? That a constitutional monarchy could not exist without a representative system, founded on all the great interests of the state, and tempered by the steadiness of a hereditary aristocracy, was indeed apparent; but where were the elements of it to be found, when the former had almost all been crushed during the convulsions of the Revolution, and the latter, destitute and exiled, was the object of inveterate jealousy to the numerous classes who had risen to greatness by its overthrow.

These difficulties were so great that they would probably have deterred any ordinary conqueror from the attempt; and he would have been content to accept the crown which was offered him, leaving to others the herculean task of closing the wounds of the Revolution. But Napoleon was not a man of that character. He believed firmly that he was the destined instrument in the hand of Providence to extinguish that terrible volcano, and he was conscious of powers equal to the undertaking. From the very outset, accordingly, he began, cautiously indeed, but firmly and systematically, to coerce the democratic spirit, and reconstruct those classes

CHAP.  
XXXV.  
1801.

3.  
He resolves  
to make the  
attempt.



and distinctions in society which had disappeared during the preceding convulsions, but which were the indispensable bulwarks of the throne. The success with which his efforts were attended is a more glorious monument to his memory than all the victories which he won.

4.  
Constitutional freedom was then impossible in France.

Those who reproach Napoleon with establishing a despotic government, and not founding his throne on the basis of a genuine representation of the people, would do well to show how he could have framed a counterpoise to democratic ambition, or a check on regal oppression, out of the representatives of a community from which all the superior classes of society had been violently torn. They should point out how the turbulent passions of a republican populace could have been moulded into habitual subjection to a legislature, distinguished in no way from their own members, and a body of titled senators, destitute of wealth, consideration, or hereditary rank; how a constitutional throne could have subsisted without either any support from the loyal, or any foundation in the religious feelings of its subjects; and how a proud and victorious army could have been taught that respect for the majesty of the legislature which is the invaluable growth of centuries of order, but which the successive overthrow of so many previous governments in France had done so much to destroy. After its patricians had been cut off by the civil wars of Sylla and Marius, Rome sank necessarily and inevitably under the despotic rule of the emperors. When Constantine founded a second Rome on the shores of the Bosphorus, he perceived it was too late to attempt the restoration of the balanced constitution of the ancient republic. On Napoleon's accession to the consular throne, he found the chasms in the French aristocracy still greater and more irreparable. The only remaining means of righting the scale was by throwing the sword into the balance. The total failure of all subsequent attempts to frame a constitutional

monarchy out of the elements which the Revolution had left in the society of France, proves that Napoleon rightly appreciated its political situation, and seized upon the only means of restoring tranquillity to its troubled waters.

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1801.

Circumstances soon occurred, which called forth the secret but indelible hatred of the First Consul at the Jacobin faction. The conspiracy of Arena and Ceracchi, which failed at the opera, had been traced to some ardent enthusiasts of that class; and soon after a more formidable attempt at his assassination gave rise to a wider proscription of their associates. On the day on which the armistice of Steyer was signed, Napoleon went to the opera. Berthier, Lannes, and Lauriston were with him in the carriage. In going from the Tuileries to the theatre, in the Rue de Richelieu, his carriage passed through the Rue St Nicaise; an overturned chariot in that narrow thoroughfare almost obstructed the passage, but the coachman, who was driving rapidly, had the address to pass it without stopping. Hardly had he got through when a terrible explosion broke all the windows of the vehicle, struck down the last man of the guard, killed eight persons, and wounded twenty-eight, besides occasioning damage to the amount of two hundred thousand francs (£8000) in forty-six adjoining houses. Napoleon drove on without stopping to the opera, where the audience were in consternation at the explosion, which was so loud as to be heard over all Paris.<sup>1</sup> Every eye was turned to him when he entered, but the calm expression of his countenance gave not the slightest indication of the

5.  
Explosion of  
the infernal  
machine.

Dec. 24,  
1800.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 23,  
24. Bour. iv.  
199, 200.  
D'Abr. iv.  
108, 110.

\* "There is in the English constitution," said Napoleon, "a body of noblesse which unites to the lustre of descent a great part of the landed property of the nation. These two circumstances give it a great influence over the people, and interest attaches it to the government. In France, since the Revolution, that class is totally wanting. Would you re-establish it? If you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it would be necessary to concentrate in their hands a large portion of the national property, which is now impossible. If it were composed of the ancient noblesse, this would soon lead to a counter revolution."—See THIBAudeau, 291.

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1801.

danger which he had escaped. Speedily, however, the news circulated through the theatre, and the First Consul had the satisfaction of receiving, in the thunders of applause which shook its walls, the most fervent expressions of attachment to his person.

6.  
Napoleon at  
once ascribes  
it to the  
Jacobins.

Before the piece had terminated, Napoleon returned to the Tuileries, where a crowd of public functionaries was assembled from every part of Paris, to congratulate him on his escape. He anticipated all their observations by commencing in a loud voice — “This is the work of the Jacobins; it is they who have attempted to assassinate me. Neither the nobles, nor the priests, nor the Chouans had any hand in it. I know on what to form my opinion, and it is in vain to seek to make me alter it. It is the Septembrisers, those wretches steeped in crime, who are in a state of permanent revolt, in close column, against every species of government. Three months have hardly elapsed since you have seen Ceracchi, Arena, and their associates, attempt to assassinate me. Again, it is the same clique, the blood-suckers of September, the assassins of Versailles, the brigands of 31st May, the authors of all the crimes against government, who are at their hellish work. It is the tribe of artisans, and journalists who have a little more instruction than the people, but live with them, and mingle their passions with their own ardent imaginations, who are the authors of all these atrocities. If you cannot chain them, you must exterminate them; there can be no truce with such wretches; France must be purged of such an abominable crew.” During this vehement harangue, delivered with the most impassioned gesticulations, all eyes were turned towards Fouché, the well-known leader of that party, and stained at Lyons and the Loire with some of its most frightful atrocities. Alone, he stood in a window recess, pale, dejected, hearing everything, answering nothing. The crowd of courtiers broke into exclamations, the echo of the First Consul’s sentiments.<sup>1</sup> One,

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 27,  
28. Bour. iv.  
201, 202.  
D’Abr. iv.  
110, 114.

gifted with more courage than the rest, approached, and asked the minister of police why he made no reply. "Let them go on," said he. "I am determined not to compromise the safety of the state. I will speak when the proper time arrives. He laughs securely who laughs the last."

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1801.

On the following day a public audience was given to the prefect of the Seine, and the twelve mayors of Paris. Napoleon said: "As long as that handful of wretches attacked me alone, I left to the laws the charge of chastising their offences; but since, by a crime without example, they have endangered the lives of a part of the population of Paris, their punishment must be as rapid as extraordinary. They consist of a hundred miscreants who have brought disgrace on liberty by the crimes committed in its name; it is indispensable that they should be forthwith deprived of the means of inflicting further injuries on society." This idea was more fully unfolded at a meeting of the council of state, which took place on the same day. It was proposed to establish a special commission to try the offenders; but this was far from meeting Napoleon's views, who was resolved to seize the present opportunity to inflict a death-blow on the remnant of the Jacobin faction. "The action of a special tribunal," said he, "would be too slow; we must have a more striking punishment for so extraordinary an offence; it must be as rapid as lightning; it must be blood for blood. As many of the guilty must be executed as there fell victims to their designs, say fifteen or twenty; transport two hundred, and take advantage of this event to purge the Republic of its most unworthy members. This crime is the work of a band of assassins, of September-brisers,\* whose hands may be traced through all the crimes of the Revolution. When that party sees a blow struck at its headquarters, and that fortune has abandoned its chiefs, everything will return to established order;

Speech  
which he  
made on the  
occasion to  
the authori-  
ties of Paris.

\* In allusion to the massacres in the prisons in September 1792.

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1801.

the workmen will resume their labours; and ten thousand men, who, in France, are ranged under its colours, will abandon it for ever. That great example is necessary to attach the middle classes to the throne; the industrious citizens can have no hope as long as they see themselves menaced by two hundred enraged wolves, who look only for the proper moment to throw themselves on their

y

8.  
He refuses  
to listen to  
any attempt  
to exculpate  
them.

“The metaphysicians are the men to whom we owe all our misfortunes. Half-measures will no longer do; we must either pardon everything, like Augustus, or adopt a great measure which may be the guarantee of the social order. When, after the conspiracy of Catiline, Cicero caused the guilty to be strangled, he said he had saved his country. I should be unworthy of the great task which I have undertaken, and of my mission, if I evinced less firmness on this trying occasion. We must regard this affair as statesmen, not as judges. I am so convinced of the necessity of making a great example, that I am ready to call the accused before me, interrogate them, and myself subscribe their condemnation. It is not for myself that I speak; I have braved greater dangers; my fortune has preserved me, and will preserve me; but we are now engaged with the social order, with the public morality, the national glory.” In the midst of this energetic harangue, it was evident that Napoleon was losing sight of the real point to be first considered, which was, who were the guilty parties. Truguet alone had the courage to approach this question, by suggesting that there were different classes of guilty persons in France; that there were fanatics as well as Jacobins who misled the people; and that the priests, whose denunciations against the holders of the national domains had already appeared in several recent publications, might possibly be the authors of the infernal project.

Napoleon warmly interrupted him—“You will not make me alter my opinion by such vain declamations; the

wicked are known; they are pointed out by the nation: They are the Septembrisers, the authors of every political crime in the Revolution, who have ever been spared or protected by the weak persons at the head of affairs. Talk not to me of nobles or churchmen. Would you have me proscribe a man for a title, or transport ten thousand gray-haired priests? Would you have me prosecute a religion still professed by the majority of Frenchmen, and by two-thirds of Europe? La Vendée never was more tranquil; the detached crimes which still disgrace its territory are the result merely of ill-extinguished animosities. Would you have me dismiss all my councillors excepting two or three; send Portalis to Sinimari, Devaine to Madagascar, and choose a council from the followers of Babœuf? It is in vain to pretend that the people will do no wrong but when they are prompted to it by others. The people are guided by an instinct alone, in virtue of which they act. During the Revolution they frequently forced on the leaders who appeared to guide them; the populace directing itself is an unmuzzled tiger. I have a list of the men employed in all the massacres. The necessity of the thing being once admitted, our duty is to attain it in the most efficacious way. Do they take us for children? Do not hope, citizen Truguet, that you would, in the event of their success, be able to save yourself by saying, 'I have defended the patriots before the council of state.' No, no. These patriots would sacrifice you as well as us all." He then broke up the council, and when passing Truguet, who was endeavouring to say something in his vindication, said aloud, "Come now, citizen, all that is very well for the soirées of Madame Condorcet or Made-moiselle Garat, but it won't do in a council of the most enlightened men of France."<sup>1</sup>

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1801.

Napoleon's  
reply to  
Truguet.<sup>1</sup> Thib. 33, 34.

These vehement apostrophes from a man vested with despotic authority cut short all discussion, and the council found itself compelled, notwithstanding a courageous

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1801.

10.  
A *coup-d'état* is resolved on against the Jacobins.

resistance from some of its members, to go into the arbitrary designs of the First Consul. The public mind was prepared for some great catastrophe by repeated articles in the public journals, drawn up by the minister of police,\* in which that astute counsellor, suppressing his private information, directed the thunders of the executive against his former associates. But while these measures were in preparation, Fouché and the First Consul received decisive information that it was the Royalists, and not the Jacobins, who were the real authors of the conspiracy, and a clue was obtained which promised soon to lead to the discovery of the guilty parties. The minister of police, therefore, received secret instructions not to allude in his report against the Republicans to the affair of the infernal machine, but to base the proposed *coup-d'état* generally on the numerous conspiracies against the public peace; and on this report Napoleon urged the immediate delivery to a military commission of eighteen, and transportation of above a hundred persons, without either trial or evidence taken against them. In vain Thibau-deau and Rœderer urged in the council of state, that there was no evidence against the suspected persons, and that it was the height of injustice to condemn a crowd of citizens, untried and unheard, to the severe punishment of transportation. The First Consul, though well aware that they had no connexion with the late conspiracy, was resolved not to let slip the opportunity of getting quit at once of so many dangerous characters.<sup>1</sup>

“We have strong presumptions, at least,” said he, “if

\* In one of these, the Minister of Police addressed the following report to the First Consul:—

“It is not against ordinary brigands, for whose coercion the ordinary tribunals are sufficient, and who menace only detached persons or articles of property, that the government is now required to act: it is the enemies of entire France who are now at the bar; men who threaten every instant to deliver it up to the fury of anarchy.

“These frightful characters are few in number, but their crimes are nume-  
rable. It is by them that the Convention has been attacked with an armed force in the bosom of the sanctuary of the laws: it is they who have endeavoured so often to render the committees of government the agents of their

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 42.  
49. Bour. iv.  
205, 207.

not proofs against the Terrorists. The Chouannerie and emigration are maladies of the skin, but terrorism is a disease of the vital parts. The minister of police has purposely omitted the mention of the late conspiracy, because it is not for it that the measure is proposed. If that reserve were not maintained, we should compromise our character. The proposed step is grounded upon considerations independent of the late event; it only furnished the occasion for putting them in force. The persons included in the lists will be transported for their share in the massacres in the prisons on September 2d; for their accession to the Jacobin revolt of 31st May; for the conspiracy of Babœuf, and all that they have done since that time. Such a step would have been necessary without the conspiracy, but we must avail ourselves of the enthusiasm it has excited to carry it into execution." In pursuance of these views, an *arrêt* was proposed by the council of state, and adopted by the senate, which condemned to immediate transportation no less than a hundred and thirty individuals, among whom were nine persons who had been engaged in the massacres of September, and several members of the Convention—Choudien, Taillefer, Thirion, and Talot, Felix Lepelletier, and Rossignol, well known for his cruelty in the war of la Vendée. The decree was forthwith carried into execution; and thus did the arbitrary tyranny which the Jacobins had so long exercised over others, at length, by a just retribution, recoil upon themselves.<sup>1</sup>\*

CHAP.  
XXXV

1801.

11.  
Napoleon's  
reason for  
transportin  
the Jacobin:  
though inno-  
cent.<sup>1</sup> Thib. 42,  
51. Bour. v  
205, 206.

atrocious designs. They are not the enemies of this or that government, but of every species of authority.

"They persist in an atrocious war, which cannot be terminated but by an extraordinary measure of the supreme police. Among the men whom the police has denounced, many were not found with the poniard in their hands; but all were equally capable of sharpening and using it. In disposing of them, we must not merely punish the past, but provide a guarantee of social order in future."—See THIBAUDEAU, 43, 44; and BOURRIENNE, iv. 204, 205.

\* The Senatus-Consultum was in these terms:—"Considering that the constitution has not determined measures necessary to be taken in certain emergencies; that in the absence of any express directions, the Senate is called upon



CHAP.  
XXXV.

1801.

12.

It is afterwards discovered that the Chouans were the really guilty parties.

Jan. 13,  
1801.

In less than a month afterwards, Fouché made a second report upon the conspiracy of the infernal machine, in which he admitted, that, when these measures of severity were adopted against the Jacobins, he had other suspicions; that Georges Cadoudal and other emigrants had successively disembarked from England; and that the horse attached to the machine had furnished a clue to the authors of the plot, who had at length been detected in the house of certain females of the Royalist party. Saint Regent and Carbon, accordingly, the really guilty persons, were tried by the ordinary tribunals, condemned, and executed. Not a shadow of doubt could now remain that the conspiracy had been the work of the Royalists; but Napoleon, though he saw that as clearly as any one, persisted in carrying into effect the sweeping decree of transportation against the Jacobins. "There is not one of them," he said to those who petitioned for a relaxation of the sentence in favour of certain individuals, "who has not deserved death a hundred times over, if they had been judged by their conduct during the Revolution. These wretches have covered France with scaffolds, and the measure adopted in regard to them is rather one of mercy than severity. The attempt of the infernal machine is neither mentioned as a motive nor the occasion of the *Senatus-Consultum*. With a company of grenadiers I could put to flight the whole faubourg St Germain, and its Royalist coteries; but the Jacobins are men of determined character, whom it is not so easy to make retreat.<sup>1</sup> As to the transportation of the Jacobins, it is of no sort

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 51,  
62, Bour. iv.  
212, 213,  
214.

to give effect to the wishes of the people, expressed by that branch of the constitution of which it is the organ; that, according to that principle, the senate is the natural judge of any conservative measures proposed in perilous circumstances by the government; and considering that the measure proposed by the council of state seems to be based on necessity and public expedience, the senate declares that that measure is conservative of the constitution." Upon this decree being obtained, the council of state decided that their resolution was obligatory on the constituted authorities, and that it should be promulgated, like the laws and acts of the government, but without receiving the sanction of the legislative body and the tribunate; and it was immediately put in force without their concurrence.—See THIBAUDEAU, 51, 52.

it consequence ; I have got quit of them. If the Royalists\* commit any offence, I will strike them also.”\* CHAP.  
XXXV.

The next important step of Napoleon was the exhibition of a king of his own creation to the astonished Parisians. By a convention with Spain, it was stipulated that the province of Tuscany, ceded to the Infanta of Spain, Marie Louise, third daughter of Charles IV., and the Duke of Parma, her husband, should be erected into a monarchy, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria. In May 1801, the newly created king, Louis I., with his young bride, arrived in Paris, on his way from Madrid to Florence, and was received with extraordinary distinction both on the road and in the capital. Numerous fêtes succeeded each other in honour of the royal pair, among which those of M. Talleyrand, in his villa at Neuilly, was remarked as peculiarly magnificent. The young king early evinced symptoms of that imbecility of character by which he was afterwards distinguished ; but it was deemed of importance to accustom the court of the First Consul to the sight of royalty, and the Parisians to the intoxicating idea that, like the Roman Senate, they were invested with the power of making and unmaking kings. Napoleon was gratified by the demonstration that he could confer royalty, while he declined its honours himself. He received the reward of this policy in the transports with which, when he was present, the celebrated lines of Voltaire, in the tragedy of *Cædipus*, were received at the theatre—<sup>1</sup>

“ Le Trône est un objet qui n’a pu me tenter.  
Hercule à ce haut rang dédaignait de monter :  
Toujours libre avec lui, sans sujets et sans maître,  
J’ai fait des souverains, et n’ai pas voulu l’être.”

*Cædipe*, Act ii. scene 5.

It is a curious and instructive fact, that no sooner was the determination of the First Consul, in regard to the Jacobins, known, than a multitude of revelations flowed in from the prefects, mayors, and magistrates over all France, implicating the Republicans still further in the conspiracy, and detailing discoveries of the vast Jacobin plot which was to have burst forth in every part

1801.  
13.  
Napoleon creates the Duke of Parma King of Etruria.

May, 1801.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 64,  
69. Bour. iv.  
270, 273.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1801.

14.

Parallel  
published by  
authority,  
between  
Cæsar,  
Cromwell,  
and Napo-  
leon.

But it was not merely by such exhibitions of royalty that Napoleon endeavoured to prepare the French nation for his own assumption of the crown. At the time when the public mind was strongly excited by the danger which the state had run from the attempt of the infernal machine, a pamphlet appeared with the title, "Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and Buonaparte," in which the cause of royalty and hereditary succession was openly advocated. It excited at first a great sensation, and numerous copies were sent to the First Consul from the prefects and magistrates, with comments on the dangerous effects it was producing on the public mind. Fouché, however, soon discovered that it had issued and been distributed from the office of the minister of the interior, and shortly after that it came from the pen of Lucien Buonaparte. Napoleon affected to be highly indignant at this discovery, and reproached Fouché with not having instantly sent his imprudent brother to the Temple; but the cautious minister was too well informed to put the hint in execution, as Lucien had shown him the original manuscript corrected by the hand of the First Consul himself. However, it was necessary to disavow the production, as its effect proved that it had prematurely disclosed the designs of the fortunate usurper; and therefore Lucien was sent into honourable exile, as ambassador at Madrid, with many reproaches from Napoleon for having allowed the device to be discovered. "I see," said Napoleon to his secretary, "that I have been moving too fast; I have broken ground too soon; the pear is not yet ripe." Lucien received secret instructions to exert all his influence at the court of Spain to induce that power to declare war against Portugal,<sup>1</sup> in order to detach the whole peninsula from the

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iv.  
217, 220.

of the country, the moment intelligence was received of the leading stroke given in the capital!—a striking instance of the distrust with which the officious zeal of such authorities should be received, and of the necessity of the executive not letting their wishes be known, if they would in such circumstances preserve even the semblance of justice in their proceedings.—See THIBAUDEAU, 53, 63; BOURRIENNE. iv. 212

alliance with Britain, and shut its harbours against the British flag.

CHAP.<sup>r</sup>  
XXXV.

1801.<sup>r</sup>  
15.

Debate on  
the lists of  
eligibility  
in the coun-  
cil of state.

The numerous complaints against the lists of eligibility, which formed so important and remarkable a feature in the constitution under the consulate, induced Napoleon to bring that subject again under the consideration of his state-council. It was justly objected against this institution, that it renewed, in another and a more odious form, all the evils of privileged classes which had occasioned the Revolution; that to confine the seats in the legislature, and all important offices under government, to five thousand individuals, out of above thirty millions of souls, was to the last degree unjust, and seemed peculiarly absurd at the close of a revolution, the main object of which had been to open them indiscriminately to all the citizens, and which had arisen from the exclusive privileges of a hundred and fifty thousand. It became necessary to consider whether these complaints should be attended to, as the time was approaching when a fifth of the legislative body and tribunate were to be renewed, in terms of the constitution; and therefore the lists, already formed, were about to be forwarded to the electors. It was urged by the advocates for a change, in the council of state, that "public opinion had strongly pronounced itself against these lists, because they at once deprive a great body of citizens of that result of the Revolution which they most prized,—eligibility to every public office. Out of delicacy to five thousand persons, who are inscribed in the highest class of these lists, you leave the seeds of a dangerous discontent in a hundred times that number. Doubtless it is not impossible from these lists to make for a few years a suitable choice of representatives; but such a result would only the more confirm a system radically vicious, and augment the difficulty which will hereafter be experienced in correcting it."

The First Consul replied :—"The institution of the lists is objectionable. It is an absurd system, the growth of

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1801.

16.  
Admirable  
views of Na-  
poleon on the  
subject.

the ideology which, like a malady, has so long overspread France. It is not by such means that a great nation is reorganised. Sovereignty is inalienable. Nevertheless, bad as the system is, it forms part of the constitution; we are only intrusted with its execution. It is impossible, besides, to let the people remain without any species of organisation: better a bad one than none at all. It is an error to suppose that society is organised merely because the constitution has created the powers of government. The supreme authority must have intermediate supports, or it has neither any stability nor any hold of the nation. We must not think, therefore, of abandoning the lists without substituting something else in their room. It is admitted that they form at present a sufficient body out of which to choose the legislature; the constitution has established them; they form an organic institution of the state; all France has aided in their construction; in the rural districts, in particular, they are universally approved of. Why, then, should we overlook the people of France, and their expressed approbation, merely because Paris has made a bad choice for her share of the list, and her citizens reckon the departments as nothing? It is better for the government to have to deal with a few thousand individuals than a whole nation. What harm can there be in going on for two or three years longer with these lists? They form the sole channel by which the influence of the people is made to bear on the government. It will be time enough at the close of that period to consider what changes should be made on it." Guided by these considerations, the council resolved that the lists should remain unchanged. They were already regarded as the nucleus of a new nobility instead of that which had been destroyed, and as an indispensable attendant on the throne which was anticipated for the First Consul.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 69,  
74.

The opposition, however, were not discouraged. "The subject of the lists was warmly debated both in the council of state and before the legislature, and the maintenance

of the existing system was only carried by a majority of 56 to 26 in the tribunate, and 239 to 36 in the legislative body. It is not surprising that this article of the constitution excited a violent opposition in the popular party, seeing that it overturned the whole objects for which the nation had been fighting during the Revolution. "The law," says Thibaudeau, "called to the honours and the advantages of eligibility for offices in the communes, 50,000 individuals; to eligibility for offices in the departments, 50,000; to eligibility for the legislature or national offices, 5000. The whole of the other inhabitants were altogether excluded both from the rights of election and eligibility." The partisans of representative governments regarded this as far too narrow a circle in a country embracing thirty millions of souls. But the public in general took very little interest in the matter; justly observing, that as the electors were no longer intrusted with the choice of representatives, or of persons to fill any offices, but only of a large body of candidates, from whom the selection was to be made by the government, it was of very little consequence whether this privilege was confined to many or few hands.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1801.

17.

Decision on  
it by the  
legislature.<sup>1</sup> Thib. 200.

But Napoleon's views in this important particular went much further, and he resolved to establish an order of nobility, under the title of the LEGION OF HONOUR, which should gradually restore the gradation of ranks in society, and at the same time attach the people to its support. This important matter was brought before the council of state in May 1801. It met with more opposition than any other measure of the consulate; and the debates on it in the council of state are in a high degree curious and instructive. "The eighty-seventh article of the constitution," said Napoleon, "sanctions the establishment of military honours, but it has organised nothing. An *arrêt* has established arms of honour, with double pay as a consequence; others with a mere increase; there is nothing formal or regular constructed. The project I propose to

18.

Legion of  
Honour.  
Napoleon's  
arguments  
in favour of  
it, in the  
council of  
state.May 4,  
1801.

CHAP.  
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you gives consistence to the system of recompenses ; it is the beginning of organisation to the nation." It was proposed by General Mathieu Dumas that the institution should be confined to military men ; but this was strongly combated by the First Consul. " Such ideas," said he, " might be well adapted to the feudal ages, when the chevaliers combated each other man to man, and the bulk of the nation was in a state of slavery ; but when the military system changed, masses of infantry, and phalanxes constructed after the Macedonian model, were introduced ; and after that it was not individual prowess, but science and skill, which determined the fate of nations. The kings themselves contributed to the overthrow of the feudal regime, by the encouragement which they gave to the commons ; finally, the discovery of gunpowder, and the total change it induced in the art of war, completed its destruction. From that period the military spirit, instead of being confined to a few thousand Franks, extended to all the Gauls. Power was strengthened rather than weakened by the change ; it ceased to be exclusive in its operation, and, from being founded solely on military prowess, it came to be established also on civil qualities.

19.  
Military  
supremacy  
secured by  
civil qualifi-  
cations.

" What is it now which constitutes a great general ? It is not the mere strength of a man six feet high, but the *coup-d'œil*, the habit of foresight, the power of thought and calculation ; in a word, pacific qualities, not such as you find in a lawyer, but such as are founded on a knowledge of human nature, and are suited to the government of armies. The general who can now achieve great things is he who is possessed of shining civil abilities ; it is their perception of the strength of his talents which makes the soldiers obey him. Listen to them at their bivouacs ; you will invariably find them award the preference to mental over physical qualities. Mourad Bey was the most powerful man among his Mamelukes ; without that advantage he never could have been their leader. When he first

saw me, he could not conceive how I could preserve authority among my troops; but he soon understood it, when he was made acquainted with our system of war. In all civilised states, force yields to civil qualities. Bayonets sink before the priest who speaks in the name of heaven, or the man of science who has gained an ascendancy by his knowledge. I predicted to all my military followers, that a government purely military would never succeed in France till it had been brutalised by fifty years of ignorance. All their attempts to govern in that manner accordingly failed, and involved their authors in their ruin. It is not as a general that I govern, but because the nation believes me possessed of the ability in civil matters necessary for the head of affairs; without that I could not stand an hour. I knew well what I was about when, though only a general, I took the title of Member of the Institute; I felt confident of being understood by the lowest drummer in the army.

“We must not reason from ages of barbarity to these times. France consists of thirty millions of men, united by intelligence, property, and commerce. Three or four hundred thousand soldiers are nothing in such a mass. Not only does the general preserve his ascendancy over his soldiers chiefly by civil qualities, but when his command ceases he becomes merely a private individual. The soldiers themselves are but the children of citizens. The tendency of military men is to carry everything by force; the enlightened civilian, on the other hand, elevates his views to a perception of the general good. The first would rule only by despotic authority; the last subjects everything to the test of discussion, truth, and reason. I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying that, if a preference is to be awarded to the one or the other, it belongs by preference to the civilian. If you divide society into soldiers and citizens, you establish two orders in what should be one nation. • If you confine honours to military men, you do what is still worse, for you sink the people into nothing.”<sup>1</sup>

20.  
His argument for the extension of the honour to civilians.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 75, 81.



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21.  
Arguments  
against the  
institution  
by Thibaudeau.

Moved by these profound observations, the council agreed that the proposed honours should be extended indiscriminately to civil and military distinction.

But the most difficult part of the discussion remained—the consideration of the expedience of the institution itself, even in its most extended form. Great opposition was manifested to it in the capital, from its evident tendency to counteract the levelling principles of the Revolution. It was strongly opposed, accordingly, in the council of state, the tribunate, and the legislative body, and all the influence of the First Consul could only obtain in these different assemblies a feeble majority. It was urged in the council of state, by Thibaudeau and the opponents of the measure:—"The proposed Legion of Honour is diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution. The abolition of titles did not take place during those disastrous days which threw into discredit everything, even of the best character, which was then established; it was the Constituent Assembly who made the change at one of the most enlightened periods of the Revolution. The nation is profoundly influenced by the feeling of honour; but that principle, strong as it is, yields to the universal passion for equality. It was these two powerful motives, combined with the love of freedom and the feelings of patriotism, which gave its early and astonishing victories to the Republic. I do not see that the Legion of Honour could have made the public spirit greater. Considered as a guarantee of the Revolution, the institution appears to me to run counter to its object; and, as laying the foundation of an intermediate body between the throne and the people, to involve a principle inconsistent with the representative system, which can recognise no distinction but that which flows from the choice of the citizens. I fear that the desire of possessing these ribbons may weaken the feelings of duty and of honour, instead of strengthening them. I have the highest respect for the motives which have led to this proposition;

but I have still great doubts ; and it seems highly desirable that such an institution should not be established but after the decided approbation of the great bodies in the state.

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“ In the theory which is presented for our consideration on this subject, representative governments are confounded with monarchical. It is quite true, that distinctions of rank are indispensable in a monarchy, in order to counterbalance, by intermediate bodies, the weight of the throne ; but in a republic they are never-failing sources of irritation, because they destroy that equality among the citizens which is the foundation of all such institutions. In a monarchy, the safeguard of the people is to be found in a multitude of obstacles which restrain the inclinations of the ruler : in representative states, sovereign power is divided ; the people are subjected only to magistrates of their own selection, and know of none but those whom the constitution recognises. By placing in the state the proposed institution, you voluntarily admit a patriciate, of which the immediate and inevitable tendency will be, to run into a military and hereditary nobility.

22.  
Alleged tendency of the institution to originate a patrician class.

“ The Legion of Honour involves within itself all the elements which have elsewhere led to a hereditary nobility,—individual distinction, power, honours, titles, and fixed revenues. Hardly anywhere has a hereditary noblesse commenced its career with such advantages. It is in vain to pretend that the progress of intelligence and the lights of the age are a sufficient guarantee against any such abuse. The human heart is ever the same ; a renewal of the same circumstances will produce the same errors and the same desires. From the institution of the Legion will spring up afresh all the ancient prejudices ; and these prejudices will fortify the military spirit and the respect for nobility, and introduce a separate in the midst of the general interest. Under pretence of effacing the last traces of nobility, it will establish a new one, and

23.  
And its tendency toward the re-establishment of a monarchy.

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strongly confirm the old. Considered as an intermediate body, the Legion is, to say the least of it, a mere superfluity. Such intermediate bodies are of some use in despotic countries; but in a representative state, and among a nation fortunate enough to possess the right of free discussion on public affairs, the sole intermediate body which is required, or should be tolerated, is the representatives of the people. The institution proposed is contrary alike to the principles of the Revolution and the text of the constitution. The proposed order leads directly to a monarchy. Crosses and ribbons are the pillars of an hereditary throne: they were unknown to the Romans who conquered the world.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
195.

24.  
Napoleon's  
reply.

Napoleon replied:—“ We are always referred by the Opposition to the Romans. It is singular that, as an argument against distinctions, reference should so frequently be made to that nation in which, among all that ever existed, they were most firmly established. The Romans had patricians, the equestrian order, citizens, and slaves; for each class they had a separate costume, different habits. To reward achievements, they awarded all sorts of distinctions, surnames recalling great services, mural crowns, triumphs. Superstition was called in to lend her aid to the general impression. Take away the religion of Rome, and nothing remains. When that fine body of patricians was destroyed, Rome was torn in pieces; there successively arose the fury of Marius, the proscriptions of Sylla, the tyranny of the emperors. Brutus is continually referred to as the enemy of tyrants; and yet Brutus was the greatest of all aristocrats. He slew Cæsar only because that prince wished to degrade the influence of the senate, and exalt that of the people. This is the use which the spirit of party makes of history.\*

“ I defy you to show me a republic, ancient or modern,

\* These observations of Napoleon are remarkable. They show how much more clearly his natural sagacity, even amidst all the tumult of camps, had apprehended the truth of ancient history, than the numerous declaimers who, through the whole of the Revolution, had descanted on its examples.

where distinctions have not prevailed. They call them baubles,—well, it is with baubles that you govern mankind. I would not say that at the tribune; but in a council of state nothing should be concealed. I have no idea that the passion for liberty and equality is to be lasting in France. The French have not been so far changed by ten years of revolution; they are still as gallant and volatile as their Gaulish ancestors. They have but one prevailing sentiment, and that is honour; everything should be done, therefore, to foster and encourage that principle. Observe how forcibly the people have been struck by the decorations of the strangers amongst us; that revealed their secret predilections. Voltaire called soldiers, Alexanders at five sous a-day. He was right; they really are so. Do you believe that you would ever make a man fight by abstract principles? Never; such views are fit only for the scholar in his study. For the soldier, as for all men in active life, you must have glory and distinction: recompenses are the food which nourish military virtue. The armies of the Republic have done such great things, because they were composed of the sons of labourers and substantial farmers, and not the mere rabble; because the officers stepped into the situations of those of the old regime, and were animated by the same sentiments of honour. It is the same principle which led to all the triumphs of Louis XIV. You may call, if you please, the Legion of Honour an order: it matters not; names will not alter the nature of things.

“For ten years you have been constantly speaking of institutions, and what, after all, have you done? Nothing. The moment had not yet arrived. The republicans proposed to unite the people to the country, by assembling them in churches, where, dying of cold, they were made to listen to the reading and exposition of the laws; it may easily be imagined what effect such an institution had in attaching them to their government. I am well

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25.

Existence  
of honorary  
rewards in  
the ancient  
republics:  
and neces-  
sity of them  
to the forma-  
tion of the  
soldier.

26.

Necessity of  
such institu-  
tions to the  
mainte-  
nance of the  
Republic.

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aware that, if you judge of this institution according to the prejudices produced by ten years of revolution, it must appear worse than useless; but if you consider that we are placed *after* a revolution, and called upon to reconstruct society, a very different opinion will be formed. Everything has been destroyed; we must commence the work of creation. We have, indeed, a nation and a government; but they are united by a rope of sand. There exist at the same time amongst us several of the old privileged classes, organised from the unity of their principles and interests, and who will always pursue one definite object. But we are scattered, without union, system, or lasting bond of connexion. As long as I survive, I will answer for the Republic; but we must consider what is likely to occur after my death. Do you suppose the Republic is definitely established? You never were more mistaken. We have the means of so establishing it; but we have not yet done it, and never will do it, till we have scattered over the surface of France some masses of granite. Do you suppose you can trust the people for the preservation of your institutions? Believe me, you are mistaken. They will exclaim in a short time, 'Vive le Roi!' or 'Vive la Ligue!' with as much alacrity as they now cry, 'Vive la République!' It is necessary, therefore, to give a lasting direction to the public impulse, and to prepare instruments for that purpose. In the war of la Vendée, I have seen forty men obtain the absolute direction of a department; that is the system that we must make use of."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 83,  
85.

Notwithstanding the profound and unanswerable observations by which he supported it, it was by a comparatively slender majority\* that the institution of the Legion of

\* The numbers were,—

	AYES.	NOES.
In the council of state, . . .	14	10
" tribunate, . . .	56	38
" corps législatif, . . .	166	110
	<hr/> 236	<hr/> 158
Majority,	78 <sup>2</sup>	

<sup>2</sup> Thib. 92.

Honour passed the great bodies of the state. So strongly implanted were the principles of the Revolution, even in the highest functionaries of the realm; and so difficult was it to extinguish that hatred at distinctions or honours which formed so leading a feature in the passions by which it was at first distinguished. No measure during the consulate encountered nearly so powerful an opposition. Napoleon was at first much struck with this circumstance, and confessed in private that he had precipitated matters, and that it would have been better to have waited longer before so obnoxious a change was introduced.<sup>1</sup> It was carried into execution, however, with all those circumstances of pomp and ceremony which he well knew are so powerful with the multitude. The inauguration of the dignitaries of the order took place, with extraordinary magnificence, in the church of the Hôtel-des-Invalides, in presence of the First Consul and of all the great functionaries of the Republic; and the decorations soon began to be eagerly coveted by a people whose passion for individual distinction had been the secret cause of the Revolution.<sup>2</sup>

The event, however, proved that Napoleon had rightly appreciated the true character of the revolutionary spirit. The leading object in the Revolution was the extinction of *castes*, not of *ranks*; equality of rights, and not of classes; the abolition of hereditary, not personal distinction. "Vanity," as Napoleon elsewhere observed, "is the ruling principle of the French, and was at the bottom of all the convulsions of the Revolution: it was the sight of the noblesse enjoying privileges and distinctions to which they could not aspire, which filled the Tiers Etat with inextinguishable and natural animosity." But an institution which conferred lustre on individuals and not on families, and led to no hereditary distinctions, was so far from running counter to this desire, that it afforded it the highest gratification; because it promised the objects of this passion to any, even the humblest of the citizens,

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27.

Small majority by which it is adopted by the legislature.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 91, 92. Bour. iv. 357, 358.

<sup>2</sup> D'Abr. vi. 21. Thib. 91. Bour. iv. 357, 358.

28.  
It entirely succeeded.

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who were worthy of receiving it, and preserved them from the irritation of seeing honours pass to descendants. The Legion of Honour, accordingly, which gradually extended so as to embrace two thousand persons of the greatest eminence in every department, both civil and military, in France, became an institution in the highest degree both useful and popular, and served as the forerunner to that new nobility which Napoleon afterwards created as safeguards to his imperial throne. The Revolution had been founded, not on hatred, but on excessive admiration of such distinctions; but it was the admiration of a lover, and created unbounded jealousy of all others enjoying them.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. Vie  
de Nap. i.  
526. D'Abr.  
vii. 163, 170.

29.  
Napoleon is  
created First  
Consul for  
ten years  
additional;  
grounds set  
forth in the  
senatus-  
consultum  
on the oc-  
casion.

When so many institutions were successively arising which pointed to the establishment of a regular government, it was impossible that its head could remain in a precarious situation. Napoleon accordingly was created by the obsequious legislature First Consul for ten years, beyond the ten fixed at his original appointment; a measure which, although far from coming up to his anticipations and wishes, was yet important as a step to the establishment of perpetual and hereditary succession in his family. The grounds of this change are thusably set forth in the senatus-consultum which introduced it:—"Considering that, in the existing circumstances of the Republic, it is the first duty of the conservative senate to employ all the means in its power in order to give the government the stability which can alone augment the national resources, inspire confidence without, establish credit within, reassure our allies, discourage our secret enemies, remove the evils of war, bring to maturity the fruits of peace, and leave to the wisdom of administration the selection of the proper period for bringing forward all the designs which it may have in view for the happiness of a free people," &c. Napoleon replied in the following words, which subsequent events rendered prophetic:—"Fortune has hitherto smiled on the Republic, but she is

inconstant ; and *how many are there whom she has overwhelmed with her favours, who have lived too long by a few years!* The interests of my glory and happiness seem to have marked, as the termination of my public career, the moment when a general peace was signed. But you deem a new sacrifice necessary on my part. I will not scruple to undertake it, if the wishes of the people prescribe what your suffrages authorise.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
98, 99.  
Bour. iv.  
361.

But all these measures, important as they were, yielded to the great step which at the same time was adopted, of re-establishing the Catholic religion in France, and renewing those connexions with the Pope, which had been violently broken during the fury of the French Revolution. Although the institutions of religion had been abolished, its ministers scattered, and its property confiscated by the different revolutionary assemblies who had governed the country, yet a remnant of the Christian faith still lingered in many parts of the rural districts. When the horrors of the reign of Robespierre ceased, and a government comparatively lenient and regular was established under the Directory, the priests obtained leave to open their churches, provided they undertook to maintain them at their own expense ; and a considerable number returned from exile, and commenced in poverty and obscurity the restoration of religious observances. They were again exposed to persecution and danger after the 18th Fructidor ; and, being destitute of any species of property, and entirely dependent upon the voluntary contributions of their flocks, they were totally unequal to the herculean task of combating the irreligious spirit which had acquired such strength during a revolutionary interregnum of ten years. A remnant of the faithful, composed for the most part of old women, attended the churches on Sunday, and marked by their fidelity an institution which might otherwise have been totally forgotten ; but they were hardly observed amidst the crowds who had discarded every species of devotion. A

30.  
State of religion in  
France at  
this period.



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great proportion of the churches, both in the towns and the country, had been either pulled down, or converted to secular purposes, during the Revolution. Of those which remained, a still greater number were in such a state of dilapidation, from the total absence of any funds for their support, as to threaten speedily to become unserviceable for any purpose whatever. In this general prostration of the Christian faith, the bewildered multitude had sought refuge in other and extravagant creeds; the sect of the Theophilanthropists had arisen, whose ravings amidst fruits and flowers were listened to by a few hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the credulous or enthusiastic of Paris; while the great majority of the people, educated without any religious impressions, quietly passed by on the other side, and lived altogether without God in the world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>-D'Abr. vi.  
38, 41. Thib.  
151, 152.  
Jom. Vie de  
Nap. i. 489.

31.  
Napoleon's  
views on this  
subject.

Although neither a fanatic nor even an avowed believer in Christianity, Napoleon was too sagacious not to perceive that such a state of things was inconsistent with anything like a regular government. He had, accordingly, early commenced a negotiation with the Pope; and the head of the Church, delighted at finding such a disposition in a revolutionary chief, had received his advances with the utmost cordiality. Cardinal Gonzalvi, who at this period with singular ability directed the conclave, had, in the name of the supreme Pontiff, written to General Murat, when advancing towards the Roman States, after the armistice of Treviso, to express "the lively admiration which he felt for the First Consul, to whose fortunes were attached the tranquillity of religion not less than the happiness of Europe." The views of Napoleon on that matter were strongly expressed to the councillors of state with whom he conversed on the subject. "Yesterday evening," said he, "when walking alone in the woods, amidst the solitude of nature, the distant bell of the church of Ruel struck my ear. Involuntarily I felt emotion; so powerful is the influence of early habits and associations.

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I said to myself, if I feel thus, what must be the influence of such impressions on simple and credulous men? Let your philosophers, your *idéologues*, answer that if they can. It is absolutely indispensable to have a religion for the people; and that religion should be directed by the government. At present, fifty bishops, in the pay of England, direct the French clergy; we must forthwith destroy their influence; we must declare the Catholic the established religion of France, as being that of the majority of its inhabitants; we must organise its constitution. The First Consul shall appoint the fifty bishops; the Pope will induct them. They shall appoint the parish priests; the people shall defray their salaries. They must all take the oath; the refractory must be transported. The Pope will, in return, confirm the sale of the national domains. He will consecrate the Revolution; the people will sing, God save the Gallican Church. They will say, I am a Papist: I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt; I will become a Catholic here for the good of my people. I am no believer in particular creeds; but as to the idea of a God, look to the heavens, and say who made that.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 152,  
153. Nap. ii.  
88.

“To discuss the necessity of a religion,” replied the opponents of the establishment, “is to mistake the question. There can be no doubt on that subject; but the point is, cannot religion exist without an established church? There is to be found in the clergy one hierarchy, one spirit, one object. If this colossus had for its head the chief of the state, the evil would exist only in half; but if a foreign potentate, the Pope, is its leader, a schism is introduced into the community. Never will you attach the clergy sincerely to the new order of things. The Revolution has despoiled them both of their honours and their property; they will never pardon these injuries; eternal war is sworn between the rival powers. The clergy will be less dangerous when they are detached from each other than when organised in one body. It is not

32.  
Arguments  
in the coun-  
cil of state  
against an  
establish-  
ment.

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necessary either to persecute or transport a single individual : all that is required is to let them say mass as they choose, and allow every citizen to go either to church or to the Theophilanthropic temples, as suits his inclination. If the incompatibility between priests and the Republic becomes so evident as to disturb the public tranquillity, we must never hesitate to banish them ; you must either proscribe them or the Revolution. The spirit of the age is wholly opposed to a return to Catholicism. We are nearer the truths of Christianity than the priests of Rome. You have but to say the word, the Papacy is ruined, and France takes its place as a Protestant state."

33.  
Napoleon's  
reply.

"You are deceived," said Napoleon ; "the clergy exist, and ever will exist ; they will exist as long as the people are imbued with a religious spirit, and that disposition is permanent in the human heart. We have seen republics and democracies ; history has many examples of such governments to exhibit, but none of a state without an established worship, without religion and without priests. Is it not better to organise the public worship, and discipline the priests, than to leave both entirely emancipated from the control of the state ? At present the clergy openly preach against the Republic, because they experience no benefit from it. Should we transport them ? Unquestionably not ! For what alone constitutes their authority in the wreck of their fortunes is the fidelity with which they adhere to the church of their fathers ; and that will be increased rather than diminished by all the sufferings they undergo. You may send into exile the English or the Austrians, for they are bound by no ties to our country ; but the French, who have families here, and are guilty of no offence but an adherence to their religious opinions, must be treated differently. You cannot extinguish their opinions ; you must, therefore, attach them to the Republic. If the Protestant faith is proclaimed, one half of the country will adopt that creed, and the other half will remain Catholic ; we shall have the

Huguenot wars over again, and interminable divisions. We have nothing to take from the clergy, and as little to ask from them. The affair is entirely a political matter ; and the line I have adopted appears the safest that could have been chosen.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Thib. 153,  
157.

Notwithstanding these decided opinions of the First Consul, the negotiations with the court of Rome were attended with considerable difficulty, and proved very tedious. At length, however, they were brought to a conclusion ; and despite the opposition of a portion of the council of the legislature, the concordat with the Pope passed into a law, and the Christian religion was re-established through the French territory.\* By this memorable law the Catholic religion was declared that of the French people. Ten archbishops and fifty bishops were established, the former with a salary of fifteen thousand francs (£600) a-year each, the latter with one of ten thousand, or £400. It was provided that there should be at least a parish priest in every district of a *juge de paix*, the lowest grade of legal jurisdiction, with as many additional ministers as might be deemed necessary ; the bishops and archbishops were to be appointed by the First Consul ; the bishops nominated the parish priests and inferior clergy, subject to the approbation of the same authority. The salary of the priests in the larger parishes was fixed at fifteen hundred francs, or £60 a-year ; in the smaller, twelve hundred, or £48. The departmental councils were charged with the procuring of houses, or lodgings and gardens, for the bishops,

34.  
Concordat,  
July 15,  
1801. Pass-  
ed into a  
law, April  
8, 1802.

The numbers were :—

	AYES.	NOES
Tribunate, . . . .	78	7
Legislative body, . . .	228	21

306

28

whereas the Legion of Honour was only carried by a majority of 236 to 158 : a striking proof how much more strenuous the opposition was to any approach towards the re-establishment of a nobility, than even of the Christian religion, which was held forth as so much the object of obloquy.—THIBAUDEAU, 210.

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<sup>1</sup> See the Concordat and Articles Organiques, in Nap. Mélanges, i. 297, et seq. and Goldsmidt's Recueil, iii.

priests, and curates. The churches which had survived the Revolution were placed at the disposal of the bishops; and provision was made for the repair, at the expense of the department, of such as were ruinous. Such was the establishment which in France emerged from the chaos of the Revolution, and such the provision for the ministers of religion made by the nation which, in the outset of the convulsions, had confiscated the vast possessions of the church, on the solemn assurance contained in the decree of the Constituent Assembly, that it "committed the due and honourable maintenance of religion and its ministers to the honour of the French people."<sup>1</sup>\*

35.  
General dissatisfaction which it occasioned.

Although the opposition in the legislature was not nearly so formidable to the concordat as to the Legion of Honour, a much stronger feeling of discontent was excited by the change in the revolutionary party and the army. "Buonaparte," said they, "is striving in vain to destroy the remains of the Revolution: he is labouring to close every avenue against the anti-revolutionary party, when by his concordat he opens to the latter an ample gateway, and with his own hands digs the mine which is to blow his

Its provisions regarding the independence of the Gallican Church.

\* Some very important articles were included in the same treaty relative to the independence of the Gallican Church. It was provided, "1. That no bull, brief, rescript, decree, mandate, or provision, or other writing whatever, emanating from the court of Rome, even concerning individuals, should be received, published, printed, or put in execution, without the authority of government. 2. That no individual announcing himself as legate, vicar, or commissioner of the Holy See, should, without the same authority, exercise, on the French territory or elsewhere, any function relative to the affairs of the Gallican Church. 3. That the decrees of foreign convocations, not excepting even those of general councils, should not be published in France, without a previous examination by the government, to ascertain whether they were in harmony with the laws and institutions of the French Republic, or were in any way calculated to affect the public tranquillity. 4. That no national or metropolitan council, diocesan synod, or other deliberative assembly, should be held without the express authority of government. 5. That an appeal should lie to the council of state in every case of alleged abuse or misgovernment on the part of the superior ecclesiastical authorities; and that under this head should be included every infraction of the rules established in the councils of the Church, every attempt calculated to injure the liberties of the Gallican Church, every infringement on the liberty of public worship, or of the rights which the laws secured to its ministers." By these articles, the Church in France was practically rendered nearly as independent of the Papal authority as the Protestant establishment of Great Britain.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Nap. Mélanges, i. 301.

edifice into the air." In truth, such was the extraordinary and unprecedented extent to which irreligion had spread under the Republican government, that "two-thirds of the French people," according to the admission of their own historians, "were ignorant of the principles on which such a measure was founded, and regarded it as a strange and dangerous innovation." The opposition which it experienced was indeed almost inconceivable, and at once afforded the clearest evidence of the pernicious tendency of those measures of extermination which former governments had adopted against the possessions of the established church. It also demonstrated how rapidly the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, founded on the pretence of applying it to purposes of beneficence and public instruction, leads to the total destruction of every species of religious belief. Universally the opinion prevailed that the restoration of the altar was but a prelude to that of the throne, and that the concordat was to be regarded as a solemn pledge for the speedy re-establishment of the ancient regime, a manifesto against all the principles of the Revolution. These feelings were in an especial manner prevalent among the military and democratic parties. Moreau, Lannes, Oudinot, Victor, and many others, openly expressed their repugnance to the measure, and declined to join the ceremony which took place in Notre Dame on the occasion of its solemn proclamation. "Never," said the soldiers, "have the Republican arms been adorned by so many laurels as since they ceased to receive the benediction of the priests."<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon, however, remained firm, notwithstanding all the opposition which took place, and the loud discontents of the capital; the re-establishment of public worship was announced by a proclamation of the consuls, and on the following day a grand religious ceremony took place, in honour of the occasion, in Notre Dame. All the great bodies in the state, all the constituted authorities attended, and proceeded in extraordinary pomp

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
198, 199.  
Norv. ii.  
166, 167.  
Jom. xiv.  
404.

36.  
Ceremony  
on the occa-  
sion in No-  
tre Dame.  
April 11,  
1802.

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to the cathedral. On this occasion, for the first time, the servants of the First Consul were in livery; the foreign ambassadors were invited to appear with all their attendants arrayed in the same manner, and a similar recommendation was addressed to such of the public functionaries as had carriages of their own. But so few of them were possessed of that luxury, that the equipages made a very indifferent appearance. The military, however, were obliged to attend in great numbers, and the brilliancy of their uniforms more than compensated the want of civil decoration. Such, however, was the repugnance of many of the generals to the ceremony, that it required all the authority of the First Consul to make Lannes and Augereau remain in the carriage when they perceived they were going to hear mass. It proceeded, nevertheless, with great *eclat*, in the cathedral of Notre Dame, which only eight years before had been polluted by the orgies of the Goddess of Reason. "What thought you of the ceremony?" said Napoleon to General Delmas, who stood near him when it was concluded. "It was a fine piece of mummery," replied he. "Nothing was wanting but the million of men who have perished in order to destroy what you have now re-established." It was at first intended to have had the standards blessed by the archbishop; but the government was obliged to abandon the design, from being given to understand, that if this was done, the soldiers would trample them under their feet. So difficult is it to eradicate the passions which have been nursed up during the frenzy and convulsions of a revolution, and so obstinately do mankind, under the influence of prejudice, sometimes resist the establishment of those very institutions from which they are themselves destined to receive the most unalloyed advantages.<sup>1</sup> \*

hib. 163,  
164. Bour.  
iv. 279.  
Bign. ii.  
193.

\* Rapp, one of Napoleon's aides-de-camp, who was a Protestant, positively refused to attend the ceremony, even when requested to do so by the First Consul himself: "provided," said he, "you do not make these priests your aides-de-camp or your cooks, you may do with them what you please." The

Immediately after this great change, the observance of Sunday was to a certain degree resumed. It was provided in the concordat, that the government offices should be closed on Sunday, and this was immediately done. Shortly after, a decree of the consuls directed that all marriages should be proclaimed on that day, and the daily service of mass began in the Tuileries. Encouraged by so many symptoms of returning favour, the clergy made the utmost efforts to induce the First Consul to join publicly in the more solemn duties which the church prescribed; but to this he never could be brought to consent. "We are very well as we are," said he; "do not ask me to go further: you will never obtain what you wish: I will not become a hypocrite: be content with what you have already gained." Mass, however, was regularly performed at the Tuileries in the morning. The First Consul went to it on Sunday, and remained during the service, which seldom exceeded ten minutes, in an adjoining apartment, with the door open, looking over papers, or engaged in his usual occupations. He had considerable difficulty in preserving the balance so imperiously required in the head of the state, during the first return to religious observances after the revolutionary fever; yet by great firmness he succeeded, during his whole reign, in maintaining a just equilibrium between the impassioned characters on both sides.<sup>1</sup>

The wisdom with which Napoleon restrained the imprudent zeal of the church party appears in the proceedings which took place on the death of Mademoiselle Chameroi, a celebrated opera-dancer. The priest of St Roch refused to receive the body into his church, or celebrate over it the solemnities of interment; and this gave rise to a vehement dispute between the *artistes* who accompanied

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37.

Constrained  
religious ob-  
servances at  
Paris.<sup>1</sup> Bour. iv.  
281, 282.  
Thib. 166.

38.

Prudence of  
Napoleon in  
restraining  
the high  
church  
party.

well-known devotion of Rapp to his general procured him impunity for such speeches as these, which he very frequently made; but Delmas was not so fortunate. The First Consul was extremely irritated at his reply, which made a great noise at the time, and he was soon after sent into exile in consequence.— See THIBAUDEAU, 164.



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the body, and the clergy. It came to be discussed in the council of state. "It amounts to nothing," said the Senator Monge, "but a dispute of one set of comedians with another."—"What!" said the First Consul, with a severe air. "Yes, Citizen Consul," replied Monge, "we may say that when the grand crosses do not hear us." But Napoleon viewed the matter in a very different light; and on the following day an article appeared in the *Moniteur*, which bore internal marks of his composition. "The curate of St Roch, in a moment of hallucination, has refused to pray for Mademoiselle Chameroi, or to admit her body into the church. One of his colleagues, a man of sense, received the procession into the church of the Filles Saint Thomas, where the service was performed with all the usual solemnities. The Archbishop of Paris has suspended the curate of St Roch for three months, to give him time to recollect that Jesus Christ commanded us to pray even for our enemies; and that, being recalled by meditation to a proper sense of his duties, he may learn that all these superstitious observances, the offspring of an age of credulity, or of crazed imaginations, tend only to the discredit of true religion, and have been proscribed by the recent concordat of the Gallican Church."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 166,  
169.

39.  
His admir-  
able procla-  
mation on  
the subject  
of the con-  
cordat to the  
people of  
France.  
April 14,  
1802.

The conclusion of the concordat was announced in these eloquent words in a proclamation issued by the First Consul: "An insane policy has sought during the Revolution to smother religious dissensions under the ruins of the altar, under the ashes of religion itself. At its voice all those pious solemnities ceased in which the citizens called each other by the endearing name of brothers, and acknowledged their common equality in the sight of heaven. The dying, left alone in his agonies, no longer heard that consoling voice which calls the Christian to a better world. God himself seemed exiled from the face of nature. Ministers of the religion of peace, let a complete oblivion veil your dissensions, your misfortunes, your faults: let the religion which unites you bind you by indissoluble

bonds to the interests of your country: let the young learn from your precepts that the God of peace is also the God of arms, and that he throws his shield over those who combat for the liberties of France. Citizens of the Protestant faith, the law has equally extended its solicitude to your interests; let the morality, so pure, so holy, so brotherly, which you profess, unite you all in love to your country, and respect for its laws; and above all, never permit disputes on doctrinal points to weaken that universal charity which religion at once inculcates and commands."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
95, 96.

But although the opposition which the restoration of religion met with in the corrupted population and revolutionary circles of Paris was very powerful, it was viewed in a very different light in the rural districts of France. The peasants beheld with undisguised delight the re-establishment of the priests, from whose labours and beneficence they had gained so much in former times; and the sound of the village bells, again calling the faithful to the house of God, was hailed by millions, as the dove with the olive branch, which first announced peace to the "green undeluged earth." The restoration of Sunday, as a day of periodical rest, was felt as an unspeakable relief by the labouring population, who had never been able to establish the exemption from work on the tenth day, which the Convention had prescribed, and were borne down by years of continued and unbroken toil. But the pernicious effect of the total cessation of all religious instruction and observances for nine years could not so easily be eradicated. A generation had been educated, who were ignorant of the very elements of the Christian faith; the frenzy of the Revolution had snapped asunder a chain which had descended unbroken from the Apostolic ages. The consequences of this chasm have been to the last degree pernicious to the existing generation, and are, it is much to be feared, now irreparable. It is to this cause that we are to ascribe the spirit of irreligion which has since been

40.  
Great joy at  
the change  
in the rural  
depart-  
ments.

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so peculiarly the characteristic of the higher and urban classes of French society, and which has worked out its natural consequences throughout all the subsequent periods of the empire and the Restoration. A nation which, in its influential classes at least, has lost all respect for religion, is incapable of freedom, and can be governed only by force. "*Naturâ, tamen,*" says Tacitus, "*infirmittatis humanæ, tardiora sunt remedia quam mala; et ut corpora lente augescunt, cito extinguuntur, sic ingenia studiisque opprimeris facilius quam revocaveris.*"\*

41.  
General  
satisfaction  
which the  
measure  
excited in  
foreign  
countries.

To foreign nations, however, who could not foresee the deplorable internal effects of this long interruption in religious instruction, the spectacle of France again voluntarily returning to the Christian faith was in the highest degree acceptable. Contrasting it with the monstrous profanations and wild extravagances of the irreligious fanaticism which had prevailed during the Revolution, they deemed it the harbinger of tranquillity to its distracted people, and peace to Europe. It contributed more than any other circumstance to weaken the horror with which the revolutionary government had so long been regarded, and opened the way to the establishment of more kindly relations, not only with the governments, but with the people of foreign states. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia publicly expressed their satisfaction at the auspicious event; forgetting, in their joy at the restoration of so important a member to the Christian family, the jealousy with which a change so likely to consolidate the power of the First Consul might possibly have been regarded. The Emperor of Austria styled it, with great felicity of expression, "a service truly rendered to all Europe." And the thoughtful and religious everywhere justly considered the voluntary return of a great nation to the creed of its fathers,<sup>1</sup> from the experienced impossi-

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
200, 201.

\* "It is the nature of human infirmity to render remedies more tardy than evils; and as bodies slowly enlarge, but are quickly destroyed, thus it is more easy to oppress and destroy inclinations and dispositions than to restore them."—TACITUS.

bility of living without its precepts, as the most signal triumph to the Christian faith which had occurred since it ascended the imperial throne under the banners of Constantine.

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It was as the first step in a great political improvement, and as closing the door against the worst principles of the Revolution, that Napoleon, in spite of so much opposition from his own subjects, undertook and carried through the concordat with Rome. Many persons urged him to complete the system; to separate the church of France from the Pope, and at once declare himself its head. They did not know, however, the real state of the country, and still less the character of the First Consul. So far from thinking that he could dispense with the court of Rome in settling this matter, he openly declared—"That if the Pope had not existed, it would have been well to have created him for that occasion, as the Roman consuls created a dictator in difficult circumstances." The concordat indeed recognised a foreign authority in religious matters, which might possibly disturb the Republic on some future occasion; but it did not create it, and, on the contrary, brought it under restraints more favourable than could possibly have been expected, to the interests of the reigning power in France. By connecting the church with the state, Napoleon hoped to withdraw it from foreign or English influence; while, by the conquest of Italy, he expected to make the Pope the ready instrument of his will. He has himself told us that he never repented of this great step:—"The concordat of 1801," says he, "was necessary to religion, to the Republic, to the government: the churches were closed, the priests persecuted, part of the bishops were in exile, and in the pay of England, part merely apostolic vicars, without any bond to unite them to the state. It put an end to these divisions, and made the Catholic apostolic church arise from its ruins. Napoleon restored the altars, caused the disorders to cease, directed the faithful to pray for the Republic, dissipated the scruples of the purchasers of

42.  
Subsequent  
opinions of  
Napoleon on  
the subject.

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 115.  
*Mélanges*.

43.

Napoleon's  
views for  
the restora-  
tion of the  
property of  
the emi-  
grants.Oct. 19,  
1800.

national domains, and broke the last thread by which the exiled dynasty communicated with the country, by dismissing the bishops who resisted the reconciliation with the court of Rome, and holding them out as rebels to the holy see, who preferred their temporal interests to the eternal concerns of religion.”<sup>1</sup> \*

Connected with the revival of religion was a great and generous design of the First Consul, which it would have been well for him if he could have carried completely into effect—viz. the restoration of all the unalienated national property to the original proprietors. His first project was to make the restitution to that extent complete, with the single exception of the buildings devoted to public establishments; and even to restore the two-thirds which had been cut off from the public creditors by the barbarous decree of 1797. He never contemplated, however, the restoration of the alienated landed property, being well aware of the inextricable difficulties in which that question was involved. But when the subject was brought forward in the council of state, he found the opposition so great that he was compelled to modify the project so much as amounted almost to its total abandonment. The severity of the laws against the emigrants had been gradually relaxed by successive edicts. An important change was first made by the decree of 28th of Vendémiaire, (19th October, 1800,) which divided the emigrants into two classes, from the first and most numerous of which the prohibition was removed.† They returned, in consequence, in crowds; and the gates were opened still more widely by the lenient policy of the government, which directed

\* Mr Fox, after the peace of Amiens, ventured to blame Napoleon, in conversation, for not having permitted the marriage of priests in his dominions. “I then had,” replied he, “and still have, need to pacify. It is with water, and not oil, that you must extinguish theological volcanoes. I would have had less difficulty in establishing the Confession of Augsburg in my empire.”—*NAPOLEON, Mélanges*, i. 121.

† When this decree was under discussion in the council of state, Napoleon observed:—“There are above a hundred thousand names on these unhappy lists; it is enough to turn one’s head. In the general calamity, the most

the minister of police to grant passports of admission to almost all who applied for them, without regard to the formal distinctions established by the decree of the First Consul. In granting these indulgences, Napoleon was influenced by more than a feeling of pity for the exiled families; he already looked forward to them as the firmest support of his throne. But it was not without difficulty that these concessions were made to the aristocratic party; the executive even was divided, and the Second Consul said to him, at the council of state:—"The existence of the government will be always precarious when it has not around itself several hundred revolutionary families, uniting in themselves the principal fortunes and offices of the state, to counterbalance the influence of the emigrant noblesse."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Thib. 96.  
103. Bour.  
iv. 333, 334.

On the 29th April 1802, a general amnesty was published by a senatus-consultum, which reduced the exiled persons to about a thousand, and the melancholy list was, by the indulgence of the police, soon after reduced to a few hundreds. Above a hundred thousand emigrants, in consequence, returned to their native country, happy again to tread the soil and breathe the air of France, though deprived for the most part of all their possessions, and many of them in a deplorable state of destitution. The senatus-consultum restored to every emigrant who was permitted to return, such part of his former property as had not been alienated by the state; but as it was soon found that they began in consequence to cut down the forests to a great extent, in order to relieve their necessities, it became necessary to put a restriction

44.  
Senatus-  
consultum  
proclaiming  
amnesty.  
April 29,  
1802.

elevated and dangerous characters can alone extricate themselves; they possess the means of purchasing testimony in their favour. Thus the practical result is, that a duke is struck off the list, while a poor labourer is kept on it. We must extricate the matter by classing the emigrants according to certain distinctions, which may admit equally persons of all descriptions. The lists must be reduced by three-fourths of its number to the names of such as are known to be hostile to the government. Having effected such a diminution, we shall be the better enabled to distinguish the really dangerous characters; they will no longer escape notice in the troubled flood of misfortune."—THIBAUDEAU, 95.

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Aug. 4,  
1802.

Sept. 5,  
1802.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 98,  
-105.

45.  
Inadequacy  
of these mea-  
sures to heal  
the evils of  
revolution-  
ary confisca-  
tion.

upon this liberality, and a subsequent decree prohibited the removal of the sequestration on such of the woods belonging to emigrants, as amounted to three hundred arpents and upwards.\* By a subsequent decree of the legislature, it was provided, through the urgent representations of the First Consul, that all successions to which the Republic had acquired right as coming in place of the emigrants prior to the 1st September 1802, and which were unalienated, should be restored to the persons having right to them; that all claims of the Republic on the emigrants prior to the amnesty should be extinguished; and that the goods of emigrants which had devolved to the Republic, and were unalienated, should be declared liable to the claims of their creditors.<sup>1</sup>

These measures, however humanely and wisely designed by Napoleon, proved almost totally inadequate to remedy the dreadful evils produced by the barbarous confiscation of property during the Revolution. He admits this himself. "My first design," says he, "was to have thrown the whole unalienated property of the emigrants into a mass, or syndicat, and divided it according to a certain proportional scale among the restored families. I met with so much resistance, however, that I was induced to abandon that design; but I soon found that, when I came to restore individually to each what belonged to him, I made some too rich and many too insolent. Those who had received the greatest fortunes proved the most ungrateful. It was a sense of this that induced me to pass the decree, which suspended the

\* On this occasion the First Consul said in the council of state:—"The emigrants who have been struck off the lists are cutting their woods, partly from necessity, partly to transport their money to foreign states. We cannot allow the greatest enemies of the Republic, the defenders of old prejudices, to recover their fortunes, and despoil France. I am quite willing to receive them; but the nation is interested in the preservation of the forests. The navy requires them; their destruction is contrary to every principle of good government. We must not, however, keep the woods without giving an indemnity to their proprietors; but we will pay them gradually, and as we acquire funds; and the delay of payment will prove a powerful means of rendering the claimants obedient to the government."—THIBAUDEAU, 98.

operation of the restitution contained in the act of amnesty as to all woods above a certain value. This was a deviation undoubtedly from the letter of the law ; but circumstances imperiously required it : our error consisted in not having foreseen it before the original law was framed. This reaction, however, on my part, destroyed all the good effect of the recall of the emigrants, and alienated from me all the great families. I would have avoided all these evils if I had followed out my original design of a syndicat : instead of one discontented great family, I would have made a hundred grateful provincial nobles, who, being all dependent on my government for their subsistence, could have been relied on to the last. It is evident that the emigrants had lost their all ; that they had embarked their property on board the same vessel, and what was rescued from the waves should have been proportionally divided. It was a fault on my part not to have done so, which is the more unpardonable that I had entertained the idea. But I was alone, surrounded by thorns : every one was against me, time pressed, and still more important affairs imperiously required my attention.”<sup>1</sup>\*

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<sup>1</sup> Las Cas. ii.  
221, 222.

But in truth, even if the projects of Napoleon could have been carried into complete effect, they would have remedied but a small part of the evils consequent on the frightful confiscation of private property which took place during the Revolution. From a report made by M. Ramel on the finances of the Republic, it appears that, before the year 1801, national domains had been sold to the enormous amount of 2,555,000,000 francs, or above

46.  
Immense  
extent of  
this evil,  
and its irre-  
mediable  
effects.

\* Considerable alarm was excited among the holders of national domains by these proceedings in favour of the emigrants. To allay them, the following article appeared in the *Moniteur* :—"The first duty of the French people, the first principle of the Republic, ever must be, to preserve untouched, and without any sort of distinction, the purchasers of national domains. In truth, to have trusted the fortunes of the Republic, when it was assailed by the united forces of Europe, to have united their private fortunes to those of the state in such a period of anxious alarm, must ever constitute a claim on the gratitude of the state and the people."—THIBAUDEAU, 176.



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<sup>1</sup> Compte  
Rendu, par  
Ramel.  
Stat. de la  
France, 545.

£100,000,000 sterling;\* and that there remained to sell property to the amount of 700,000,000 francs, or £28,000,000 sterling.<sup>1</sup> When it is recollected that, during the greater part of this period, the national domains, from the insecure tenure by which they were held, and the general confusion, were sold for a few years' purchase, it may be conceived what a prodigious mass of landed property must have been torn from the rightful proprietors in this way, and how fatal was the wound thus inflicted on the social system of France. Mr Burke declared at the outset of the Revolution, that without complete restitution or indemnification to all the dispossessed proprietors, it would be impossible to construct a stable constitutional monarchy in France;<sup>2</sup> and the result has now completely established the justice of his opinion. The want of a landed aristocracy to coerce the people on the one hand, and restrain the executive on the other, has ever since been felt as the irreparable want in the monarchy: its absence was bitterly lamented by Napoleon.

<sup>2</sup> Burke, v.  
289, et seq.

47.  
Napoleon's  
important  
observations  
on this sub-  
ject.

"I am now convinced," said he, "that I was in the wrong in my arrangements with the faubourg St Germain. I did too much and too little; enough to excite jealousy in the opposite party, and not enough to attach to my interest the restored noblesse. There were but two lines to take; that of extirpation or fusion. The first could not for a moment be entertained; the second was by no means easy, but I do not think it was beyond my strength. I was fully aware of its importance. It

\* The periods during which this prodigious confiscation of private property took place were as follows:—

From 17th May 1790, to 18th Jan. 1795,	the sales of national domains, chiefly church property, produced,		
	1,500,000,000 francs, or	£60,000,000	
From Jan. 18, 1795, to Sept. 20, 1795,	511,438,000	...	24,500,000
From Sept. 20, 1795, to Nov. 25, 1797,	316,464,000	...	12,750,000
From Nov. 25, 1797, to June 30, 1801,	127,231,000	...	5,300,000
	2,555,133,000	...	£102,550,000

—See *Compte Rendu de Ramel, Stat. de la France*, 545.

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was "incumbent on us to complete the fusion—to cement" the union at all hazards: with it we should have been invincible. The want of it has ruined us, and will *for long prolong the misfortunes and agony of unhappy France*. An aristocracy is the true support of the throne; its moderator, its lever, its fulcrum: the state without it is a vessel without a rudder—a balloon in the air. But the whole advantage of an aristocracy—its magic—consists in its antiquity; that was the precise thing, and the only thing, which I could not create: I did not possess the intermediate elements. A reasonable democracy will not seek more than equal capacity in all to rise to the highest dignities; the true course would have been to have employed the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and spirit of democracy. Above all, it was desirable to have assembled together the ancient families, the names celebrated in our history; that was the only way to have conferred an air of grandeur on our modern institutions."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Las Cas.  
iii. 23.

How exactly have all men of a certain elevation of thought concurred, in all ages and countries, in the same opinions on this subject! "With the government of the multitude, and the destruction of the aristocracy," says Polybius, "commences every species of violence: the people run together in tumultuous assemblies, and are hurried into every excess—assassinations, banishments, and divisions of lands; till, being reduced at last to a state of savage anarchy, they once more find themselves under a master and a monarch, and submit to arbitrary sway."<sup>2</sup> All the attempts of subsequent governments to construct a constitutional throne, or establish public freedom on a durable basis, have failed from the absence of this element. Neither Napoleon nor the Bourbons were ever strong enough to attempt the restitution of the confiscated estates at the expense of the six millions of landed proprietors among whom they were now divided. "Melancholy," says Sir James Mackintosh, "as this conclusion is, it

48.  
Ruinous effects of this violence.<sup>2</sup> Polyb. vi.  
c. i.

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seems too probable that the present state of property and prejudice among the larger part of the people of France, rather disposes towards a despotism, deriving its sole title from the Revolution, and interested in maintaining the system of society which it has established, and armed with that tyrannical power which may be necessary for its maintenance. Having no body of great proprietors to contend with, the monarch is delivered from all regular and constant restraint, and from every apprehension but that of an inconstant and often servile populace." The conclusion to be drawn from this, however, is not that Mr Burke's and Napoleon's opinion was erroneous, or that the fabric of liberty can be erected on the basis of robbery and spoliation; but that the national sins of France had been so great that reparation or restitution became impossible, and she has received the doom of perpetual servitude in consequence.

49.  
Measures  
to promote  
public in-  
struction.

When so many great ideas were passing through the mind of the First Consul, the important subject of public instruction, and the progress of science, could not long remain unnoticed. Insatiable in his desire for every species of glory, he aspired, like Charlemagne, not only to extend the frontiers and enhance the renown of the Republic, but to construct a monument to science, which should perpetuate his fame to the latest generation. When he ascended the consular throne, the state of knowledge and public instruction was in the highest degree deplorable. The old establishments of education, which before the Revolution had been for the most part in the hands of the clergy, and endowed from ecclesiastical foundations, had shared the fate of all the feudal institutions, and perished alike with their blessings and their evils. During the long interregnum of ten years which intervened under the revolutionary government, public instruction had been generally neglected, and religious education, by far its most important department, entirely ceased, except in a small and persecuted class of society. Not that the Con-

vention had overlooked this great subject of general instruction ; on the contrary, they were fully aware of its importance, and had done their utmost, during the distracted and stormy period when they held the reins of government, to fill up the chasm. They established several seminaries of medicine ; the Polytechnic school, which afterwards attained such deserved celebrity ; various schools of rural economy ; and a complete system for the instruction of the young men destined for the artillery, the engineers, the mines, and the naval service. Central schools were also introduced by their exertions in each department ; and to them is due the formation of the Institute, which so long kept alive the torch of science during the melancholy night of modern civilisation. But these efforts, how meritorious soever, were wholly inadequate to remedy the evils which the Revolution had produced. The distracted state of the country, after the subversion of all its institutions, caused no education to be of any value, but such as tended at once to military advancement. The general poverty of the people gave them no means of supporting their instructors, or sending their children to school from their own resources ; and the abolition of religious instruction rendered all that was, or could be, taught to the great body of the people, of little practical benefit. Under democratic rule, France, amidst incessant declamations in favour of general illumination, and pompous eulogies on the lights of the times, was rapidly sinking into a state of darkness, deeper than the gloom of the middle ages.<sup>1\*</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Thib. 122,  
125. Bign.  
ii. 211.

By directions from the First Consul, Chaptal presented to the council of state a project for a general system of public instruction. It was founded on singular principles. Distrust of the general education of the people, especially in rural districts, and an anxiety to train up a body

50.  
Napoleon's  
measures in  
favour of  
education.

\* These observations apply to France as a nation. The splendid discoveries and vast talent displayed in mathematics and the exact sciences by the Institute, throughout all the Revolution, can never be too highly eulogised, and will be fully enlarged upon in treating of the French literature during its progress.

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Decree,  
May 1, 1802.

of favoured young men in the interests of the government, were its leading features. Schools of primary instruction in the communes were everywhere permitted, but government contributed nothing to their support, and the teachers were left to such remuneration as they could obtain from their scholars. Secondary schools, the next in gradation, were placed on the same footing—with this difference, that they could not be established without the special authority of government. The favour of the executive was reserved for academies of the higher kind, which, under the name of lyceums and special schools, were established to the number of thirty in different parts of the Republic, and at which not only were the masters paid by the state, but the scholars, six thousand four hundred in number, were also maintained at the public expense. The teachers in these institutions were required to be married—a regulation intended to exclude the priests from any share in the higher branches of tuition; and no mention whatever was made of religion in any part of the decree. A striking proof of the continued influence of the infidel spirit which had grown up during the license and sins of the Revolution, and which rendered the whole establishment for education of little real service to the labouring classes of the community.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 134,  
135. Bign.  
ii. 1802.

51.  
Principles  
on which his  
system was  
founded, and  
rewards to  
sciences.

It was a fundamental rule of these establishments to admit no young man whose family was not attached to the principles of the Revolution. “We must never,” said Napoleon, “admit into these schools any young man whose parents have combated against the Republic. There could be no concord between officers of such principles and the soldiers of the army. I have never appointed even a sub-lieutenant, to my knowledge, unless he was either drawn from the ranks, or was the son of a man attached to the Revolution. The lion of the Revolution sleeps; but if these gentlemen were to waken him, they would soon be compelled to fly with their best speed.” How much attached soever to his favourite system of fusing

together the opposite parties in the Revolution, Napoleon had no notion of extending it to the armed force of the state. Following out the same plan of concentrating the rays of government favour upon the higher branches of knowledge, the sum of sixty thousand francs (£2400) was set aside to encourage the progress of French science in electricity and galvanism; a galvanic society was instituted: a senatus-consultum awarded the rights of French citizenship to every stranger who had resided a year in its territory, and had deserved well of the Republic by important discoveries in science or art; the Institute was divided into four classes, and each member received a pension of fifteen hundred francs, or £60 a-year; while a chamber of commerce was established in each considerable city of the Republic, and a council-general of commerce at Paris.<sup>1</sup>

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1802.

Oct. 4, 1802.

Oct. 18,  
1802.Dec. 24,  
1802.<sup>1</sup> Thib. 130,  
134, 141.  
Norv. ii.  
189, 190.

The rapid succession of objects, tending to monarchical ideas, encouraged the Royalists in the capital to make a trial of their influence over the public mind. Duval composed a play, entitled "Edward in Scotland," which Napoleon resolved to see performed before he determined whether or not it should be allowed to be represented. He listened attentively to the first act, and appeared even to be interested in the misfortunes of the exiled prince; but the warm and enthusiastic applauses which ensued as the piece advanced, convinced him that it could not be permitted without risk. It was interdicted, and the author counselled to improve his health by travelling; he retired to Russia, and remained there for a year.<sup>2</sup>

52.  
Trials of  
public feel-  
ing by the  
Royalists.

Oct. 9, 1802.

<sup>2</sup> Thib. 147,  
148. Bour.  
v. 257.

A general system was now set on foot for the maintenance of the requisite forces by sea and land, and the instruction of the young officers in the rudiments of the military art. A levy of one hundred and twenty thousand men was ordered; one-half of whom were destined to replace the discharged veterans, and the other to form an army of reserve.<sup>3</sup> At the same time a project was discussed for the formation of a fixed body of seamen,

53.  
Measures for  
recruiting  
the army and  
navy. De-  
bates on the  
subject in  
the council  
of state.<sup>3</sup> Thib. 107,  
109.

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divided into regiments, and allotted to each vessel in the navy. Truguet observed—"If you have only commerce you will never want sailors, and they will cost nothing; it is only when a nation has no trade that it is necessary to levy sailors; much longer time is required to form a sailor than a soldier; the latter may be trained to all his duties in six months." Napoleon replied, "There never was a greater mistake; nothing can be more dangerous than to propagate such opinions; if acted upon, they would speedily lead to the dissolution of our army. At Jemappe, there were fifty thousand French against nine thousand Austrians; during the first four years of the war all the hostile operations were conducted in the most ridiculous manner. It was neither the volunteers nor the recruits who saved the Republic; it was the one hundred and eighty thousand old troops of the monarchy, and the discharged veterans whom the Revolution impelled to the frontiers. Part of the recruits deserted; part died; a small proportion only remained, who, in process of time, formed good soldiers. Why have the Romans done such great things? Because six years' instruction was with them required to make a soldier. A legion composed of three thousand such men was worth thirty thousand ordinary troops. With fifteen thousand men such as the Guards, I would anywhere beat forty thousand. You will not soon find me engaging in war with an army of recruits. In this great project we must not be startled by expense. No inland boatman will ever voluntarily go to the sea-ports: we must make it a matter of necessity. The conscription for the marine should commence at ten or twelve years of age; the men should amount to twelve thousand, and serve all their lives. We are told there is no such naval conscription in England; but the example is not parallel. England has an immense extent of coast which furnishes her with abundance of seamen. We have a comparatively small coast, and but few seamen. Nature has been niggardly

to us in this particular; we must supply its defects by artificial means." In pursuance of these principles a decree appeared upon the 4th October, which laid the foundation of the conscription for the naval service of France.

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About the same time a project was brought before the council for the establishment of chambers of agriculture in the colonies. They were decreed; but the war, which soon afterwards broke out, prevented the plan being carried into execution. The principles, however, advanced by Napoleon in support of the proposal, are admirable for their wisdom and sagacity. "Doubtless," said he, "you must govern the colonies by force; but there can be no force without justice. Government must be informed as to the real situation of the colonies, and for this purpose, it must patiently hear the parties interested; for it is not sufficient, to acquire the character of justice, that the ruling power does what is right. It is also necessary that the most distant subjects of the empire should be convinced that this is the case, and this they will never be, unless they are sensible that they have been fully heard. Were the council of state composed of angels or gods, who could perceive at a glance everything that should be done, it would not be sufficient unless the colonists had the conviction that they had been fully and impartially heard. All power must be founded on opinion; it is in order to form it that an institution similar to that proposed is indispensable. At present there is no constitu-

54.  
Speech of  
Napoleon  
on govern-  
ment of the  
colonies.  
Nov. 9,  
1802.

\* The establishment of the *Ecole Militaire* at the same time underwent a discussion at the council of state. Napoleon observed—"This institution diminishes the severity of the conscription. It enables the young man to complete his education, which the conscription would otherwise prevent, at the same time that he is learning the rudiments of the military art. I know of no other school equally well constituted; it will raise the organisation of our army to the very highest point. The army under the Republic was for long supported by the youths who in 1793 issued from this establishment. All the commanders of corps feel the want of skilled young men; I can appoint them, but if they are ignorant of the duties of the private soldier, it is felt as an injustice by the common men. The *Ecole Militaire* furnishes scholars instructed in both departments, and thence its great excellence."

Discussion  
on the *Eco-  
Militaire*.



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tional channel of communication between France and the colonies; the most absurd reports are in circulation there as to the intentions of the central government, and it is as little informed as to the real wants and necessities of its distant possessions. If government had, on the other hand, a colonial representation to refer to, it would become acquainted with the truth, it would proclaim it, and transmit it in despatches to its colonial subjects.

\* 55.  
Their right  
to represen-  
tation in the  
parent state.

“ Commerce and the colonies have opposite interests ; the interest of the former is that of purchasers and consumers, of the latter that of raisers and producers. No sooner is it proposed to impose duties on colonial produce, than I am besieged with memorials from all the chambers of commerce in France, but no one advances anything in behalf of the colonies ; the law, whatever it is, arrives there in unmitigated rigour, without the principles which led to it being explained, or their receiving any assurance that their interests have been balanced with those of the other side. But the colonists are Frenchmen, and our brothers ; they bear a part of the public burdens, and the least that can be done for them in return is to give them such a shadow of a representation. Many persons here see only in the colonies the partisans of the English ; that is held out merely as a pretext for subjecting them to every species of insult. Had I been at Martinique, I should have espoused the cause of the English ; for the first of social duties is the preservation of life. Had any of your philanthropic liberals come out to Egypt, to proclaim liberty to the blacks or the Arabs, I would have hung him from the mast-head. In the West Indies similar enthusiasts have delivered over the whites to the ferocity of the blacks, and yet they complain of the victims of such madness being discontented. How is it possible to give liberty to the Africans when they are destitute of any species of civilisation, and are ignorant even of what a colony or a mother country is ? Do you suppose that, had the majority of the Constituent Assembly been aware

what they were doing, they would have given liberty to the blacks? Certainly not; but few persons at that time were sufficiently far-sighted to foresee the result, and feelings of humanity are ever powerful with excited imaginations. But now, after the experience we have had, the maintenance of the same principles is inconsistent with good faith; it can be the result only of overweening self-confidence or hypocrisy."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Thib. 117,  
121.

Words of true political wisdom, which demonstrate how admirably qualified Napoleon was to have held, with just and even hands, the reins of power in a vast and varied empire, and which have since become of still greater value from the contrast they afford to the measures subsequently pursued by another state, in regard to far greater colonial dependencies, and with the lamentable result of former rashness even more forcibly brought before its eyes. It is observed by Mr Hume, that the remote provinces and colonial dependencies of a despotic empire are always better administered than those of a popular government, and that the reason is—that an uncontrolled monarch, being equally elevated above all his subjects, and not more dependent on one class than another, views them all, comparatively speaking, with equal eyes; whereas a free state is ruled by one body of citizens who have obtained the mastery of another, and govern exclusively the more distant settlements of the empire, and are consequently actuated by personal jealousy or patrimonial interests, in their endeavours to prevent them from obtaining the advantage of uniform and equal legislation. The admirable wisdom of the principles of colonial government thus developed by Napoleon, compared with the unjust and partial principles of administration which have of late years been adopted by Great Britain towards her West Indian settlements and East Indian empire, afford a striking illustration of the justice of this remark. Britain, if she does not alter her system of government, will ultimately lose her splendid colonial

56.  
Superior  
justice of  
colonial ad-  
ministration  
in monarchi-  
cal than in  
republican  
states.

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1802.

empire, from the same cause which proved fatal to that of Athens, Carthage, and Venice—viz., the selfish system of legislation, exclusively adapted to the interest, or directed by the prejudices, of the holders of political power in the centre of the state, and the general neglect of the wishes of its remote and unrepresented colonial dependencies.

57.  
Finances  
of France.  
General va-  
luation, or  
cadastre.

France, both under the monarchy and during the course of the Revolution, like every other country which has fallen under despotic power, had become burdened with an enormous and oppressive land-tax. The clear produce of the direct contributions in the year 1802 was two hundred and seventy-three millions six hundred thousand francs, or £11,000,000 sterling, which, on the net amount of agricultural labour in the Republic, was above twenty per cent.\* This immense burden was levied according to a scale, or “cadastre,” at which it was estimated the land was worth; and as the smiles of government favour were bestowed on the official persons employed in making the surveys, in a great degree in proportion to the amount to which they contrived to bring up the revenue of their districts, the oppression exercised in many parts of the country was extreme, and the less likely to be remedied that it fell on a numerous body of detached small proprietors, incapable of any

Statistical  
details.

MM. Lavoisier and Peuchet estimate the total agricultural produce in France in 1805 at . . . . . 2,750,000,000 francs, or £110,000,000  
 Net produce, deducting cost of production, 1,200,000,000 „ 48,000,000  
 Direct taxes falling on land, . . . . . 250,000,000 „ 10,000,000  
 Indirect taxes, . . . . . 350,000,000 „ 14,000,000  
 Drawn by the owners of the soil, 600,000,000 „ 24,000,000

So that of the net produce of the soil one-half was absorbed in taxation, and no less than 20 per cent taken from the proprietors in a *direct form*—a signal proof how little the French peasantry had gained, in alleviation of burdens at least, by the result of the Revolution.—See PEUCHET, *Stat. de la France*, 286, 287.

The committee of the Constituent Assembly, who reported in 1793 on this subject, estimated the net territorial revenue of France at 1500 millions, or £60,000,000. M. Ganilh, after various laborious calculations, estimates it in 1816 at 1,300,000,000, or £52,000,000; while the Duke de Gaeta, in 1817, fixed it at 1,323,000,000, or £53,000,000.—See DUC DE GAETA, ii. 299.

effective or simultaneous effort to obtain redress. The "cadastre," or scale of valuation, had been of very old standing in France, as it regulated the *taille* and *vingtième*, which constituted so large a portion of the revenue of the monarchy.\* By a decree of the National Assembly of 16th September 1791, sanctioned by the King on the 23d September in the same year, the method prescribed for fixing the valuation was as follows:—"When the levy of the land-tax in the territory of any community shall commence, the surveyor charged with the operations shall make out a scheme in a mass, which shall exhibit the general result of the valuation, and its division in sections. He shall then make out detailed plans, which shall constitute the parcelled valuations of the community."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Duc de  
Gaeta, ii.  
261.

These directions were justly and impartially conceived; but the difficulty of forming just and equal valuations in a country so immensely subdivided, and of such vast extent as France, was extreme; and, during the license and tyranny of the Revolution, the most flagrant inequality prevailed in the land-tax paid in different parts of the country. We have the authority of Napoleon's finance minister in 1802 for the assertion, that in every district of France, "there were some proprietors who were paying the fourth, *the third, and even the half*, of their clear revenue, while others were only rated at a tenth, a twentieth, a fiftieth, or a hundredth."<sup>2</sup> The gross injustice of such a system naturally produced the most vehement complaints, when the restoration of a regular government afforded any prospect of obtaining redress. The consular government, during the whole of 1802, was besieged with memorials from all quarters, setting forth

58.  
Immense  
evils arising  
from its in-  
equality.

<sup>2</sup> Duc de  
Gaeta, ii.  
261.

\* The Constituent Assembly in 1790 estimated the territorial revenue at 1,500,000,000 francs, or £60,000,000 annually, but took the cadastre or valuation at 1,200,000,000 francs, or £48,000,000, and fixed the land-tax at 240,000,000 francs, or £9,600,000, and, with the expenses of collection, 300,000,000 francs, or £12,000,000, being a fourth of the income of every landed proprietor.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Duc de  
Gaeta, ii.  
288. Peuchet,  
Stat. de  
France, 524.

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<sup>1</sup> Duc de  
Gaeta, ii.  
257.

the intolerable injustice which prevailed in the distribution of the land-tax, the utter inefficacy of all attempts which had been made in preceding years to obtain from the councils or prefects of the departments anything like equality in the valuation, and the complete disregard which both the Convention and the Directory had evinced towards the loud and well-founded complaints of the country.<sup>1</sup>

59.  
Napoleon's  
arguments  
on the neces-  
sity of a ca-  
dastre.

The matter at length became so pressing, that it was brought before the council of state. The magnitude of the evil did not escape the penetration of the First Consul. "Your system of land-tax," said he, in the council of state, "is the worst in Europe. The result of it is, that there is no such thing as property or civil liberty in the country; for what is freedom without security of property? There can be no security in a country where the valuation on which the tax proceeds can be changed at the will of the surveyors every year. A man who has three thousand francs of rent a-year (£120) cannot calculate upon having enough next year to exist; everything may be swept away by the direct tax. We see every day questions about fifty or a hundred francs gravely pleaded before the legal tribunals; and a mere surveyor can, by a simple stroke of the pen, surcharge you several thousand francs. Under such a system there cannot be said to be any property in the country. When I purchase a domain, I know neither what I have got, nor what I should do in regard to it. In Lombardy and Piedmont there is a fixed valuation; all know what they have to pay; no extraordinary contributions are levied but on extraordinary occasions, and by the judgment of a solemn tribunal. If the contribution is augmented, every one, by applying it to his valuation, knows at once what his burden amounts to. In such a country, therefore, property may truly be said to exist. Why is it that we have never had any public spirit in France? Simply because every proprietor is

obliged to pay his court to the tax-gatherers and surveyors of his district. If he incurs their displeasure, he is ruined. It is in vain to talk of appealing; the judgments of the courts of review are arbitrary. It is for the same reason that there is no nation so servilely submissive to the government as the French, because property depends entirely upon it. In Lombardy, on the other hand, a proprietor lives on his estate without feeling any disquietude as to who succeeds to the direction of affairs. Nothing has ever been done in France to give security to property. The man who shall devise an equal law on the subject of the cadastre will deserve a statue of gold." What an instructive testimony as to the amount of security which the Revolution had conferred upon property in France, and the degree of practical freedom which had been enjoyed, and of the public spirit developed, under its multifarious democratic administrations!<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i.  
221. Thib.  
179.

The formation of a valuation was decreed, proceeding on a different principle: this was, to adopt as the basis of the scale a valuation, laid, not on parcels of ground, but on masses of the same kind of cultivation. This system, however, although in appearance the most equitable, was found by experience to be attended with so many difficulties, that its execution did not proceed over above a fifth of the territory of the Republic, and it was at length abandoned from the universal complaints of its injustice. The discussion of the cadastre was again brought forward, and made the subject of anxious consideration in 1817, but the inequality of the valuation still continued, and is the subject of loud and well-founded complaints at this hour. In truth, such are the obstacles which individual interests oppose to an equal valuation, and such the difficulties with which the execution of such a task is attended, from the variation in the amount of the produce of the soil, and the prices which can be got for it at different times and seasons, that it is not going too far to pronounce it to be impossible to establish it univer-

60.  
His system  
to remedy  
the evils.

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<sup>1</sup> Gaeta, ii.  
253.

61.  
Indignation  
of Napoleon  
at the lan-  
guage used  
in the tribu-  
nate.

sally without great local injustice. Inequality, severity, and oppression are the invariable and inevitable attendants of direct taxation wherever established, and even under the very best system of local administration. The only taxes which are, comparatively speaking, equal, just, and unfelt, are indirect burdens, which, being laid on consumption, are voluntarily incurred, disguised under the price of the article, and accurately proportioned to the amount of expenditure of each individual.<sup>1</sup>

But in the midst of these great designs of Napoleon for the reconstruction of society in France, he experienced the most serious annoyance from the independent, and sometimes cutting language used by the popular orators in discussing the projects sent from the council of state to the tribunate. Though friendly to a free and unreserved discussion of every subject in the first of these bodies, which sat with closed doors, and in which the intellect of able men only was addressed, the First Consul was irritated to the last degree by the opposition which his measures experienced in the only part of the legislature which retained even a shadow of popular constitution, and appealed, though in a very subdued tone, to popular passion. Influenced by these feelings, he openly expressed his resolution to get quit of an institution which reminded the people of the dangerous powers which they had exercised during the anarchy of the Revolution. He loved unfettered arguments in presence only of men competent to judge of the subject, but could not endure the public harangues of the tribune, intended to catch the ears, or excite the passions of an ignorant populace.<sup>2\*</sup> On various occasions, during the course of 1802, his displeasure was strongly excited by the ebullitions of republican spirit or spleen which occasionally took place in the tribunate. An expression in the treaty with Russia roused the indig-

<sup>2</sup> Bour. v.  
85. Thib.  
198.

\* He often said to the leading orators of the tribunate,—"Instead of declaiming from the tribune, why do you not come to discuss the points under deliberation with me in my cabinet? We should have family discussions as in my council of state."—THIBAUDEAU, 198.

nation of the veteran democrats of the Revolution. It was provided that "the two contracting parties should not permit their respective *subjects* to entertain any correspondence with foreign powers." When the treaty came to be discussed in the tribunate, this expression gave rise to an angry discussion. Thibault exclaimed, "The French are citizens, and not subjects." Chenier observed, "Our armies have combated ten years that we should remain citizens, and we have now become subjects. Thus are accomplished the wishes of the two coalitions." Napoleon was highly displeased with these symptoms of a refractory spirit. "What," said he, "would these declaimers be at? It was absolutely necessary that my government should treat on a footing of equality with that of Russia. I would have become contemptible in the eyes of all foreign nations if I had yielded to these absurd pretensions on the part of the tribunate. These gentlemen annoy me to such a degree that I am strongly tempted to be done at once with them."<sup>1</sup>

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1802.

Another law was brought forward about the same time, which excited a still more vehement opposition on the part of the public orators, and confirmed the First Consul in his resolution to abolish the tribunate. It related to certain changes in the constitution of the judges intrusted with the arrest of individuals, and the municipal police. These powers were, by the existing law, invested in the hands of the *juges de paix*, who were judges of the lowest grade, and the only ones still appointed by the people; the proposed change took this branch of jurisdiction from these functionaries, and vested it in a small number of judges appointed for that special purpose by the government, who were to take cognisance of the crimes of robbery, housebreaking, and some others, without a jury. The importance of this change, which so nearly concerned the personal liberty of every individual, was at once seen; and the public indignation was, in an especial manner, roused by a clause which subjected every citizen to arrest by the

62.  
Important  
change in  
municipal  
government  
carried in  
spite of that  
body.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. i. 85,  
87. Thib.  
198, 207.



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1802.

Dec. 11,  
1802.

1 Thib. 204.

63.  
Debates on  
the tribu-  
nal  
in  
council of  
state.

simple authority of the minister of police, and took away all personal responsibility on the part of the members of administration, on account of any acts infringing on the liberty of the subject which they might have committed. The storm was so violent, and the complaints, on this point especially, so well founded, that government was obliged to withdraw the most obnoxious article; but the necessity of the case, and the universal knowledge which prevailed of the total insecurity to life and property, from the height to which outrage and violence still existed in the interior, prevailed over the opposition, and the law, with that exception, passed after a strenuous resistance. Napoleon's displeasure was so great that he could not conceal it, even in an audience to which the senate was admitted on this subject. Speaking of the tribunate, he said with the utmost energy, "There are assembled within its walls a dozen or fifteen metaphysicians; they are fit only to be thrown into the Seine. They are a kind of vermin, who have overrun my dress. But don't let them imagine I will suffer myself to be attacked like Louis XVI.; I will never allow matters to come to that,"<sup>1</sup>

His opinions on this subject were emphatically expressed, and the grounds of them powerfully urged in the council of state, when the project for the renewal of the constitution was brought forward. "We must make a change," said he; "the example of England must not mislead us; the men who compose its Opposition are neither emigrants who regret the feudal regime, nor democrats who seek to revive the Reign of Terror. They feel the natural weight of talent, and are chiefly desirous to be bought at a sufficient price by the crown. With us the case is very different; our Opposition is composed of the remnant of the privileged classes, and of the outrageous Jacobins. They by no means limit their ambition to accession to place or office; the one half would be satisfied with nothing but a return to the ancient regime, the other to the reign of democratic clubs.

No two things are more opposite than the effects of free discussion among a people long habituated to its excitement, and in a country where freedom has only commenced. Once admitted into the tribunate, the most honourable men aim only at success, without caring how violently they shake the fabric of society. What is government? Nothing, if deprived of the weight of opinion. How is it possible to counterbalance the influence of a tribunate always open for the most inflammatory speeches? When once the patrician classes are destroyed, the freedom of the tribune must of necessity be suppressed. The circumstances were widely different at Rome; yet, even there, the tribunes of the people did infinite mischief. The Constituent Assembly placed the king in a secondary position; they were right, for he was the representative of the feudal regime, and was supported by all the weight of the nobles and the clergy. At present the government is the representative of the people. These observations may appear foreign to the subject in hand, but in reality they are not so; they contain the principles on which, I am persuaded, government must now be conducted; and I willingly throw them out in order that they may be more largely disseminated by the intelligent circle which I see around me."

In conformity with these principles, the First Consul brought forward his plan, which was to divide the tribunate into five sections, corresponding to the divisions of the council of state; that the proposed laws should be *secretly* transmitted from the section of the council of state to the corresponding section of the tribunate; that they should be *secretly* discussed in the tribunate, and between the tribunate and the council of state by three orators appointed on both sides; and that no public discussion should take place except by three orators, mutually in like manner chosen, between the tribunate and the government pleaders before the legislature. It was strongly objected to this change, that it tended to destroy

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XXXV.

1803.

64.  
Napoleon's  
plan for modifying it.

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XXXV.

1802.

the publicity of proceedings in the only quarter where it still existed, and eradicated the last remnants of a free constitution. Napoleon replied: "I cannot see that. Even if it were so, a constitution must be moulded by circumstances, modified according to the results of experience, and ultimately constructed in such a way as not to impede the necessary action of government. My project secures a calm and rational discussion of the laws, and upholds the consideration of the tribunate. What does the tribunate mean? Nothing but the tribune—that is, the power of rational discussion. The government has need of such an addition to its means of information: but what is the use of a hundred men to discuss the laws introduced by thirty? They declaim, but do nothing of real utility: we must at length organise the constitution in such a manner as to allow the government to advance. No one seems yet sufficiently impressed with the necessity of giving unity to the executive; until that is effected, nothing can be done. A universal disquietude prevails; speculation, exertion of every kind, is arrested. In a great nation, the immense majority of mankind are ever incapable of forming a rational opinion on public affairs. Every one must contemplate, at some period or another, the death of the First Consul; in that case, without a cordial union of the constituted authorities, all would be lost." The opposition, however, against these great alterations was very powerful; and Napoleon, whose prudence in carrying through political changes was equal to his sagacity in conceiving them, contented himself, at the annual renewal of the constitution, with a decree of the senate, that thenceforward the duties of the tribunate and the legislative body should be exercised only by the citizens who were inscribed on the two lists, as the first elected to continue the exercise of the national functions.<sup>1</sup> The great change of the constitution involved in the mutilation of the tribunate, was reserved for the period when Napoleon was to be elected First

Dec. 21,  
1802.<sup>1</sup> Thib. 229,  
232.

Consul for life—an event which soon afterwards took place.

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XXXV.

Influenced not merely by ambition, but by a profound democratic view of the existing state of France, Napoleon had firmly resolved to convert the Republic into a monarchy, and not only seat himself on the throne, but render the dynasty hereditary in his family, or those whom he might designate as his successors. Nothing could be more apparent to an impartial spectator of the state of France, and the adjoining nations, than that it was utterly impossible that republican institutions could exist in a country so situated. Destitute of any of the elevated or ennobled classes, which alone in a great and powerful community can give stability to such institutions; exposed to all the sources of discord and corruption arising from a powerful military force, selfish and highly civilised manners, and the influence of a vast revenue; placed in the midst of the great military monarchies of Europe, who were necessarily hostile to such institutions, from the experience they had had of the evils with which they were attended to all the adjoining states,—France could not by possibility avoid falling under the government of a single individual. Napoleon had no alternative but to restore the Bourbons, or seat himself on the throne. During the whole of 1802, the efforts of government were incessant to extend monarchical ideas by means of the press, and the private influence of all persons in official situations. Lucien Buonaparte has been already noticed as one of the earliest and most zealous propagators of these new opinions, a year before; though, as they came forth at too early a period, and somewhat startled the public, he was rewarded for his services by an honourable exile as ambassador at Madrid. But in the succeeding season, the change of the public mind had become so evident that it was no longer necessary to veil the real designs of government; and the appointment of Napoleon to the consulship for life was

802.

65.

He resolves to make himself consul for life. His efforts to spread monarchical ideas.

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XXXV.

1802.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
231, 232.  
Thib. 236.

66.

Strong op-  
position of  
Josephine  
to these at-  
tempts.

accordingly zealously advocated by all persons in prominent situations. Rœderer supported it with all the weight of his acute metaphysics ; Talleyrand gained for it the suffrages of the whole diplomatic body. Arbitrary power advanced with rapid steps in the midst of general declamations in favour of order and stability. Whoever spoke of liberty or equality was forthwith set down as a Jacobin, or terrorist, and looked upon with suspicious eyes by all the servants of government. The partisans of revolution, finding themselves reduced to a miserable minority, retired into the obscurity of private life, or consoled themselves for the ruin of their republican chimeras, by the personal advantages which they derived from situations round the consular throne.<sup>1</sup>

It is remarkable that, while all around the First Consul beheld with undisguised satisfaction his approaching elevation to the throne, the individual in existence who, next to himself, was to gain most by the change, was devoured with anxiety on the subject. All the splendour of the throne could not dazzle the good sense of Josephine, or prevent her from anticipating, in the establishment of the Napoleon dynasty, evident risk to her husband, and certain downfall to herself. "The real enemies of Buona-parte," said she to Rœderer, who was advocating the change, "are those who put into his head ideas of hereditary succession, dynasty, divorce, and marriage." She employed all the personal influence which she possessed with the First Consul, and his most intimate counsellors, to divert him from these ideas, but in vain. "I do not approve the projects of Napoleon," said she ; "I have often told him so ; he hears me with attention, but I can plainly see that I make no impression : the flatterers who surround him soon obliterate all I have said. The new honours which he will acquire will augment the number of his enemies ; the generals will exclaim that they have not fought so long to substitute the family of the Buonapartes for that of the Bourbons. I no longer

regret the want of children ; I should tremble for their fate. I shall remain attached to the destiny of Buona-  
 parte, how dangerous soever it may be, as long as he continues to me the regard which he has hitherto manifested ; but the moment that he changes, I will retire from the Tuileries. I know well how much he is urged to separate from me.”<sup>1</sup>

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1802:

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
44, 47.  
Thib. 237,  
242.

The project for appointing Napoleon consul for life had failed a few months before, when the extension of that appointment for ten years took place. Napoleon affected at that period to decline such an elevation ; the two other consuls, acquainted with his real desires, insisted that it should be forced upon him ; and it was so carried in the council of state by a majority of ten to seven. Lanfrède, who brought up the report of the committee of the senate on the subject, and was not in the secret, proposed only a temporary extension ; Despinasse moved that it should be for life. But Tronchet, who was president, and whose intrepidity nothing could overcome, held firm for the first proposal, and it was carried by a majority of sixty to one, Lanjuinais alone voting in the minority. Tronchet was neither a republican nor a courtier ; he preferred a monarchy ; but notwithstanding his admiration for Napoleon, he feared his ambition. He said of Napoleon, in a company where several senators were assembled :—“ He is a young man ; he has begun like Cæsar, and will end like him : I hear him say too frequently, that he will mount on horseback and draw his sword.” What a glorious distinction for the same individual to have with equal courage pleaded the cause of Louis XVI. in the Temple, and restrained the career of Napoleon on the throne ; and how noble a contrast to the baseness of so many of the popular faction, who had shown as great vehemence in the persecution of a falling,  
 as they now displayed servility in the adulation of a rising monarch !<sup>2\*</sup>

67.  
The attempt  
at first fails  
in the  
senate.

<sup>2</sup> Thib. 245.  
Bour. v. 17,  
18.

\* So far did the spirit of servility proceed among the courtiers of the Tuil-

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XXXV.

1802.

68.

Means  
adopted to  
insure its  
success.

The design of making Napoleon consul for life having thus failed in the senate, probably from misapprehension of what he really desired, the method of attaining the object was changed. He began, as he usually did in such cases, to blame severely those who had been most prominent in urging forward the plan, and in an especial manner animadverted on Rœderer, whose efforts to procure his elevation had been peculiarly conspicuous. But in the midst of his seeming displeasure at the proposal which had been made, the most efficacious means were taken to secure its adoption. In reply to the address of the senate, which extended his power for ten years beyond the term originally assigned, he observed—"The suffrages of the people have invested me with the supreme authority; I should not deem myself sufficiently secured in the new proof which you have given me of your esteem, if it were not sanctioned by the same authority." Under cover of this regard for popular sovereignty, the partisans of Napoleon veiled a design of conferring on him hereditary power.

69.  
Reference of  
the question  
to the votes  
of the  
people.

It was proposed in the council of state, that the people should be consulted on the question, whether the consulship for *life* should be conferred upon him. Rœderer said,—“An extension of the consulship for ten years gives no stability to government. The interests of credit and of commerce loudly demand a stronger measure. The senate has limited its appointment to ten years, because it conceived it did not possess power to confer authority for a longer period; but we should submit to the people the question, whether the First Consul should

eries, that they seriously proposed to Napoleon to restore the ancient titles of honour, as being more in harmony than republican forms with the power with which he was now invested. But Napoleon had too much sense to disclose at once the whole of his designs. “The pear,” said he to Bourrienne, “is not yet ripe. All that will come in good time; but it is essentially requisite that I myself, in the first instance, assume a title, from which those which I bestow on others may naturally flow. The most difficult part is now over; no one can be deceived; everybody sees there is but a step between the consulship and the throne. Some precautions are still requisite; there are many fools in the tribunate; but let me alone, I will overcome them.”—BOURRIENNE, v. 17.

be nominated for life, and invested with the right to appoint his successor." So clearly was the design seen through, that the proposal was carried without a division, though some of the popular members abstained from voting. In conformity with this resolution of the council of state, and without any authority from the other branches of the legislature, the question was forthwith submitted to the people,—“ Shall Napoleon Buonaparte be consul for life ? ” Registers were directed to be opened in every commune, to receive the votes of the citizens. Napoleon declined the addition of the question, whether he should be invested with the right to nominate his successor, deeming the inconsistency too glaring between a refusal to accept a prorogation for ten years from the senate, if not confirmed by the people, and the demand of a right to nominate a successor to the throne of France.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.

1802.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 250,  
253, 265.  
Bour. v. 17.  
Bign. ii. 239.

The result of this appeal was announced by the senatus-consultum of 2d August. It appeared that 3,557,885 citizens had voted, of whom 3,368,259 were for the affirmative. This is one of the most remarkable events recorded in the history of the Revolution, and singularly descriptive of that longing after repose, that invincible desire for tranquillity, which uniformly succeeds to revolutionary convulsions,\* and so generally renders them the prelude to despotic power. The rapid rise of the public funds demonstrated that this feeling was general among the holders of property in France. They advanced with every addition made to the authority of the successful general ; as low as eight before the 18th Brumaire, they rose at once to sixteen when he seized the helm, and after the consulship for life was proclaimed, reached fifty-two. Contrast this with the rise of the public securities thirty per cent,

70.  
Result of the  
appeal, and  
great satis-  
faction  
which this  
gave,  
Aug. 2,  
1802.

\* The majority of 4,000,000 votes, by which Napoleon's nephew, Prince Louis Napoleon, was elected president of the republic, after the disastrous revolution of 1848, is another and still more striking confirmation of the same observation.



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1802.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
55. Novv. ii.  
129. Thib.  
ii. 81.

when Necker was restored to the ministry on the shoulders of the people, to carry through the convocation of the States-General, and observe the difference between the anticipation and the experience of a revolution.<sup>1</sup>

71.  
Letter of  
to vote for it.

In the midst of the general unanimity, M. Lafayette had the courage to vote against the appointment of the First Consul for life. He added to his vote these words: "I cannot vote for such a magistracy, until public freedom is sufficiently guaranteed; when that is done, I give my voice to Napoleon Buonaparte." In a letter, addressed to the First Consul, he fully expressed the grounds of his jealousy:—"When a man," said he, "penetrated with the gratitude which he owes you, and too much enamoured of glory not to admire that which encircles your name, has given only a conditional vote, it is the less suspected that no one will rejoice more than himself to see you the first magistrate for life, in a free republic. It is impossible that you, General, the first in that class of men who occasionally arise at the interval of ages, should wish that such a revolution, made illustrious by so many victories, stained by so many crimes, should terminate only in the establishment of arbitrary power. Patriotic and personal motives would lead me to desire for you that compliment to your glory which the consulship for life would afford; but the principles, the engagements, the actions of my life forbid me to wish for any such appointment if not founded on a basis worthy of you." In a private conversation with the First Consul, he added:—"A free government, and you at its head; that comprehends all our desires."

72.  
Napoleon's  
observations  
on Lafayette's  
vote.

The veteran republican did not perceive, what indeed none of the enthusiasts of his age were aware of, that the establishment of the freedom to which he was so warmly attached had been rendered impossible by the crimes of the Revolution, in which he himself had borne so conspicuous a part. He was taught the same truth in a still

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1802.

more striking manner thirty years afterwards, by the result of the revolution which overturned the Restoration; but it is seldom that political fanatics, how sincere or respectable soever, are enlightened even by the most important lessons of contemporaneous history. Napoleon said on this occasion :—"In theory Lafayette is perhaps right; but what is theory? a mere dream when applied to the masses of mankind. He thinks he is still in the United States, as if the French were Americans. He has no conception of what is required for this country. The Catholic religion has still its root here; I have need of the Pope. He will do all I desire." From that period all communication between the General and the First Consul ceased. Napoleon tried repeatedly afterwards to regain him to his government, but in vain.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Bour.v. 61,  
62. Bign. ii.  
235, 236.

The answer of the First Consul to the address of the Senate on this important occasion is valuable, as illustrating the great views which he already entertained of his mission, to extinguish the discord which had preceded him, and restore the reign of order upon earth. "The life of a citizen," said he, "belongs to his country; the French people have expressed their wish that mine should be solely devoted to it: I obey their will. In bestowing upon me a new, a permanent pledge of their confidence, the nation has imposed upon me the duty of moulding the system of its laws, so as to bring it into harmony with durable institutions. By my exertions, aided by your co-operation, citizen senators, by the concurrent voice of all the authorities, by the trust and the will of the whole people, the liberty, the prosperity, the equality of France will be established beyond the reach of chance. The most distinguished of people will be the most fortunate, and their prosperity will secure that of all Europe. Content to have been called by the will of Him from whom

73.  
Answer of  
the First  
Consul to  
the address  
of the se-  
nate on the  
occasion.

\* Napoleon did not attempt to disguise his contempt for the venal revolutionists who now fawned on the sceptre of the consulate. "How contemptible are these men!" said he: "all your virtuous republicans are at my service, if I will condescend to put gilt lace on their coats."—BOURRIENNE, v. 10, 11.

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1802.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 287.

everything emanates, to bring back the reign of justice, order, and equality upon the earth, I will hear the voice which summons me hence without regret, and without disquietude as to the opinion of future generations.”<sup>1</sup>

74.  
Napoleon's  
ideas on the  
lists of eligi-  
bility.

Important changes in the constitution followed this alteration in the character of the executive authority; they were preceded by memorable discussions on the principles of government in the council of state. “All the powers of the state,” said Napoleon, “are in the air; they have nothing to rest upon. We must establish relations between them and the people, a particular in which the constitution was essentially defective. The lists of those eligible to particular offices have by no means answered the desired end. If they were for life, they would establish the most fearful aristocracy that ever existed; if temporary, they would keep the nation in continual excitement for an imaginary advantage. What flatters and captivates the people in democratic institutions is the real and practical exercise of their powers; but under the existing system, the people, who perceive only five thousand persons eligible to the higher offices of state, cannot flatter themselves that they possess such a share in the elections as to have any influence on the administration. To insure the stability of government, the people must have a larger share in the elections, and feel themselves really represented. The electoral colleges attach the people to the government, and *vice versa*. They are a link, and a most important one, between the authorities and the nation. In that link it is indispensable to combine the class of proprietors with the most distinguished of those who have not that advantage: the former, because property must be the basis of every rational system of representation; the latter, because the career of ambition must not be closed to obscure or indigent genius.

“We are told to look at the English constitution for a

model: I am of opinion that it is inapplicable to this country, situated as it now is; and my reasons for that opinion are these:—England embraces in the bosom of its society a body of nobles who hold the greatest part of the property of the nation, and are made illustrious by ancient descent. In France that body is totally wanting. It cannot be created; if you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it could only be brought about by a concentration in their hands of the whole property of the nation, which is impossible; if of the ancient noblesse, a counter-revolution would immediately ensue. Besides this, the character of the two people is different; the Englishman is rude, the Frenchman is vain, polite, inconsiderate. Look at the elections; you will see the English swilling for forty days at the expense of the nobles; never would the French peasantry disgrace themselves by similar excesses. Their passion is for equality. For these reasons I am clearly of opinion that the English constitution is inapplicable to France. The constitution may be aptly compared to a vessel; if you abandon it to the winds, with all its sails set, no one can tell where it may be drifted. Where are now the men of the Revolution? the moment they were expelled from office, they sank into oblivion. This will happen in all cases, if precautions are not taken to prevent it: it was with that design that I instituted the Legion of Honour: among all people, in every republic that ever existed, classes are to be found. At present, nothing has a lasting reputation but military achievement; civil services are less striking, more open to differences of opinion. Hereditary succession to the First Consul is absurd; not in itself, for it is the best guarantee for the stability of the state, but because it is incompatible with the present state of France. It long existed in the ancient monarchy, but with institutions which rendered it feasible, which exist no longer, and cannot be restored. Hereditary succession is founded on the idea of civil right; it presupposes property; it is

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1802.

75.  
The usages  
of the Eng-  
lish repre-  
sentative  
system in-  
applicable  
to France.

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<sup>1</sup> Thib. 295,  
299.

intended to insure its transmission from the dead to the living. But how is it possible to reconcile hereditary succession in the chief magistrate with the principle of the sovereignty of the people? When the crown was hereditary, the chief situations in the kingdom were hereditary also; the fiction on which the former was founded was but a branch of the general law. At present there is no longer anything of that kind.”<sup>1</sup>

76.  
Great  
changes in  
the constitu-  
tion. Aug.  
4, 1802.

On the views taken by Napoleon the new constitution was framed, which was proclaimed on the 4th August. The chief changes were, that the tribunate was reduced from one hundred to fifty members; a diminution of importance, which was regarded at the time, as it really was, as merely a prelude to its total extinction, and which so completely deprived that remnant of free institutions of consideration, as to render it, from thenceforward, no obstacle whatever to the despotic tendency of the government. The legislative body was reduced to two hundred and fifty-eight members, and organised in five divisions, each of which was annually renewed; the electors also retained their functions for life. The senate was invested with the power to dissolve the legislative body and the tribunate, declare particular departments *hors de la constitution*, and modify the fundamental institutions of the Republic. The First Consul received the right to nominate his successor and to pardon offences. In return for so many concessions to the executive, a shadow of privilege was conferred on the electors; the electoral colleges were allowed each to present two citizens for the offices of the municipalities, departments, and nation. In all but name, the consulship was already a despotic monarchy. So evident did this soon become, that even the panegyrists of Napoleon have not scrupled to assert that the consular and imperial institutions were “fraudulent constitutions, systematically framed by servile hands to introduce despotic power.”<sup>2</sup> Subsequent experience has warranted the belief that, how arbitrary soever, they were the only insti-

<sup>2</sup> Norv. ii.  
193. Bour.  
v. 56. Bign.  
ii. 242, 246.  
Thib. 289,  
297.

tutions under which France could enjoy any degree of tranquillity; and that, if they were calculated to extinguish freedom, it was because the sins of the Revolution had rendered her people neither worthy of receiving, nor capable of enjoying that first of blessings.

A few days after the constitution was published, the First Consul presided at the senate, and received the congratulations of the constituted authorities, the public bodies, and the foreign ambassadors, on his appointment for life. This was remarkable as the first occasion on which he openly displayed the pomp and magnificence of regal power. The soldiers formed a double line from the Tuileries to the Luxembourg; the First Consul was seated in a magnificent chariot, drawn by eight horses; the two other consuls followed in carriages drawn by six. A splendid *cortège* of generals, ambassadors, and public functionaries followed, whose gorgeous appearance captivated the Parisian multitude, more passionately devoted than any other in Europe to spectacles of that description. Enthusiastic applause from the inconstant populace rent the heavens; they did not manifest greater rapture when the Constituent Assembly began the work of demolishing the monarchy, than they now did when the First Consul restored it.<sup>1</sup>

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1802.

77.

Acceptance  
of the new  
constitution

Aug. 8.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 305,  
306.

The aspect of Paris at this period was sufficient to have captivated a nation gifted with a less volatile imagination than the French, the more especially coming as it did after the sad and melancholy scenes of the Revolution. The taste for luxury and pleasure had spread rapidly in a capital where they had all the charms of novelty; while the people, delighted at the return of enjoyments to which they had long been strangers, drank deep and thankfully of the intoxicating draught. The vast influx of strangers, especially English and Russians, filled the streets with brilliant equipages; while the gay and party-coloured liveries dazzled the inhabitants, from the contrast they afforded to the sombre appearance of the Jacobin costume.

78.

Aspect of  
Paris and  
its society  
at this pe-  
riod

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XXXV.

1802.

The whole population of Paris flocked to the Place Carrousel, where their eyes were daily dazzled by splendid reviews, attended by a concourse of strangers which recalled the prosperous days of Louis XIV. ; while the higher classes of citizens were not less captivated by the numerous and brilliant levees and drawingrooms, in which the court of the First Consul already rivalled the most sumptuous displays of European royalty.\* M. de Mar-koff, who had succeeded Kalitscheff as ambassador from Russia, Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, and the Marquis Lucchesini, the representative of Prussia, were in an especial manner distinguished by the magnificence of their retinues, and the eminent persons whom they presented to the First Consul. Among the illustrious Englishmen who hastened to Paris to satiate their curiosity by the sight of the remains and the men of the Revolution, was Mr Fox, whom Napoleon received in the most distinguished manner, and for whom he ever after professed the highest regard. But the praises of an enemy are always suspicious, and the memory of that able man would have been more honoured if the determined foe of England had bestowed on him some portion of that envenomed hatred which he so often expressed towards Pitt or Wellington, and all the British leaders who had advanced the real interests and glory of their country.<sup>1†</sup>

v. 55.  
D'Abr. vi.  
136, 140.

\* The court of Napoleon at this period was happily characterised by the Princess Dolgorucki, who then resided in Paris: "The Tuileries," said she, "is not, properly speaking, a court; and yet it is as little a camp: the consulship is a new institution. The First Consul has neither a *chapeau* under his arm, nor do you hear the clank of a sabre at his side."—LAS CASES, iii. 241.

Generous  
conduct of  
Mr Fox in  
defending  
Mr Pitt to  
the First  
Consul.

† To the honour of Mr Fox it must be mentioned, that during his intercourse with the First Consul he never failed to impress upon him the absurdity and falsehood of those ideas in regard to the privy of Mr Pitt to any designs against his life, or any desire for his destruction, which were then so prevalent in the Tuileries. Alone and unaided, in the midst of the officers and generals of Napoleon, Mr Fox undertook the defence of his illustrious opponent, and pleaded his cause with a warmth and generosity which excited the admiration even of the most envenomed enemies of the English administration.—See DUCHESSE D'ABRANTÈS, vi. 136, 143.

He said frequently, in his bad French, "Premier Consul, ôtez cela de votre tête."—See LAS CASES, iv. 172.

Not was the French metropolis less adorned by the spoils which were collected there from the vanquished states in every part of Europe. Already the Venus de Medicis, torn from her sanctuary in the tribune of Florence, diffused over the marble halls of the Louvre her air of alluring grace; the Pallas of Velletri attested the successful researches of the French engineers in the Roman states; while the St Jerome of Parma, the Transfiguration of Rome, and the Last Communion of the Vatican, exhibited to wondering crowds the softness of Correggio's colouring, the grandeur of Raphael's design, and the magic of Domenichino's finishing. Dazzled by the brilliant spectacle, the Parisians came to regard these matchless productions, not as the patrimony of the human race, but as their own peculiar and inalienable property, and thus prepared for themselves that bitter mortification which afterwards ensued on the restoration of these precious remains to their rightful owners.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.

180

79.

Formation  
of the lower-  
gallery in  
the Louvre.<sup>1</sup>Bour. v. 55.  
D'Abr. vi.  
259.

In foreign states the re-establishment of a regular government in France, and its settlement under the firm and able guidance of Napoleon, diffused as great contentment as among its own inhabitants. In London, Vienna, and Berlin, the institution of the consulship for life gave unalloyed satisfaction. All enlightened persons in these capitals perceived that the restoration of the feudal regime and the property of the emigrants had already become impossible, and that the fury of the Revolution, under which they had already suffered so severely, was never so likely to be stilled as under the resolute and fortunate soldier who had already done so much to restrain its excesses. The Queen of Naples, a woman endowed with masculine spirit and great penetration, expressed the general feeling at Vienna, where she then was, in these words: "If I had possessed a vote in France, I would have given it to Napoleon; and written after my signature, 'I name him consul for life, as being the man most fitted to govern the country. He is worthy of the throne, since he knows

80.

Great satis-  
faction  
which  
ch  
in  
courts.



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how to fill it.'” Public opinion, after this change, ran so strongly in favour of the centralisation of influence and hereditary succession, that if the First Consul had not repressed the general transports, he would have received at once the unlimited gift of absolute power. The agents of government pursued with unrelenting severity the last remains of democratic fervour. It was generally suggested that all authority should be concentrated in the same hands, from the consulship for life to the appointment of mayor to the lowest village in France; and that the citizens should as rapidly as possible be estranged from any exercise of powers which they were evidently incapable of using to advantage. Innumerable projects were set on foot for reducing the number of the communes, the prefectures, and the tribunals; the old parliaments were held up as models of the administration of justice, the old intendants of provinces as a perfect system of local administration. So powerful had become the reaction against the ideas and the changes of the Revolution! <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 311,  
312. Bign.  
ii. 250.

81.  
Infamous  
proposals of  
Lucien, re-  
jected by  
Josephine.

So strong was the desire generally felt at this time for perpetuating the dynasty in the descendants of Napoleon, that the persons around his throne went the length of proposing to Josephine that she should palm off a stranger or bastard child upon the nation. “You must have a son, if not of him, of some one else. You are going to the waters of Plombières; you know what they are celebrated for,” said Lucien to her. And when she expressed her indignation at the proposal,—“Well,” said he, “if you will not or cannot comply, Buonaparte must have a child by some other woman, and you must adopt it; for a family is indispensable to him, and it is for your interest that he should have one; you can be at no loss to understand why.”—“Lucien,” replied she, “you are mad. Do you suppose France would ever submit to be governed by a bastard?” Shortly after, she recounted this extraordinary scene to one of the councillors of state. “You may depend upon it,” said she, “they have not abandoned

their idea of hereditary succession, and that it will be brought about some day, one way or other. They wish that Buonaparte should have a child of some other woman, and that I should adopt it; but I told them I would never lend myself to such an infamous proposal. They are so blinded as to believe that the nation would permit a bastard to succeed. They are already beginning to hint at a divorce and a large pension to me. Buonaparte even is carried away by their ideas. The other day, when I expressed my fears in regard to the Princess Hortense, on account of the infamous reports which are in circulation about her infant being his son, he answered, 'These reports are only accredited by the public, from the anxiety of the nation that I should have a child.' He is more weak and changeable than is generally imagined. It is owing to that circumstance that Lucien has got such an extraordinary dominion over him." Napoleon at St Helena alluded to this proposal, though, with his usual disregard of truth, he made it come from Josephine herself; an assertion which his secretary most properly denies, and which is completely disproved by the event. If Josephine had been willing to adopt an illegitimate son of Napoleon, and pass it off as her own offspring, she would have lived and died Empress of France.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Bour. v. 21,  
49. Thib.  
309, 310.

Shortly after Napoleon was appointed to the consulship for life, several changes in the administration took place. The most important of these was the suppression of the ministry of police, and the transference of Fouché to a comparatively insignificant situation in the conservative senate. This selfish and cruel, but astute and able statesman, notwithstanding his share in the atrocious massacres of the Loire and the fusilades of Lyons, had now become one of the most important supporters of the consular throne. His great value consisted in his perfect knowledge of the revolutionary characters, and the clear guidance which he afforded to the First Consul on all the delicate points where it was necessary to consult the

82.  
Suppression  
of the minis-  
try of police.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1802.

inclinations, or yield to the prejudices of the immense body of men who had risen to importance on the ruins of the ancient proprietors. He formed the same link between the government and the revolutionary interests which Talleyrand did between them and the ancient regime. The honours and fortune to which he had risen, had in no respect changed the simplicity of his former habits; but with the possession of power he had acquired a taste for its sweets, and became little scrupulous as to the means by which it was to be exercised. Ambition had become his ruling passion; he loved office and the wealth which it brought with it, not for the enjoyments which it might purchase, but for the importance which it conferred. Such was his dissimulation, that he never suffered his real views to escape either from his lips or his countenance; and by the extraordinary hypocrisy of which he was master, inspired parties the most at variance with a sense of his importance, and a desire to propitiate his good-will.\* The republicans beheld in the ancient Jacobin who had voted for the death of Louis, and presided over the executions of Nantes and Lyons, the representative of their party in the state; the ancient noblesse lavished on him their praises, and acknowledged with gratitude the favours he had conferred on many of the most illustrious of their body. Josephine made him her confidant in all her complaints against the brothers of her husband, and received large sums of money from his coffers to reveal the secrets she had elicited from the First Consul; while he himself yielded to a fascination which seemed to extend alike over the greatest men and most powerful bodies in the state.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v. 32,  
33. Thib.  
325, 326.

83.  
dis-

Napoleon, however, at length perceived, that the immense influence which Fouché enjoyed as head of the police, might one day become formidable even to the government. He had the highest opinion of the importance of that branch of the administration; but he began

\* His ruling maxim, in common with Talleyrand, was, that the chief use of words was to *conceal* the thoughts.

to entertain inquietude as to its concentration in the hands of so able an individual. It was impossible to disguise the fact that its members had conspired in favour of the consulate against the Directory, and the powerful machinery, which was then put in motion to support Napoleon, might with equal facility be directed to his overthrow. Influenced by these considerations, the First Consul lent a willing ear to the party at the Tuileries who were adverse to Fouché, at the head of which was Talleyrand, who openly opposed and cordially hated his powerful rival. Yet such was the ascendancy of the minister of police, even over the powerful mind of Napoleon, that he long hesitated before he took the decisive step; and, after it had been resolved on, felt the necessity of veiling it under a professed measure to increase the popularity of government. He represented to Fouché, therefore, that the office of minister of police was one which might now be dispensed with, and that the government would derive additional popularity from the suppression of so obnoxious a branch of the administration. Fouché saw through the device; but, according to his usual policy, he yielded to a power which he could not brave, and expressed no dissent to the First Consul, though he was far from supposing the storm was so soon to break on his head. The decree for his dismissal was signed when he was on a visit to Joseph Buonaparte, at Morfontaine. Fouché was named a senator, and loaded with praises by the government, which deemed him too powerful to be retained in his former situation; and at the same time the ministry of police was suppressed, and united to that of justice, in the person of Regnier.<sup>1</sup>\*

Sept. 12.  
<sup>1</sup>Bour.v.2  
37. Thib.  
325, 329.  
Fouché,  
Mem. i.

\* The letter of the First Consul to the senate, announcing the suppression of the ministry of police, was couched in these terms:—"Appointed minister of police in the most difficult times, the senator Fouché has fully answered by his talents, his activity, and his attachment to the government, all that the circumstances demanded of him. Placed now in the bosom of the senate, he is called to equally important duties; and if ever a recurrence of the same circumstances should require a restoration of the office of minister of police, it is on him that the eyes of government would first be fixed to discharge its functions."

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1803.

84.

Changes in  
the constitu-  
tion of the  
senate.  
Aug. 15,  
1802.

Jan. 14,  
1803.

Soon after, an important change took place in the constitution of the senate. It had been originally provided that those elevated functionaries should, after their appointment, be incapable of holding any other situation; but it was subsequently enacted that the senators might hold the offices of consuls, ministers, inspectors of public instruction, be employed in all extraordinary missions, and receive the decoration of the Legion of Honour. Subsequently a munificent provision was made for the senate, and every member on his nomination received an appointment for life. Pensioned by the executive, nominated by the First Consul, surrounded by every species of seduction, this branch of the government in reality served thereafter no other purpose but to throw a thin veil over the omnipotence of the executive. Napoleon was careful, however, to keep up its name, and bring forward all his despotic measures under the sanction of its authority, as the Roman emperors retained the venerable letters S. P. Q. R. on their ensigns, and the preamble "ex auctoritate senatus," to the most arbitrary acts of their administration.<sup>1</sup>

85.  
Renewed  
correspon-  
dence be-  
tween Louis  
XVIII. and  
Napoleon.

An event occurred at this period, which tended in a remarkable manner to illustrate the dignity with which the exiled family of the Bourbons bore the continued rigours of fortune. When Napoleon was pursuing his projects for the establishment of a hereditary dynasty in his family in France, he caused a communication to be made to the Count de Lille, afterwards Louis XVIII., then residing, under the protection of the Prussian king, at Königsberg, offering, in the event of his renouncing in his favour his right to the throne of France, to provide for him a principality, with an ample revenue, in Italy.

These consolatory words opened to Fouché a ray of hope in the midst of his disgrace; all his efforts were from that moment directed to bring about his restoration to office; and at length, as will appear in the sequel, he attained his object.—See *BOUR.* v. 37; and *THIB.* 328.

Another decree at the same period regulated the costume of the persons employed in the legal profession. The robes of the judges were ordered to be red, and those of the bar black. During the Revolution, all the distinguishing

But Louis answered in these dignified terms, worthy of the family from which he sprung :—" I do not confound M. Buonaparte with those who have preceded him. I esteem his valour, his military talents; I am gratified by many acts of his administration, for the happiness of my people must ever be dear to my heart. But he deceives himself, if he imagines that he will prevail upon me to surrender my rights. So far from it, he would establish them himself, if they could admit of doubt, by the step which he has taken at this moment. I know not the intentions of God to my family or myself, but I know the obligations which he has imposed upon me. As a Christian, I will discharge the duties which religion prescribes, to my last breath; son of St Louis, I will make myself be respected even in fetters; successor of Francis I., I wish ever to be able to say with him, ' All is lost save honour.'"<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXV.1802.  
Feb. 1803.<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
147. Bign.  
iii. 283, 287.

It was at the same period that Napoleon commenced the great undertaking which has so deservedly covered his memory with glory, and survived all the other achievements of his genius—the formation of a CIVIL CODE, and the concentration of the heterogeneous laws of the monarchy and republic into one consistent whole. In contemplating this great work, it is difficult to determine whether to admire most the wisdom with which he called to his assistance the ablest and most experienced lawyers of the old regime, the readiness with which he apprehended the difficult and intricate questions which were brought under discussion, or the prudence with which he steered between the vehement passions and contending interests that arose in legislating for an empire composed of the remains of monarchical and republican institutions. It is no

86.  
Formation  
of the Code  
Napoleon.

marks had been abolished. The black robe, which Molière had so exquisitely ridiculed, had given way to the costume of the sans-culottes. At the same time, the old habiliments at the *Messe Rouge* were re-established; and the service was celebrated by the Archbishop of Paris. Everything breathed a return to the ancient regime. Cambacérès was the great promoter of these changes, well aware of the importance of whatever strikes the eye on the inconsiderate multitude.—THIBAUDEAU, 338.

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XXXV.

1802.

longer the conqueror of Jena or Austerlitz, striking down nations in a single field, whom we recognise ; it is Solon legislating for a distracted people ; it is Justinian digesting the treasures of ancient jurisprudence, that arises to our view ; and the transient glories even of the imperial reign fade before the durable monument which his varied genius has erected in the permanent code of half of Europe.

87.  
Reflections  
on the diffi-  
culty of this  
subject.

It is observed by Lord Bacon, that when "laws have been heaped upon laws, in such a state of confusion as to render it necessary to revise them, and collect their spirit into a new and intelligible system, those who accomplish such a heroic task have a good right to be classed among the benefactors of mankind." Never was the justice of this observation more completely demonstrated than by the result of the labours of the First Consul in the formation of the Code Napoleon. The complication of the old laws of France, the conflicting authority of the civil law, the parliaments of the provinces, and the local customs, had given rise to a chaos of confusion which had suggested to many statesmen before the Revolution the necessity of some attempt to reduce them to a uniform system. By an astonishing effort of mental vigour, Pothier had contrived to extract out of this heterogeneous mass the elements of general jurisprudence, and followed out the principles of the Roman law with a power of generalisation, and clearness of expression, to which there is nothing comparable in the whole annals of legal achievement. But his lucid works had not the weight of general law ; they could not be referred to as paramount on every question ; they contained principles to be followed from their equity, not rules to be obeyed from their authority. The difficulty of the task was immensely increased by the Revolution ; by the total change in the most important branches of jurisprudence, personal liberty, the rights of marriage, the descent of property, and the privileges of citizenship, which it occasioned ; and the large inroads

which revolutionary legislation had made on the broken and disjointed statutes of the monarchy.

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XXXV.

1802.

88.

Extreme  
difficulty of  
legal reform-  
ation.

To reform a system of law without destroying it, is one of the most difficult tasks in political improvement, and one requiring, perhaps, more than any other change, a combination of practical knowledge with the desire of social amelioration. To retain statutes as they are, without ever modifying them according to the progress of society, is to make them fall behind the great innovator, Time, and often become pernicious in their operation. To new-model them, in conformity with the wishes of a heated generation, is almost certain to induce unforeseen and irremediable evils. Nothing is more easy than to point out defects in established laws, because their inconvenience is felt, and the people generally lend a ready ear to those who vituperate existing institutions; nothing is more difficult than to propose safe or expedient remedies, because hardly any foresight is adequate to estimate the ultimate effects which any considerable legal changes shall produce. They are in general calculated to remedy some known and experienced evil, and, in so far as they effect that object, they are salutary in their operation; but they too often go beyond that limit, and, in the pursuit of speculative good, induce unforeseen inconveniences much greater than those they remove. The last state of a nation, which has gone through the ordeal of extensive legal innovation, is in general worse than the first. The only way in which it is possible to avoid these dangers is to remedy experienced evils, and extend experienced benefits only, without advancing into the tempting but dangerous regions of speculative improvement. It is the clearest proof that the Code of Napoleon was formed on these wise principles, that it has not only survived the empire, which gave it birth, but continues, under new dynasties and different forms of government, to regulate the decisions of many nations who were leagued to bring about the overthrow of its author. Napoleon has said,



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“that his fame in the eyes of posterity would rest even more on the code which bore his name than all the victories which he won;” and its permanent establishment, as the basis of the jurisprudence of half of Europe, has already proved the truth of the prophecy.

89.  
Discussions  
on the sub-  
ject of the  
Code in the  
council of  
state.

Deviating altogether from the rash and presumptuous innovations of the Constituent Assembly, which took counsel of its own enthusiasm only, Napoleon commenced his legislative reforms by calling to his councils the most distinguished lawyers of the monarchy. Tronchet, Rœderer, Portalis, Thibaudeau, Cambacérès, Lebrun, were his chief coadjutors in this herculean task;\* but although he required of these eminent legal characters the benefit of their extensive experience, he joined in the discussions himself, and struck out new and important views, on the most abstract questions of civil right, with a facility which astonished the councillors, who had been accustomed to consider only his military exploits. To the judgment of none did the First Consul so readily defer as to that of Tronchet; notwithstanding his advanced age, and monarchical prepossessions, he deemed no one so worthy as the illustrious defender of Louis XVI. to take the lead in framing the code for the empire. “Tronchet,” said he, “was the soul of the commission, Napoleon its mouth-piece. The former was gifted with a mind singularly profound and just; but he soared above those around him, spoke indifferently, and was seldom able to defend his opinions.” The whole council, in consequence, was in general adverse to his propositions when they were first brought forward; but Napoleon, with the readiness and

\* Their respective merits were thus stated by Napoleon:—“Tronchet is a man of the most enlightened views, and possessing a singularly clear head for his advanced years. Portalis would be the most eloquent orator, if he knew when to stop. Thibaudeau is not adapted for that sort of discussion; he is too cold. He requires, like Lucien, the animation and fire of the tribune. Cambacérès is the advocate-general; he pleads sometimes on one side, sometimes on another. The most difficult part of the duty is the reduction of their ideas into the procès-verbal; but we have the best of *redacteurs* in Lebrun.”—THUR., #15.

sagacity which he possessed in so remarkable a degree, saw at a glance where the point lay ; and with no other materials than those which Tronchet had furnished, and hardly any previous acquaintance with the subject, brought forward such clear and lucid arguments as, coming from such a quarter, seldom failed to convince the whole assembly.<sup>1</sup>

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XXXV.

1802.

12.

123. Las  
Cases, iii.  
241, 242.

He presided at almost all the meetings of the commission for the formation of the civil code, and took such a vivid interest in the debates, that he frequently remained at them six or eight hours a-day. Free discussion in that assembly gave him the highest gratification ; he provoked it, sustained it, and shared in it. He spoke without preparation, without embarrassment, without pretensions—in the style rather of free and animated conversation than of premeditated or laboured harangue. He appeared inferior to no member of the council, often equal to the ablest of them, in the readiness with which he caught the point at issue, and the logical force with which he supported his opinions, and not unfrequently superior to any in the originality and vigour of his expressions. The varied powers and prodigious capacity of Napoleon's mind nowhere appeared in such brilliant colours as on those occasions, and would hardly appear credible, if authentic evidence on the subject did not exist in the *procès-verbaux* of those memorable discussions. Bertrand de Molleville, formerly minister of marine to Louis XVI., and a man of no ordinary capacity, said, in reference to those discussions—" Napoleon was certainly an extraordinary man ; we were very far indeed from appreciating him on the other side of the water. From the moment that I looked into the discussions on the civil code, I conceived the most profound admiration for his capacity. It is utterly inconceivable where he acquired so much information on these subjects."<sup>2</sup> The limits, however, of a work of general history, render it impossible to enter into a survey of the many impor-

90.  
Great abil.

discussions.

<sup>2</sup> Bert. de  
Molleville,  
viii. 312.

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XXXV.

1802.

tant subjects brought under review in the formation of the Code Napoleon: two only can be noticed, as those on which the interests of society chiefly depend—the laws of succession, and those regarding the dissolution of marriage.

91.  
Law of suc-  
cession, as  
finally fixed  
by Napo-  
leon.

How clearly soever Napoleon saw and announced the dangers of the minute subdivision of landed estates, and consequent destruction of a territorial noblesse, arising from the establishment of an equal division of property, whether in land or money, among the heirs of a deceased person, he found this system too firmly established to venture to attack it. It was identified in the eyes of all the active and energetic part of the nation with the first triumphs of the Revolution; it had been carried by Mirabeau in the Constituent Assembly, with the general concurrence of the people, and had since become the foundation of so many private interests and individual prospects, that it was universally regarded as the great charter of the public liberties, and any infringement on it as the first step towards a restoration of feudal oppression. Great as was the power, apparently unbounded the influence, of Napoleon, these would have been instantly shattered by any attempt to break in upon this fundamental institution. Wisely abstaining, therefore, from change, where he could not introduce improvement, he contented himself with consolidating the existing laws on the subject, and establishing in the Code Napoleon a general system of succession, fundamentally at variance with that of all the other states of Europe, and of which the ultimate consequences are destined to be more important than any of the other changes brought about by the Revolution.

92.  
Sketch of  
the French  
revolution-  
ary system  
of suc-  
cession.

By this statute, which may be termed the revolutionary law of succession, the right of primogeniture, and the distinction between landed and movable property, were taken away, and inheritance of every sort was divided in equal portions among those in an equal degree of con-

sanguinity to a deceased person.\* This indefeasible right of children to their parents' succession was declared to be a half, if one child was left; two-thirds, if two; three-fourths, if three or more. All entails or limitations of any sort were abolished. The effects of such a system, co-operating with the immense subdivision of landed estates, which took place from the sale of the forfeited properties during the Revolution, have been incalculable. It was estimated by the Duke de Gaeta, long minister of finance to Napoleon, that, in 1815, there were 13,059,000

\* By the decree April 19, 1803, the law of succession was established in the following manner :—

I.—1. The law pays no regard either to the nature of property or the quarter from which it comes, in regulating succession.

2. Every succession which devolves to ascendants or collaterals is divided into two equal parts; the one for the relations by the father's side, the other for those by the mother's.

3. The proximity of relations is determined by the number of generations by which they are separated from the deceased; in the line direct, by the number of descents; in the collateral, by the number which separates each from the common ancestor, up and down again. Thus, two brothers are related in the second degree; the uncle and nephew in the third; cousins-germain in the fourth.

4. In all cases where representation is admitted, the representatives enter as a body into the place, and enjoy the rights of the person represented. This right obtains *ad infinitum* in the direct line of descendants, but not in that of ascendants. In the collateral line, it is admitted in favour of the children of a brother or sister deceased, whether they are called to the succession concurrently with their uncles or aunts, or not. In all cases where representation is admitted, the succession is divided *per stirpes*; and if the same branch has left several descendants, the subdivision in the same manner takes place *per stirpes*, and the members of each subdivision divide what devolves to them *per capita*.—*Code Civil*, § 731-745.

II. Children or their descendants succeed to their father or mother, grandfather, grandmother, or other ascendants, without distinction of sex or primogeniture, and whether of the same or of different marriages. They succeed *per capita* when they are all related in the first degree; *per stirpes* when they are called in whole or in part by representation. If the defunct leaves no issue or descendants, his succession divides according to the following rules :—

III.—1. In default of descendants, the brothers and sisters are called to the succession, to the exclusion of collaterals or their descendants. They succeed either *per capita* or *stirpes*, in the same way as descendants.

2. If the father and mother of a deceased person survive him, his brothers and sisters, or their descendants, are only called to half of the succession; if the one or the other, only to three-fourths.

3. The division of this half, or three-fourths, is made on the same principles as that of descendants, if the collaterals are of the same marriage; if of different, the succession is divided equally between the paternal and maternal lines.—*Code Civil*, § 750-755.

IV. In default of collaterals, or their issue, ascendants succeed according to the following rules :—

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<sup>1</sup> Gaeta, ii.  
335.93.  
Prodigious  
effects of  
this law in  
subdividing  
land in  
France.

individuals in France belonging to the families of agricultural proprietors, and 710,500 belonging to the families of proprietors not engaged in agriculture, all living on the revenue of profit derived from their properties.<sup>1</sup>

As may be supposed, where so extreme a subdivision of property has taken place, the situation of the greater part of these little proprietors is indigent in the extreme. It appears from the authority of the same author, that there were in 1815 no less than 10,400,000 properties\*

1. The succession divides into two equal parts; of which the one-half ascends to the father's side, the other to the mother's.

2. The ascendant the nearest in degree receives the half belonging to his line, to the exclusion of the more remote.

3. Ascendants in the same degree take *per capita*, there being no representation in the ascending line.

4. If the father and mother of a deceased person, who dies without issue, survive him, and he leaves brothers and sisters, or their descendants, the succession is divided into two parts; one to the ascendants, one to the collaterals. But if the father and mother have predeceased him, their share accresces to that of the collaterals.—*Code Civil*, § 746-749.

V.—1. Voluntary gifts, whether by deeds *inter vivos*, or by testament, cannot exceed the half of the deceased's effects, if he leaves one child; the third, if two; the fourth, if three or more.

2. Under the description of children in this article are included descendants in whatever degree; estimating these, however, *per stirpes*, not *per capita*.

3. Voluntary gifts, either by deeds *inter vivos*, or testamentary deeds, cannot exceed the half of the effects of the deceased if he leaves no descendants, but ascendants in both the paternal and maternal line, or three-fourths, if one of these only.—*Code Civil*, § 913-915.

VI. Natural children have a right of succession to their parents, alone if they have been legally recognised, but not otherwise.

1. If the father or mother have left legitimate issue, the natural child has a right to a third of what he would have had right to if he had been legitimate.

2. It extends to a half if the deceased have left no descendants, but ascendants, or brothers or sisters.

3. It extends to three-fourths when he leaves neither descendants nor ascendants, but brothers or sisters; to the whole when he leaves neither.—*Code Civil*, § 756-758.

* Taxed at	Number		Produce of Tax.	
		taxed.	Franks.	£
1000 franks, or £40		17,745	31,649,468	or £1,266,000
500 to 1000, or from 20	to £40,	40,773	27,653,016	or 1,100,000
101 to 500, or from 4	to 20,	459,937	90,411,706	or 3,600,000
51 to 100, or from 2	to 4,	594,648	41,181,488	or 1,650,000
31 to 50, or from 24s.	to 2,	699,637	27,229,518	of 1,100,000
21 to 30, or from 16s. 10d. to 24s.,		704,871	17,632,083	or 700,000
Below 21 frs., or below 16s. 10d.,		7,897,110	47,178,649	or 1,900,000

<sup>2</sup>10,414,721 282,935,928 £11,816,000

When it is recollected that the contribution *foncière* in France is fully 20

<sup>2</sup> Gaeta, ii.  
327.

taxed in France ; and that of this immense number only 17,000 paid direct taxes to the amount of 1000 francs, or £40 a-year each ; while no less than 8,000,000 were taxed at a sum below twenty-one francs, or sixteen shillings and tenpence. Direct taxes to that amount correspond to an income of five times that sum, or £4 a-year ; to the amount of £40 a-year, to one at the same rate of £200. Thus the incomes of only 17,000 properties in France exceeded £200 a-year, while there were nearly 8,000,000 which were worth only £4 per annum.\* The separate *proprietors*, as many held more than one property, were estimated at 4,833,000 by the minister of finance in 1813. They have now increased, from the natural operation of the revolutionary law of succession, to 5,446,763 separate owners of land.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXV.  
1802.

<sup>1</sup> Duc de Gaeta, ii. 327, 328. Peuchet, 246, 247. Mounier, Agric. en France, i. 101.

It is a singular fact, pointing apparently to an important law in the moral world, that when men yield to the seductions of passion, and engage in the career of iniquity,

*per cent*<sup>2</sup> upon all estates without exception, this table gives the clearest proof of the changes in property brought about by the Revolution. It is shown by it, that in 1815 there were only 16,000 proprietors in the whole country who were worth £200 a-year and upwards—a fact incredible, if not stated on such indisputable authority, and speaking volumes as to the disastrous effects of that convulsion.

<sup>2</sup> Peuchet, 286, 287.

\* From the report to the minister of the finances, published in 1817, by the commissioners on the cadastre, it appears that at that period there were 10,083,000 separate properties assessed to the land-tax in France. This number has since that time been constantly increasing, as might be expected, under the revolutionary order of succession. The numbers were,—

1816,	.	.	.	10,083,750
1826,	.	.	.	10,296,693
1833,	.	.	.	10,814,799

Allowing that there are several separate properties often held by the same individuals, this implies, in the estimation of the French writers, at least 5,500,000 *separate* proprietors. The total clear produce of the agriculture of France is estimated by DUPIN at 4,500,000,000 francs, or L.180,000,000 sterling. Supposing that the half of that sum, or L.90,000,000 sterling, is the annual clear profit of cultivation, after defraying its charges, it follows that the average income of the five millions and a half of French proprietors, *including all the great estates*, is about L.16, 10s. a-year ! No less than 2,000,000 proprietors are rated *at or below* L.2 a-year ! Nothing more is requisite to explain the experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in that country. It exhibits Asiatic, not European civilisation.—See SARRAN'S *Contre-Révolution de 1830*, ii. 273, 274 ; *Deux Ans du Règne de Louis Philippe*, 271 ; and DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, i. 7.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1802.

94.  
Singular  
attachmēt  
of the mo-  
dern French  
to this law.

they are led by an almost irresistible impulse to covet the very changes which are to lead to their own destruction, and cling with invincible tenacity to the institutions which are calculated to defeat the very objects on account of which all these crimes have been committed. The confiscation of property in France was the great and crying sin of the Revolution, because it extended the consequences of present violence to future ages, and injured the latest generations on account of the political differences of the present time ; and it is precisely that circumstance which has rendered hopeless all the efforts for freedom made by the French people. By interesting so great a number of persons in the work of spoliation, and extending so far the jealousy against the nobles, by whom the confiscated properties might be resumed, it has led to the permanent settlement of the law of succession, on the footing of equal division and perfect equality. Opinion, there, as elsewhere, founded on interest, has followed in the same direction.

95.  
Which is  
fatal to all  
real free-  
dom.

No doctrine is so generally prevalent in France, as that this vast change is the leading benefit conferred upon the country by the Revolution ; and yet nothing can be so evident to an impartial spectator as that it is its greatest curse. It is precisely this circumstance which has ever since rendered nugatory all attempts to establish public freedom there ; because it has totally destroyed the features and the elements of European civilisation, and left only Indian ryots engaged in a hopeless contest with a metropolis wielding the influence of a central government, and the terrors of military power. The universality of the illusion under which the French labour on this subject, is owing to the wide extent of the instinct which leads the revolutionary party to shun everything that seems to favour even an approach to the restoration of the dispossessed proprietors. In their terror of this remote and chimerical evil, they have adopted measures which, by preventing the growth of any hereditary class between

the throne and the peasant, have rendered the establishment of constitutional freedom utterly impracticable, and doomed the first of European monarchies to the slavery of oriental despotism. By such mysterious means does human iniquity, even in this world, work out its merited punishment; and so indissoluble is the chain which unites guilty excess with ultimate retribution.

CHAP.  
XXXV.  
1803.

The principle of admitting divorce, in many cases, was too firmly established in the customs and habits of France to admit of its being shaken. Important deliberations, however, took place on the subject of the cases in which it should be admissible. The First Consul, who entertained very singular ideas on the subject of marriage and the proper destiny of women,\* warmly supported the looser side; and it was at length agreed—1. That the husband might in every case sue out a divorce on the account of the adultery of his wife. 2. That she might divorce her husband for adultery in those cases only where he brought his concubine into their common habitation. 3. Divorce was permitted for severe and grave injuries inflicted by the one spouse on the other; and for the condemnation of either to an infamous punishment. 4. The mutual consent of the spouses, steadily adhered to, and expressed in a way prescribed by law, was also admitted as a sufficient cause of divorce.<sup>1</sup> The only limitations in the last

96.  
Law regard-  
ing divorce.

March 21,  
1803.

<sup>1</sup> Code Civil,  
§ 229, 233.

\* When the article in the Code, "The husband owes protection to his wife, she obedience to him," was read out, Napoleon observed:—"The angel said so to Adam and Eve,—the word *obedience* is in an especial manner of value in Paris, where women consider themselves at liberty to do whatever they please. I do not say it will produce a beneficial effect on all, but on some it may. Women in general are occupied only with amusement and the toilet. If I could be secure of never growing old, I would never wish a wife. Ought we not to add, that a woman should not be permitted to see any one who is displeasing to her husband? Women have constantly the words in their mouths, —'What! would you pretend to hinder me from seeing any one whom I choose?'" —THIBAUDEAU, 436.

In these expressions it is easy to discern that Napoleon's thoughts were running on Josephine, whose extravagance in dress and passion for amusement knew no bounds. But, independent of this, he had little romance or gallantry in his disposition, and repeatedly expressed his opinion, that the oriental system of shutting up women was preferable to the European, which permitted them to mingle in society.



CHAP.  
XXXV.

1603.

<sup>1</sup> Code Civil,  
§ 275, 278.<sup>2</sup> Las Cas.  
v. 41.<sup>97.</sup>  
(Great effects  
of the salu-  
tary changes  
introduced  
by Napo-  
leon.

case were, that it could not take place until two nor after twenty years of married life had elapsed, nor after the wife had attained the age of forty-five; that the parents or other ascendants of the spouses should concur, and that the husband should be above twenty-five, and the wife above twenty-one years of age.<sup>1</sup> It may easily be conceived what a wide door such a facility in dissolving marriage opened for the introduction of dissolute manners and irregular connexions; and in its ultimate effects upon society this change is destined to be not less important, or subversive of public freedom, than the destruction of the landed aristocracy by the revolutionary law of succession.\* In such a state of society, the facility of divorce and dissoluteness of manners act and react upon each other. Napoleon admitted this himself:—"The foundlings," says he, "have multiplied tenfold since the Revolution." But it is not in so corrupted a source that we are to look for the fountains either of public freedom or durable prosperity.<sup>2</sup>

The effects of the great measures, carried into execution by Napoleon, are thus justly and emphatically summed up in his own words:—"In the course of the four years of the consulship, the First Consul had succeeded in uniting all the parties who divided France. The list of emigrants was infinitely reduced; all who chose to return had received their pardon; all their unalienated property had been restored, excepting the woods, of which, nevertheless, they were permitted to enjoy the life-rent; none remained exiled but a few persons attached to the Bourbon princes, or such as were so deeply implicated in resistance to the Revolution as to be unwilling to avail themselves of the amnesty. Thousands of emigrants had returned under no other condition but that of taking the oath of fidelity to the constitution. The First Consul

\* From the returns made, it appears that, in the year 1824, out of 28,812 births, only 18,591 were legitimate; 2378 being of children born in concubinage, and 7843 children having been brought to the foundling hospitals.—DUPIN, *Force Com. de France*, 99, 100.

had thus the most delightful consolation which a man can have, that of having reorganised above thirty thousand families, and restored to their country the descendants of the men who had made France illustrious during so many ages. The altars were raised from the dust; the exiled or transported priests were restored to their dioceses and parishes, and paid by the Republic. The concordat had rallied the clergy round the consular throne; the spirit of the western provinces was essentially changed; immense public works gave bread to all the persons thrown out of employment during the preceding convulsions; canals were everywhere formed, to improve the internal navigation; a new city had arisen in the centre of la Vendée; eight great roads traversed that secluded province, and large sums had been distributed to the Vendéans, to restore their houses and churches, destroyed by orders of the Committee of Public Salvation.”<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1803.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Month. ii.  
225.

The difficulty with which the restoration of order in a country recently emerging from the fury of a revolution was attended, cannot be better stated than by the same masterly hand:—“We are told that all the First Consul had to look to was to do justice: but to whom? To the proprietors whom the Revolution had violently despoiled of their properties, for this only, that they had been faithful to their legitimate sovereign and the principle of honour which they had inherited from their ancestors? Or to the new proprietors, who had adventured their money on the faith of laws flowing from an illegitimate authority? Justice! but to whom? To the soldiers mutilated in the fields of Germany, la Vendée, and Quiberon, who were arrayed under the white standard or the English leopards, in the firm belief that they were serving the cause of their king against a usurping tyranny; or to the million of citizens, who, forming round the frontiers a wall of brass, had so often saved their country from the inveterate hostility of its enemies, and bore to so transcendent a height the glory of the French eagle?

93.

Extreme  
difficulty of  
the task he  
had under-  
taken.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1803.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Month. ii.  
225.

Justice! but to whom? To that clergy, the model and the example of every Christian virtue, stripped of its birthright, the reward of fifteen hundred years of beneficence; or to the recent acquirers, who had converted the convents into workshops, the churches into warehouses, and turned to profane uses all that had been deemed most holy for ages?"<sup>1</sup>

99.  
Great public  
works set on  
foot in  
France.

Amidst these great undertakings, the internal prosperity of France was daily increasing. The budget for the year 1803 presented a considerable increase of revenue over that of 1802.\* Various public works, calculated to encourage industry, were everywhere set on foot during that year. Chambers of commerce were established in all the principal cities of the Republic; a grand exhibition of all the different branches of industry was formed at the Louvre, which has ever since continued with signal success; the Hotel des Invalides received a new and more extended organisation, adapted to the immense demands upon its beneficence, which the wounds and casualties of the war had occasioned:<sup>2</sup> a portion of the veterans were settled in national domains, as a reward for their services during the war;<sup>3</sup> a new establishment was formed at Fontainebleau, for the education of youths of the higher class for the military profession<sup>4</sup> and the great school of St-Cyr, near Paris, was opened gratuitously to the children of those who had died in the service of their country;<sup>5</sup> an academy was set on foot at Compiègne for five hundred youths, where they were instructed in all the branches of manufactures and the mechanical-

<sup>2</sup> July 8,  
1803.<sup>3</sup> June 15,  
1803.<sup>4</sup> Jan. 28,  
1803.<sup>5</sup> Oct. 8,  
1803.

\* The budget for that year stood thus, being an increase of 17,000,000 francs, or £700,000 over the preceding year:—

Direct taxes, ...	305,105,000 francs or	£12,200,000
Registers, ...	200,106,000 —	8,000,000
Customs, ...	36,924,000 —	1,500,000
Post-office, ...	11,205,000 —	450,000
Lottery, ...	15,826,000 —	610,000
Salt tax, ...	2,300,000 —	92,000

570,966,000

£22,852,000

— See BIGNON, iii. 246; and GAETA, i. 303.

arts;<sup>1</sup> the Institute received a new organisation, in which the class of moral and political science was totally suppressed,—a change highly symptomatic of the resolution of the First Consul to put an end to those visionary speculations from which so many calamities had ensued to France;<sup>2</sup> while the general councils of the departments were authorised, in cases where it seemed expedient, to increase the slender incomes of the bishops and archbishops—a power which received a liberal interpretation under the empire, and rapidly induced the cordial support of the clergy throughout all France to the government of Napoleon.<sup>3</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1803.

1 April 1803.

Jan. 1803.

<sup>3</sup> Bign. ii.  
252-258.

Nor was it only in measures of legislation that the indefatigable activity and beneficent intentions of the First Consul were manifested. Then were projected or commenced those great public improvements which deservedly rendered the name of Napoleon so dear to the French, and still excite the admiration even of the passing traveller in every part of the kingdom. That extensive inland navigation was set on foot which, under the name of the canal of St-Quentin, was destined to unite the Scheldt and the Oise; other canals were begun, intended to unite the waters of the Saone to the Yonne, the Saone to the Rhine, the Meuse to the Rhine and the Scheldt, the Rance to the Villaine, and thereby furnish an internal communication between the Channel and the ocean; the canals of Arles and Aigues-Mortes were opened, and an inexhaustible supply of fresh water was procured for the capital by the canal of Ourcq. This great step led to further improvements. Paris had long suffered under the want of that necessary element, and the means of cleaning or irrigating the streets were miserably deficient; but, under the auspices of Napoleon, this great want was soon supplied. Numerous fountains arose in every part of the city, alike refreshing to the eye, and salutary to the health of the inhabitants; fifteen were projected by the First Consul to be erected in different

160.

Vast im-  
provements  
in Paris.  
April 8,  
1803.

CHAP.  
XXXV.

1803.

parts of the city. The beautiful cascade of the Château d'Eau cooled the atmosphere on the Boulevard du Temple, while the water-works and lofty *jets d'eau* in the gardens of the Tuileries, attracted additional crowds to the shady alleys and marbled parterres of that splendid spot. Immense works, undertaken to improve and enlarge the harbours of Boulogne, Havre, Cherbourg, Rochelle, Marseilles, Antwerp, and Ostend, sufficiently demonstrated that Napoleon had not abandoned the hope of wresting the sceptre of the seas from Great Britain ; while the order to erect in the centre of the Place Vendôme a pillar in imitation of the column of Trajan, to be surmounted by the statue of Charlemagne, already revealed the secret design of his successor to reconstruct the Empire of the West.<sup>1</sup>

Bign. ii.  
52, 264.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

FOREIGN HISTORY DURING THE PEACE OF AMIENS—FROM THE  
CONCLUSION OF HOSTILITIES TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.  
—OCTOBER 1801—MAY 1803.

UNBOUNDED was the joy, unlimited the hopes, conceived in Europe upon the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. Ten years of ceaseless effusion of blood had tamed the fiercest spirits, and hushed the strongest passions ; the finances of all the parties in the strife had become grievously embarrassed ; and the people of every country, yielding to the joyful illusion, fondly imagined that the period of discord had terminated, and a long season of peace and prosperity was to obliterate the traces of human suffering. They did not reflect on the unstable basis on which this temporary respite was rested ; they did not consider that it was not from the causes of hostility having ceased, but from the means of carrying it on having been exhausted, that a truce had been obtained ; that the elements of a yet greater conflagration lay smouldering in the ashes of that which was past ; that discordant passions had been silenced, not extinguished ; irreconcilable interests severed, not adjusted. Little anticipating the dreadful calamities which yet awaited them, the population of Paris forgot, in the glitter of reviews, and the splendour of military pageantry, all the calamities of the Revolution ; the inhabitants of Vienna enjoyed with unwonted zest the respite from anxiety and exertion

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

1.  
Universal  
joy in Eu-  
rope at the  
termination  
of the war.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

2.  
Napoleon  
meditates  
an expedi-  
tion to St  
Domingo.  
Disastrous  
effects of  
the St Do-  
mingo re-  
volt to the  
French  
navy.

which the suspension of hostilities afforded them ; and the youth of Britain hastened in crowds to the French metropolis, to gratify their curiosity by the sight of the scenes which had so long been the theatre of tragic events, and of the heroes who had gained immortality by their glorious achievements.

But not one instant's respite did the First Consul allow to his own active and indefatigable mind. Deeming, like Caesar, nothing done while aught remained to do, he had no sooner arrived at the highest point of military glory than he turned his attention to the restoration of naval power, and eagerly availed himself of the opportunity which the suspension of maritime hostilities afforded, to recruit that decayed but indispensable part of public strength. Wisely deeming the recovery of the French colonies the only means that could be relied on for the permanent support of his marine forces, he projected, on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, an expedition for the recovery of ST DOMINGO, the once great and splendid possession of France in the Gulf of Mexico, long nursed by the care and attention of the monarchy, at once lost by the reckless innovations of the Constituent Assembly. It would seem as if the laws of Providence, in nations not less than individuals, have provided for the certain ultimate punishment of inordinate passions, in the consequences flowing from their own indulgence. Long before the war commenced, or the fleets of France had felt the weight of British strength—before one shot had been fired on the ocean, or one harbour blockaded by a hostile squadron—the basis on which the French maritime power rested had been destroyed. Not the conquest of the Nile, or the conflagration of Toulon ; not the catastrophe of Camperdown, or the thunderbolt of Trafalgar, ruined the navy of France. Severe as these blows were, they were not irremediable ; while her colonies remained, the means of repairing them existed. It was the rashness of ignorant legislation which inflicted the fatal wound, the folly of

revolutionary enthusiasm which produced consequences that could never be repaired.

St Domingo, the largest, with the exception of Cuba, and beyond all question, before the Revolution, the most flourishing of the West India islands, is about a hundred marine leagues, or three hundred English miles in length, and its mean breadth is about thirty leagues or ninety miles. It contains three thousand square leagues, of which two-thirds were, in 1789, in the hands of the Spaniards, and one-third in those of the French. Although the French portion was the smallest, yet it was incomparably the most productive, both from the nature of the soil and the cultivation bestowed on the surface. The Spanish consisted for the most part of sterile mountains, clothed with forests, or rising into naked cliffs, in the centre of the island; whereas the French possessed the plains and valleys at the feet of these, and had the advantage both of the numerous streams, which, in that humid climate, descended from their wooded sides, and the frequent bays and gulfs which the ocean had formed in its deeply indented shore. The French possession of their portion of the island commenced in 1664, and, notwithstanding the frequent interruption of their colonial trade during the wars with England, its prosperity had increased in a most extraordinary degree, and in a ratio far beyond that of any other of the West India islands. As usual in all the colonies of that part of the world, the inhabitants consisted of whites, mulattoes, and negro slaves; the first were about forty thousand, the next sixty thousand, while the slave population exceeded five hundred thousand. Such a disproportion was in itself a most perilous element in social prosperity; but it was much increased by the habits and prejudices of the European race, who were exposed to so many dangers. A large portion of the property of the island was in the hands of an inconsiderable number of great and old families, whose fortunes were immense, their prejudices strong, and luxury extreme; while a far more nume-

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

3.

Description  
of St Do-  
mingo.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vi  
457, 458,  
460, 461.<sup>4</sup>.  
Its statisti-  
cal details.

rous but less opulent body, under the name of *Petits Blancs*, were gradually rising into importance, and, like the *Tiers Etat* in the mother country, felt far more jealous of the established aristocracy than apprehensive of the consequences of political innovation. Not a few also of the great proprietors were overwhelmed with debt, the natural consequence of long-continued extravagance; and experience soon proved, that no less in the new than the old world, it was in that class that the most ardent and dangerous partisans of revolutionary change were to be found.<sup>1</sup>

The produce of the island, and the commerce which it maintained with the mother country before the commencement of the troubles, were immense. The French part alone raised a greater quantity of colonial produce than the whole British West India islands taken together. Its exports in 1788 amounted to the enormous value of one hundred and eighty-nine million francs, or £7,560,000, and the gross produce, including the Spanish portion, reached four hundred and sixty million francs, or £18,400,000; while its imports, in manufactures of the parent state, were no less than two hundred and fifty million francs, or £10,000,000 sterling. More than half of this immense produce was re-exported from France to other states, and the commerce thence arising was the chief support of its maritime power. Sixteen hundred vessels, and twenty-seven thousand sailors, were employed in conducting all the branches of this vast colonial traffic. The inhabitants of the French portion, consisted of 25,000 Europeans, an equal number of free mulattoes, and 400,000 negro slaves. The soil of the island was equally suitable in the plains for the cultivation of sugar, indigo, and cotton, and in the mountains for that of coffee and cocoa. The value of its produce was not less than £30,000,000, at the present value of money, of which at least a half belonged to France. With so magnificent a settlement, France had no occasion to envy the dependencies of all other states put together.<sup>2</sup>\*

<sup>2</sup> Dum. v  
112, 113.  
Jom. xiv.  
445. Bign. ii  
407. Malte  
Brun, c. 93,  
v. 583.  
Thiers, iii.  
, &c.

\* The produce of the whole British West India islands exported was, anterior

It was this splendid and unequalled colonial possession which the French nation threw away and destroyed at the commencement of the Revolution, with a recklessness and improvidence of which the previous history of the world had afforded no example. CHAP. 1801.

Hardly had the cry of liberty and equality been raised in France, when it was re-echoed warmly and vehemently from the shores of St Domingo. Independent of the natural passion for liberty which must ever exist among those who are subjected to the restraints of servitude, the slave population of this colony was very soon assailed by revolutionary agents and emissaries, and the workshops and fields of the planters were overrun by heated missionaries, who poured into an ignorant and ardent multitude the new-born ideas of European freedom. The planters were far from appreciating the danger with which they were menaced. On the contrary, a large proportion of the lower class took part, as usual in revolutionary convulsions, with the popular party, and aided in the propagation of principles, destined soon to issue for themselves in conflagration and massacre. All united in regarding the crisis in the mother country as a favourable opportunity for asserting their independence, and emancipating themselves from those restraints which the jealousy of her policy had imposed on their commerce. By a decree on March 8, 1790, the Constituent Assembly had empowered each colony belonging to the Republic to make known its wishes on the subject of a constitution, these wishes to be expressed by colonial assemblies, freely elected and recognised by their citizens. This privilege excited the most ruinous divisions among the inhabitants of European descent, already sufficiently menaced by the ideas ferment-

5.  
Origin of the revolution in that island. Rast measures of the French Constituent Assembly.

March 8, 1790.

to the emancipation of the negroes, £8,448,839; the British manufactures they consumed was £3,988,286; the shipping employed in their trade 249,079 tons; the seamen, 13,691 in the outward, 14,900 in the homeward voyages. The total gross agricultural produce of the islands was about £22,000,000.—See *Parl. Return*, 4th June 1833; and *Porter's Parl. Tables*, i. 64. Since the disastrous measure of emancipation, the exports of the sugar islands have fallen off above a third; the tonnage they require is now only 160,000.

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XXXVI.

1801.

ing in the negro population. The whites claimed the exclusive right of voting for the election of the members of this important assembly, while the mulattoes strenuously asserted their title to an equal share in the representation; and the blacks, intoxicated with the novel doctrines so keenly discussed by all classes of society, secretly formed the project of ridding themselves of both. This decree of the National Assembly was brought out to the island by Lieutenant-Colonel Ogé, a mulatto officer in the service of France, who openly proclaimed the opinion of the parent legislature, that the half-caste and free negroes were entitled to their full share in the election of the representatives. The jealousy of the planters was immediately excited. They refused to acknowledge the decree of the Assembly, constituted themselves into a separate legislature, and, having seized Ogé in the Spanish territory, put him to death by the torture of the wheel, under circumstances of atrocious cruelty.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
112, 119,  
123.

6.  
Freedom is  
conferred on  
all persons  
of colour.

May 17th,  
1791.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. viii.  
123, 125.  
Bertrand de  
Moll. Mem.  
193, 195.

This unpardonable proceeding, as is usually the case with such acts of barbarity, aggravated instead of stifling the prevailing discontents; and the excitement in the colony soon became so vehement, that the Constituent Assembly felt the necessity of taking some steps to allay it. The moderate and violent parties in that body took different sides, and all Europe looked with anxiety upon a debate so novel in its kind, and fraught with such momentous consequences to a large portion of the human race. Barnave, Malouet, Alexander Lameth, Bertrand de Molleville, and Clermont Tonnerre, strongly argued, that men long accustomed to servitude could not receive the perilous gift of liberty with safety either to themselves or to others, except by slow degrees, and that the effect of suddenly admitting that bright light upon a benighted population, would be to throw them into inevitable and fatal convulsions.<sup>2</sup> But Mirabeau, the master-spirit of the Assembly, and the only one of its leaders who combined popular principles with a just appreciation of the danger

of pushing them to excess, was no more, and the declamations of Brissot and the Girondists prevailed over these statesmanlike ideas. By a decree passed on 17th May 1791, the privileges of equality were conferred indiscriminately on all persons of colour born of a free father and mother.

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XXXVI.  
1801.

Far from appreciating the hourly increasing dangers of their situation, and endeavouring to form with the new citizens an organised body to check the further progress of levelling principles, the planters openly endeavoured to resist this rash decree. Civil war was preparing in this once peaceful and beautiful colony; arms were collecting; the soldiers, caressed and seduced by both parties, were wavering between their old feelings of regal allegiance and the modern influence of intoxicating principles, when a new and terrible enemy arose, who speedily extinguished in blood the discord of his oppressors. On the night of the 22d August the negro revolt, long and secretly organised, at once broke forth, and wrapt the whole northern part of the colony in flames. Jean François, a slave of vast penetration, firm character, and violent passions, not unmingled with generosity, was the leader of the conspiracy; his lieutenants were Biasson and TOUSSAINT. The former, of gigantic stature, herculean strength, and indomitable ferocity, was well fitted to assert that superiority which such qualities seldom fail to command in savage times; the latter, gifted with rare intelligence, profound dissimulation, boundless ambition, and heroic firmness, was fitted to become at once the Numa and the Romulus of the sable republic in the western hemisphere.<sup>1</sup>

7.  
The insurrection  
breaks out.

August 22,  
1791.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
125, 127.  
Bign. ii.  
395.

This vast conspiracy, productive in the end of calamities in the island, unparalleled even in the long catalogue of European atrocity, had for its objects the total extirpation of the whites, and the establishment of an independent black government over the whole colony. So inviolable was the secrecy, so general the dissimulation of the slaves, that this awful catastrophe was noways appre-

8.  
Its progress  
and horrors.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
127, 130.  
Rap. à l'As-  
semblée  
Const. 23,  
27.

9.  
Furious  
civil war in  
the south of  
the island.

hended by the European proprietors; and a conspiracy which embraced nearly the whole negro population of the island, was revealed only by the obscure hints of a few faithful domestics, who, without betraying their comrades, warned their masters of the approach of an unknown and terrible danger. The explosion was sudden and dreadful, beyond anything ever before seen among mankind. At once the beautiful plains in the north of the island were covered with fires; the labour of a century was devoured in a night; while the negroes, like unchained tigers, precipitated themselves on their masters, seized their arms, massacred them without pity, or threw them into the flames. From all quarters the terrified planters fled to Cape Town, already menaced by ten thousand discontented slaves in its own bosom; while fifteen thousand insurgents surrounded the city, threatening instant destruction to the trembling fugitives within its walls. The cruelties exercised on the unhappy captives on both sides, in this disastrous contest, exceeded anything recorded in history. The negroes marched with spiked infants on their spears instead of colours; they sawed asunder the male prisoners, and violated the females on the dead bodies of their husbands. Nor were the whites slow in taking vengeance for these atrocities. In several sallies from Cape Town, the discipline and courage of the Europeans prevailed. Numerous prisoners were made, who were instantly put to death; and the indiscriminate rage of the victors extended to the old men, women, and children of the insurgent race, who had taken no part in the revolt.<sup>1</sup>

While these disasters were overwhelming the northern part of the island, the southern was a prey to the fierce and increasing discord of the planters and people of colour. At length the opposite parties came into open collision. The mulattoes, aided by a body of negroes, blockaded Port-au-Prince; while the whites of that town and its vicinity, supported by the national guard and

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1801.

troops or the line, assembled their forces to raise the siege. The black army was commanded by a chief named Hyacinthe, who displayed in the action an uncommon degree of skill and intrepidity. The shock was terrible; but at length the planters were overthrown, and their broken remains forced back to the town. In other quarters similar actions took place, with various success, but the same general result; the whites were finally forced into the cities, and the plains overrun by the insurgent forces.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
130, 138.

Overwhelmed with consternation at these disastrous events, the Constituent Assembly endeavoured, when it was too late, to retrace their steps. Barnave, who had so ably resisted the precipitate emancipation of the coloured races, and clearly predicted the consequences to which it would lead, prevailed upon them, in those brief days of returning moderation which signalised the close of their career, to pass a decree, which declared in substance that the external relations and commerce of the colonies should alone be subject to the direct legislation of the National Assembly in the parent state, and that the colonial assemblies should have the exclusive right of legislating, with the approbation of the king, for the internal condition and rights of the different classes of inhabitants. But it was too late. This wise principle, which, if embraced earlier in the discussion, might have averted all the disasters, only added fuel to the flames which were consuming the unhappy colony. The planters, irritated by injury and hardened by misfortune, positively refused to make any dispositions for the gradual extinction of slavery, and insisted upon the immediate and unqualified submission of the whole insurgents, mulatto and negro; while the slaves, emboldened by unlooked-for success, openly asserted their determination to come to no accommodation but on condition of their absolute freedom.<sup>2</sup>

10.  
The Constituent Assembly in vain try to retrace their steps. Sept. 24, 1791.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. viii.  
138, 142.

Three delegates of the Convention, with a reinforcement of three thousand men, were despatched, in Novem-

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

11.  
The French  
delegates in  
vain endea-  
t-  
the differ-  
ences.

ber 1791, to endeavour to re-establish the affairs of the colony, and reconcile its discordant inhabitants; but they soon found that the passions excited on both sides were so vehement as to be incapable of reconciliation. They arrived at Cape Town, where they found the remnant of the white population blockaded by the negro forces. They were received by the members of the colonial legislature covered with black, and those of the municipality arrayed in red crape; while instruments of punishment, gibbets and scaffolds erected in the market-place, too surely told the bloody scenes which the island had recently witnessed. Their first step was to proclaim a general amnesty, which was received with apparent thankfulness in the insurgent camps, and cold distrust by the colonial legislature. Toussaint repaired to the town, where he professed the desire of the negroes to return to their duty, if their rights, as proclaimed by the mother country, were recognised; but his language was not that of rebels negotiating an amnesty for their offences, but of an independent power, actuated by a desire to stop the effusion of blood. As such, it excited the indignation of the planters, who insisted on the unqualified submission of the slaves, and the punishment of the authors of the revolt; demands which so enraged the negroes, that it was with difficulty Toussaint could prevent them from giving their indignation vent by the indiscriminate massacre of all the prisoners in their hands.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
143, 145.

12.  
The insur-  
rection be-  
comes uni-  
versal.

The Constituent Assembly had flattered itself that its last decree, which put the fate of the mulatto and negro population into the hands of the colonial legislature, would have had the effect of inducing the latter to concede emancipation to the half-caste race, and of conciliating these, through gratitude for so great a benefit conferred on them by their former masters. But in forming that hope, they proved their ignorance of the effect of concessions dictated by alarm, of which their own institutions were soon to afford so memorable an

example. The colonial legislature, aware, from dear-bought experience, that the prospect of such acquisitions in that moment of excitement would only inflame with tenfold fury all who had a drop of negro blood in their veins, resolutely refused to make any concessions even to the mulatto population. The commissioners of the National Assembly openly took part with that unhappy body of men, thus deprived of the benefit conferred on them by the mother country; in consequence of which the war, which had subsided during the progress of the negotiation, broke out again with redoubled fury, and the mulattoes everywhere joined their skill and intelligence to the numbers and ferocity of the negroes. A large body of whites was massacred in the church of Ouana-minthe by the Africans, whom the mulattoes had the cruelty to introduce; and Cape Town itself was nearly surprised by Biasson and Toussaint at the head of a chosen body of their followers. The contest had no longer a semblance of equality. The insurrection broke out on every side, extended into every quarter; fire and sword devoured the remains of this once splendid colony; the wretched planters all took shelter in Cape Town; and the slaves, deprived of the means of subsistence by their own excesses, dispersed through the woods, reverting to the chase or plunder for a precarious existence.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Legislative Assembly, which had succeeded the Constituent, a step farther advanced in revolutionary violence, was preparing ulterior measures of the most frantic character. Irritated at the colonial legislature for not having followed up their intentions, and instigated by the populace, whom the efforts of Brissot and the *Société des Amis des Noirs* at Paris had roused to a perfect frenzy on the subject, they revoked the decree of the 24th September preceding, which had conferred such ample powers on the colonial legislatures, dissolved the Assembly at Cape Town, and despatched three new commissioners, Arthaux, Santhonax, and Polverel, with

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
145, 151.

13.  
The Girondists resolved upon unlimited concession.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

151, 152.  
Toul. iv.  
172.

unlimited powers to settle the affairs of the colony. In vain Barnave and the remnant of the constitutional party in the Assembly strove to moderate these extravagant proceedings: the violence of the Jacobins bore down all opposition. "Don't talk to us of danger," said Brissot; "let the colonies perish rather than one principle be abandoned."<sup>1</sup>

14.  
The arrival  
of the com-  
missioners  
augments  
the discord,  
May 1789.

June 10th,  
1793.

The proceedings of the new commissioners speedily brought matters to a crisis. They arrived first at Port-au-Prince, and, in conformity with the secret instructions of the government, which were to dislodge the whites from that stronghold, they sent off to France the soldiers of the regiment of Artois, established a Jacobin club, transported to France or America thirty of the leading planters, and issued a proclamation, in which they exhorted the colonists "to lay aside at last the prejudices of colour." Having thus laid the revolutionary train at Port-au-Prince, they embarked for Cape Town, where they arrived in the middle of June. Matters had by this time reached such a height there as indicated the immediate approach of a crisis. The intelligence of the execution of the king, and proclamation of a republic, had roused to the very highest pitch the democratic passions of all the inferior classes. The planters, with too good reason, apprehended that the Convention which had succeeded the Legislative Assembly would soon outstrip them in violence, and put the finishing stroke to their manifold calamities, by at once proclaiming the liberty of the slaves, and so destroying the remnant of property which they still possessed. But their destruction was nearer at hand than they supposed. On the 20th of June, a quarrel accidentally arose between a French naval captain and a mulatto officer in the service of the colonial government; the commissioners ordered them both into their presence, without regard to the distinction of colour, and this excited the highest indignation in the officers of the marine, who landed with their crews to

June 20th,  
1793.

take vengeance for the indignity done to one of their members. The colonists loudly applauded their conduct, and invoked their aid as the saviours of St Domingo : the exiles brought from Port-au-Prince fomented the discord as the only means of effecting their liberation ; a civil war speedily ensued in the blockaded capital, and for two days blood flowed in torrents in these insane contests between the sailors of the fleet and the mulatto population.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
152, 159.

The negro chiefs, secretly informed of all these disorders, resolved to profit by the opportunity thus afforded to them of finally destroying the whites. Three thousand insurgents penetrated through the works, stripped of their defenders during the general tumult, and, making straight for the prisons, delivered a large body of slaves who were there in chains. Instantly the liberated captives spread themselves over the town, set it on fire in every quarter, and massacred the unhappy whites when seeking to escape from the conflagration. A scene of matchless horror ensued : twenty thousand negroes broke into the city, and, with the torch in one hand and the sword in the other, spread slaughter and devastation around. Hardly had the strife of the Europeans with each other subsided, when they found themselves overwhelmed by the vengeance which had been accumulating for centuries in the African breast. Neither age nor sex was spared ; the young were cut down in striving to defend their houses, the aged in the churches where they had fled to implore protection ; virgins were immolated on the altar ; weeping infants hurled into the fires. Amidst the shrieks of the sufferers and the shouts of the victors, the finest city in the West Indies was reduced to ashes. Its splendid churches, its stately palaces, were wrapped in flames ; thirty thousand human beings perished in the massacre,<sup>2</sup> and the wretched fugitives who had escaped from this scene of horror on board the ships were guided in their passage over the deep by the prodigious light which arose from

1.  
and mas-  
Cape Town.

<sup>2</sup> Toul. i.  
257, 260.  
Dum. viii.  
157, 160.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

their burning habitations. They almost all took refuge in the United States, where they were received with the most generous hospitality ; but the frigate *la Fine* foundered on the passage, and five hundred of the survivors from the flames perished in the waves.

16.  
The universal  
freedom  
of the blacks  
is proclaimed.  
June 3,  
1793.

Thus fell the queen of the Antilles, the most stately monument of European opulence that had yet arisen in the New World. Nothing deterred, however, by this unparalleled calamity, the commissioners of the Republic pursued their frantic career ; and, amidst the smoking ruins of the capital, published a decree which proclaimed the freedom of all the blacks who should enrol themselves under the standards of the Republic ; a measure which was equivalent to the instant abolition of slavery over the whole island. Further resistance was now hopeless. The Republican authorities became the most ardent persecutors of the planters ; pursued alike by Jacobin frenzy and African vengeance, they fled in despair. Poverel proclaimed the liberty of the blacks in the west, and Montbrun gave free vent to his hatred of the colonists, by compelling them to leave Port-au-Prince, which had not yet fallen into the hands of the negroes. Everywhere the triumph of the slaves was complete, and the authority of the planters for ever destroyed. But although the liberation of the negroes was effected, the independence of the island was not yet established. The English regarded with the utmost jealousy this violent explosion in their vicinity ; and the leaders of the insurgents soon perceived that they could maintain their freedom only by an alliance with the French government. Toussaint, influenced by these views, passed into the service of France with the rank of colonel, and the blacks began to be organised into regiments under the standards of the Republic.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
160, 166.

The British before long appeared as actors on this theatre of devastation. They were naturally apprehensive of the utmost danger to their West Indian posses-

sions, from the establishment of so great a revolutionary outpost in the centre of the Gulf of Mexico ; and entertained a hope that, by allying themselves with the remnant of the planters, they might not only extinguish that frightful volcano, but possibly wrest the island with all its commerce from the French Republic. A British squadron appeared off Port-au-Prince early in 1794, and took possession of that town in the June following. They afterwards secured the mole of St Nicholas, the principal harbour of the island ; and the negro chief Hyacinthe passed into their service with twelve thousand blacks. Encouraged by this great reinforcement, they commenced a systematic warfare for the reduction of the island. But Toussaint, at the head of the French forces and the great majority of the negroes, still maintained the standard of independence : the blacks soon deserted the British standard ; the deadly climate mowed down the European troops ; they were gradually pressed backward to the sea-coast ; and at length the mole of St Nicholas, their principal stronghold, capitulated to the victorious negro chief.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

17.

The English obtain a footing on the island, but are soon expelled.

June 5,  
1794.<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii  
167, 171.  
Bign. ii.  
396, 397.

No sooner were they delivered from external enemies, than the parties in the island broke out into furious hostility with each other. The mulattoes beheld with undisguised apprehension the preponderance which the negroes had acquired in the late contests, and arrayed themselves under General Rigaud, and Hédouville, the commissioner of the French government, to resist Toussaint, who was at the head of the African population. A frightful civil war ensued, which was long carried on with various success ; but at length the mulattoes were overcome, and Rigaud was forced to take refuge within the walls of Cayes, the sole fortress on the island which still acknowledged his authority. Toussaint, who still professed himself a lieutenant of the French Republic, now undisputed master of the field, immediately turned his forces against the Spanish part of the colony, which had

18.

Furious civil wars between the negroes and mulattoes.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> *Jom* xiv.  
430, 434.

19.  
Napoleon  
confirms  
Toussaint  
in his com-  
mand.

been ceded to France by the treaty of Bâle. He marched at the same time against Port-au-Prince and Cape Town; his progress was one continued triumph; the Spanish territory received him without resistance, and in December 1800, his authority was obeyed from one end of the territory to the other.<sup>1</sup>

Matters were in this situation when Napoleon, who had now succeeded to the helm of government, began to turn his attention to the affairs of this long neglected and now ruined colony. Entirely directed by military ideas, he immediately conceived the design of regaining the French dominion over the island by means of Toussaint, who had now concentrated in his own hands all its forces, and for this purpose lent a willing ear to the representations of Colonel Vincent, whom the negro chief had sent to Paris to lay the state of its affairs before the First Consul. Influenced by these views, he sent back that officer with a decree, confirming Toussaint in his command as general-in-chief, establishing the constitution there, which in France followed the 18th Brumaire, and issued a proclamation, in which he called on the "brave blacks to remember that France alone had recognised their freedom." This proclamation cut off all hopes from Rigaud and the remnant of the mulatto population, who immediately, in despair, embarked from Cayes, and dispersed themselves over the West India Islands, abandoning for ever their country to the insurgent population for whom they had made so many sacrifices—the usual fate of those in the middle ranks who stir up the passions of the lowest.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Jom*. xiv.  
435, 440.  
*Bign.* ii.  
398, 399.

20.  
Vigorous  
measures of  
the negro  
chief in the  
administra-  
tion.

Toussaint, now undisputed governor of the whole island, adopted the most vigorous measures to put an end to the public discord. While he himself published a general amnesty, and paraded in triumph through the island, attended by all the pomp of European splendour, he committed to his ferocious lieutenant, Dessalines, the task of extinguishing the remains of the hostile party.

That chief executed the duty with scrupulous exactness and fatal effect. The method of wholesale execution by means of noyades, imported from France by the revolutionary agents, was practised with cruel success, and African vengeance availed itself of the means of destruction which revolutionary wickedness had invented. While Toussaint was received with discharges of cannon and every demonstration of public joy in the principal cities of the island, ten thousand unhappy captives were put to death by the orders of his bloodthirsty lieutenant; and the remains of the ardent race of mulattoes, whose ambition had first disturbed the peace of the island, perished by the hands of the servile crowd whom they had themselves elevated into irresistible power.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
399, 400.

Delivered by this bloody execution from almost all his enemies, Toussaint applied himself, with his wonted vigour, to restore the cultivation of the island, which, amidst the public calamities, had been almost totally abandoned. Imitating the feudal policy, he distributed the unoccupied buildings and lands among his military followers; and their authority having compelled the common men to work, the level parts of the country soon assumed a comparatively flourishing appearance. At the same time an assembly of the leading chiefs of the country was convoked at Cape Town, who drew up a constitution for the inhabitants, and conferred on Toussaint unlimited authority, under the title of President and Governor for life, with the right of nominating his successor. Colonel Vincent was immediately despatched to Paris with the new constitution, and a letter from Toussaint to the First Consul, beginning with the words, "The first of blacks to the first of whites." The African chief was active, energetic, and magnanimous: his deeds will secure for him a lasting place in the page of history. But he was dark and deceitful, a perfect master of dissimulation, and, like all blacks who have risen to eminence, vain to a degree of which all the vanity, great as it is, of the Old World can give but a feeble idea.<sup>2</sup>

21.

Hi  
tural policy.  
He is ap-  
pointed pre-  
life of  
island.

1st Ju  
1801.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiv.  
444, 445.  
Bign. ii.  
401, 402.  
Dum. viii.  
176, 177.  
Thiers, iv.  
181.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

22.  
Napoleon  
instantly  
resolves to  
subdue the  
island.

This unexpected intelligence was a severe blow to the First Consul. He at once perceived that Toussaint had no intention of remaining his lieutenant; that the feeling of independence had taken root; and that, unless a blow was immediately struck, the colony was forever lost to the French empire. Colonel Vincent arrived with this despatch on the 14th October 1801, just thirteen days after the signature of the preliminaries of peace with England, and when the now pacified ocean afforded him the means of at once reasserting the French dominion over the island. He immediately resolved to subdue the colony by force of arms, and restore to France those inestimable maritime advantages which its possession had so long secured to the monarchy. The idea of regaining a commerce which, with the addition of the Spanish part of the island, might be expected to amount to sixteen millions sterling, employ two thousand ships and thirty thousand seamen, was irresistible to a newly installed sovereign, who felt his deficiency in these particulars to be the only impediment to universal dominion.<sup>1</sup>

gn. ii.  
402. Jom.  
xiv. 445.

23.  
Increasing  
prosperity of  
the island  
under Tous-  
saint's admi-  
nion.

Meanwhile, under the stern and severe government of the African chief, the fields of St Domingo began to regain in part their once smiling aspect. The military discipline which, during the long previous wars, he had been enabled to diffuse among his followers, afforded him the means of establishing that forced cultivation, without which experience has ever found the negro race incapable of pursuing the labour of civilised life. The mulattoes, compelled to engage in the most degrading occupations, bitterly lamented the insupportable black yoke they had imposed upon themselves; the negroes, forced to re-enter their fields and workshops, found that their dreams of liberty had vanished into air, and that they had only made an exchange of masters for the worse. Their comfortable dwellings, their neat gardens, their substantial fare, had disappeared, and there remained only the bitterness of servitude without its protection, the license of freedom without its industry.

But, amidst the most acute individual suffering, the rigid government of Toussaint succeeded ere long, by the application of force, in restoring, in part, the cultivation of the colony. The negroes were detained, by the terrors of military execution, in the most complete subordination. His lieutenants, Christophe and Dessalines, attended by an armed band, enforced the obligation of labour, and executed the rural code with the most unsparing severity. Often they caused delinquents to be executed on the spot, in their own presence, for trifling acts of disobedience. The chiefs to whom the lands were allotted submitted to the rule of a master whom they at once feared and admired. Commerce with the adjoining islands and the United States began to revive from its ashes; and out of the surplus produce and customs of the island, the government obtained the means of maintaining a respectable military establishment. Eighteen thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred mounted *gens-d'armes*, preserved order in the colony, and gave it the appearance of a military establishment. Toussaint, amidst other great projects, had conceived the design of purchasing slaves from the adjoining states, for experience had already proved that the African race, when free, is incapable of continued personal labour. His activity was unbounded. He often rode forty leagues in a day, and, after the manner of the Russian czars, suddenly fell like a flash of lightning on delinquents in a part of the island, who imagined he was a hundred miles off, and wholly ignorant of their proceedings. He eagerly amassed a treasure, a resource against future dangers, which was stored up in his stronghold at "Morne du Chaos," in the midst of woody steeps and precipices. Like most men of an ardent temperament, he was passionately fond of women, especially of the old European families, many of whom purchased his protection by their dishonour. His courtiers constantly compared him to the First Consul, and nothing flattered him so much as being assimilated to the hero of



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
177, 178.  
Thiers, iv.  
177, 182.

the Old World. His authority was absolute and universal; and the convulsions of St Domingo added another to the numerous proofs furnished by history, that revolutionary movements, under whatever circumstances commenced, invariably terminate in establishing the unlimited despotism of a single individual.<sup>1</sup> \*

24.

tions of Na-  
poleon for its  
subjugation.

But it was no part of the designs of the First Consul to allow this magnificent colony to slip out of the grasp of France, or to leave its reviving commerce to nourish only the navy of Britain. Hardly was the ink of his signature to the preliminaries of a maritime peace dry, when he turned his attention to the conquest of the island. Independently of the maritime and political advantages to be derived from such a measure, he entertained the most sanguine hopes of the accession of influence which he would obtain from the disposal of the immense possessions, belonging chiefly to the emigrant noblesse, which would be recovered in the western hemisphere. Having taken his resolution, he proceeded, with his wonted vigour and ability, in preparing the means of its execution. An extraordinary degree of activity was immediately manifested in the dockyards of Brest, l'Orient, Rochefort, Toulon, Havre, Flushing, and Cadiz. Land forces began to diverge towards these different points of embarkation, and the destination of the armament was announced in the following proclamation issued by government :—" At St Domingo, systematic acts have disturbed the political horizon. Under *equivocal appearances*, the government has permitted itself to see only the ignorance which confounds names and things, which usurps when it seeks to obey ; but a fleet and an army, which are preparing in the harbours of Europe, will soon dissipate these clouds, and St Domingo will be reduced, in whole, to the govern-

22d Nov.  
1801.

\* The American war of independence is no exception. It was not so much a revolutionary movement as a national war between one distant power and another ; and, but for the boundless extent of the back settlements, it is more than doubtful whether even there the same results would not have taken place before this time.

ment or the Republic." In the proclamation addressed to the blacks, it was announced by the same authority :—

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1801.

" Whatever may be your origin or your colour, you are Frenchmen, and all alike free and equal before God and the Republic. At St Domingo and Guadaloupe slavery no longer exists—all are free—all shall remain free. At Martinique different principles must be observed."<sup>1</sup>

The force collected in the different harbours of the Republic for this purpose was the greatest that Europe had ever yet sent forth to the New World. Thirty-five ships of the line, twenty-one frigates, and above eighty smaller vessels, having on board twenty-one thousand land troops, were soon assembled. They resembled rather the preparations for the subjugation of a rival power, than the forces destined for the reduction of a distant colonial settlement. The fleet was commanded by Villaret-Joyeuse; the army by le Clerc, the brother-in-law of Napoleon and husband of the Princess Pauline whose exquisite figure has since been immortalised by the chisel of Canova. The land forces were almost all composed of the conquerors of Hohenlinden; the First Consul gladly availed himself of this opportunity to rid himself of a large portion of the veterans most adverse to his authority. The most distinguished generals of Moreau's army, Richepanse, Rochambeau, Lapoype, and their redoubtable comrades, were employed in the same destination. In the selection of the general-in-chief, the First Consul was not less influenced by private considerations. He was desirous of giving the means of enriching themselves to two relations, whose passion for dress and extravagant habits had already occasioned repeated and disagreeable pecuniary demands on the public treasury.<sup>2</sup>

The British government naturally conceived no small disquietude at the preparation of so great an armament, at the very time when the signature of the preliminaries rendered it difficult to imagine what could be its destination. They demanded, accordingly, explanations on the

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
193, 194.  
Bign. ii.  
408, 409.

25.  
Immen-e  
naval and  
military  
forces as  
sembled.

<sup>2</sup> Duchess  
d'Abr. vi. 53,  
99. Norv.  
ii. 194.  
Bign. ii.  
411.

26.  
The British  
government  
makes no  
opposition.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 335.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 99.  
Dum. viii.  
202, 203.

subject, and the cabinet of the Tuileries at once unfolded the object of the expedition. Not deeming themselves entitled to interfere between France and her colonies, and perhaps not secretly disinclined to the subjugation of so formidable a neighbour as an independent negro state in the close vicinity of her slave colonies, Great Britain abstained from any further opposition, and merely took the precautionary measures of assembling a powerful fleet of observation in Bantry Bay, and greatly strengthening the naval force in the West Indies.<sup>1</sup>

27.  
The expedi-  
tion sails,  
and arrives  
off St Do-  
mingo.

The fleets from Brest, l'Orient, and Rochefort, all set sail on the 14th December 1801. The land forces they had on board, under the immediate command of le Clerc, amounted at first only to ten thousand men, but they were followed by reinforcements from Cadiz, Brest, Havre, and Holland, which swelled the troops ultimately to thirty-five thousand men. The first division of this formidable force appeared off the island in the beginning of February. So completely was the government of St Domingo at fault as to the object of the expedition, that, had it not been for fifteen days which were lost in the Bay of Biscay in assembling the different divisions of the fleet, Toussaint would have been surprised ere he had begun to make any preparations whatever for his defence. No sooner, however, did he receive intelligence from an American vessel of the appearance of the fleet in the western latitudes, than he instantly took his line, despatched messengers in all directions to assemble his forces, and announced his heroic resolution in these memorable words:—"A dutiful son, without doubt, owes submission and obedience to his mother; but if that parent should become so unnatural as to aim at the destruction of its own offspring, nothing remains but to intrust vengeance to the hands of God. If I must die, I will die as a brave soldier and a man of honour. I fear no one."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xv.  
41, 42.  
Dum. viii.  
205, 206.  
Le Clerc, i.  
117, 132.

But events quickly succeeded each other, which warned the negro chief of the desperate nature of the contest to

which he was committed. He had recently before concluded a convention for mutual assistance with General Nugent, the governor of Jamaica, and with reason placed great reliance on the efficacious support of the English naval power to protect his dominions from the threatened invasion, when the intelligence of the peace of Amiens, followed by accounts of the arrival of the French fleet in the neighbourhood of the island, at once dissipated these expectations. He hastened to Cape Samana to obtain, with his own eyes, a view of the formidable armament of which report had so magnified the terrors; and was struck with astonishment at the sight of it, covering, as it did, the ocean with its sails, and so much beyond anything yet seen in these latitudes. For a moment he hesitated on the part he should adopt. "We must die," said he; "France in a body has come to St Domingo. We have been deceived; they are determined to take vengeance and enslave the blacks." Recovering, however, soon after, his wonted resolution, he mournfully cast his eyes over the interminable fleet, whose sails, as far as the eye could reach, covered the ocean, and despatched couriers in all directions to rouse the most determined resistance. His forces, however, even with all the advantages of climate and local knowledge, were scarcely correspondent to the magnanimous resolution. They hardly exceeded twenty thousand men, dispersed over the whole island; and whatever their courage may have been, they could not be expected to stand the shock of the troops with whom the Austrian veterans had contended in vain.<sup>1</sup>

Le Clerc gave orders to commence the disembarkation at Cape Town, on the 1st February, where Christophe commanded; but difficulties arose in consequence of the impossibility of finding a pilot to guide the vessels into the harbour. At length the admiral seized upon the harbour-admiral, a mulatto, named Sangos, put a rope about his neck, and threatened him with instant death if he did not show the way, and a bribe of fifty thousand

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1801.

28.

First irreso-  
lution, but  
final firm-  
ness of  
Toussaint.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
206, 207.  
Jom. xv. 42,  
43, 48. Le  
Clerc, i. 19,  
35.

29.

The French  
land, and  
Cape Town  
is burnt by  
the blacks.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

4th Feb.  
1802.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
208, 218.  
Jom. xv. 46,  
47, 48. Norv.  
ii. 207.

30.  
But the  
French  
generally  
prevail in  
the field.

francs (£2000) if he would; but nothing could induce him to betray his country. The precious time thus gained was turned to a good account by Christophe. He rapidly organised everything for burning what yet remained of the town, which had been in part rebuilt since the sack ten years before; removed all the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, and all the stores which could be of service to the enemy, and only waited the signal of disembarkation to apply the torch in every direction. On the 4th, the division of Hardy effected a landing on the one side of the capital, and Rochambeau on the other, under cover of a brisk cannonade from the fleet; on the same night the town was set on fire, and burned with the utmost fury; out of eight hundred houses, scarcely sixty were standing on the following morning, and the first struggles of African independence were signalised by an act of devotion, of which European patriotism has exhibited few examples. The generous sacrifice was not made in vain: both stores and provisions, which might have furnished invaluable supplies to the army, were destroyed, and out of the ruins of the city arose those pestilential vapours which afterwards proved more fatal to the troops than all the forces that Toussaint could assemble for their destruction.<sup>1\*</sup>

This sinister commencement, however, so ominous of the desperate nature of the resistance which they might expect, was not immediately followed by the disasters which were apprehended. European skill and discipline soon asserted their wonted superiority over the military

\* The parallel conflagrations of Numantium, Cape Town, and Moscow, prove, that whatever may be the deficiency in industry, or the habits of persevering exertion, the negro race is as capable as the European of the sacrifices required by patriotic spirit. When we recollect that it was in a comparatively rude state of society that all these heroic deeds were done, and that the history of civilisation in its later stages has afforded no similar examples, we are led to the conclusion, that the progress of refinement, by extending the influence of artificial wants, and strengthening the bonds by which men are bound to their individual possessions, gradually weakens the cords of public feelings, and that a foundation is thus laid, by the wisdom of Nature, for the decay of empires in the very consequences of their extension and greatness.

efforts of the other quarters of the globe; and how could the blacks, but recently emancipated from the lash of slavery, be expected to withstand, in regular combat, the conquerors of Hohenlinden? General Kerveseau without difficulty made himself master of the Spanish part of the island, which had unwillingly submitted to the negro government. Boudet and Latouche landed at Port-au-Prince in the harbour, in the face of the enemy, and pursued them so rapidly into the town, as to save it from the conflagration with which it was menaced by the savage Dessalines; while the whole southern part of the island submitted at once to the authority of the invaders, and was thus saved from impending destruction. The important harbour of the mole of St Nicholas was occupied without opposition; but Dessalines, who had failed in accomplishing that object at Port-au-Prince, did not abandon Saint Marc till he had reduced it to ashes. On all sides the plains and sea-coast fell into the hands of the Europeans, and the negro forces were driven back into the impracticable and wooded mountain-ridges in the central parts of the island.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1802.

<sup>1</sup> Jem. xv.  
50, 53. Norv.  
ii. 207, 208.  
Bign. ii. 415,  
416. Dum.  
viii. 220.  
230.

But this apparent triumph was the result chiefly of the profound and resolute system of defence adopted by the negro government, which consisted in destroying the cities on the coast, ruining the cultivated plains which might afford supplies to the enemy, and retiring into the woody fastnesses in the interior, called, in the emphatic language of the country, "the Grand Chaos," where the system of bush-fighting might render unavailing the discipline and experience of the European soldiers. There is nothing in the temperate zone comparable to the difficulty and intricacy of these primeval forests, where enormous trees shoot up to the height of two hundred feet from the ground, and their stems are enveloped in an impenetrable thicket of creepers and underwood, which flourish under the heat of a vertical sun. No roads, few paths, traverse this savage district; almost the only mode

31.  
Description  
of the moun-  
tainous inter-  
ior to which  
the negroes  
retire.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

of penetrating through it is by following the beds of the torrents, which in that humid climate frequently furrow the sides of the mountains, where a column of regular soldiers is exposed to a murderous fire from the unseen bands stationed in the overhanging woods. It was Toussaint's design to maintain himself in these impenetrable fastnesses, sending forth merely light parties to harass the flanks and rear of the enemy, until the pestilential season of autumn arrived, and the heavy rains had generated those noxious vapours, which in that deadly climate so rapidly prove fatal to European constitutions. He had only twelve thousand regular troops remaining, but they were aided by the desultory efforts of the negroes in the plains, who were ever ready, like the peasants of la Vendée, to answer his summons, though apparently engaged only in agricultural pursuits; and with such auxiliaries, and the prospect of approaching pestilence, his resources were by no means to be despised, even by the best-appointed European army. All the blacks were animated with the most enthusiastic spirit; for the intentions of the invader were no longer doubtful, and the tenor of the last instructions to Le Clerc had transpired, which were to re-establish slavery throughout the whole island.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Norv. ii.  
207. Jom.  
xv. 53, 55.  
Dum. viii.  
230, 232.  
Le Clerc, i.  
171, 180.

32.  
Fruitless  
attempt to  
induceTous-  
saint to sub-  
mit.

Penetrated with the difficulty of the novel species of warfare on which he was about to enter, le Clerc tried to prevail on the negro chief, by conciliatory measures and the force of his paternal affections, to lay down his arms. For this purpose, he sent to him his two sons, whom he had brought with him from Paris, whither they had been sent to complete their education, along with their crafty preceptor, M. Coisson, and a letter from the First Consul, in which he acknowledged his great services to France, and offered him the command of the colony, if he would submit to the laws of the Republic. With no small difficulty the children made their way to the habitation of their father at Ennery, thirty leagues

from Cape Town, in the mountains. The mother wept for joy on beholding her long-lost offspring; and the chief himself, who was absent on their arrival, fell on their necks on his return, and for a moment was shaken in his resolution to maintain the independence of his country by the might of parental affection. He soon, however, recovered the wonted firmness of his character. In vain his sons embraced his knees, and implored him to accede to the proposal of the First Consul; in vain his wife and family added their tears. He left it to their own choice whether they would remain with him or return to France. One declared he would live and die with his father, a freeman; the other brother was agitated and uncertain. Toussaint saw through the artifice of his enemies, and clearly perceived that his submission would be the signal for the re-establishment of slavery throughout the colony. In the generous contention, patriotic duty prevailed over parental love. He sent back his sons to le Clerc, with an evasive letter proposing an armistice. The French general granted him four days to determine, and again restored them to their father. Toussaint, upon this, retained his sons, and returned no answer to le Clerc, who forthwith declared him a rebel, and prepared to carry on the war to the last extremity.<sup>1</sup>

A few days afterwards the Toulon squadron arrived, bringing a reinforcement of six thousand men; and the French general, finding himself at the head of fifteen thousand effective men, prepared for a concentric attack from all quarters on the wooded fastnesses still in the hands of the negro chief. It took place on the 17th, with the greatest success. Toussaint intrenched himself with two thousand five hundred of his best troops, supported by two thousand armed negroes, in a strong position on the summit of a plateau surrounded by precipices, entangled with underwood or overshadowed by gigantic trees, in the ravine of Couleuvre, at the entrance of

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Feb. 12.

1802.

<sup>1</sup> Thiers, iv.

199. Dum.

viii. 232.

235. Jom.

xv. 55, 59.

Norv. ii.

209, 210.

Franklin's

Hayti, 143.

33.

General and  
successful  
attack on  
his position.

Feb. 17.

Feb. 28.



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the hill and woody region. He was there attacked and defeated by Rochambeau, with the loss of seven hundred men. His lieutenant, Maurepas, who had gained an important success at Gros Morne, was by this advantage placed between two fires, and forced to surrender; and soon after entered, with all his followers, into the service of the Republic. Dessalines, defeated by Boudet in the neighbourhood of St Marc, like the governor of Moscow in after days, with his own hands set fire to his dwelling. All his officers followed his example, and the retreat of the blacks towards the mountains in the south was preceded by the massacre of twelve hundred whites, and clouds of smoke, which announced the destruction of all the plantations in that part of the island.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xv.  
60, 62. Dum.  
viii. 236,  
245. Norv.  
ii. 211, 212.  
Thiers, iv.  
263.

34.  
Desperate  
defence at  
Crête-a-  
Pierrot.

March 3.

Nothing daunted by these calamities, Dessalines had no sooner reached a place of security in the hills than he meditated an expedition against Port-au-Prince, from which the French troops had been in a great measure withdrawn; but it was defeated by the skill and valour of Latouche-Treville, and he was compelled to fall back to the mountains. The beaten remains of the blacks now assembled at the fort of Crête-à-Pierrot, an inconsiderable stronghold erected by the English at the confluence of two streams, in a position deemed inaccessible. Here, however, they were assaulted by two brigades of the French army under Debelle; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the blacks with grape and musketry, that the attempt to carry it by a *coup-de-main* failed, and the assailants were repulsed with the loss of seven hundred of their bravest troops. Le Clerc, upon this, concentrated all his disposable forces for the attack of this important point. The divisions both of Hardy and Rochambeau were brought up to support that of Debelle, and an escalade was again tried with the victorious troops of Rochambeau, who were a second time repulsed with severe loss. Le Clerc now despaired of reducing the fort but by regular approaches; and heavy artillery

having, with infinite difficulty, been at length planted against it, the defences were battered in breach, and everything disposed for an assault. Conceiving themselves unable to resist the attack of so considerable a body, the negroes, during the night, fell furiously upon the blockading forces, cut their way through, and got clear off, highly elated at having arrested the whole French army above three weeks, and inflicted on them a loss of fifteen hundred men, in the attack of a fort so inconsiderable, that fifteen pieces of cannon only were found mounted on the ramparts.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.1802.  
March 23.<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
244, 249.  
Jom. xv. 64,  
70. Norv.  
ii. 212.  
Thiers, iv.  
206.

Meanwhile Toussaint was again rallying his broken divisions in the rear of the besieging force, and had spread terror in every direction through the conquered territory. His lieutenant, Christophe, carried his nocturnal incursions as far as Cape Town, and kept in constant alarm the feeble garrison which was left amidst its ruins. The division of Hardy, in consequence, fell back to their assistance, and, reinforced by two thousand five hundred fresh troops, which had just disembarked from the Dutch fleet, its brave commander issued forth, and took the field against Christophe. But the blacks, taught by experience, nowhere appeared in large bodies, and kept up such a murderous guerilla warfare against the invaders, that, without making any sensible progress, they sustained a very serious diminution. The war daily assumed a more savage character. When the French reached Verettes, in the mountains, they found the ground strewn with the remains of eight hundred whites, many of them women and children, who had been carried away as captives by the negroes in their retreat. A stern feeling of vengeance took possession of their minds; all idea of quarter was thereafter at an end. Christophe at length retired to his old and formidable positions of Dondon and la Grand Rivière, at the entrance of the woody defiles. He was there attacked by Hardy, but the French were defeated with heavy loss.<sup>2</sup>

35.  
The war  
assumes a  
guerilla  
character.<sup>2</sup> Dum. viii  
249, 255.  
Jom. xv. 70  
72. Norv.  
ii. 214.  
Thiers, iv.  
206.

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1802.

36.

Negotia-  
tions for the  
termination  
of hostili-  
ties. Digni-  
fied conduct  
of Toussaint.

Both parties were now exhausted with this deadly strife. The negroes, driven from the rich and cultivated part of the island into the sterile and intricate woody fastnesses, had no resources for successfully prolonging the contest. Their means of subsistence must soon be expected to fail in these savage thickets; they had beheld with astonishment the agility and courage with which the French soldiers pursued them into their most inaccessible retreats, and began to despair of successfully maintaining the contest with an enemy who was continually receiving reinforcements from apparently interminable squadrons. On the other hand, le Clerc was not less desirous to come to an accommodation. Although, in a campaign of six weeks, he had, by great exertions, surmounted incredible difficulties, yet it could not be dissembled that these advantages had been gained by enormous sacrifices. The reinforcements received from France were far from compensating the losses which had been sustained; the soldiers, worn out with fatigue, and disgusted with an inglorious warfare, passionately longed for repose; their republican principles revolted at shedding their blood so profusely for the re-establishment of slavery; the military chest was exhausted, and the unhealthy season fast approaching, which would mow down the troops yet faster than the deadly aim of the negroes. These feelings at length led to an accommodation. The French general secretly entered into a separate negotiation with the leaders of the enemy; Christophe and Dessalines followed the example of Maurepas, and went over with their forces to the French service, where they received their former rank and appointments; and the heroic Toussaint was left, with a few thousand devoted followers, to make head against not only the European invaders, but the faithless Africans who had ranged themselves on their side. Borne down by necessity, the negro chief was at length forced to submit;<sup>1</sup> but, in doing so, he maintained the dignity of his character, and, instead of

May 5,  
1802.<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
423, 424.Dum. viii.  
254, 257.Jom. xv. 72,  
75. Thiers,  
iv. 207.

accepting the rank and emoluments which had seduced the fidelity of his followers, returned to his mountain farm of Ennery, and resumed, like Cincinnatus, the occupations of rural life.

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This pacification was complete; and everything promised a successful issue to this hazardous expedition. The negro chiefs rivalled each other in deeds testifying the reality of their submission. Christophe, Dessalines, Maurepas, zealously performed all the duties imposed upon them by the French general. Thirty thousand muskets were surrendered in the department of the north alone, and stored up in the magazines of Cape Town. The French even found themselves compelled to restrain the ferocious zeal of their new allies, who put to death, without mercy, all the negroes who evaded the general disarming. Everywhere the blacks returned to their usual occupations. The workshops, the fields, were filled with labourers; foreign ships began to frequent the harbours, and commerce to give an air of returning prosperity to the scene of desolation. The regulations chalked out by Toussaint were for the most part adopted; the officers he had selected confirmed in their respective commands; and the foundations of a judicious system of colonial administration laid, by an assembly convoked at Cape Town.\* As the public treasury was exhausted, General le Clerc pledged his private credit for these beneficent undertakings: a generous confidence, which was returned by the French government by a base disavowal, which involved his family in total ruin.<sup>1</sup>

37.  
General  
pacification.

<sup>1</sup> Norv. ii.  
218. Dum.  
viii. 257.  
261. Jcm.  
xv. 73, 75.

The regulations of Toussaint had converted personal into rural servitude. The negroes were compelled to work in common by their overseers and officers, and received in return a fourth of the produce, which fourth was divided among them, according to the skill and strength of each individual. The inspectors exercised a summary jurisdiction over the labourers. All delinquencies were brought before them by the proprietors, and they forthwith investigated and punished the offence with rigid severity. Free labour was unknown, and continues so, generally speaking, to this day. It was the reality of slavery without its name. These regulations were so judicious, among a people invincibly averse to voluntary exertion, that they were immediately adopted by the French general.—See DUMAS, viii. 263, 269.

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XXXVI.

1802.

38.  
Treacherous  
views of  
Napoleon.

The secret instructions of the First Consul directed the commander-in-chief to engage all the negro chiefs to accept situations in the French service, and to send them over to receive employment, according to their rank, in the French Continental armies. It was not very likely that the soldiers of Marengo and Hohenlinden would have submitted to be commanded by negro officers, or that the place of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Richepanse could have been supplied by the sable generals of division from Toussaint's army. Napoleon's real design was to deprive the blacks of their efficient leaders, and so pave the way for the re-establishment of slavery and the ancient proprietors. This was soon made manifest by what occurred at Guadaloupe. The proclamation of the First Consul had announced to the blacks the same treatment in St Domingo and Guadaloupe; and the re-establishment of servitude in the latter island revealed to the African race the fate which awaited them under the French government.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Month. ii.  
129. Dum.  
viii. 262.  
263. Nov.  
ii. 219. Jom.  
xv. 75, 76.

39.  
Perfidious  
arrest of  
Toussaint by  
the French  
authorities.

During the two months which followed the pacification, Toussaint lived in profound retirement in his country residence at Ennery. Meanwhile, however, the yellow fever broke out at Cape Town, and the hospitals were speedily crowded with French soldiers, several hundreds of whom died every day. The sight of this catastrophe excited the hopes of the negroes, and some insurrectionary movements manifested themselves among them in the mountains, not far from Toussaint's dwelling. Le Clerc immediately called upon Toussaint to disperse these assemblages, and he formed a detachment for that purpose; but the French, being suspicious of its destination, surrounded and disarmed it; and soon after, the general-in-chief, conceiving apprehensions of the fidelity of the negro leader, had him arrested and brought to Cape Town. The grounds on which this perfidious act was justified were so flimsy as to be incapable of deceiving any one; but it can hardly be made a subject of reproach against le Clerc, for his instructions were positive,<sup>2</sup> in one way

July 5,  
1802.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. viii.  
270, 271.  
Jom. xv. 77,  
78.

or another, to transport to France all the leaders of the blacks. Its infamy rests on the government of Napoleon, on whom the subsequent fate of this great man has affixed a lasting stain, which the consequent destruction of the expedition has inadequately expiated.

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The ground set forth by the French government was, that in one of his letters which they intercepted, addressed to one of his old aides-de-camp, he had congratulated him "that at length *Providence* had come to their succour."

40.  
Subsequent  
treatment  
and death of  
Toussaint.

La Providence was the name of the great hospital at Cape Town; and from this ambiguous expression, the French authorities concluded that he viewed with satisfaction the progress of the malady which was consuming them—a supposition probably not far from the truth, but which could never justify the arrest of the sable hero, while living quietly on his estate on the faith of a treaty solemnly concluded with the French government. The mode of Toussaint's arrest added to the atrocity of the deed. Instead of sending a detachment to Ennery to seize him, he was called to Gonaives by General Brunck, on the pretence that his advice was desired on the means of recovering the blacks who had escaped from the cultivation of the ground, and on the best situations for stations for the troops. The unsuspecting African fell into the snare, trusted to French honour, and was betrayed. His last words, when surrounded and seized, were,—“In destroying me, they have only cut down the tree of liberty of the blacks: but the roots remain; they will shoot forth afresh, for they are profound and numerous.” He was forthwith sent to France, and confined in the castle of Joux, in the Jura, where he died soon after, whether by natural or violent means is unknown. This castle is situated on a rocky eminence, in a defile of those romantic mountains on the road from Besançon to Lausanne.<sup>1</sup> Among the numerous spots made memorable by these wars, not the least interesting is the scene of the imprisonment and death of the greatest, after Hannibal, of African heroes;

<sup>1</sup> Thiers, iv  
356, 357.  
Norv. ii. 21  
Dum. viii.  
271, 272.  
Jom. xv. 71

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1802.

41.  
Sadful  
atrocities on  
both sides  
in Guada-  
loupe.

May 5,  
1802.

and it were well for the memory of Napoleon, if it could be cleared of the obloquy arising from the sudden death, about the same time, of so many eminent men in the state prisons of France.

While these events were in progress in St Domingo, changes which ultimately were productive of the most important consequences took place in Guadaloupe. That island had revolted, and fallen under the dominion of the blacks by a process extremely analogous to, though less bloody than, that which had ensued in its larger neighbour. The mulattoes, under a renowned leader named Pélage, had risen in insurrection in October 1801, against the European governor, and speedily made themselves masters of the island; but hardly had they got possession of the reins of power, when they found themselves threatened by a formidable conspiracy of the slaves, and narrowly escaped being butchered a few days after in the seat of their newly acquired power. The island was in a state of anarchy, divided between rival factions, when Admiral Bouvet arrived with the renowned division of Richepanse, three thousand five hundred strong, which had mainly contributed to the great victory of Hohenlinden. Pélage, whose terrors were fully awakened by the fervour of the insurgent slave population, immediately ranged himself under his command, and manifested, in the short campaign which followed, the most distinguished bravery: but the slaves resisted, and Basseterre, the capital, was only taken after a bloody conflict. Though driven to the mountains, the negroes maintained a desperate conflict; an inconsiderable fort in the woods held out long, and was only reduced by a regular siege. Ignatius, a determined chief, was at length destroyed at Petit Bourg, after a frightful slaughter; and another leader, named Delgrasse, blew himself up, with three hundred of his followers, rather than surrender to the enemy. These bloody catastrophes, however, extinguished the revolt in the island; but they were followed by

measures of unpardonable and ruinous severity. Twelve hundred prisoners were drowned in cold blood by Lacrosse, who took the command of the island; and soon after, by a proclamation issued in the name of the First Consul, slavery and the whole ancient regime was formally re-established. A few days afterwards, Richepanse was cut off by the yellow fever—a lamentable fate for so distinguished a European officer, to perish by an inglorious death in the midst of colonial atrocity.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1802.

August 5,  
1802.  
Dum. viii.  
268, 301.  
Jom. xv. 80,  
85.

The intelligence of these alarming events produced the utmost agitation in St Domingo. The re-establishment of slavery in Guadaloupe, to which liberty had been promised equally as to St Domingo in the proclamation of the First Consul,\* naturally excited the utmost apprehensions in the blacks as to the fate which was reserved for themselves, in the event of the French authority being firmly re-established in the larger island. A new insurrection soon broke out, which speedily spread over the whole colony, although Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines, vied with each other in acts of severity against the insurgents. Dessalines even went so far as to arrest Charles Belais, Toussaint's nephew, who was conducted to the Cape, and sentenced to death by a military commission composed of mulatto officers. But the enthusiasm soon became universal, as the mask of profound dissimulation which they had so long worn was laid aside by the negro chiefs. On the night of the 14th October, Clerveaux, Christophe, and Paul Louverture, joined the insurgents in the north, and their example was shortly afterwards followed by Dessalines with all the forces in the west. The situation of the French army was now critical in the extreme. By the losses of the campaign their troops had been reduced to thirteen thousand men, and of these five thousand were in the hospitals; so that there

42.  
General re-  
volt in St  
Domingo.  
Death of le  
Clerc.

\* At St Domingo and Guadaloupe, slavery no longer exists; all are free, and shall remain so. At Martinique different principles must prevail: slavery continues there, and must continue."—*Proclam. Nov. 1801*; DUMAS, viii. 283.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1802.

Nov. 2.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
273, 277,  
279. Journ.  
xv. 85, 87,  
92. Novv.  
ii. 223, 224.

remained only eight thousand capable of bearing arms—a force totally inadequate to maintain the whole country against an exasperated black population of several hundred thousand souls. Le Clerc therefore directed a concentration of all the disposable troops at Cape Town and Port-au-Prince; but in doing this they were severely pressed by the insurgents, who increased immensely when the retreat of the French had become manifest. In the midst of this hazardous operation le Clerc himself was seized with the yellow fever, which had already proved fatal to Hardy, Debelle, and his best officers. The violence of the malady, and the anxiety consequent on so responsible a situation, triumphed over the natural strength of his constitution, and he died on the 2d of November, leaving the remains of the army in the deepest state of dejection.<sup>1</sup>

43.  
Continued  
successes of  
the negroes.

Rochambeau succeeded to the command; but, though by no means destitute of military talents, he hastened the approaching annihilation of the French authority in the island, by the violence and injustice of his civil administration. Instead of cultivating the affections of the mulatto population, who had rendered such important services to his predecessor, he for ever alienated the affections of that numerous body, by the arrest and execution of Bardet, one of the half-caste chiefs who had rendered the most efficient aid to the French. Such was the exasperation occasioned by this atrocious proceeding, that it instantly threw the mulattoes into the arms of the negroes, and the flames of insurrection shortly spread through the southern and eastern parts of the island, where that mixed race chiefly prevailed. Encouraged by these successes, Christophe and Dessalines made a nocturnal attack on Cape Town in the middle of February; they surprised Fort Belair, and put the garrison to the sword; and their assault on the body of the place was only defeated by an uncommon exertion of vigour and courage on the part of the French general. Exasperated at these disasters,

Feb. 17,  
1803.

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Rochambeau renewed his severities against the mulatto race; two of their chiefs, Prosper and Brachas, were seized and drowned; and this so enraged their countrymen, that they all left the colours of France, to which they had hitherto rendered essential service, and joined the negro standards. Informed of this defection, Rochambeau embarked in person for Port-au-Prince, with twelve hundred fresh troops recently arrived from France; but no sooner had he advanced into the open country round that town, than his troops fell into an ambuscade, and were driven back with great loss into its walls.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. 303,  
315. Jom.  
xv. 92, 95.  
Bign. ii. 433,  
435.

Matters were in this disastrous state when the finishing blow was put to the affairs of the colony by the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and renewal of hostilities between France and Great Britain. The insurgents, then supplied with arms and ammunition by the English cruisers, speedily became irresistible. All the fortified posts in the south and west fell into their hands. Lavalette, at Port-au-Prince, capitulated to Dessalines, and was fortunate enough to reach the Havanna with the greater part of his troops. Rochambeau, blockaded in Cape Town by the blacks on the land side, and the English at sea, was obliged, after a gallant resistance, to surrender at discretion, and was conducted to Jamaica; while the Viscount de Noailles, who last maintained the French standard on the island, escaped under false colours, dexterously eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers, and surprised one of their corvettes. He was wrecked, however, on the coast of Cuba, as if it had been ordained that no part of that ill-fated armament should escape destruction.<sup>2</sup>

44.  
The rupture  
of the peace  
of Amiens  
causes the  
total de-  
struction of  
the French.  
Oct. 5, 1803.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xv.  
98, 99.  
Norv. ii. 270,  
281. Dum.  
viii. 336,  
339.

Thus terminated this melancholy expedition, in which one of the finest armies that France ever sent forth perished, the victims of fatigue, disease, and the perfidy of its government. The loss sustained was immense. Out of thirty-five thousand land troops embarked, scarcely seven thousand ever regained the shores of France. The history of Europe can hardly afford a parallel instance of so com-

45.  
Reflections  
on the expe-  
dition.

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1802.

plete a destruction of so vast an armament. Nevertheless the First Consul is not chargeable with any want of skill or foresight in the conduct of the expedition, or any Machiavelian design to get quit of the soldiers of a rival chief in its original conception, though the choice of the troops employed in the expedition betrays that object when the design was once formed. The object of regaining possession of so great a colony was well worth the incurring even of considerable risk ; the forces employed were apparently adequate to the end ; the period of the year selected was the best adapted for the conduct of warlike operations. In ability of design and wisdom of execution, Napoleon never was deficient. It was the insensibility to any moral government of mankind, springing out of the irreligious habits of a revolution, that occasioned all his misfortunes. St Domingo, in fact, was conquered when it was lost by his deceit and perfidy ; by the iniquitous seizure of Toussaint when relying on the faith of a solemn treaty, and the re-establishment of slavery in Guadaloupe in violation of the promises of the French government, contained in a proclamation signed by the First Consul. Napoleon admitted subsequently that he was wrong in his conduct to St Domingo. "I have to reproach myself," said he, "for that expedition in the time of the consulate. It was a great fault to try to subject it by force. I should have been contented with the intermediate government of Toussaint. Peace was not then sufficiently established with England : the territorial wealth to which I looked in trying to subject it, would have only enriched our enemies. It was undertaken against my opinion, in conformity to the wishes of the council of state, who were carried away by the cries of the colonists." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Las Cas. ii.  
179. Bign.  
ii. 445.

Since the expulsion of the French from the island, St Domingo has been nominally independent ; but slavery has been far indeed from being abolished, and the condition of the people has been anything but ameliorated by the change.

Nominally free, the blacks have remained really enslaved. Compelled to labour, by the terrors of military discipline, for a small part of the produce of the soil, they have retained the severity without the advantages of servitude. The industrious habits, the flourishing aspect of the island, have disappeared; the surplus wealth, the agricultural opulence of the fields, have ceased; from being the greatest exporting island in the West Indies, it has ceased to raise any sugar; and the inhabitants, reduced to half their former amount, and bitterly galled by their republican task-masters, have relapsed into the indolence and inactivity of savage life.<sup>1</sup> The revolution of St Domingo has demonstrated that the negroes can occasionally exert all the vigour and heroism which distinguish the European character; but there is as yet no reason to suppose that they are capable of the continued efforts, the sustained and persevering toil, requisite to erect the fabric of civilised freedom. An observation of Gibbon seems decisive on this subject. "The inaction of the negroes does not seem to be the effect either of their virtue or of their pusillanimity. They indulge, like the rest of mankind, their passions and appetites, and the adjacent tribes are engaged in frequent acts of hostility. But their rude ignorance has never invented any effectual weapons of defence or destruction; they appear incapable of forming any extensive plans of government or conquest; and the obvious inferiority of their mental faculties has been discovered and abused by the nations of the temperate zone. Sixty thousand blacks are annually embarked from the coast of Guinea, but they embark in chains, never to return to their native country; and this constant emigration, which, in the space of two centuries, might have furnished armies to overrun the globe, accuses the guilt of Europe and the weakness of Africa."<sup>2</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI1802.  
46.Degraded  
state of St  
Domingo  
ever since  
that time.<sup>1</sup> Macken-  
zie's St Do-  
mingo, i.  
260, 321.  
Franklin's  
Hayti, ii.  
172, 176.<sup>2</sup> Gibbon,  
c. 25, vol.  
iii. 326.

If the negroes are not inferior, either in vigour, courage, or intelligence, to the Europeans, how has it happened

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1802.

47.  
Inferiority  
of the Negro  
to the Euro-

that, for four thousand years, they have remained in the savage state? What has prevented mighty empires arising on the banks of the Niger, the Quorra, or the Congo, in the same way as on those of the Euphrates, the Ganges, and the Nile? Why have they not made slaves of the Europeans, instead of the Europeans of them? Heat of climate, intricacy of forests, extent of desert, will not solve the difficulty; for they exist to as great an extent in the plains of Mesopotamia, and on the banks of the Nile, where the highest triumphs of civilisation have been achieved, as in Central Africa, which has always remained in a savage state. It is in vain to say the Europeans have retained the Africans in that degraded condition, by their violence and injustice, and the slave trade. How has it happened that the inhabitants of that vast and fruitful region have not risen to the government of the globe, and inflicted on the savages of Europe the evils now set forth as the cause of their depression? Did not all nations start alike in the career of infant improvement? and was not Egypt, the cradle of civilisation, nearer to Central Africa than the shores of Britain? In the earliest representations of nations in existence, the paintings on the walls of the tombs of the kings of Egypt, the distinct races of the Asiatics, the Jews, the Hottentots, and the Europeans, are clearly marked; but the blue-eyed and white-haired sons of Japhet are represented in cow-skins, with the hair turned outwards, in the pristine state of pastoral life, while the Hottentots are already clothed in the garb of civilised existence. What since has given so mighty an impulse to European civilisation, and retained in a stationary or declining state the immediate neighbours of Egyptian and Carthaginian greatness? It is impossible to arrive at any other conclusion, but that, in the qualities requisite to create and perpetuate civilisation, the African is decidedly inferior to the European race;<sup>1</sup> and if any doubt could exist, on this subject, it would be removed by the subsequent history

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie's *St Domingo*, ii. 260, 321.

and present state of the Haytian republic, and the lamentable failure of the emancipation of the negroes in the British colonies.\*

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But it was not only in the western hemisphere that the vast designs of the First Consul were manifested. Europe also was the theatre of his ambition; and the preliminaries of Amiens were hardly signed, when his conduct gave unequivocal proof that he was resolved to be fettered by no treaties, and that, to those who did not choose to submit to his authority, no alternative remained but the sword. By the eleventh article of the treaty of Lunéville, it had been provided, that "the contracting parties shall mutually guarantee the independence of the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics, and the right to the people who inhabit them to adopt whatever form of government they think fit." The Allies, of course, understood by this clause real independence—in other words, a liberation of these republics from the influence of France. But it soon appeared that Napoleon affixed a very different meaning to it, and that what he intended was the establishment of constitutions in them all, affiliated with the great parent Republic, which should absolutely subject them to his power.

48.  
Ambitious  
designs of  
Napoleon in  
Europe.

Holland was the first of the affiliated republics which underwent the change consequent on the establishment of the consular power in France. For this purpose the French ambassador, Schimmelpennick, repaired to the

49.  
Holland is

\* The following table contains the comparative wealth, produce, and trade of St Domingo, before 1789, and in 1832, after forty years of nominal freedom.

	1789.	1832.
Population, . . .	600,000	280,000
Sugar exported, . . .	672,000,000 lbs.	None.
Coffee, . . .	86,789,000 lbs.	32,000,000 lbs.
Slaves employed in trade,	1680	1
Sailors, . . .	27,000	167
Exports to France, . .	£6,720,000	None.
Imports from ditto, . .	9,890,000	None.

—MCKENZIE'S *St Domingo*, i. 321; and DUMAS, viii. 112.

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XXXVI.

1802.

Sept. 18,  
1801.

Hague, to prepare a revolution which should assimilate the government of the Batavian to that of the French Republic. So devoted was the Directory at that capital to Napoleon's will, that they voluntarily became the instruments of their own destruction. On the 17th September the French ambassador sent the constitution, ready made, to the legislative body, with the intimation that they had nothing to do but affix to it the seal of their approbation, as it had already received the sanction of the people. In fact, on the same day it was published to the nation, before the opinion of the legislature on it was known: the Directory took for granted that it would be approved. The Dutch legislature, however, were not prepared for this degradation; and the last act of their existence did honour to their memory: they decreed the suppression of the illegal acts of the present government. Forthwith a *coup d'état* was put in force. The Directory, by a violent act, dissolved the Chambers; their doors were closed by French bayonets, the guards absolved from their oaths, and all the persons in the employment of the government dismissed. Shortly after, the new constitution was published by the Directory, alike without the knowledge or concurrence of the people. It was, however, a nearer approximation to the habits and wishes of the respectable classes than the democratic institutions which had preceded it: a legislative body, composed of five-and-thirty members, in a slight degree recalled the recollection of the old States-general. The division of provinces was the same as that of the United Provinces; but the council of state, of twelve members, with a president changing every three months, was possessed of much more absolute power than ever belonged to the Stadtholder, while the frequent change of the president prevented any one from acquiring such a preponderance as might render him formidable to the authority of the First Consul. The form of submitting the constitution to the people was gone through. Out of 416,419 citizens

having a right to vote, 52,219 rejected it. The immense majority who declined to vote was assumed to be favourable to the change, and the new government was solemnly proclaimed. The conduct of the Dutch on this occasion affords a striking proof of the impossibility of eradicating, by external violence, the institutions which have grown with the growth and strengthened with the strength of a free people. In vain they were subdued by the armies of France, and democratic institutions forced upon them, with the loud applause of the indigent rabble in power. The great mass of the inhabitants, and almost the whole proprietors, withdrew altogether from public situations, and took no share whatever in the changes which were imposed upon their country. In the seclusion of private life, they retained the habits, the affections, and the religious observances of their forefathers; their children were nursed in these patriotic feelings, untainted by the revolutionary passions which agitated the surrounding states; and when the power of Napoleon was overthrown, the ancient government was re-established, with as much facility and as universal satisfaction, as the English constitution on the restoration of Charles II.<sup>1</sup>

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1802.

Having thus established a government in Holland, entirely subservient to his will, and in harmony with the recent institutions in France, the next care of the First Consul was to remodel the Cisalpine republic in such a way, as to render it, too, analogous to the parent state, and equally submissive to his authority. For this purpose, early in November 1801, the French authorities began to prepare the inhabitants of the infant republic for the speedy fixing of their destinies, and the formation of a new constitution better adapted to their more matured state of existence; and, on the 14th of the same month, a proclamation of the Extraordinary Commission of government announced the formation of an Assembly of four hundred and fifty deputies at Lyons in the end of December, to deliberate on the approaching constitution.

<sup>1</sup> D.....  
39, 42. Norv.  
ii. 174, 175.

50.  
And the Cis-  
alpine re-  
public again  
remodelled.

Nov. 14,  
1801.



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XXXVI.

1802.

The place assigned for their meeting sufficiently indicated the influence intended to be exercised over their deliberations; and it was openly avowed in the proclamation, which “invited the First Consul to suspend the immense labours of his magistracy, to share with the members of the Assembly the important duties which awaited them.” To render the members more docile to him, and prepare the scenes in the drama which was to be performed before the audience of Europe, two of the ablest statesmen in France, M. Talleyrand and M. Chaptal, preceded the First Consul at Lyons, and arranged everything before his arrival in a way perfectly conformable to his will.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iii.  
416. Bign.  
ii. 152, 153.  
Norv. ii.  
175, 176.

51.  
Entry of  
Napoleon  
at Lyons.

g the Cis-  
alpine gov-  
ernment.  
Dec. 31,  
1801.

Jan. 25,  
1802.

The convocation was opened on the 31st December, at Lyons, with extraordinary pomp. The unwonted concourse of strangers, both from France and Italy; the immense number of the most illustrious characters of both countries who were assembled, gave that city the air of the capital of southern Europe; the splendour of the processions with which the proceedings were opened, excited the utmost enthusiasm among the inhabitants. On the 11th January the First Consul made his triumphal entry into the city, escorted by a brilliant troop of one hundred and fifty young men of the first consideration, and was everywhere received with the most enthusiastic acclamations. Fêtes, spectacles, and theatrical representations succeeded each other without interruption, and universal transports attended the opening of a council fraught with the fate of the Italian peninsula. The few deputies attached to republican principles soon perceived that their visions of democracy were vanishing into air; but, unable to stem the torrent, they were constrained to devour their vexation in secret, and join in the external acts of homage to the First Consul. But, amidst the fumes of incense and the voice of adulation, Napoleon never for one instant lost sight of the important object of establishing his authority in Italy; and the report of

the committee to whom the formation of a constitution had been referred, soon unfolded the extent of his views. They reported, that reasons of policy and state-necessity forbade the evacuation of the Cisalpine territory by the French troops; that the infant republic "had need of a support which should cause it to be respected by the powers who have not yet recognised its existence; that it absolutely required a man who, by the ascendant of his name and power, might give it the rank and consideration which it could not otherwise attain; and therefore that General Buonaparte should be invited to honour the Cisalpine republic, by continuing to govern it, and by blending with the direction of the government in France the charge of its affairs, as long as he might deem this necessary for uniting all the parts of its territory under the same political institutions, and causing it to be recognised by all the powers of Europe." Napoleon accepted without hesitation the duty thus imposed upon him. He replied—"The choice which I have hitherto made of persons to fill your principal offices has been independent of every feeling of party or local interests; but as to the office of president of the republic, I can discover no one among you who has sufficient claims on the public gratitude, or is sufficiently emancipated from party feelings, to deserve that trust. I yield, therefore, to your wishes, and I shall continue to take, as long as circumstances shall require it, the lead in your affairs." Loud applauses followed every part of this well-conceived pageant; and, at the conclusion of the address, the whole Assembly rose and demanded that the name of "Cisalpine" should be changed into that of "Italian" republic, an important alteration, which revealed the secret designs, already formed by the ruler of France, of converting the whole peninsula into one state in close alliance with the great nation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ann.  
1802,  
Bot. iii. 416  
417. Norv.  
ii. 176, 177.  
Bign. ii. 154,  
157.

The new constitution of the Italian republic, "prepared in the cabinet of the First Consul, and to which the

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1802.

52.

Nature of

n-

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iii.  
416.<sup>2</sup> Dum. viii.  
56, 57. Bign.  
ii. 157, 158.  
Norv. ii.  
177, 178.53.  
Annexation  
of Piedmont  
to France.Sept. 11,  
1802.

representatives of that state were not permitted to offer any opposition," was founded upon different principles from any yet promulgated in Europe. Three electoral colleges were formed; one composed of proprietors, one of persons of the learned professions, one of the commercial interests, whose numbers were invariably to remain the same. The legislative body consisted of seventy-five persons, elected by these colleges; while the vice-president, secretary of state, and all the members of the executive, were appointed by the First Consul. This constitution, so different from the democratic institutions which had preceded it, in some respects merits the eulogium of the Italian historian, as being "the best which Napoleon had ever conceived;"<sup>1</sup> and unquestionably, in the restriction of the elective franchise to the most respectable members of these different classes, an important step was made towards that establishment of political power on the basis of property and intelligence, which is the only foundation on which that admirable part of a limited government can be securely rested. Melzi, a great proprietor in Lombardy, was appointed vice-president of the republic, with every demonstration of regard from the First Consul—a judicious choice, well deserved by the character and patriotism of that illustrious nobleman; and in that appointment, not less than the general character of the constitution, the democratic party perceived a deathblow given to all the hopes they had formed.<sup>2</sup>

The success of this measure for the thorough subjection of the Italian republic to his will, led shortly after to another still more audacious, and which, at any other period, would have instantly lighted in Europe the flames of a general war. On the 11th September, Piedmont was, by a formal decree, annexed to the French republic, the First Consul alleging that the absence of any stipulation in its favour, in the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, was equivalent to a permission for him to absorb it in

the growing dominion of France. The principle was thus openly acted upon, that the Republic was at liberty to incorporate with its dominions any lesser state, whose integrity was not expressly guaranteed by the greater powers. By this bold measure, all the north of Italy, from the summit of the Maritime Alps to the shores of the Mincio, was directly subjected to French influence; and Austria beheld at Milan a second French capital, almost within sight of the frontier of its Italian possessions. Thus Sardinia, which was the first of the European states that had submitted to the power of Napoleon, which, after a fortnight's struggle, opened its gates to the youthful conqueror, and had since, through every change of fortune, remained faithful to his cause, was rewarded for its early submission and long fidelity by being the first to be destroyed; and the keys of Italy were placed, without opposition, in the hands of the French Republic.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1862.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ix.  
80, 81. Jom  
xv.

Formidable as these acquisitions to France were, they were rendered doubly so from the measures taken at the same time by the enterprising spirit and vast conceptions of the First Consul to secure these important Transalpine acquisitions to his dominions. Louis XIV. had said, after the Family Compact was concluded, "There are no longer any Pyrenees;" but with greater reason Napoleon might say, after the roads over the Simplon and Mont Cenis were formed, "There are no longer any Alps." The Valais, an integral part of Switzerland, of great importance in a military point of view, as commanding the direct route from France to Italy, both by the Great St Bernard and the Simplon, was erected into a separate republic, entirely under French influence, under the denomination of the "Republic of the Valais." The object of detaching this inconsiderable state from the Helvetic confederacy was soon apparent. French engineers began to work on the northern side of the Simplon; Italian, to surmount the difficulties of the long ravine on

54.  
Construction of the  
roads over  
Mont Cenis  
and the  
Simplon.

July 2,  
1802.

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1802.

the south; and soon that magnificent road was formed which leads from the rugged banks of the Rhone to the smiling shores of the Lago Maggiore, and has revealed to the eyes of an admiring world the stupendous grandeur of the defile of Gondo. Similar works were undertaken at the same time up the valley of the Isère and over Mont Cenis, as well as from the Rhone over Mont Genevre to Turin. The Alps, traversed by three splendid roads, ceased to present any obstacle to an invading army; and works, greater than the Roman emperors achieved in three centuries of their dominion in Italy, were completed by Napoleon in the three first years of his consular government.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1802, 90.  
Dum. ix.  
81.

55.  
Parma and  
Placentia  
are occu-  
pied, with  
Elba.

The command of Savoy, Piedmont, the Pays de Vaud, and the Valais, gave France a ready entrance through these new roads into Italy; but, not content with this, the First Consul rapidly extended his dominions through the centre of the peninsula. A new constitution was given to the Ligurian republic, which brought Genoa more immediately under French influence. The secret treaty of 12th March 1801, with Spain, by which Parma and Placentia were ceded to the Italian republic, was made public, and the French troops took possession of these states, as well as of the island of Elba, on the shores of Tuscany; while the King of Etruria, at Florence, a creature of his creation, preserved entire the ascendancy of the First Consul in the centre of Italy. Thus not only was the authority of Napoleon obeyed, but almost his dominion extended from the North Sea to the Roman states; while the Pope and the King of Naples, trembling for their remaining possessions, had no alternative but entire submission to the irresistible power in the north of the peninsula. These rapid and unparalleled encroachments would, notwithstanding the bad success of their former efforts,<sup>2</sup> have led to a fresh coalition of the Continental powers against France, if they had not been intent at that moment upon the important subject of indemnity.

<sup>2</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1802, 88, 89.  
Dum. ix. 81.

ties to be provided for the German princes, and divided by the fatal apple of discord which French diplomacy had thus contrived to throw between the rival powers of Prussia and Austria.

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1802.

When the conquests of France were extended to the Rhine, and all the territories on the left bank were annexed to the Republic, not only was a host of small German princes dispossessed of their estates, but several of the greater powers lost valuable appendages of their dominions, situated on that side of the river. To soften the effects of this deprivation, it was provided by the treaty of Lunéville, that indemnities should be obtained by the sovereigns who had suffered on the occasion, and that for this purpose a congress should be opened in some convenient part of the German empire. But how were the sufferers to be indemnified, when the whole territories on the right bank were already appropriated by lay or ecclesiastical princes; and no one could receive an indemnity without some party being spoliated to give him admission? To solve the difficulty, it was agreed by the greater powers to *secularise*, as it was called, a large proportion of the ecclesiastical sovereignties of the empire: in other words, to confiscate a considerable part of the church property, and out of the spoils thus acquired provide equivalents for the conquests gained by the French Republic. Thus the dangerous precedent was established, of indemnifying the stronger power at the expense of the weaker—a species of iniquity of which France and Austria had set the first example, in their atrocious convention for the partition of the Venetian territories, and which, by showing the German princes that they could place no reliance on the support of the great powers in a moment of danger, gave an irremediable wound to the constitution of the empire.

36.  
Progress of  
the negotia-  
tion regard-  
ing the  
German  
indemnities.

As it was early foreseen that the partition of these indemnities would form a most important subject of discussion, and that, by dexterous negotiation on that subject,

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XXXVI.

1802.

57.

Cordial  
union of  
France and  
Russia in  
this matter.  
Oct. 8, 1801.

n.ii.89,  
Aug. 24,  
1801

\* Bign. ii.  
301, 320.  
See the  
treaty in  
Martens,  
vii. 424.

more might be gained than by a successful campaign, the great powers soon began to strengthen themselves by secret alliances. Preparatory to the approaching contention, and before entering that great field of diplomacy, France and Russia inserted, with this view, in the secret treaty of 8th October 1801, already mentioned, between the two powers, a stipulation, by which it was provided that the two cabinets "should pursue a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to the adoption of their plans in the partition of the indemnities, which have for an invariable object the maintenance of a just equilibrium between the houses of Prussia and Austria."<sup>1</sup> Shortly before, a treaty had been concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the First Consul guaranteed all the possessions of the latter, and engaged to support its claim for indemnities with all the influence in his power. Prussia might already calculate with certainty upon the support of France, not only from general principles of policy and common jealousy of the Emperor, but from the express stipulations in the treaty of Bâle in 1795, and the secret convention of 1796, in virtue of which she had maintained a firm neutrality, of essential service to the Republic in the subsequent desperate struggles with the Imperial forces. The Prussian cabinet, accordingly, received the warmest assurances of support from the First Consul in the approaching negotiations; the idea of a triple alliance between the cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and St Petersburg, was even talked of and seriously entertained at all these capitals; insomuch that the French envoy at St Petersburg, General Hédouville, and the Prussian at Paris, the Marquis Lucchesini, received orders from their respective courts to make every exertion to bring about this object.<sup>2</sup>

At length, on the 23d May 1802, a treaty was concluded at Paris between France and Prussia, without the privity of the Russian ambassador, which settled the amount of the Prussian indemnity and of that of the

Prince of Orange; and such was the address of the First Consul and his ambassador at St Petersburg, that the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander to its provisions was obtained without difficulty, notwithstanding the slight thus offered to his influence. By this convention it was stipulated that Prussia should obtain the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildesheim, l'Eschefeld, the town and territory of Erfurth, the city of Munster, with the greater part of its territory, and other cities and abbacies, to the amount of more than four times what she had lost on the left bank of the Rhine. In return for these large acquisitions at the expense of neutral states, Prussia "guaranteed to the French Republic the arrangements made in Italy,—viz. the existence of the kingdom of Etruria, that of the Italian republic, and the annexation of the 27th military division (Piedmont) to the French territory." By a treaty, signed on 4th June 1802, between France and Austria, it was stipulated that these two powers should act together in regulating the matter of the indemnities; and the Emperor Alexander, when he ratified the treaty, provided for a compensation to the King of Sardinia for his Continental possessions, and to the Duke of Holstein-Oldenburg for his losses under the new arrangement. Thus was Prussia rewarded for her impolitic desertion of the European alliance and seven years of discreditable neutrality, by the acquisition of extensive territorial possessions adjoining her own dominions; and thus did Napoleon, who at first bribed Austria to wink at his Italian conquests by the confiscation of the whole Continental possessions of Venice, now reward the defection of Prussia by the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire. The parties to this general system of spoliation, linked as they were together, seemed to be beyond the reach of punishment; but Providence was preparing for them all, in consequence of their iniquity, the accomplishment of ultimate retribution—for Austria the disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz; <sup>1</sup> for Prussia the catastrophe of Jena

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XXXVI.

1802.

58,

In return for which Prussia guarantees the French acquisitions in Italy. May 23, 1802.

June 4,  
1802.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii. 304, 325.  
Jom. xv. 23, 27. Dum. vii. 10, 23.



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XXXVI.

1802.

59.  
Policy of  
Austria in  
this negotia-  
tion, and of  
Russia.

and treaty of Tilsit; for Napoleon the retreat from Moscow, and exile at St Helena.

The views of Austria in this negotiation were widely different. Intent upon gaining a large indemnity for herself, and desirous even of extending her frontier from the Inn to the Iser at the expense of Bavaria, in exchange for her possessions in Suabia, she was yet opposed to the system of secularisation, and anxious that the compensations should break up as little as possible the old and venerable constitution of the Germanic empire. This policy, which duty equally with interest prescribed to the head of that great confederation, was directly opposite to that which France and Prussia pursued. The latter of these powers was anxious to augment her own strength by the acquisition of as many of the ecclesiastical possessions as possible, and to increase her influence by the enrichment, at the expense of the church, of the princes who were included in the line of neutrality protected by her power; the former looked only to breaking up the German confederation, and creating a circle of little sovereigns round the frontiers of the Republic, dependent on its support for the maintenance of their recent acquisitions. Russia took under its especial protection, after the share of Prussia was secured by the treaty of May 1802, the interests of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden; and France cordially united in their support, foreseeing already, in the extension of these powers through revolutionary influence, the formation of an outpost which might at all times open an entrance for her armies into the heart of Germany, and counterbalance all the influence of the Emperor in its defence. Thus was Austria, the power best entitled, both from the dignity of the Imperial crown and the magnitude of its possessions in the empire, to a preponderating voice in the negotiation, thrown into the shade in the deliberations;<sup>1</sup> and thus did Russia and Prussia unite with the First Consul in laying the foundation of that CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, from which,

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vii.  
23, 40. Bign.  
ii. 325, 332.  
Jom. xv.  
26, 29.

as a hostile outwork, he was afterwards enabled to lead his armies to Jena, Friedland, and the Kremlin.

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It was not without ulterior views to her own advantage that Russia supported in this extraordinary manner the pretensions of France in the affairs of Germany. The French ambassador at St Petersburg, M. Hédouville, received instructions from the First Consul to assure the Emperor of his "sincere desire to obtain for Russia the entire and free navigation of the Black Sea;" while, at the same time, Colonel Caulaincourt was commissioned at Paris to communicate to Napoleon the desire of the Czar to favour the extension of French commerce in the Black Sea. M. Hédouville was also enjoined to open a negotiation for "the triumph of liberal principles in the navigation and commerce of neutral vessels." Thus Napoleon shook for a moment the firm purpose of the Emperor Alexander, by artfully presenting to his youthful imagination the objects of ambition long cherished by his predecessors, Catherine and Paul—afterwards in part attained by his successor, Nicholas.<sup>1</sup>

1802.  
60.  
Secret views  
of the latter  
power.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
320, 321.

Convinced at length, from the intelligence communicated by his ambassadors at St Petersburg, Paris, and Berlin, of the perfect accord between these powers, the Emperor of Austria deemed it high time to take some step which should vindicate his authority as the head of the empire, and show the coalesced powers that they would not succeed in maintaining all their proposed acquisitions except by force of arms. By an Imperial decree he directed that the deputation of the interested powers should meet at Ratisbon on the 3d August. This deputation consisted of four electors, viz. Mayence, Saxony, Bohemia, and Brandenburg, and four members of the College of Princes, Bavaria, Würtemberg, the Grand-Master of the Teutonic Order, and Hesse-Cassel. It was universally known that a decided majority of this assembly was in the interest of France; and in effect so little did the coalesced powers attempt to disguise their designs, that the parties whom

61.  
Courageous  
act of Aus-  
tria in occu-  
pying Passau.  
Jul.  
23, 1802.

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XXXVI.

1802.

July 3.

they supported had seized upon the provinces allotted to them in the secret treaties before the congress at Ratisbon assembled. The King of Prussia, on 3d July, took possession of the territories assigned to him, in conformity with a proclamation issued on the 6th June; and the Elector of Bavaria, following the example, occupied the territories he was to receive on the 17th July, and was proceeding to do the same with Passau, when the Emperor, who regarded that important city with reason as one of the bulwarks of his hereditary states, anticipated him by marching the Austrian forces into it, as well as into the archbishopric and city of Salzburg.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vii.  
42, 45. Jom.  
xv. 28, 29.  
Bign. ii. 333,  
335.

62.

Angry cor-  
respondence  
in conse-  
quence  
between  
France and  
Austria.

This courageous act, which seemed at first sight to set at defiance the whole power of Russia, Prussia, and France, was in reality levelled at the First Consul, who had, by secret instructions not communicated to the other powers, enjoined this extravagant prejudication of the deliberations of the congress upon Bavaria. Desirous, however, if possible, to avoid coming to an open rupture with France, the Emperor instructed his ambassador at Paris to soften as much as possible the hostile act, by representing that the town in dispute was only taken possession of in a provisional manner, till its destiny was finally determined by the congress. An angry interchange of notes ensued between the French and Imperial ambassadors, during which the First Consul deemed the opportunity favourable to draw still closer his relations with the Prussian cabinet. In consequence, a treaty was concluded on the 5th September between France, Prussia, and Bavaria, by which it was stipulated, that if "within sixty days the Emperor should not evacuate the town of Passau and its dependencies, the French and Prussian governments should unite their forces to compel him to do so, as well as to maintain the ancient possessions of Bavaria on the right bank of the Inn." To this convention the cabinet of St Petersburg acceded, stipulating only as the condition of its concurrence, an adequate compensation to the Grand-duke of Tuscany.<sup>2</sup>

Sept. 5,  
1802.

<sup>2</sup> Bign. ii.  
335, 336.  
Dum. viii.  
44, 51. Mar-  
tens, vii.  
431.

Meanwhile the conferences at Ratisbon were opened, and the fruit of the secret negotiations which had so long been depending became manifest. Immediately after it met, the ministers of France and Russia laid on the table a joint plan for the partition of the indemnities, and insisted that the matters submitted to their deliberations should be finally adjusted within the space of sixty days. This haughty interference on the part of stranger powers was in the highest degree irritating to the feelings of the Austrian cabinet; but, with the usual prudence of their administration, they resolved to dissemble their resentment. Having recourse again to negotiation, they assailed the cabinet of the Tuileries by the same artifices with which the First Consul had succeeded so well at St Petersburg and Berlin, and offered, on condition of obtaining some advantages in Germany, to recognise his recent usurpations in Italy. This proposal had the desired effect. Two conventions were concluded at Paris, in the end of December, between Austria and France, which settled the affairs both of Italy and Germany. By the first, the compensations in which the Imperial family was interested were fixed. The Brisgau and Ortenau were conferred upon the Duke of Modena, in lieu of the states he had lost in Italy; and the Emperor received in exchange the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, which were severed from the church for that purpose; while Passau was ceded to Bavaria, and, in exchange, the bishopric of Eichstadt conferred upon Austria. By the second, the Emperor recognised the King of Etruria, and all the changes which had taken place in Italy since the treaty of Lunéville.<sup>1</sup>

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XXXVI.

1802.

63.

Conference-  
at Ratisbon,  
Aug. 18.

64.

The principle of secularisation is admitted.

Dec. 26,  
1802.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. vi.  
343, 345.  
Jom. xv. 31,  
32. Martens,  
vii. 432.

The shares of the greater powers being settled, the claims of the minor states were easily disposed of, and the indemnities finally adjusted by a recess of 25th February 1803. By this arrangement, the most important which had taken place since the treaty of Westphalia, the old Germanic constitution was entirely overturned,

65.

Compensations respectively received.  
Feb. 25,  
1803.

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XXXVI.

1802.

and a new division made which for ever subverted the fundamental principles of the empire. It was easy to perceive, on comparing the compensations dealt out to the different states, the influence which had preponderated in the deliberations, and the gross injustice with which those states who had inclined, in the preceding contests, to the interests of France, were enriched at the expense of those who had stood by the Imperial fortunes. The Grand-duke of Tuscany received hardly a fourth, the Duke of Modena little more than a third, of what they had respectively lost; while Prussia acquired four times, and Bavaria nearly twice, the amount of their ceded provinces on the left bank of the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vii.  
48, 49. Jom.  
v. 32, 33.  
Bign. i. 344,  
349.

66.

Disastrous  
moral effects  
of this gen-  
eral spolia-  
tion of the  
ecclesiasti-  
cal princes.

But it was not merely by the augmentation of some and diminution of other states, and the formation of a body of sovereigns in the empire, dependent on France for the maintenance of their acquisitions, that this partition of the indemnities was fatal to the best interests of Europe. Moral effects far more disastrous resulted from this great act of diplomatic spoliation. In all ages, indeed,

\* By this treaty, the equivalents settled upon the principal powers out of the ecclesiastical spoils of the empire, were thus adjusted:—

Proportion  
in which

powers gain-  
ed acqui-  
sitions.

I. Prussia, by the treaty of Bâle, had ceded to the Republic her provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, including the duchy of Gueldres, the principality of Mœurs, and part of the duchy of Cleves, containing in all—

	INHABITANTS.	REVENUE.
She lost,	137,000	1,400,000 florins.
Gained,	526,000	3,800,000

So gained, 389,000 2,400,000

Her acquisitions, which made up this great addition, consisted of the free towns of Muhlhausen, Nordhausen, and Goslar; the bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and part of Munster, and many other abbacies and churchlands.

II. Bavaria had lost, beyond the Rhine, the duchy of Deux Ponts, that of Juliers, and the palatinate of the Rhine. She received instead the important free towns of Ulm, Memmingen, Nordlingen, the bishoprics of Wurzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg, and Passau, and a vast number of rich abbacies and monasteries. Her losses and gains stood thus—

	INHABITANTS.	REVENUE.
She lost,	580,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	854,500	6,600,000
Gained,	274,500	2,800,000

the *maxim vœ victis* has been the rule of war, and injury or subjugation formed the lot of the conquered. But in all such cases, not even excepting the recent and flagrant partition of Poland, it was on the belligerent states only that these consequences fell; and the adjoining nations were exempt from the effects of the tempest which had overthrown their less fortunate neighbours. It was reserved for an age in which the principles of justice, freedom, and civil right, were loudly invoked on both sides, to behold the adoption of a different principle, and see belligerent states indemnify themselves for their losses in war, at the expense not of the vanquished, but of neutral and weaker powers which had taken no part in the contest. This monstrous injustice, of which Napoleon gave the first example in the cession of Venice, precipitated into hostile measures by his intrigues, to Austria, was immediately adopted and acted upon by all the great powers; and at the congress of Ratisbon their frontiers were rounded, and strength augmented, by the spoils of almost all the ecclesiastical princes, and a great number of the free cities of the empire. This, too, was done, not by conquerors with arms in their hands, not in the heat of victory or triumph of conquest, but by calculating

III. Würtemberg, for its possessions in Alsace and Franche Comté, obtained nine imperial cities and eight abbeys.

	INHABITANTS.	REVENUE.
She lost,	14,000	240,000 florins.
Gained,	120,000	612,000
Gained,	106,000	372,000

\* While such were the portions allotted to the states under the protection of France or Prussia, who were to be rewarded for preceding neutrality, and form the basis of a counterpoise to the power of Austria, the indemnities allotted to the connexions of that power were of the most meagre description. For example, the Grand-duke of Tuscany had lost in Italy the beautiful duchy of Tuscany, and he received the archbishopric of Salzbourg, the bishopric of Eichstadt, part of that of Passau, and the valley of Berchtesgaden.

	INHABITANTS.	REVENUE.
He lost,	1,150,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	286,000	2,150,000
Lost,	864,000	1,650,000

—See BIGNON, ii. 349, 351; and JOMINI, xv. 32, 37.

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diplomatists, in the midst of peace, without any inquiry into the interest or wishes of the transferred people, and guided only by an arithmetical estimate in cold blood of the comparative acquisitions by each power in revenue, subjects, and territory.

67.  
It destroyed  
all ideas of  
public right  
international  
law.

All ideas of public right, of a system of international law, or the support of the weaker against the greater powers, were overturned by this deliberate act of spoliation. Woful experience diffused a universal conviction of the lamentable truth, that the lesser states had never so much cause for alarm as when the greater were coming to an accommodation. Neutrality, it was seen, was the most perilous course which could be adopted, because it interested no one in the preservation of the weaker states; and all Europe prepared to follow the banners of one or other of the rival chiefs, who, it was foreseen, must soon contend for the empire of the world in the centre of Germany. It is the glory of England that she alone has never acceded to this system of international spoliation, but on the contrary resisted it, on every occasion, to the utmost of her power: that her acquisitions and losses have been all at the expense of her enemies or herself; that no friendly or neutral power has had cause to rue the day that she signed her treaties; and that so far from gaining at the expense of lesser states, she has repeatedly made sacrifices of enormous magnitude, to soften the consequences of their adverse fortune—a memorable instance of the effects of real freedom and a constitutional government in subduing the desire of gain and elevating the standard of public virtue, and of the difference of its effects from all that the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm or the ambition of despotic power are capable of producing!

While the Continental powers were intent on the acquisition of ill-gotten gains in the centre of Germany, Napoleon had leisure to pursue his projects of ambition in the mountains of Switzerland. His conduct towards

the inhabitants of that country led to important consequences, as it first unfolded, even to his warmest admirers, the insatiable spirit of aggrandisement by which he was actuated, and was one of the immediate causes of the renewal of the war. When republican institutions are established in a country of considerable extent and varied productions, it is alone by the *federal system*—in other words, a congregation of independent states, having each the power of internal legislation—that the national integrity can for any length of time be preserved. The reason is, that separate interests are there brought to bear directly on the conduct of public affairs; and if those interests are adverse, which must frequently be the case, the despotism of the stronger over the weaker power speedily becomes insupportable. A monarch far removed from both, and equally dependent upon either for his support, may dispense equal justice between the contending interests of separate provinces or classes of society; but it is in vain to expect anything like equity in the judgment formed by one of these provinces or classes upon the rival pretensions of the other. To do so is to expect that men will judge equally and impartially in their own cause—a pitch of perfection to which human nature never has and never will arrive. The autocrat of Russia, or the emperors of Rome, may deal out impartial justice in determining on the rival and conflicting interests of the different provinces of their vast dominions, because they are equally removed from any; but it would be quite extravagant to look for a just decision by one of these provinces or its representatives with regard to the other. Power, superiority of votes or influence, will ever form the basis of their decision; the majority, as Tocqueville tells us it is now in America, will become despotic; and that power will never be yielded up but to the sword.

The unchangeable division in Great Britain between the manufacturing and agricultural classes on the subject of the corn-laws, and the threatened dissolution of the

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1842.

68.

Projects of  
Nap.  
against  
Switzer-  
land. Fe-  
deral system  
in that coun-  
try.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

69.

Necessity of  
it in all  
extensive

American confederacy by the collision of the southern and northern provinces on the subject of the tariff on English goods, are instances of the operation of the simple principle, that no man can judge impartially in his own cause—a principle which, when applied to nations, forbids the extension of democratic institutions for any great length of time beyond the limits of a single city or particular class of society.\* Interest, accordingly, universally leads the holders of considerable property, in all countries where democratic institutions prevail, to support the system of federal union, in preference to that of a central and universally diffused authority; because they find that it is in small states where the interests of the inhabitants are nearly the same, and in such states only, that their influence can be felt, or their wants receive due consideration. On the other hand, the democratic party in such communities are generally at first desirous of the concentration of power in a central government, and the concurrence of all the representatives in its formation; these being the circumstances in which the influence of the leaders of the multitude is most effectually exercised, and the ascendancy of towns, where their partisans are chiefly to be found, most thoroughly established.

70.

is adapta-  
tion to the  
varieties of  
the physical  
condition of

Though not extensive in point of surface, Switzerland embraced such an extraordinary variety of climate, soil, and occupation, as rendered the rule of a single central democratic government in an especial manner vexatious. The habits and interest of the vine-growers in the Pays de Vaud are as much at variance with those of the shepherds of Glarus, as those of the intellectual city of Geneva, or the aristocratic society of

\* Sparta, Athens, Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, are instances of the government of a subject-territory by the citizens of a single town; Holland of the ascendancy of one commercial class in society: Great Britain, from 1688 to 1832, of a government substantially vested in the representatives of the great properties and *interests* of the state. It is not difficult to foresee what must be the result of the subsequent transference of political power from the proprietors to the multitude in an empire divided by so many interests, and composed of such widely separated and discordant materials.

Berne, are with the manufacturers of Soleure or the chestnut-fed inhabitants of the Italian bailiwicks. Nor were the habits and ideas of the people less at variance than the physical features of the districts in which they dwelt. Their lineage, their language, their religion, their affinities were different. Perched on the summit of the Alps, they partook of the varied character of the races of mankind who met at their feet and ran up the valleys to their highest summits. The inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud, speaking the French tongue, shared in the feelings and excitement which the Revolution had produced to the north of the Jura. Those who dwelt on the Tessino and the Misocco betrayed, in their harmonious language, enthusiastic feelings, and indolent habits, the influence of Italian descent; while the brave Switzers to the north of the St Gothard evinced, in their independent spirit, rough manners, cleanly habits, and persevering character, the distinguishing features which in every age have marked the nations of German or Teutonic descent. To establish one uniform democratic government for a country so situated, is as great an absurdity as it would be to propose the same political institutions for the English, trained to habits of order by centuries of freedom; the French, impetuous by nature, and unrestrained by custom; and the Russians, but recently emerged, under the rule of despotism, from savage life.

The natural and unavoidable consequence of the establishment of a central democratical government, in a country composed of such various and discordant materials, was the entire subjugation of the rural districts by the inhabitants of the great towns. The peasants of Unterwalden, the shepherds of Glarus, in vain attempted a contest with the citizens of Berne, Lausanne, or Zurich, speaking a different language, trained to habits of business, comparatively affluent, and closely congregated round the seat of government. In the unequal struggle they were speedily cast down; and thus the unity of the republic was but

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71.  
Discontent  
which the  
central de-  
mocratic  
government  
produced.

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another expression to them for the practical loss of all their political rights. The circumstances, too, under which this constitution had been forced upon them—the cruel devastation of their country by which it had been preceded; the odious foreign yoke which it had brought upon their necks; the unheard-of contributions and spoliation by which it had been followed—had produced indelible feelings of aversion among the mountaineers, a race of men resolute in their ideas, tenacious of their habits, and more jealous of their independence than any other people in Europe. Hence the singular fact, that the most ardent opponents of the new central government were to be found among the partisans of the most opposite former constitutions; and that, beside the oligarchy of Berne and Zurich, where political power was confined to a limited number of families, were to be found the peasants of the Forest Cantons, who exercised indiscriminately, under the canopy of heaven, all the functions of government.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
409, 410.  
Dum. viii.  
35, 36. Bigu.  
ii. 368.

72.  
Violent internal  
disensions of  
the Swiss  
cantons.

After the forcible proclamation of the new constitution imposed by the Directory upon Switzerland in 1798, the country remained for four years the theatre of incessant contests and intrigues. The success of the Allies in 1799 having brought their forces into the mountains, and the Archduke Charles having, by proclamation, invited the people to re-establish their ancient form of government, an insurrection broke out simultaneously in every part of the country. But the Allies being unable to render them any assistance, or advance any distance into their territory, it was speedily suppressed, without difficulty, by the armed force organised in the towns in the French interest. Overwhelmed with astonishment at the immense bodies of men who contended for the empire of Europe amid their mountains, sensible of their own insignificance amidst such prodigious masses, and equally pillaged by friend and foe, the Swiss took hardly any further share in the contest, and resigned themselves, in hopeless

despair, to a yoke which, in the circumstances of the world, appeared inevitable. But the passions, restrained from breaking out into open hostilities with foreign powers, burned only the more fiercely in the internal dissensions which tore every part of the republic. So furious did the spirit of party become, and so vehement the reproaches addressed by the adverse factions to each other, that the historian would be at a loss to recognise the features of the Swiss character, were it not in the lenity of them all, when victorious, to their fallen adversaries,—a moderation so remarkable, and so analogous to what took place in Holland during all the convulsions subsequent to the Revolution, and in England throughout the Great Rebellion, that it encourages the pleasing hope, that such tempering of savage inclination is either the blessed result of long-established freedom and religious habits, or is an inherent quality in the nations of Teutonic descent.<sup>1</sup>\*

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiv.  
410, 411.  
*Bign.* ii. 361.  
*Dum.* viii.  
35, 37.

Without pursuing the complicated thread of Helvetic revolution during the four disastrous years that followed the French invasion, it will be more serviceable to give a summary of the arguments urged respectively by the partisans of the new constitution and of the ancient government. On the part of the French supporters it was urged, "that nothing could be so extravagant as to hear the federal party invoke the popular welfare, when they were in reality advancing the interests only of oligarchy and fanaticism. How dare they make use of the sacred name of freedom, when, under the name of a popular government, two or three families have been for above a century in possession of all the offices of administration? It is in vain that they impose so far upon the public

73.  
Arguments  
adduced by  
the partisans  
of France.

\* The usual course with the victorious party was to banish their fallen antagonists to Bâle or Lausanne; and, after a few months, even this severity was relaxed, and the proscribed families returned to their homes and usual avocations. What a contrast to the proscriptions of the Convention, and transportations of the Directory, in the capital styling itself the centre of European civilisation.—See *BIGNON*, ii. 361.

credulity as to style the central government a thousand times more burdensome than the ancient regime, when the slightest observation must be sufficient to show, that the burdens which have pressed so severely upon all classes have been owing solely to the evils irseparable from foreign warfare. And are the expenses of a few additional regiments, and of a central administration, composed at most of eighty or a hundred individuals, to be put in comparison with at least twenty separate governments, embracing, with their subordinate agents, several thousand persons? Disguise it as you will, it is not the feelings of patriotism or a regard for the public interests which occasion all the outcry, but selfish consideration and private advantage. Thinking, like Cæsar, that it is better to be the first at Præneste than the second at Rome, these popular despots would rather reign unmolested in their little valleys than be blended in the general administration of Switzerland, where they would speedily be reduced to their proper level, and where their voices, drowned in the minority, would cease to give them the consideration to which they aspire under the mark of disinterested patriotism.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
411, 412.

74.  
Answer of  
the partisans  
of the  
old institu-  
tions.

It was impossible to deny that there was some truth in these insinuations; but the opposite party, at the head of which was Aloys Reding, chief of the canton of Schwytz—a chief of an energetic and noble character—did not fail to retort upon their adversaries arguments of an opposite kind, to which the recent calamities gave additional weight. They urged, that if the misfortunes of Switzerland, since it had been exposed to revolutionary agitation, did not convince the partisans of a central government of their errors, neither would they be convinced though one rose from the dead. Since the disastrous period when the French troops entered Switzerland, and proclaimed that form of administration amidst the blood of thousands, and by the light of burning villages, what had been witnessed in their once happy and united ter-

ritory but rancour, hatred, and dissension? It is idle to ascribe that continued exasperation to the clamour of interested individuals; it has extended infinitely beyond the persons dispossessed by the recent changes, and embraces, in fact, the whole population, with the exception of that limited class in the towns to whom the central system has given the entire government of the country. Every one knows that Helvetia has paid more in taxes and contributions since the French invaded it than in a century before; and, in fact, it could hardly have been credited that such vast sums existed in the country as the Republican agents have contrived to extort from its industrious inhabitants. It is in vain to allege that these calamities have been the result of war. The worst of them have accrued, not during war, but in peace; and have been, not contributions irregularly levied by soldiers with arms in their hands, but exactions systematically made by the cupidity of revolutionary agents, armed with the powers of the central government. It is utterly impracticable that such a system of administration can answer in a country so peculiarly situated as our cantons are; the universal reprobation in which it is held is a sufficient proof of its total failure. In fact, the interested motives, so liberally insinuated on the other side, truly govern those who, for the sake of a constitution in which they have contrived to obtain lucrative situations, oppose themselves to the unanimous wish of their fellow-citizens.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
412, 414.  
Dum. ix. 16.

Matters were brought to a crisis by a solemn recognition of the central authority, by the Assembly which met at Berne on the 1st August 1801. The representatives of the lesser cantons, and of the aristocratic party, protested against that resolution, and also against the power of redeeming tithes, inserted in the new constitution. Deeming opposition fruitless in an assembly ruled by a revolutionary majority, the deputies of nine cantons separated from the remainder of the body, and finding

75.  
Revolution  
effected by  
the aid of  
the French  
troops.

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Oct. 28,  
1801.

that their absence only rendered the opposite party more precipitate in their measures, they had recourse to a *coup d'état* to accomplish their subversion. On the night of the 28th of October, a part of the legislative body met, and gave full power to Dolder and Sagary, two leading members of the ancient executive council, to accomplish the revolution. They immediately had recourse to the French troops, who had secret orders from the First Consul to support the movement; the posts of government were all forced, the legislative assembly was dissolved, and a provisional government with Reding at its head proclaimed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. viii.  
37, 39. Bign.  
ii. 368, 369.  
Jom. xiv.  
418, 419.

76.

But it does  
not answer  
the views of  
Napoleon.

The object of Napoleon in supporting this counter-revolution at Berne, was to establish a government in the country more in harmony with the monarchical institutions, now in the course of reconstruction at Paris, than the democratic assembly convened during the first fervour of the Helvetic revolution. But he soon experienced some difficulty in steering between the opposite extremes into which the country was divided. Reding, the head of the provisional government, repaired to Paris, where the First Consul immediately impressed upon him the necessity of acting upon the principle of fusing together the different parties, on which he himself had proceeded in the formation of the consular government; and therefore required, as the condition of his further support, the admission of six of the most moderate of the opposite party into the government. The brave Swiss was coldly received at the Tuileries. His energetic and ardent character little suited the First Consul, who had no intention of reinstating the aristocratic party, who necessarily inclined to Austria, in close proximity to that defenceless part of the French territory. He returned, therefore, to Berne, disappointed in his hopes, and applied without success to Austria and Prussia to obtain that support which he despaired of receiving from the government of the Tuileries.<sup>2</sup>

Nov. 29,  
1801.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. ix.  
19, 20. Bign.  
ii. 370, 371.  
Jom. xiv.  
420, 421.

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77.

The govern-  
ment is again  
deposed, and  
a new con-  
stitution  
framed by  
Napoleon.April 17,  
1802.

On his return, Reding found the new government destitute both of power and consideration, and discord breaking out more fiercely than ever between the adverse factions. The senate appointed by the revolution of 28th October promulgated, on 17th February, a new constitution, professed to be based on the principles laid down by the First Consul; but it neither satisfied either of the parties in Switzerland, nor accorded with the views on which his administration was founded. Deeming the time now arrived, therefore, when his interference was loudly called for, Napoleon instigated Dolder, and the six persons admitted into the government at his suggestion, to accomplish another revolution. They took advantage of the moment when Reding and the deputies of the Forest cantons had returned, with patriarchal simplicity, to their valleys, to celebrate the festival of Easter, and effected the object without difficulty. The government was deposed, the constitution of 17th February abolished, and an assembly of forty notables, specified in a list furnished by the French ambassador, appointed to meet at Berne on the 28th April, to put a final stop to the dissensions of the country. The new constitution, framed by Napoleon upon principles far superior to any which had yet been extracted out of the revolutionary crucible, was proclaimed at Berne on the 19th May. It consisted of an executive, composed of a landamman and two lieutenants, appointed for nine years; a senate of fifty-six members, who proposed all changes in the laws; and a national diet which sanctioned them. The sense of the citizens was forthwith taken upon this constitution. It appeared that, out of three hundred and thirty thousand persons entitled to vote, ninety-two thousand rejected it, seventy-two thousand supported it, and a hundred and seventy thousand abstained from voting. A majority of votes, therefore, were for rejection; but the government, proceeding on the principle already acted on in Holland, that those who withheld their votes were favourable to the



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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
424, 425.  
Dum. viii.  
19, 20. Bign.  
ii. 371, 372.

change, proclaimed its adoption by a large majority. The lesser cantons loudly announced their determination of seceding from the confederacy, if it was forced upon them; but the aristocratic cantons, influenced by the promise that, if accepted, the French troops would be withdrawn, at length agreed to its adoption.<sup>1</sup>

73.

The French  
troops are  
withdrawn,  
and the in-  
dependence  
of the Valais  
is proclaim-  
ed.  
July 20,  
1802.

Deeming the result of the last revolution sufficiently favourable to his views, Napoleon thought it no longer advisable to continue the French troops in Switzerland, where they had remained, in defiance of the treaty of Lunéville, for two years, to the evident dissatisfaction both of Britain and Austria. On the 20th July, accordingly, the withdrawal of the Republicans was proclaimed by the First Consul, and at the same time the erection of the Valais into a separate republic was announced. This measure, contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the inhabitants, and evidently in connexion with the formation of the great military road over the Simplon, announced but too clearly to the Swiss the state of dependence under which they were to be placed to France by the new government they had obtained, and contributed not a little to the explosion which immediately followed the removal of the French forces. The government at Berne, aware of the slight hold which they had on the affections of the great majority of the inhabitants, were thunder-struck by the intelligence that the French troops were to be withdrawn, and loudly remonstrated against the adoption of a measure so fatal to their interests; but the First Consul, tired of the incessant changes of rulers in the Swiss states, and desirous of a pretext for interfering with decisive effect in a country so important to his military operations, persevered in his resolution, and the evacuation in good earnest commenced. The government, despairing of any support from the national troops, eagerly solicited the aid of the Helvetic brigades, which was granted them by the First Consul;<sup>2</sup> but before they had time to arrive, the insurrection had broken out in

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xv.  
109. Dum.  
ix. 20, 21.

the small cantons, and the constitution approached its dissolution.

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79.

Upon which  
the govern-  
ment at  
Berne  
overtur-  
and the  
mountain-  
eers prepare  
for war.  
July 13,  
1802.  
Aug. 17,  
1802.

In a letter addressed to the French ambassador on the 13th July, these cantons openly announced their resolution to withdraw from the Helvetic confederacy, and renew the ancient league of the Waldstätten, under which they had in early times maintained their independence.\* In this important and touching manifesto, the shepherds of the Alps asserted, by unanswerable arguments, their right to that freedom in the choice of their government for which the French had so long and justly contended, and which had been expressly guaranteed to them by the treaty of Lunéville. But the government at Berne answered them by a proclamation, in which they announced their resolution to maintain by force the unity of the republic. Upon this the Forest cantons convoked a diet at Schwytz, which abolished all privileges, and re-established the ancient democratic constitutions; in which they were immediately joined by the neighbouring cantons of Zug, Glarus, Appenzel, and the Rheinthal. "The treaty of Lunéville," said they, "allows us the free choice of our institutions: we are at liberty, therefore, to overturn those which have been forced upon us." The opposite parties now openly prepared for war; magazines were formed, arms collected on both sides; and while the mountaineers on the lake of Luzern were rousing themselves, under their former magistrates, for the assertion of their ancient democratic rights, the peasants of the Oberland were secretly conspiring with the patricians of

\* "We have in vain endeavoured," said they, "for four successive years, to extricate ourselves from a constitution which, from its origin, and still more from the violence with which it was established, could not fail to be insupportable. It is in vain that we have constantly hoped that the Helvetic government, instructed by the calamitous events of the last four years, would at length find that our separation from the republic was that which was most wise and suitable for both parties; and that the wish which we have so often and so strongly expressed for our ancient liberty, would have induced them to abandon the hope that these three cantons would ever voluntarily accept any other constitution, than that which has always been considered as the only one suited to these states, and for that reason has been so highly prized by ourselves and

Heroic pro-  
clamation of  
the Forest  
Cantons.

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Berne for the re-establishment of the former aristocratic privileges of that oligarchy—a union at which the French writers are never weary of expressing their astonishment, not perceiving that it was formed on true conservative principles, which, amidst the experienced suffering produced by urban democracy, invite the nobles and rural population to combine for its overthrow, and for the re-establishment of a government in both situations recommended by experience, and suited to the interests and habits of the people.

80.  
Hostilities  
commence.  
Great early  
success of  
the moun-  
taineers.  
August 28.

Hostilities were commenced in the Forest cantons, by an attack on the advanced guard of the troops of the Helvetic republic, near the foot of Mount Pilatus, who were repulsed in an attempt to penetrate from the north into the canton of Unterwalden. Zurich soon after revolted against the constituted authorities, and the indignation of the inhabitants was strongly excited by an ineffectual bombardment which General Andermatt, at the head of the forces of the republic, kept up with the view of terrifying the inhabitants into submission. But the flame now broke out on all sides; the peasants of the Oberland and Argovia assembled under their old leaders, and the approach of their united forces towards Berne compelled the government to summon Andermatt from the siege of Zurich to its own defence. Dolder, who, by making himself useful to all parties, had contrived to place himself at the helm of the government, now lost all hope, and seeing no means of

our ancestors. Our reunion with Helvetia, which has been stained with so much blood, is perhaps the most cruel example of constraint that history can offer.

“In the conviction, therefore, that for a forced and unfortunate marriage divorce is the only reasonable remedy, and that Helvetia and ourselves cannot recover repose and contentment except by the dissolution of this forced tie, we are firmly resolved to labour at that separation with all possible activity; and we think it best to address that authority which for four years past has united us, in spite of ourselves, to the Helvetic republic. As to anything further, we only wish to preserve uninterrupted harmony and good understanding with all our neighbours. In listening to our just demands, the Helvetian republic will find the only means of preserving with us the relation of brotherhood and kindly neighbourhood.”—See *Ann. Reg.* 1802, p. 227.

making head against the storm, concluded a convention, by which he was allowed to retire with his troops unmolested to the Pays de Vaud. Thither he proceeded accordingly, followed by the French ambassador, who fabricated a story of a bullet having fallen in the court of his hotel, to give his government a pretence for immediate hostilities with the insurgents. The confederates instantly published a proclamation, in which they declared—"After four years of incessant calamity, we have at length attained the object of our desires. Guided by duty, and called by fortune, we have at last re-entered the city of Berne, our common mother, which your courage and fidelity has placed in our hands. We are penetrated with gratitude and admiration when we behold the generous and sublime burst of patriotism which has led you to brave so many dangers to recover your laws and your government. The supreme authorities have resolved to remain on terms of friendship with those who, during the preceding days of calamity, have deviated from their duty: it tenders them the hand of reconciliation. It expects not less confidently from its own now victorious supporters, that they will forget their former injuries, and not stain the triumph of their country by acts of individual vengeance."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ix.  
24, 30. Jom.  
xv. 110, 125.  
Bign. ii. 373,  
375.

Meanwhile Reding convoked a general diet to be held at Schwytz; and announced to the assembled cantons "the necessity of renouncing for ever all political privileges, and conceding to the people subjected to their government, as to lawful brothers, the same liberties and privileges which are enjoyed by the inhabitants of towns." A resolution wise and just in itself, and which sufficiently indicated the intention not to re-establish those vexatious distinctions in political power, by which the Swiss confederacy had been so long deformed. The diet met on the 27th of September, and immediately adopted the resolution to raise an armed force of twenty thousand men. At the same time, the truce agreed upon with Dolder having expired, hostilities were renewed on the

81.  
Diet assembled at Schwytz, and total subversion of the central government.

Sept. 27.

side of the Pays de Vaud; and Fribourg, after a sharp cannonade, fell into the hands of the confederates. The approaching dissolution of the central government was now apparent: the national guards of the Pays de Vaud, who had taken up arms in its defence, were driven back in disorder from Morat to Meudon; Payerne opened its gates; and the discomfited authorities could hardly assemble two thousand men at Lausanne for their defence. Already the Swiss troops, in great force, were approaching the shores of the Lemman lake, and the fugitive government was preparing to retire into the neighbouring territory of France, when a new actor appeared on the stage, and the wishes of Switzerland were crushed for a long course of years, by the armed interference of the First Consul. His resolution to interfere in a decisive manner in the affairs of Switzerland was immediately taken. "Now," said he, "that the counter-revolution there is openly announced, I can no longer be deceived. If the insurgents had meant to deceive me, they should not have put at the head of their columns the royalist regiment of Bachman. I will permit no counter-revolution anywhere, neither in Switzerland, in Italy, in Holland, nor in France. I will never surrender to fifteen hundred mercenaries in the pay of England, *those formidable bastions of the Alps*, which the Coalition was unable, during two campaigns, to wrest from our brave soldiers. Talk not to me of the wishes of the Swiss people; what they call such, is nothing but the wishes of two hundred aristocratic families. I esteem that brave people too much to believe they will submit to such a yoke; but, whether they desire it or not, my part is taken. I have the security of forty millions of men, whom I command, to attend to. I shall declare myself the mediator of the Swiss confederacy, and give it a constitution suited to its rights, and the nature of its territory. I shall support my mediation in an effectual manner by thirty thousand men.<sup>1</sup> But if, contrary to my wishes, I cannot thus pacify them, I shall annex to

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xv.  
125, 129.  
Dum. ix. 30,  
28. Thiers,  
iv. 238.

France the Pays de Vaud, and all that adjoins Franche-Comté, and unite the rest to the Forest cantons. Switzerland must be friendly to France, or cease to exist.”

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1802.

On the 4th October, General Rapp, aide-de-camp to Napoleon, arrived at Lausanne with the following proclamation by the French government :—“ Inhabitants of Helvetia ! Swiss blood has flowed from the hands of the Swiss. For two years you have exhibited the most deplorable spectacle. Contending factions have alternately possessed themselves of power. They have signalled their ephemeral authority by a system of partiality which revealed at once their weakness and incapacity. You have disputed for three years without coming to an understanding. If you are abandoned to yourselves, you will massacre each other for three years longer without interruption. Your history proves that you can never settle your intestine divisions except by the interposition of France. It is true I had intended not to intermeddle in your affairs. I had seen all your different administrations seek my advice without following it, and not unfrequently abuse my name to the purposes of their interests and their passions ; but I can no longer remain an unconcerned spectator of the misfortunes which are devouring you. I revoke my resolution. I will become the mediator in your differences ; but my mediation shall be efficacious, and such as suits the dignity of the great nation which I represent. Five days after the publication of the present proclamation, the senate shall assemble at Berne. The government established at that place since the capitulation is dissolved. All authorities whatever, constituted by it, are at an end. The troops who have been in arms for six months shall alone be retained. All the others are hereby disbanded, and required to lay down their arms.”<sup>1</sup>

82.  
Forcible interference of  
the First  
Consul.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. x.  
38, 39.

This haughty proclamation was a severe blow to the confederate chiefs at the moment of triumph ; for nearly the whole country had now ranged themselves under

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

83.

The Swiss  
in vain in-  
voke the aid  
of Austria.  
England re-  
monstrates  
in vain.

their banners, and, with the exception of the Pays de Vaud, Switzerland had unanimously overturned the constitution forced upon her by France. The dignity of their conduct was equal to its wisdom under this cruel reverse. Disdaining to submit to the yoke of the conqueror, and yet sensible of their inability to contend with so formidable a state without the aid of more efficient allies, they invoked the support of Austria and the other powers, to assert for them the independence stipulated by the treaty of Lunéville; and, finding the Imperial cabinet deaf to their entreaties, still refused to separate, protested against the violence by which they were menaced, and declared that "they yielded only to force." They despatched a confidential agent to Paris, who addressed himself to the ambassadors of all the other states, imploring their assistance. "Scarcely," said he to the English ambassador, "did Switzerland find herself independent than she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes. Almost the whole of the country, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, threw off the yoke. The aristocratic cantons renounced their exclusive privileges. The new cantons were left at liberty to form their own constitutions. Who could have imagined that Buonaparte, in defiance of the treaty of Lunéville, would have issued such a decree as has just appeared? Is an independent nation to be thus treated? Should he persist in his determination, and the other powers not interfere, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, though without hope of successful resistance, prostrated as we are before the colossus that is about to overwhelm us, or debase ourselves in the eyes of the whole universe. Will the government of England, ever so generous, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide whether we are still to be ranked among free people? We have only men left us. The revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our

means.\* We are without arms, ammunition, stores, or money to purchase them." But though all the Continental powers warmly sympathised with these feelings, none ventured to give expression to them. England alone interfered, and by an energetic note protested against this subjugation of a neutral power, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, and despatched a confidential agent to the borders of Helvetia to ascertain the real state of the country. But finding it impossible to rouse the Continental powers to any interference on its behalf, she justly deemed it inexpedient to proceed further at that moment in support of so remote and inland a state.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1802.

Oct. 10,  
1802.

A. D. 1802  
xxxvi. 128  
Jom. xv.  
130, 135.  
Dum. ix. 2.,  
40. Bign.  
ii. 377, 378.

All was soon accomplished. Ney entered Switzerland with twenty thousand men, and occupied, without resistance, Soleure, Zurich, and Berne; the scene of violence commenced by the imposition of a contribution of six hundred thousand francs on the cities which had fallen under the power of the invaders. The subjugation of Switzerland being resolved on, the tyrannical process was, however, carried into effect with as much clemency and moderation as the circumstances would admit. Ney executed his duty with humanity and discretion. He sent a peremptory order to the diet to dissolve its forces; and supported the mandate by the advance of masses, evidently overwhelming, to St Gall, Glarus, and Schwytz. Yielding to necessity, they ordered their troops to disband, and closed their sittings by a touching appeal to posterity, in which they protested against the violence by which they had been oppressed, and bequeathed to happier times the duty of restoring the liberties of their country.\* At the same time they notified to Ney, "that the diet at Schwytz, yielding to force, had come to the

84.  
The Swiss  
in despair  
submit, and  
Ney over-  
runs the  
country.

\* This memorable address, worthy of the country of Tell, was couched in the following terms:—"The deputies of the Cantons have come to the resolution of surrendering the powers with which they were invested into the hands of their constituents, inasmuch as the force of foreign armies opposes an irresistible bar to the accomplishment of their duties. But while they recognise the necessity of submission, the deputies conjure their constituents not for one moment to believe that it can impair their right to choose their own form of Dignified address of the deputies of the Forest Cantons on resigning the government.



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XXXVI.

1802.

resolution of separating, inserting, however, in the name of all Switzerland, the same reservation for the future which it had already made known in its public proclamation." Aloys Reding, after the disbanding of the troops, disdained either to fly or to make submission, but remained at Schwytz, ready to undertake, in his own person, all the responsibility consequent on his patriotic devotion. He was soon after arrested, along with his brother the Landamman of Baden, and some other leaders of the confederates, and sent under a strong guard to Zurich, from whence, in a short time, he was transferred to the castle of Chillon, on the lake of Geneva—a fortress rendered more interesting in the eyes of freedom by his captivity, than by the sufferings of the feudal prisoner over whose fate modern genius has thrown an imperishable lustre.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ix.  
56, 58, 59.  
Jom. xv.  
137. Ney's  
Mem. ii. 247,  
260.

85.  
Speech of  
the First  
Consul to the  
Swiss deputies  
at Paris.

Resistance being thus rendered hopeless in Switzerland, a diet of fifty-six deputies of the cantons was appointed to meet at Paris, in the December following, to deliberate on the formation of a constitution, and receive the law from the First Consul. His conduct and language on this occasion were distinguished by his usual penetration and ability, and a most unusual degree of lenity and forbearance. Indeed if anything could have reconciled the Swiss to the loss of their independence, it must have been the wisdom and equity which characterised his mediation. "The situation of your country," said he to the assembled deputies, "is critical; moderation, prudence, and the sacrifice of passion, are necessary to save it. I have undertaken, in the face of Europe, the engagement to render my mediation efficacious. I will faithfully discharge all the duties which that sacred function

Dec. 10,  
1802.

government—a right which they inherit from the virtues and courage of their ancestors, and which is expressly guaranteed by the treaty of Lunéville. With this view, while they yield to force, they are resolved to do nothing which may impair that precious bequest to future generations, or sanction in any degree that which other inhabitants of Switzerland, by accepting such an alienation, may have the appearance of approving."—See JOMINI, xv. 133; and DUMAS, ix. 57

imposed on me; but that which might be difficult without your concurrence becomes easy by your influence and assistance. Switzerland does not resemble any other country; its geographical and topographical situation, the difference of religion, and extreme variety of manners which prevail in its various parts, render it an exception to all other states. Nature has made your country federative; to attempt to conquer it is not the part of wisdom. Circumstances, the spirit of past ages, have established among you sovereign and subject people. New circumstances, and the spirit of a different age, have introduced equality of right between all the parts of your territory. Many of your states have been governed for centuries by the most absolute democracy; others have fallen under the dominion of particular families, and subjects have grown into sovereigns. The influence of public opinion in Italy, Savoy, France, and Alsace, which surround you, have powerfully contributed to the formation of these institutions. The disposition of these countries is now changed, and yours must undergo a corresponding modification. The renunciation of all exclusive privileges is at once the wish and the interest of your people.

“What your interests require is—1. Equality of rights among the whole eighteen cantons; 2. A sincere and voluntary renunciation of all exclusive privileges on the part of the patrician families; 3. A federative organisation, where every canton finds itself arranged according to its language, its religion, its manners, its interests and opinions. The central government remains to be provided for; but it is of much less consequence than the cantonal organisation. It is impossible to establish uniformity, either in finances, army, or civil administration, amongst you. You have never maintained regular armies, nor had established accredited agents at the courts of the different governments. Situated on the summit of the mountains which separate France, Italy, and Ger-

CHAP.  
XXXVI.  
1802.

86.  
His state-  
ment of the  
proposed  
constitution.

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XXXVI.

1802.

many, you participate in the disposition of all these different countries. Strict neutrality, a prosperous commerce, and family administration, can alone secure your interests, or be suited to your wishes. Every organisation that could be established amongst you, hostile to the wishes or welfare of France, would injure you in the most essential particulars. After having addressed you as becomes one of your own citizens, I must now use the language befitting the chief magistrate of two of your most powerful neighbours; and I must at once declare, that neither France nor the Italian republic will ever suffer a system to be established amongst you calculated to promote the interests of their enemies. The repose and tranquillity of forty millions of men, your immediate neighbours, without whom you can neither exist as a state nor subsist as individuals, are also of no small weight in the scale of public justice. Let nothing, as concerns them, be hostile amongst you; let everything, on the contrary, be in conformity with your interests; and let it continue, as in times past, your first object, your first policy, your first inclination, your first duty, to permit nothing, to leave nothing on your territory which, directly or indirectly, can prejudice the interests, the honour, or the cause of the French people. It is indispensable, not merely that there should exist no sort of disquietude for that portion of our territory which is open, and which you cover; but that we should further feel the assurance that, if your neutrality were ever to be violated, your interest, not less than your inclination, would lead you to range yourselves under the banner of France, rather than in opposition to it.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 356,  
359.

87.  
Discontent  
which his  
principles  
excite on

Apart from the determination here openly announced of subjecting Switzerland to the influence and even government of France, which, however alarming to all the neighbouring powers, as chief magistrate of that country, the First Consul was naturally led to desire, there can be no doubt that the principles which he here

set forth were those which the most profound wisdom would have suggested for terminating the dissensions of which it had so long been the prey. They gave, accordingly, almost as great umbrage to the vehement republican as to the ultra-conservative party: the former deploring the re-establishment of a federal union, and the separate constitution of different cantons; the latter the formation of a central government, under the influence, and subject to the control of France. Both parties conducted the debate with much warmth, and the greatest abilities of France and Switzerland were employed in the conference, which took place in the council of state at Paris, in presence of the First Consul. At length the discussion was terminated by the Act of Mediation published by Napoleon on the 19th February 1803, which, for the remainder of his reign, settled the condition of the Helvetic confederacy.<sup>1</sup>

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1802.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ix.  
65. 72. Jom.  
xv. 123. 140.

By this act Switzerland was divided into nineteen cantons; the lesser ones were revived, and their limits re-established as formerly. The Oberland was restored to Berne; but the states of the Pays de Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, St Gall, and the Tessino, which formerly had been subjected to the other cantons, were elevated to the rank of constituent members of the confederacy. Five of the principal cantons, namely, Fribourg, Berne, Soleure, Zurich, and Luzern, were styled directing cantons, and the diet sat, year about, at their chief towns; and for that year the chief magistrate of that canton was Landamman of Switzerland. The federal contingent was fixed at 15,203 men, and 490,507 francs, (£20,000.) All exclusive privileges were abolished, so that the citizen of any one canton was a denizen of any part of the confederacy. All alliances of one canton with another, or with a foreign state, were interdicted. Each canton sent a deputy to the diet; Berne, Zurich, Vaud, Argovia, St Gall, and the Grisons, each sent two. The functions of the supreme council were declared to be,—1. To proclaim

88.  
His final Act  
of Media-  
tion for the  
settlement  
of Helvetia.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

war or peace, and conclude foreign alliances, which required the consent of three-fourths of the diet; 2. To fix regulations for foreign commerce, capitulations in foreign services, and the recruiting of soldiers; 3. To levy the contingent, and appoint commanders of the armed force, and the foreign ambassadors; 4. To adopt measures of external utility, and settle disputes between one canton and another. The act concluded in these terms:—"The present act, the result of long conferences with enlightened persons, appears to us the best that could be devised for the constitution and happiness of the Swiss. As soon as it is carried into execution, the French troops shall withdraw. We recognise Helvetia, as organised by this act, as an independent power, and guarantee the federal constitution, and that of each canton in particular, against the enemies of the tranquillity of the state."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xv.  
139, 141.  
Dum. ix. 70,  
73—App.  
253, 279,  
Pièces Just.

89.  
Equitable  
measures for  
the govern-  
ment of the  
country.

The subsequent dispositions of the First Consul were all dictated by a desire to render the foreign yoke then imposed upon the Swiss as light as possible, and win the affections of a people whose situation rendered their neutrality of more value to France than their alliance. Satisfied with the erection of the Valais into a separate republic, which gave him the entire command of the Simplon road, Napoleon allowed the Swiss to retain their neutrality, rejected all idea of an alliance offensive and defensive, and modified the existing stipulated contingent into a levy of sixteen regiments, who were taken into the pay of the French Republic. These lenient conditions gave universal satisfaction in Switzerland. The deputies of the cantons met at Fribourg in the beginning of July, under the auspices of Louis d'Affry, designated by Napoleon as the first landamman of the confederacy; while the presence of Aloys Reding, as deputy for Schwytz, gave testimony to the commencement of the system of fusion which it was so much the object of the First Consul to establish in all the countries subjected to his dominion, and proved,<sup>2</sup> that if the Swiss were not reconciled to the

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xv.  
240, 241.  
Dum. ix. 73,

foreign yoke, at least they had abandoned all hope of further resisting it.\*

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XXXVI.

1802.

90.

Extreme  
dissatisfac-  
tion excited  
by this event  
over Europe.

The dignified conduct of the Swiss patriots, in the last extremity of their independence, and the necessity to which they reduced the First Consul of openly employing force to subdue them, was in the highest degree contrary to his wishes, and proved more prejudicial to his interests in Europe than any other event which had occurred under his government. He had hoped that all necessity for a visible conquest would be prevented by one of the factions openly invoking his assistance; and that thus Switzerland would be subjugated as other countries had been, by dividing without appearing to do violence to the people. The unanimous expression of public detestation which attended the proclamation of the French constitution, and the instant overthrow of the government which followed the removal of the French troops, entirely frustrated this insidious design, and compelled Napoleon to throw off the mask, and, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, openly accomplish the subjugation of the country. This violent proceeding was not less painful to the feelings of the people, than it was alarming to the governments of all the neighbouring states. To see the great central fortress of Switzerland, commanding all the passes

\* The sagacity with which the First Consul discriminated the most important features in the condition of the Swiss cantons, may be appreciated by the following extracts from the speech he delivered on the formation of the internal constitution of the confederacy:—"The re-establishment of the ancient order of things in the democratic cantons, is the best course which can be adopted both for you and me. They are the states whose peculiar form of government renders them so interesting in the eyes of all Europe; but for this pure democracy, you would exhibit nothing which is not to be found elsewhere. Beware of extinguishing so remarkable a distinction. I know well that this democratic system of administration has many inconveniences; but it is established, it has subsisted for centuries, it springs from the circumstances, situation, and primitive habits of the people, from the genius of the place, and cannot with safety be abandoned. When usage and systematic opinion find themselves in opposition, the latter must give way. You must never take away from a democratic society the practical exercise of its privileges. To give such exercise a direction consistent with the tranquillity of the state, is the part of true political wisdom. In ancient Rome the votes were counted by classes; and they threw into the last class the whole body of indigent citizens, while the first contained only a

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from France into Italy, placed in the hands of so ambitious a ruler, at the very time when he was rapidly extending his dominions over the whole peninsula, excited the strongest jealousy in all the European Cabinets; while the subjugation of the country of William Tell, and the overthrow of Swiss independence by Republican bayonets, awakened deep feelings of commiseration among all to whom the name of liberty was dear. It did more to dispel the general fascination which had attended the government of the First Consul, than any circumstance which had occurred since his elevation to power. At the same time, the indignation of the Dutch was strongly excited by the continued residence of the French troops in their territory, and the heavy load which the maintaining and paying so large a body of men imposed on their almost ruined finances, in direct opposition to the treaty signed, and promises held out on occasion of the late change in their government: and the conviction became as general as it was painful, that the ambition of France was insatiable, and that the establishment of revolutionary governments in the adjoining states, only led to a prolongation of the onerous yoke of the great parent Republic.<sup>1\*</sup>

See also  
ton's Des-  
patch, Dec.  
29, 1802.  
Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 1285.

few hundred of the most opulent individuals; but the populace were content, and, amused with the solicitation of their votes, did not perceive the immense difference in their relative value, and that, all put together, they did not equal the influence of a few of the great patrician families.

"Since the Revolution, you have never ceased to seek your safety independent of France. Your position, your history, in fine, common sense, forbid it. The interests of defence bind Switzerland to France; those of attack render it of value in the eyes of other powers. The first is permanent and constant; the second depends on fortune and political combination, and can only be transient in its operation. Switzerland can never defend its plains except with the aid of France; France is open to attack on the Swiss frontier; Austria is not, for she is covered by the bulwark of the Tyrol. I would have gone to war on account of Switzerland; I would have sacrificed a hundred thousand men, rather than allow it to remain in the hands of the party who were at the head of the last insurrection, so great is the influence of its geographical position upon France."  
—THIBAUDEAU, 363, 367.

\* As a specimen of the effect which these events produced on the liberal party in Europe, it is sufficient to refer to the speeches of the leaders of the Opposition in the British parliament.—"The French government," said Mr Fox, "was bound by treaty, as well as by every principle of justice, to with-

While the continent of Europe was agitated by these important events, and presaged, in the rapid strides of the First Consul towards universal dominion, the approaching renewal of the war, England was tasting, with unalloyed satisfaction, the blessings and the tranquillity of peace. She had given the most unequivocal proof of the sincerity of her confidence in the honour of France, in permitting the vast armament of le Clerc to proceed unmolested to the West Indies; and had beheld, with pain indeed, but without opposition, the successive new-modelling of the Batavian, Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Valaisan republics, under the authority of the First Consul, and the annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia to his dominions, or those of his subject states. On occasion only of the overthrow of Helvetic independence, her ministers presented an energetic note to the French government, complaining of that assault on the European liberties; but, finding their remonstrances not supported by the other powers, they prudently desisted from any more efficacious interference in their behalf.\* Secure in her insular position and maritime strength, she beheld with uneasiness, but without apprehension for her own independence, the successive additions to the power of France; and deemed

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

91.  
Tranquillity  
and happi-  
ness of Eng-  
land during  
this period.

draw their troops from Switzerland, and to leave that country to itself, even with the miserable government which they had established in it, and to respect its independence. During their dominion in that country, they had formed a government so utterly odious to the people, that, the moment their troops were withdrawn, the inhabitants, by an insurrection founded on the truest principles of justice, rose and overturned it. The French government interfered to restore it, and, bad as the system was, the manner of their interfering to restore it was, if possible, still worse. This violent act of injustice, no man can contemplate with more indignation than myself.

Opinion of  
Mr Fox  
the subj

"The conduct of France, with respect to Holland, affords a still more intolerable instance of injustice. Were I a master of the use of colours, and could paint with skill, I would take the darkest to delineate the conduct of France towards that republic. It certainly has been worse treated by her than any other country whatever. Holland has not only suffered all the unavoidable evils of war; but when peace came, to turn that country, in defiance of a positive treaty with France, into a depot for French troops, for the mere purpose of putting the Dutch to the expense of maintaining them, was an act no less despicable for its meanness than hateful for its atrocity."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1446, 1450.

And on the  
treatment of  
Holland

\* "His Majesty has received with deep regret the address of the First



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XXXVI.

1802.

92.  
Rapid im-  
provement  
of the finan-  
ces and trade  
of the coun-  
try.

herself not called upon to interfere actively in Continental affairs till the powers more immediately interested were prepared to second her efforts by efficacious aid.

During this brief period of national repose, the industry and finances of the country prospered in a most extraordinary degree; and Great Britain literally reaped at the same time the excitement of war with the commerce and tranquillity of peace. As her statesmen did not consider it safe to make any considerable reduction in the national establishments while the power of France was so formidable, the lassitude arising from a diminished government expenditure was hardly experienced; an extensive paper currency maintained the prices and activity of war; while the opening of the Continental ports brought into her harbours the extended commerce of peace, and rendered her commercial cities the emporium of the civilised world, without diminishing, but on the contrary greatly increasing, the employment of British shipping. Her exports and imports rapidly increased;\* the cessation of the income-tax conferred comparative affluence on the middle classes; agriculture, sustained by continued high prices, shared in the general prosperity; the sinking fund,

Consul to the Helvetic people, published by authority in the *Moniteur* of 1st October. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers.

"The cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as any other power, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has, in the present instance, been expressly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the treaty of Lunéville, by the French government, conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and with whatever regret he may have perused the late proclamation of the French government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will further attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights."—LORD HAWKESBURY'S *Note to M. OTTO*, Oct. 10, 1802; *Parl. Hist.*, xxxvi. 1281. °

\* It was stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his place in parlia-

relieved in some degree from the counteracting influence of annual loans, attracted universal attention ; while the revenue, under the influence of so many favourable circumstances, steadily augmented, and the national exigencies were easily provided for, without any addition to the burdens of the people. So widespread was the enthusiasm occasioned by this bright gleam of prosperity, that even sagacious practical men were carried away by the delusion ; and the only apprehension expressed by the moneyed classes was, that the sinking fund would extinguish the debt too rapidly, and capital, left without any secure investment, be exposed to the risk and uncertainty of foreign adventure.

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1802.

Under the influence of such favourable circumstances, the permanent revenue of Great Britain steadily increased, while the public expenditure was rapidly diminished. In the year 1802, indeed, the effect of the great war expenses, which the unsettled state of the negotiation prior to the signing of the definitive treaty made it impossible to reduce, rendered a considerable national expenditure necessary ; but in the succeeding year the full benefit of pacific reduction was experienced. In the former year the current annual expenditure was, independent of the interest of the debt, £29,693,000, and the receipt £36,368,000. In the latter, the receipt had risen to £38,609,000, and the expenditure, without the interest of the debt, fallen to £28,298,000.<sup>1</sup> The financial operations of both years were on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, from the extent of the floating debt which was funded,

93.  
Financial  
details.

<sup>1</sup> Porter's  
Parl. Table  
i. p. 1.

ment, that the real value of British produce and manufactures exported in the year 1802 was little short of £50,000,000, being an increase of £8,000,000 above the year preceding ; and the shipping entering the port of London in the years 1801 and 1802 was as follows :—

	BRITISH.			FOREIGN.		
	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
1801,	1762	418,681	23,096	3385	452,667	20,388
1802,	2459	574,700	33,743	1549	217,117	10,555

Thus indicating that the return of peace had reduced to a half the foreign shipping in the port of London, and added a half to the British.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1127.

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1802.

and loans contracted to meet the winding-up of the war, which produced a receipt and expenditure in each of nearly eighty millions from the public treasury; but, excepting these extraneous sums, the aspect of the national resources was in the highest degree satisfactory. The sinking fund was rapidly and steadily absorbing the debt, and afforded the prospect of extinguishing the whole national encumbrances, great as they were, at no distant period.\*

But these flattering prospects were of short duration. Independent of the increasing jealousy with which the

\* The ways and means and expenditure for these two years stood as follows:—

*Expenditure, 1802.*

Ordinary, . . . . .	£29,693,000
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded, . . . . .	19,855,588
Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	23,892,815
Sinking fund, . . . . .	6,114,033
	<hr/>
	£79,555,436

The interest of the debt, funded and unfunded, was £19,855,588, and the produce of the sinking fund, £6,114,033.<sup>1</sup>

*Ways and Means.*

Ordinary income, . . . . .	£36,368,149
Loan, . . . . .	27,550,449
Exchequer bills, . . . . .	17,094,653
	<hr/>
	£81,013,251

The unfunded debt funded this year amounted to £23,892,815, which explains the difference between the supply and expenditure.

*Expenditure, 1803.*

Ordinary, . . . . .	£28,298,866
Interest of funded and unfunded debt, . . . . .	20,699,864
Sinking fund, . . . . .	6,494,694
Paid Exchequer bills, . . . . .	17,194,108
	<hr/>
	£72,687,122

*Ways and Means.*

Revenue, . . . . .	£38,609,892
Loan, . . . . .	11,960,523
Exchequer bills, . . . . .	20,481,130
	<hr/>
	£71,051,045

The rapid growth and steady application of the sinking fund was the subject

<sup>1</sup> Porter's  
Parl. Tables,  
i. Parl. Hist.  
xxvi. 440,  
and Ann.  
Reg. 1802,  
558, App. to  
Chron.

British government beheld the Continental encroachments of Napoleon, and which rapidly communicated itself to all classes of the English people, several causes of irritation grew up between the rival governments, which first weakened and at last destroyed their good understanding. The detail of these causes is fraught with the highest historical interest. The fate of the world has depended on the results to which they led. The first of these subjects of irritation was the asperity with which the government and acts of the First Consul were canvassed in the English newspapers. Not only did several French journals published in London, in particular that of Peltier and the *Courrier Français de Londres*, comment with great severity on his proceedings, but almost all the English journals, following the bent of the public mind, descanted in the most unmeasured terms on his continual encroachments in Continental Europe. To Napoleon, who was accustomed only to the voice of adulation, and heard nothing from the enslaved journals of his own country but gracefully turned flattery, these diatribes were in the highest degree painful; and not the less so, probably, because the charges which they contained in regard to his foreign aggressions were more easily silenced by authority than answered by argument.

He therefore caused his minister at the court of London to remonstrate warmly against these articles,\* and con-

of deserved congratulations to the country, both by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr Pitt. They calculated that it would extinguish the whole existing debt in forty-five years; and the celerity of its increase, compared with that of the interest of the debt, might be judged of by the fact, that when it was first instituted in 1784 its produce annually was one-tenth of the interest: whereas in 1803 it had risen to a third of that of the then existing debt. It will hereafter appear that when it was broken upon in 1813, it was producing more than half the interest of the debt; and that, if it had been let alone, it would have extinguished the whole debt existing at the conclusion of the war before the year 1845.—See PORTER'S *Parl Tables*, i. 1; *Parl. Deb.* xxxvi. 1127-1130.

\* "The greatest of all injuries," said M. Otto, "is that which tends to debase a foreign government, or to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most pernicious of all protections is that which places under the safeguard of the laws men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquillity of Europe, but even to dissolve the first bands of society." This is not

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

95.

Complaints  
and demands  
of the First  
Consul.

cluded by demanding—"1. That the English government should adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and writings printed in England are filled. 2. That the individuals specified in the undersigned list should be sent out of Jersey. 3. That Georges and his adherents should be transported to Canada. 4. That, in order to deprive the evil-disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two governments, it should be recommended to the princes of the house of Bourbon, at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw. 5. That such of the French emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient government of France, be required to quit the territory of the British empire." Of these extravagant demands, which proved that Napoleon understood as little the action of a free government as he did the relative situation of France and England, and their right to treat on a footing of perfect equality, it is sufficient to observe, that they have excited the indignation even of the French historians who are most friendly to his cause. "It was nearly the same thing," says his eloquent apologist, Norvins, "to propose to Great Britain the sacrifice of its constitution, as to insist upon its abandoning the two pillars of its freedom, the liberty of the press and the privilege of *habeas corpus*. Such a demand

a question concerning some paragraphs which, through the inadvertence of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print, but a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the chief of the French republic, but all its constituted authorities—against the whole nation—represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. These observations are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered in England only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace. It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings, evidently published with a view to circulation in France, but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to induce the evil-disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the conclusion of the concordats, that these implacable enemies of France continue to exercise hostilities and provoke the just indignation of the French government and people. Not a doubt can exist of these writings having been composed and circulated by Georges and the former bishops of France."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1270.

was in the highest degree imprudent on the part of the First Consul, as it necessarily rendered him odious to the English people. Such language might have been used to the Cisalpine or Ligurian republics, the creations of his hands; but it was wholly unsuitable to an independent power like England: and although that language was but the expression of disunion which already existed between the two governments, yet it was extremely imprudent to make it known in a diplomatic communication to the whole of Europe.”<sup>1</sup>

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XXXVI.  
1802.

<sup>1</sup> M. Otto's  
note, Aug.  
17, 1802.  
Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 1270.  
Norv. ii.  
234, 236.

The British government replied to this extraordinary requisition in dignified but courteous language.\* They answered specifically each of the charges advanced by the French government, and concluded by observing:—“His Majesty is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace which is consistent with the honour and independence of the country, and the security of its laws and constitution. But the French government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation, and the character of its government,<sup>2</sup> if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power would

96.  
Answer of  
the British  
government.

Kesbury's  
Note, Aug.  
17, 1802.  
Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 1277.

\* “It cannot be denied,” they observed, “that some improper and indecent paragraphs against the government of France have appeared, both in the English newspapers and the French journals published in London: but they have not been published under the authority of the British government, nor are they in any way responsible for their contents. His Majesty neither can nor will, in consequence of any representation or menace from a foreign power, make any concession which may be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject; the constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description; but there exist judicatures wholly independent of the executive, capable of taking cognisance of such publications as the law deems criminal; and they may investigate and punish not only libels against the government and magistracy of this kingdom, but those reflecting on the individuals in whose hands the administration of foreign governments is placed. The British government is perfectly willing to afford to the French government all the means of punishing the authors of any writings which they may deem defamatory, which they themselves possess; but they never can consent to new-model their laws, or to change their constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign power. If the French government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels, they may punish the venders or distributors of such writings as they deem defamatory in their own

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

97.  
Trial of Pel-  
tier for a  
libel on the  
First Con-  
sul.

ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded."

No further diplomatic correspondence took place on this subject; but soon after, to remove all grounds for complaint on the part of the First Consul, a prosecution was instituted by the Attorney-general against Peltier, for one of the most vehement of his articles against the French government. This criminal case, which, in the excited state of the public mind on the subject of France, awakened the most intense interest, gave occasion to a splendid display of eloquence in defence of the accused from Sir James Mackintosh, who then first gave public proof of those great abilities which his *Vindiciæ Gallicæ* and lectures on constitutional law had long made known to a more limited circle. Peltier was found guilty; but the subsequent breaking out of war between the two countries prevented his being brought up to receive judgment. The war of journals continued with redoubled vehemence on both sides of the Channel, as events succeeded calculated to call forth mutual complaints; and

country, or increase by additional penal regulations the risk of their circulation within their own bounds.

"With respect to the removal of the persons considered obnoxious to the French government from the British dominions, his Majesty has no desire that the princes of the house of Bourbon should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed or can be induced to quit it; but he feels it to be inconsistent with his honour and with his sense of justice to withdraw from them the right of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly, and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two governments. The emigrants in Jersey, most of whom are there chiefly in consequence of the cheapness of provisions, had removed, or were removing, previous to M. Otto's note. If any of them can be shown, by reasonable evidence, to have distributed papers on the coast of France with the view of disturbing the government, and of inducing the people to resist the new Church Establishment, his Majesty will deem himself justified in taking measures to compel them to leave the country. Measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for removing Georges and his adherents from his Majesty's European dominions. There are few, if any, of the French emigrants who continue to wear the decorations of the ancient government: it might be more prudent if they all abstained from doing so; but the French government cannot expect that his Majesty will commit so harsh an act as to send them out of the country on that account."—LORD HAWKESBURY'S *Note*, 17th August 1802; *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1274. 1276

several articles in the *Moniteur*, of the most hostile character, bore evident marks of the First Consul's composition. The French incessantly urged the execution of "the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens;" loudly complained that the British government had not evacuated Alexandria, Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope, as stipulated in that instrument; and declared that France would in consequence remain in the attitude of Minerva, with a helmet on her head and a spear in her hand. The English answered, that the strides made by France over continental Europe since the general pacification, and her menacing conduct towards the British possessions, were inconsistent with any intention of preserving peace, and rendered it indispensable that the securities held by them for their own independence should not be abandoned; and retorted upon the French by demanding "the state of Europe before the treaty of Amiens, the whole state of Europe before the treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the state of Europe before the treaty of Amiens." This recriminatory warfare was continued with equal zeal and ability on the opposite sides of the Channel; loud and fierce defiance was uttered by both parties; and it soon became manifest, from the temper of the people, not less than the relations of their governments, that the contest could be determined only by the sword.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Dum. ix.  
98, 101.  
Norv. i. 230,  
241. Ann.  
Reg. 1803,  
240, 246.  
Thiers, iv.  
251.

In truth, it was not merely from the Continental acquisitions of France, great as they had been since the peace, that the British government conceived apprehensions of the impossibility of long maintaining friendly terms with that power. Other circumstances nearer home revealed a determination on the part of the First Consul to resume the contest at no distant period, and render the places evacuated by the treaty of Amiens the outposts, from which hostilities were to be directed against their vital interests. The continued stay of a large French force in

98.  
Expedition  
of Sebastiani  
to Egypt.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1802.

Holland, in defiance of express treaty; the gradual accumulation of troops on the shores of the Channel and on the frontiers of Hanover, indicated anything rather than a pacific disposition, and menaced England in the quarters where she was most easily assailable. At the same time, the mission of Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt and Syria, in October 1802, for purposes evidently of a warlike character, and the minute and elaborate military report which he laid before the First Consul on his return, proved that, so far from having abandoned the idea of conquest on the banks of the Nile, he was prepared to resume it on the first convenient opportunity.\* Influenced by these circumstances, and the evident demonstration of an insatiable ambition which the conduct of France to Italy and Switzerland afforded, the English government sent orders to delay the evacuation of Malta, Alexandria, and the Cape of Good Hope, which they had not only resolved on, but in part commenced,† and openly declared their resolution to retain these important stations till some satisfactory explanation was obtained of the French movements.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> British declaration,  
Parl. Hist.  
vi.1257.  
1297, 1332,  
1333.

\* It appears from Colonel Sebastiani's Report, that he embarked on the 16th September at Toulon, and, after visiting Tripoli, arrived at Alexandria on the 16th October. "I communicated," says he, "to the English commander there the order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to demand a speedy evacuation, and the execution of the treaty of Amiens. General Stuart told me that the evacuation of the place would shortly be effected, and when I insisted for a more specific answer, he declared that he had no orders from his court to quit Alexandria, and that he believed he should winter there." He minutely examined the fortifications of Alexandria, and all the neighbouring forts; afterwards visited Cairo under an escort of five hundred men; traversed Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts, and returned by St Jean d'Acre and the Ionian Islands to France, with specific information as to the military and political state of the countries he had visited, and their respective dispositions towards France and England. The First Consul thought it so little necessary to disguise his designs, that he published the Report, which is very long and elaborate, in the *Moniteur*; and it was particularly observable that Sebastiani assured all the Christians from whom he received deputations in Egypt and Syria "of the friendship and protection of the First Consul." The Report concluded with a detailed statement of all the British troops in Egypt, and the respective forces of the Turks and native chiefs.—See the whole Report in *Parl. Hist.* xxxvii. 1350, 1359.

† As decisive evidence that in autumn 1802, and anterior to the manifestation of the First Consul's ambitious designs in Europe, the British government

CHAP.

893

99.

Violent ex-  
plosion of  
Napoleon in  
conv .ti  
with re  
Whitworth.

This resolution of the cabinet of St James's immediately gave rise to an angry diplomatic correspondence between the two governments; but, instead of quoting these official documents, which as usual convey no idea of the real views of the parties, it is more important to give the substance of the famous interview which the First Consul had with Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador at Paris, on the 21st February 1803, which is so descriptive of the character of that extraordinary man as to be one of the most valuable documents of history. "He placed," says that nobleman in his account of the interview transmitted the day following to his own government, "in the very first rank our not evacuating Egypt and Malta, as we were bound by the treaty to have done. 'In this,' said he, 'no consideration on earth shall make me acquiesce. Of the two, I would rather see you in possession of the faubourg St Antoine than Malta. The abuse thrown out against me in the English public prints is vexatious, but not of so much consequence, nor so mischievous, as what appears in the French papers published in London. My irritation against England is daily increasing, because every wind which blows from England brings nothing but enmity and hatred against me. If I

was sincere in its intention to execute the treaty of Amiens, it is sufficient to refer to the testimony of the French historians. "England," says General Mathieu Dumas, "notwithstanding its regret at seeing the key of the Levant and the East Indies slip from its grasp, was making preparations for receiving into the fortresses of Malta the Neapolitan troops, who, by the treaty of Amiens, were to form its garrison for a year. Such, indeed, was their sincerity, that the foreign troops were actually disembarked and well received. From the 15th to the 20th September, at the periods fixed by the treaty, orders were in like manner transmitted for the evacuation of Alexandria by the British troops, and the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch forces." General Dundas and Sir Roger Curtis had received positive orders for the surrender of the Cape, with all its dependencies, to the Dutch forces. The best understanding prevailed between the troops of the two nations. The 1st January 1803 was fixed for the final evacuation; and the English troops had actually commenced their embarkation, and were half on board, when, on the evening of the 31st of December, a vessel arrived, which had left Plymouth on the 31st October, with orders to stop the cession of the colony. The British had only fifty-nine men at that time in the town; the Dutch garrison was fifteen hundred strong; and the British troops were eight miles distant when this unexpected intelligence arrived.—DUMAS, ix. 91, 120, 121.

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1803.

had felt the smallest inclination to take Egypt by force, I might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country, in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. Instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it only furnishes me with a pretence for invading it. I shall not do so, however I may wish to possess it as a colony, because I do not think it worth the chance of a war, in which I might possibly be considered as the aggressor, and by which I should lose more than I should gain; since sooner or later Egypt must belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.

100.  
Danger to  
him from  
war, and his  
assertion of  
desire to  
conciliate.

“What have I to gain by going to war? A descent upon your coasts is the only means of offence I possess; and that I am determined to attempt, and put myself at its head. I am well aware of the risks of such an undertaking, but you compel me to incur them. I will risk my army, my life, in the attempt. But can you suppose that, after having gained the height on which I stand, I would risk my life and reputation in so hazardous an undertaking, unless compelled to it by absolute necessity? I know that the probability is, that I myself and the greatest part of the expedition will go to the bottom. There are a hundred chances to one against me, but I am determined to make the attempt; and such is the disposition of the troops, that army after army will be found ready to engage in the enterprise. France, with an army of four hundred and eighty thousand men, to which amount it is to be immediately completed, and ready for the most desperate enterprise, and England with a fleet which has rendered her the mistress of the seas, and which I shall not be able to rival for ten years, might, by a good understanding, govern the world, and by their strife would overturn it. If I had not felt the enmity of the British government on every occasion since the peace of Amiens, there is

nothing I would not have done to prove my desire to conciliate :—participation in indemnities, as well as influence on the Continent; treaties of commerce; in short, anything that would have testified confidence.

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XXXVI.  
1803.

“ Nothing, however, has been able to overcome the hostility of the British government; and thence we are now come to the point—Shall we have peace or war? Will you, or will you not, execute the treaty of Amiens? For my part, I have performed its conditions with scrupulous fidelity. It bound me in three months to evacuate Naples, Tarentum, and the Roman States, and in two months my troops had evacuated them. Yours are still at Malta and Alexandria, though ten months have elapsed since the ratification of the definitive treaty. You can never blind me in that particular. To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled, the abuse in the public prints suppressed or kept within due bounds, and the protection openly given to my bitterest enemies withdrawn. If you desire war, it is only necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. I have not chastised the Algerines, from my unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers; but I hope that the time will come when England, Russia, and France, will feel that it is for their interest to destroy such a nest of robbers, and force them to live by cultivating their lands instead of by plunder. Peace or war depends on Malta. It is in vain to talk of Piedmont and Switzerland. They are mere trifles, and must have been foreseen when the treaty was going forward. You have no right to speak of them at this time of day. I do not pretend to say this mission of Colonel Sebastiani was merely commercial. It was rendered necessary, in a military point of view, by your infraction of the treaty of Amiens. That rock of Malta, on which new fortifications have been erected, is doubtless of great importance in a maritime point of view; but it has a value far more important in my eyes: it touches the honour of France.<sup>1</sup> What would

101.  
And of  
inveterate  
hostility of  
England.

<sup>1</sup> Thiers, iv.  
298. Parl.  
Hist. xxxvi.  
1297, 1299.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1803.

the world say, if we were to submit to the violation of a solemn treaty signed by ourselves? Would they not doubt our energy? For myself, my part is taken; I would rather put you in possession of the heights of Montmartre than of Malta."

102.

Hostile pre-  
parations on  
both sides.  
Unanimity  
in England  
in support  
of the gov-  
ernment.  
March 8,  
1803.

This energetic and highly characteristic conversation was not of a nature calculated to diminish the alarm of the British government, or allay the hourly increasing irritation in the two countries. The result was, that the English cabinet openly gave orders for the assembling of forces; and on the 8th March, a message from the King to both houses of parliament announced that, "as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, his Majesty had judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his Majesty refers are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet, as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his Majesty and the French government, this communication has been deemed necessary." This message was received with the most animated feelings of patriotism by both houses of parliament. Mr Fox, whose eloquence had so often been exerted in palliating the conduct of France, concurred in the address in answer, which passed both houses without a single dissenting voice; and everything announced a degree of unanimity in the further prosecution of the war unknown in its earlier stages. A few days afterwards the militia was called out. Ten thousand additional men were voted for the navy; and preparations were made in the principal harbours of the kingdom for the most vigorous hostilities. These measures were immediately met by corresponding menaces on the part of France; and everything breathed hostility and defiance in the two countries.\*

March 10.

\* M. Talleyrand, in answer to the message of the English King, drew up the following note, which was delivered to the British ambassador:—

1. If his Britannic Majesty, in his message, means to speak of the expedition at Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it is destined for America,<sup>2</sup> and was

Lord Nelson was intrusted with the command of the Mediterranean fleet. Lord Keith set out for Plymouth. Sir Sidney Smith received orders to put to sea with a squadron of observation. A hot press took place in the Thames. Sixteen ships of the line were instantly put in commission. The public ardour rose to the highest pitch; and England resumed her arms with a degree of enthusiasm exceeding even that with which she had laid them aside.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

Parl. Hist.  
1171  
Dun  
ix. 133, 144.  
Ann. Reg.  
1803.

These hostile preparations speedily led to a second and still more violent ebullition on the part of the First Consul. In a public court at the Tuileries, held a few days after the King's message had been communicated to him, he publicly addressed Lord Whitworth in the most violent terms. He was in his private apartments at the Tuileries, with Madame Buonaparte, playing with the infant son of Louis Buonaparte and Hortense, when it was announced that the circle was formed. Putting down the infant, who was on his knee, he immediately assumed a severe air, and entering the presence-chamber, went straight up to the British ambassador, and thus addressed him:—"So you are determined to go to war. We have already fought for fifteen years: I suppose you want to fight for fifteen years more. The English wish for war; but if they are on the point of sailing; but in consequence of that message its orders are countermanded.

103.  
Second violent ebullition of Napoleon to Lord Whitworth.  
March 14.

2. If we do not receive satisfactory explanations respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march twenty thousand men into Holland, since that country is named in the King's message.

3. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that they should form an encampment on the borders of Hanover; and that additional bodies of troops should join them.

4. It is natural that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

5. It is likewise in the nature of things that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.

6. It is also the natural consequence of all this that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1809.

CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1803.

the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it into the scabbard. They have no respect for treaties. Henceforth they must be shrouded in black crape. Wherefore these armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in the harbours of France; but if you arm, I shall arm also. If you insist upon fighting, I shall fight also. You may destroy France, but never intimidate it. If you would live on terms of good understanding with us, you must respect treaties. Wo to those who violate them! They shall answer for the consequences to all Europe." Passing on, then, without waiting for an answer, to the Swedish minister, he said,—“Your king has forgotten that the days of Gustavus Adolphus are passed; that Sweden has sunk to the rank of a third-rate power.” To the other ambassadors he uttered not a word, but walked silent round the circle, with fire flashing from his eyes. This violent harangue, rendered still more emphatic by the impassioned gestures with which it was accompanied, induced the English ambassador to suppose that the First Consul would so far forget his dignity as to strike him; and he was deliberating with himself as to what he should do in the event of such an insult being offered to the nation which he represented, when Napoleon retired, and delivered the assembled ambassadors of Europe from the pain they experienced at witnessing so extraordinary a scene.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Whitworth's Despatch, March 14, 1803. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1310. Norv. ii. 249. Dum. ix. 163, 164. Thiers, iv. 311, 312.

104.  
Diplomatic  
and military  
evolutions  
France.

This vehement exposure of hostile disposition produced an extraordinary sensation both in England and Europe: In the former, by the indignation it excited, and the ardent desire to revenge the slight thus publicly put upon the national honour, in the person of its ambassador; in the latter, by the clear evidence which it afforded of the impossibility of amicable terms being any longer preserved between the rival powers. Couriers, despatched the same night to every court in Europe, immediately made generally known the conflict that was approaching;

and diplomacy was soon as active in endeavouring to contract alliances as military energy was in forwarding war-like preparations. General Duroc was forthwith sent by the First Consul to Berlin, and Colonel Colbert to St Petersburg, to endeavour to rouse the northern powers to reassert the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and join in the league against Great Britain; but these potentates had already concerted measures, on occasion of the meeting they had at Memel in the preceding year to settle the matter of German indemnities, and refused to interfere in the contest. At the same time Napoleon put the army on the war footing; ordered the immediate levy of a hundred and twenty thousand men; reinforced the troops both in Holland and Italy; declared Flushing and Antwerp in a state of siege; commenced the formation of the great arsenals which were afterwards constructed in the Scheldt; hastened his naval preparations with the most incredible activity; and already began to direct those numerous corps to the shores of the Channel, which, under the name of the Army of England, were so seriously to menace the independence of Great Britain. Nor was this all. The First Consul had the extreme imprudence, in a state paper prepared by himself, and officially presented to the legislative body, to assert that England could not now contend single-handed with France.\* From the moment these words were read in England, reconciliation was hopeless. A challenge had been given: it could not but be accepted. The flame spread to every heart; patriotic feeling was roused to the highest pitch in France as well as in England; and never was war commenced with more cordial approbation on the part of the people of both countries.<sup>1</sup>

To these intemperate sallies on the part of the First

\* "Quelque soit à Londres le succès de l'intrigue, elle n'entraînera point d'autres peuples dans des ligues nouvelles; et le gouvernement le dit avec un juste orgueil—seule Angleterre ne saurait aujourd'hui lutter contre la France." —*Exposé au Corps Législatif*, Feb. 21, 1801; THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, iv. 366. •

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ix. 146. Novr. ii. 250. Thiers, iv. 303.



CHAP.  
XXXVI.

1803.

105.

Note in reply to Napoleon's complaints from Lord Hawkesbury. March 15, 1803.

Consul, the British government contented itself with replying, through the medium of the minister for foreign affairs:—"His Majesty has the most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens should be executed in as complete a manner as possible; but it is impossible for him to consider that treaty as founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other treaty or convention—namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that, if that state of possession or engagement was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situations; and that, if ever there was a case in which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to in a note by the French government—namely, that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests, for the acquisition of territory made by France upon the Continent. The subsequent acquisitions made by France in various quarters, particularly in Italy, have extended the power and increased the territory of France; and therefore England would have been justified, consistently with the spirit of the treaty, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, would have been willing to have overlooked these acquisitions, for the sake of not disturbing the general peace of Europe, and was prepared to have acted up to the very letter of the article regarding the evacuation of Malta,<sup>1</sup> when his attention was arrested by

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1311, 1312.

the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani on Egypt, which discloses views utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the treaty of Amiens."

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Notwithstanding the hostile nature of these declarations, the negotiation was kept open for two months longer, and had very nearly terminated by the English being permitted to retain Malta, on an indemnity being provided for France on the Continent. The British government proposed that Malta should be retained by England, and the Knights indemnified; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops; Elba confirmed to France; the Italian and Ligurian republics recognised by England, with the kingdom of Etruria, upon a satisfactory indemnity being provided to the King of Sardinia. To this the French cabinet would not agree; and it was next proposed by the English ministers, that "Great Britain should possess Malta for ten years; that the island of Lampedosa should be ceded in perpetuity to that power; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops, and the new Italian states recognised by England, on provisions in favour of Sardinia and Switzerland being contained in the treaty."<sup>1</sup> If these terms were not acceded to in seven days, the British ambassador was enjoined to demand his passports. Napoleon would only consent, on the other hand, that Malta should be placed in the power of Russia, Prussia, or Austria, upon their agreeing to it, and becoming parties to the treaty of Amiens; but this the British cabinet declined, alleging that Russia, the only power deemed independent of France, had positively refused to be a party to any such arrangement.\* As a last resource, and finding the

106.  
Ultimatum  
of both parties. War  
is  
de

<sup>1</sup> April 23,  
1803. Lord  
Hawkes-  
bury's Des-  
patch.

\* When this was first proposed to the Emperor Alexander, he answered, that it would be ineffectual, as so inconsiderable an island could not be the real object of contest between the parties; but he afterwards signified his readiness to accept the treaty, though it was then too late, as war was declared. The communication from the Russian ambassador, signifying the Emperor's

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British ambassador resolute, Talleyrand suggested an arrangement by which Malta should be ceded in perpetuity to Great Britain, in return for a proper equivalent to France; but Lord Whitworth had no authority to enter into such an arrangement, which was one of exchange, instead of indemnity and security; and Talleyrand positively refused to explain himself further on the subject, or specify what equivalent France required. Lord Whitworth, in consequence, demanded and received his passports on 12th May; letters of marque were issued by the British government on the 16th; General Andreossi, the French ambassador, embarked at Dover on the 18th May; and the flames of a war were again lighted up, destined ere long to involve the civilised world in conflagration. The most violent hatred to England now possessed the First Consul, which became ever after the ruling passion of his life. Anger, at once personal and national, got the mastery of his mind. To conquer, to humble England—to ruin it, destroy it—became the fixed object of his life. To cross the Channel, and transport into England one of the armies which had conquered the Continent, became the grand and lasting object of his ambition.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1339, 1349. Lord Whitworth's Despatch May 12, 1803. Bign. iii. 65, 75. Norv. ii. 250, 253. Dum. ix. 160, 177. Thiers, iv. 315.

107.  
Arrest of all British  
sellers in  
France.

Decree, May  
22, 1803.

This declaration of war was immediately followed by an act as unnecessary as it was barbarous, and which contributed, more perhaps than any other circumstance, to produce that strong feeling of animosity against Napoleon which pervaded all classes of the English during the remainder of the contest. Two French vessels had been captured, under the English letters of marque, in the bay of Audierne; and the First Consul made this a pretence for ordering the arrest of all the English then travelling in France between the ages of eighteen and sixty years. Under this savage decree, unprecedented in

readiness to act as mediator, was dated 24th May, and was not communicated to the English government till all diplomatic relations with France had ceased, by the declaration of war on the 16th May preceding.—See BIGNON, iii. 73, 107, 108.

the annals of modern warfare, above ten thousand innocent individuals, who had repaired to France in pursuit of business, science, or amusement, on the faith of the law of nations, which never extended hostilities to persons in such circumstances, were at once thrown into prison, from whence great numbers of them were never liberated till the invasion of the Allies in 1814. Among the rest was Lord Elgin, then on his return from Constantinople, where he had been ambassador, who had entered France on a positive assurance from Murat that he should not be molested. The chief persons arrested were sent to Verdun, where they offered to pay the value of the vessels taken, if allowed to depart ; but this was refused, on the ground that there were other reasons for their detention besides the capture of the vessels in Audierne bay. This severity was the more unpardonable, as the minister of foreign affairs had, a few days before, given the English at Paris assurances that they should be permitted to leave the kingdom without molestation ; and numbers had, in consequence, declined to avail themselves of the means of departure when in their power. No other authority than that of Napoleon itself is required to characterise this transaction. "Upon reading," says he, "the ironical and insolent answer made by the English government to my complaints, I despatched, in the middle of the night, an order to arrest over all France, and in all the territories occupied by our armies, the whole English, of whatever description, and retain them as hostages for our vessels, so unjustly seized. The greater part of these English were wealthy or noble persons, who were travelling for their amusement. The more novel the act was, *the more flagrant its injustice*, the more it answered my purpose. The clamour it raised was universal, and all the English addressed themselves to me ; I referred them to their own government, telling them their fate depended on it alone."<sup>1</sup> In committing this unpardonable act, Napoleon hoped to bring under his power such a number of English-

<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Las Cas. vi  
32, 33.

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1803, p. 289.  
Dum. ix.  
178. Bign.  
iii. 127, 128.

108.

Debates on  
the war in  
Parliament.  
Arguments  
in favour of  
it by the  
ministers.

men of distinction as should compel the British government to yield to his terms; but he mistook the character of the people with whom he had to deal, and contributed only to the rousing of that inveterate spirit of hostility which mainly occasioned his overthrow.<sup>1\*</sup>

The renewal of the war was soon after the subject of important and animated debates in both houses of parliament; but in the tone which pervaded the speeches of the Opposition, it was manifest how materially the light in which the war was viewed by the Whig party had changed in the course of the contest, and how much the constant aggressions of Napoleon had alienated the minds of those who had hitherto shown themselves the staunchest enemies of the conduct of government in resisting the progress of the Revolution. It was argued by Mr Pitt, Mr Canning, and Lord Hawkesbury, that "the first great point on which the negotiation turned was, whether there was such clear evidence of an intention on the part of France to resume its designs against Egypt, as justified us in retaining Malta for our security? Now, on this point,

General indignation  
which it excited even in  
France.

\* Of the feelings with which this unjustifiable proceeding on the part of the First Consul was received, even by those of his generals who were most attached to his person and government, no better proof can be required than is furnished in the Duchess d'Abantes' Memoirs, to the lot of whose husband, as governor of Paris, it fell to carry the painful decree into execution in that city. He was sent for by the First Consul in the middle of the night, who put letters into his hands explaining the cruel measure which was in contemplation. His eyes flashed fire, his whole figure was trembling with agitation. "Junot," said he, "you must, before an hour elapses, take measures, so that *all* the English, without one single exception, shall be arrested. The Temple, the Force, the Abbaye will hold them—they must be seized;" and with these words struck the table violently with his fist. "This measure," said Napoleon, "must be executed before seven in the evening.—I am resolved that, in the obscurest theatre, or lowest restaurateur's in Paris, not an Englishman shall this night be seen."—"My General," replied Junot, who, though at first stunned, soon recovered from his stupor, "you know, not only my attachment to your person, but my absolute devotion to everything which concerns you. It is that devotion which induces me to hesitate at obeying your orders, and imploring you to take a few hours to reflect on the measure which you have now commanded." Napoleon frowned: "Again," said he, "are we to have the scene of the other day over again? Even Duroc, with his quiet air, will soon come here to preach to me. By God! gentlemen, I will show you that I can make myself obeyed. Lannes has already experienced that: he will not find much to amuse himself with while eating oranges at Lisbon. Do not trust too far, Junot, to my friendship; from the moment that I conceive doubts as to yours, mine is gone." "My

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the proof furnished by the conduct of the First Consul himself was decisive. The mission of Sebastiani to the Levant, which he admitted to Lord Whitworth was of a military character; the emphatic declaration which he made to that nobleman, that sooner or later Egypt must belong to France; and the information of the same intention, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, evidently proved that he had only suspended his designs against that country, and was resolved to renew them on the first favourable opportunity. This was a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of the treaty of Amiens, which expressly provided for the integrity of the Turkish empire; and the time when he set out (Sept. 16) was important, as it entirely destroyed the pretence that he was sent to refute the statements in Sir Robert Wilson's work, which it is notorious was not published at that time.

"It is in vain to oppose to the inference clearly deduced from these circumstances the improbability that, if such had really been the designs of the French government,

109.  
Defence of  
the retentive  
of Malta.

General," replied Junot, still undaunted, "it is not at the moment that I am giving you the strongest proof of my devotion, that you should thus address me. Demand my blood—demand my life—I will surrender them without hesitation: but to ask a thing which must cover us with ——" "Go on," cried Napoleon; "what is likely to happen to me, because I fling back on a faithless government the insults which it offered to me?"—"It is not my part," said Junot, "to decide on the conduct which you should pursue. I am sure that when you come to yourself, and are no longer fascinated by those around you, who compel you to violent measures, you will be of my opinion."—"Of whom do you speak?" Junot made no answer: he knew what he would say, but his noble heart disdained to descend to the accusation of others.<sup>1</sup>

1 D'Abr. vi.  
338, 493.

The pretence put forth by the French writers, that this unparalleled measure was justified by the capture of two French vessels in the bay of Audierne before war was formally declared, is totally groundless. These vessels were seized on the 20th May, eight days after the English ambassador had left Paris, and two after the French had sailed from Dover,—that is, after hostilities had been openly announced between the two countries—and four after the issuing of letters of marque by the British government. To set up this, the first capture of the war, as an excuse for the severe and cruel measure adopted towards the private travellers—a class of men who invariably have been allowed, in modern Europe, to retire unmolested upon hostilities breaking out—was a pretext as flimsy as the measure itself was unjustifiable and impolitic; and it was, in an especial manner, unseemly in a power which made such loud complaints of the enforcing of the ordinary rules of war in maritime affairs by the English cruisers.

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they would have so openly avowed them ; for it has been uniformly the system of all the rulers of that state since the Revolution, and seems to be now a fixed principle of their policy, instead of carefully concealing any project likely to shock the feelings of mankind till the moment of its execution, to announce it publicly for a long period before, in order that the minds of men may be familiarised to its contemplation, and have come to regard it with indifference. If, then, the design against Egypt is apparent, can there be the smallest doubt that we are entitled, from the moment it is discovered, to take such measures of prevention and security as are sufficient to guard against the danger to which we are thus exposed ? And, if this be admitted, the justice of our retaining Malta, the outwork both of Egypt and India, is apparent. All military authorities are agreed upon the vast importance of that island ; and among them we must place, in the very first rank, the First Consul himself, who has not only declared that he would rather see us in possession of the faubourg St Antoine, but has evinced the sincerity of that declaration by preferring all the hazards of a war which he was obviously anxious to avoid, to its relinquishment. England's interest in Malta is apparent, because it is a step on the road to India ; whence the extraordinary anxiety of France for its acquisition, if not as a stage on the same journey for herself ? Consider, then, what would be our feelings if, after all the warnings given us, we were now to surrender Malta out of our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to follow in six or twelve months afterwards.

110.  
The aggres-  
sions of  
France on  
the Conti-  
nent as a  
ground for  
war.

“ The conduct of France on the continent of Europe has been equally inconsistent with the maintenance of pacific relations. What shall we say to her arrogant interference in the matter of the German indemnities, and arrangement of the sharing of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes, without the concurrence either of the Emperor or the states interested in the maintenance of

the equilibrium of the empire? What of the unprovoked and tyrannical attack on Switzerland? What of the continued stay of French troops in Holland, in direct violation both of the treaty of Amiens and the subsequent conventions with the Batavian republic? The annexation of Piedmont, the severing of the Valais from Switzerland, the acquisition of Parma and Placentia, the new governments imposed on the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, the erection of the kingdom of Etruria, are so many steps towards supreme dominion over Italy, which may be already said to be in the hands of the French government. And are we, with such instances of disregard of treaties and insatiable ambition before our eyes, to permit the First Consul to make the same unresisted strides towards maritime, which he has already made towards Continental supremacy?

“Add to this a still more glaring attack on our national independence, the clandestine sending of agents in the train of the French ambassador, with instructions to take soundings in our ports, and obtain information as to the military situation of all the provinces of the kingdom; and when the government of England applied to the French ambassador to have them removed, the First Consul manifested an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refusal, authorised emissaries, under the name of commercial agents, to prepare, in the midst of peace, the most effectual means for our annoyance and destruction in time of war. He has at the same time summoned us, in the most arrogant manner, to restrain the liberty of the press with reference to his government; in other words, to make an exception in favour of France as regards that general right to free discussion which is the birthright of Englishmen, and daily exercised against their own government and all the world besides. What do these acts amount to but the requiring us to surrender at once our liberties and the means of national defence? And, not content with this, he requires us to banish the

111.  
And Napoleon's measures specially directed against England.



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112.  
Results of  
non-inter-  
ference dur-  
ing the  
peace.

Bourbon princes, and transport the French emigrants to Canada—addressing thus the King of England as if he were the president of one of his newly-created republics, and requiring him to submit to the last indignity of the conquered, the necessity of betraying the unfortunate.

“ We have tried the system of connexion with Europe for a century, and that of leaving the Continent to shift for itself for eighteen months, and we see what has been the result. Compare the rank and station to which we raised ourselves by our former policy, with that to which we have been fast descending by the prevalence of the latter. Weigh the insults which we have borne, the aggressions to which we have been exposed, during this short period, against all the causes and provocations of war scattered over the face of the preceding century, and see if the former do not preponderate. We have found, then—and this, if nothing else, the experiment of the peace of Amiens has clearly proved—that a country, circumstanced as this is, cannot safely abjure a dignified policy, and abdicate its rank among nations; that with such a country to be lowly is not to be sheltered, to be unpresuming is not necessarily to be safe. We may now see, by dear-bought experience, that our safety is necessarily linked with that of continental Europe, and that a recurrence to our ancient and established policy is not only the most honourable, but the most prudent course which can be pursued. In these circumstances, nothing remains but to be prepared, collectively and individually, to meet with courage and resignation whatever difficulties it may be the will of Providence we should encounter; to make such vigorous naval and military preparations as may not only be adequate to repel any attempt at invasion, but as shall suffice to diffuse the most complete sense of security throughout the whole nation; and to enter at once upon such a resolute and prospective system of finance, as may enable the people to contemplate, without apprehension,<sup>1</sup> the maintenance of the war for as long a period as it has

it.  
xxxvi.1387,  
1398, 1430.

already lasted, and prevent its expenses in the end from being unnecessarily, perhaps intolerably, augmented."

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr Fox and Mr Wilberforce, that, "however manifest it might be that the First Consul cast a longing eye to Egypt, and coveted Malta as a stepping-stone to that country, still the question of peace or war did not depend on that circumstance. Was it not evident that, from the very first, he had fixed his affections on that fortress? and nothing has recently occurred to strengthen the conviction of every thinking man on that subject. But still, seeing that, knowing that, we made peace, and stipulated for the surrender of Malta to a neutral power—and this was all that the security of our Eastern possessions required—this is what, by the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim; this is what we should have remained contented with. Malta, indeed, is a valuable possession; but the most valuable of all possessions is good faith. By claiming the sovereignty of Malta, instead of its independence, you take a ground which is barely tenable, and give your inveterate enemy an opportunity of misstating your real views, both to France and Europe, and charging this country with those projects of rapacity and monopoly by which it has been his incessant object to represent its councils as actuated. The language of Buonaparte in the later stages of the negotiation, affords reason to believe that he would have acquiesced in the independence of Malta, if not in our retention of it for ten years; and this affords a reply to the argument that the surrender of Malta, or a declaration of war, was the only alternative left us. No; there was another alternative, the independence of Malta—that independence which, under the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim, and which would have secured Egypt and our Eastern possessions. Why were we so dilatory in availing ourselves of the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Russia? Whence the extraordinary haste, at the very close, to break off the negotiation, when it

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113.

Arguments  
on the other  
side by the  
Opposition.

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had taken a turn favourable beyond our most sanguine hopes—when the First Consul apparently was willing, rather than risk a war, to have ceded it to us in perpetuity, upon obtaining an equivalent, and the appearance of coercion being avoided ?

114.  
Their de-  
fence of the  
German  
spoliations,  
&c.

“ Undoubtedly you may interfere to prevent the aggrandisement of any Continental state upon the general principles of policy, which include prudence, and upon the first principle which governs nations as well as individuals, the principle of self-defence. Nay, you are authorised by the rank you hold, and I trust will ever hold in the scale of nations, to interfere and prevent injustice and oppression by a greater to a smaller power. But has the conduct of France since the peace been such as to call for the application of this principle ? The system of German indemnities, indeed, was robbery—spoliation of the weaker by the stronger power; but France has had no greater share in the general iniquity than other powers against whom we have made no complaint. To say that the Emperor was injured by the arrangements made is nothing to the purpose. Undoubtedly he was; but what else could be expected after the disasters of the war ? Piedmont, at the time of the treaty of Amiens, was substantially a province of France ; it was the twenty-seventh military division, and belonged to that power as effectually as Gibraltar does to us. Whether it is expedient that it should belong to France, instead of being restored to the King of Sardinia, is a different question, which should have been settled, if it was meant to have been seriously agitated, at the treaty of Amiens. The violent interference with Switzerland no one can contemplate without the utmost indignation ; but it was an act not particularly directed against this country, and one which, how culpable soever, we were not called on to resist, if the powers more immediately interested looked on with indifference. The disgraceful treatment of Holland, in defiance alike of treaty and former services, is indeed one of the most

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atrocious acts on record ; but we have allowed the proper season for complaining to go past, and, by acquiescing in its injustice at the time, have precluded ourselves from making it the subject of recrimination afterwards. The mutual abuse of the press is not to be classed with these serious subjects of complaint. Great and permanent as was the evil thereby occasioned, from the irritation which is perpetuated in the minds of the people of both countries, still it is not a fit subject for war ; and both nations might properly be addressed in the advice which Homer put into the mouth of the goddess of wisdom—‘ Put up your swords, and then abuse each other as long as you please.’

“ The demand to send away the French refugees, however, can never be too strongly reprobated. To deny to any man, whatever be his condition or rank, the rights of hospitality on the ground of political principles, would be cowardly, cruel, and unworthy of the British character. The demand that we should send out of the country persons obnoxious to the government of France, is made upon the most false and dangerous principles. The acquiescence of two such nations as England and France in such a system of international law would exterminate every asylum, not only to crime but to misfortune, on the face of the globe. To yield to such demands would be the height of baseness. No man has,” said Mr Fox, “ politically speaking, less respect for the house of Bourbon, nor a greater desire for peace, than I have ; but yet for that family, or the very worst prince it contains, if among them there should be a bad one, I should be willing to draw my sword and go to war, rather than comply with a demand to withdraw a hospitality to which he had trusted. I say this with respect to persons against whom no crime is alleged ; with respect to those who are accused, whether justly or unjustly, of a crime, I think some inquiry should be made into the grounds of the accusation, and the result, whatever it is, be publicly

115.  
Reprobate  
the demand  
of Napoleon  
relative to  
the emi-  
grants.

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made known. This is a duty we owe not only to France but to ourselves; for the hostility of a great and generous nation gives no countenance to crimes even against its worst enemies.

116.  
And the

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“As to the commercial commissioners, as it is apparent that they were in truth military men, and in effect no better than spies, it was a shameful attempt to impose upon us for a most mischievous purpose; and therefore there was but one course to have pursued—namely, to have sent them immediately out of the country, and instantly applied to France for explanation and satisfaction for having sent them here under such colours, and for such objects. But without doing either the one or the other, the question is, was this a ground for going to war? Is Malta essential to Egypt? Is Egypt essential to India? Both propositions are more than doubtful. Great stress is laid upon the possession of the banks of the Nile as indispensable to the security of our Eastern possessions; but is there any rational foundation for this opinion? Is it not rather the result of an overweening interest in that country, from the glorious triumphs to our arms of which it has recently been the theatre?—feelings natural and praiseworthy if kept within due bounds, but not fit to be made the ground for determination in so momentous a question as that of peace and war. And let us beware, lest, while crying out against the aggrandisement of France in Europe, we do not give them too good cause to recriminate upon us for our conduct in Asia; and consider well whether, since the treaty of Amiens, we have not added more to our territories in the Mysore, than France has done in the whole Continent put together.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 1405,  
1438, 1466.

<sup>2</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 1491,  
1514.

The House divided, when three hundred and ninety-eight supported the address approving of the war; and sixty-seven voted against it. In the House of Lords the majority was still greater; one hundred and forty-two voting for the address, and ten against it.<sup>2</sup>

The altered tone of the Opposition upon the war was very remarkable, and eminently characteristic of the change which, in the estimation even of its warmest opponents, the contest had undergone. There were no longer the fierce recriminations, the vehement condemnation of government, the loud accusations of its being leagued with sovereigns in a crusade against the liberties of mankind, with which the chapel of St Stephen had so long resounded when the subject was brought forward. France now had little of popular sympathy in any country. She had lost the support of the democratic party throughout Europe, and stood forth merely as a threatening and conquering military power. This change, though at the time little attended to, like all alterations which are gradual in their progress, was of the utmost moment, and deprived the contest, in its future stages, of the principal dangers with which it had at first been fraught. It was no longer a war of opinion on either side of the Channel. Democratic ambition did not now hail, in the triumphs of the French, the means of individual elevation. Aristocratic passion ceased to hope for their overthrow, as paving the way to a restoration of the ancient order of things. The contest had changed its character; from being social it had become national. Not the maintenance of the constitution, the coercion of the disaffected, the overthrow of the Jacobins, was the object for which we fought: the preservation of the national independence, the vindication of the national honour, was now felt to be at stake. The painful schism which had so long divided the country was at an end. National success was looked upon with triumph and exultation by an immense majority of the people, with the exception of a few party leaders who to the last regarded it with aversion. The war called forth the sympathies of almost all classes of citizens. The young, who had entered into life under its excitement, were unanimous in its support; and a contest which had commenced amid more divided

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Reflections

the Opposi-  
tion.

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feelings than any recorded in the history of England, terminated with a degree of unanimity in its behalf unprecedented in her long and glorious career.

118.  
England  
was obviously  
resolved  
on war.

Upon coolly reviewing the circumstances under which the contest was renewed, it is impossible to deny that the British government manifested a feverish anxiety to come to a rupture, and that, so far as the transactions between the two countries considered apart from other states are concerned, they were the aggressors. The great stress laid on Sebastiani's mission to Egypt; the evasion of Russian mediation; the peremptory refusal to abandon Malta, even to a neutral power; the repeated demands by the English ambassador for his passports; the resolution at last not to treat even on the footing of Malta being abandoned to England, are so many indications of a determined spirit of hostility, and a resolution, on one pretence or another, to put an end to amicable relations between the two countries.

119.  
But it was  
unavoidable  
on Napo-  
leon's ac-  
knowledge-  
ment.

On the other hand, the same impartiality requires it to be stated, that the conduct of France to other states, and the language which the First Consul had begun to hold towards Great Britain herself, indicated a settled resolution of disregarding the stipulations of treaties, and the commencement of a system of intimidation inconsistent with the existence of any independent power. The stretches made by France over Europe during a period of profound peace, in defiance alike of express agreement and of the regard due by the common law of nations to the independence of weaker powers, were such as to render any long-continued pacification out of the question. Pointing as the acts of the First Consul evidently did towards universal dominion, actuated as he plainly was by the principle that everything was allowable which was conducive to the interests or the grandeur of France, it was in vain to expect that he would long continue at peace with this country—the only obstacle that stood in his way in the prosecution of these intoxicating objects.

If he had not hitherto engaged in open acts of hostility against us, it was only because he was not prepared for them—because peace was requisite to restore his marine, and put his naval resources on a more respectable footing. But his language already showed his secret designs, and in his anxiety for supreme authority, he spoke as if he had already acquired it. In these circumstances, it is of little consequence what was the ostensible cause of the rupture; the real ground of it was a well-founded distrust of the pacific intentions of the First Consul, or his ability to remain at peace even if he had been so inclined—a conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that he was preparing, at some future period, a desperate attack upon our independence, and that all which he now acquired would ere long be turned with consummate talent against it.

He himself has told us what he meant to have done, and unfolded the matured designs he had formed for our subjugation. It was no part of his plan to have gone to war in 1803, or exposed his infant navy to the risk of being swept from the ocean, or blockaded in its harbours, before his sailors had acquired the experience requisite for success in naval warfare. He intended to have remained at peace with England for six or eight years; to have built annually twenty or twenty-five ships of the line; immensely enlarged his ports and fortifications in Holland, the Scheldt, and the Channel; extended, in the interim, his dominion over all the lesser states in the Continent, and not unfurled the flag of defiance till he had from eighty to a hundred ships of the line at Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, manned by experienced seamen, to cover the embarkation of the invading army at Boulogne.\* The immense docks which he excavated

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120.  
Napoleon's  
own account  
of his de-  
signs against  
England at  
this period.

\* "I was resolved," said Napoleon, "to renew at Cherbourg the wonders of Egypt. I had already raised in the sea my pyramid. I would also have had my lake Mareotis. My great object was to concentrate at Cherbourg all our maritime forces, and in time they would have been immense, in order to be able to deal out a grand stroke at the enemy. I was establishing my ground



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<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Lac. Cas. v.  
8, 14. Thiers,  
iii. 287.

out of the granite of Cherbourg and the slime of the Scheldt, the vast arsenal of Antwerp, the capacious basin of Boulogne, were all preparations for the great design which he had in contemplation, and which no moderation or pacific disposition on the part of Great Britain, short of absolute submission, could possibly have averted. "When by these means," said he, "England came to wrestle hand to hand with France, and the advantage which she derived from her insular situation was at an end, she must necessarily have fallen. The nation which depends on a population of seventeen millions, must in the end sink before one which commands the resources of forty." So thoroughly had those ideas got possession of Napoleon's mind, that they pervaded all his despatches at this period, and are admitted by his ablest historians. "In his opinion," says Thiers,<sup>1</sup> "he required three or four

so as to bring the two nations, as it were, body to body. The ultimate issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated the contest by a battle of Actium."

"The Emperor had resolved upon a strictly defensive plan till the affairs of the Continent were finally settled, and his naval resources had accumulated to such a degree as to enable him to strike a decisive stroke. He ordered canals in Brittany, by the aid of which, in spite of the enemy, he could maintain an internal communication between Bordeaux, Rochefort, Nantes, Holland, Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest. He proposed to have at Flushing, or its neighbourhood, docks which were to be capable of receiving the whole fleet of Antwerp, fully armed, from whence it could put to sea in twenty-four hours. He projected near Boulogne a dike similar to that at Cherbourg; and between Cherbourg and Brest, a roadstead like that of the Isle de Bois. Sailors were to be formed by exercising young conscripts in the roads, and performing gun practice and other operations in the harbours. He intended to construct twenty or twenty-five ships of the line every year. At the end of six years he would have had two hundred ships of the line, at the end of ten as many as three hundred. The affairs of the Continent being finished, he would have entered heart and soul into that project; he would have assembled the greater part of his forces on the coast from Corunna to the mouth of the Elbe, having the bulk on the shores of the Channel. All the resources of the two nations would thus have been called forth, and then he would either, he conceived, have subjected England by his moral ascendancy, or crushed it by his physical force. The English, alarmed, would have assembled for the defence of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Thames. Our three corps at Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp, would have fallen on their central masses, while our wings turned them in Scotland and Ireland. Everything then would have depended on a decisive affair, and this was what Napoleon called his battle of Actium. 'We must have conquered,' said he repeatedly, 'when the two nations were opposed

years of continual efforts in the bosom of a profound peace before recommencing the war.”\*

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121.

The greatest stretches of power by France during his reign were made in time of peace.

In forming a judgment on the propriety of the course adopted by England on this occasion, there are two considerations not generally attended to, which require to be steadily kept in view, arising as they do out of the whole conduct of the French government throughout the revolutionary war.

The first is, that all the principal stretches of power during the whole contest were made by France in periods of peace; and that, great as were her military conquests, they were yet inferior to the strides which she made, in defiance of treaty, during the forced pacifications which followed her triumphs. During the peace of Campo Formio she conquered Switzerland, revolutionised Rome, and subjugated Naples. By the treaty of Lunéville, she was bound to allow the Helvetian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine republics to choose their own constitutions; but hardly was the ink of her signature dry, when she established governments in these independent states, all entirely composed of her creatures, and incorporated Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia with her dominions. The treaties of Presburg and Tilsit were immediately followed by the overthrow of her own allies, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, and the seating of brothers of Napoleon on the thrones of the two first of these king-

to each other, body to body, for we were forty millions, and they only fifteen.”

See *LAS CASES*, v. 8, 15.

\* “Le Premier Consul répétait souvent, qu’après tout, la guerre était sa vocation naturelle, son origine, sa destinée peut-être; qu’il savait gouverner d’une manière supérieure, mais qu’avant de gouverner il avait su combattre; que c’était là sa profession, son art par excellence; et que si Moreau, avec les armées Françaises, était arrivé jusqu’aux portes de Vienne, il irait bien au delà. Il voyait des empires détruits, l’Europe refaite, et son pouvoir consulaire changé en une couronne, qui ne serait pas moins que la couronne de Charlemagne. A son avis, il lui fallait, avant de recommencer la guerre, quatre ou cinq ans encore d’efforts continuels au sein d’une paix profonde. Le Premier Consul partageait cette passion des grandes constructions, qui est naturelle aux fondateurs d’empires. Il prenait goût à ces places fortes qu’il élevait en Italie, à ces vastes routes qu’il perçait dans les Alpes, à ces plans des villes nouvelles qu’il projetait en Bretagne, à ces canaux qui allaient unir les bassins de la Seine et de l’Escaut.” — *THIERS’ Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire*, IV. 287.

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doms. The peace of Vienna, in 1809, was but a prelude to the incorporation of the Roman States, Holland, and Hamburg, with the French dominions; and the treaty of Vienna, in 1805, was the immediate forerunner of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the conquest of Naples for his brother Joseph—in other words, the organisation of half of Germany and the whole of Italy under the direction of the Emperor.

122.  
And vast  
growth dur-  
ing peace  
of her mili-  
tary power.

Nor did the military strength of France, under the able direction of Napoleon, grow in a less formidable manner during every cessation of hostilities. Like blood in a plethoric patient, it accumulated fearfully during each interval of bleeding; and resistance to the malady became the more difficult the longer it was delayed. Down to 1800, Austria had maintained a protracted and doubtful contest with the Republic; but during the peace which followed, the military resources of France were so immensely increased that, in the next war which ensued, in 1805, that power was struck to the earth in a single campaign. The long repose of Germany which succeeded the treaty of Tilsit in 1807, was marked by such an extraordinary growth of the military strength of France, as enabled it simultaneously, in 1812, to maintain three hundred thousand men in Spain, and precipitate five hundred thousand on the Russian dominions. Continued hostility, however, in the end weakened this colossal power—the military resources of France rapidly declined during the fierce campaigns of 1812 and 1813; and at length the conqueror of Europe saw himself reduced, in the plains of Champagne, to the command of fifty thousand men. This effect of peace to France, so different from what is generally observed in conquering states, was the result of the complete overthrow of all pacific habits and pursuits during the Revolution; the rise of a generation, educated in no other principles but the burning desire for individual and national elevation, and the organisation of these immense warlike resources by a man of unexampled civil

and military talent. Napoleon felt this strongly. He had no alternative but continued advance or abandonment of the throne. "My conquests," said he, "were in no respect the result of ambition or the mania for dominion; they originated in a great design, *or rather in necessity.*" More truly to him than even to the Numidian prince were the words of the historian applicable:—"In Jugurthâ tantus dolus, tantaque peritia locorum et militiæ erat, uti absens an præsens, pacem an bellum gerens, perniciosior esset in incerto haberetur."\*

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ii. 273.

The second is, that Napoleon uniformly treated with the greatest severity the powers which had been most friendly and submissive to his will; and that acquiescence in his demands, and support of his interests, so far from being a ground to expect lenient, was the surest passport to vindictive measures; while he reserved all his favours for the rivals from whom he had experienced only the most determined hostility. Reversing the Roman maxim, his principle was—

123.  
His constant severity to his most friendly and submissive allies, as exemplified in the cases of Holland, Sardinia, and Spain.

"Parcere superbis et debellare subjectos."

The object of this policy was, that he might strengthen himself by the forces of the weaker before he hazarded an encounter with the greater powers. Its steady prosecution was an important element in his unexampled success; its ultimate consequences the principal cause of his rapid decline. Holland was the first power which submitted to the Republican arms. The inhabitants of its great towns hailed the soldiers of Pichegru as deliverers. Its government was rapidly revolutionised, and throughout the whole war stood faithfully by the fortunes of France; and it received in return a treatment so oppressive as to call forth the passionate censure of Mr Fox in the British parliament,† and induce a brother of Napoleon to abdi-

\* "In Jugurthâ there was so much craft, and such knowledge of places and war, that it was hard to say whether he was more formidable present or absent, in peace or in war."—SALLUST, *Bell. Jugurthinum*.

† *Ante*, Chap. XXXVI. § 90, note.

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1803.

cate the throne of that country, that he might not be implicated in such oppressive proceedings. Piedmont next submitted to the rising fortunes of Napoleon. After a campaign of fifteen days, it opened its gates to the conqueror, and placed in his hands the keys of Italy; and in a few years after, the King of Sardinia was stripped of all his Continental dominions, and the territories he had so early surrendered to France were annexed to the engrossing Republic. Spain was among the first of the allied powers which made a separate treaty with France; and for thirteen years afterwards its treasures, its fleets, and its armies were at the disposal of Napoleon; and he rewarded it by the dethronement of its king, and a six years' war fraught with unexampled horrors.

124.  
And in those  
of Portugal,  
the Pope,  
Venice, &c.

Portugal at the first summons drew off from the alliance with England, and admitted the French eagles within the walls of Lisbon; and it received in return an announcement in the *Moniteur* that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign. The Pope submitted without a struggle to all the rapacious demands of the French government—the treasures, the monuments of art, one-third of the dominions of the Church, were successively yielded up; the Head of the Faithful condescended to travel to Fontainebleau to crown the modern Charlemagne, and he was rewarded by a total confiscation of his dominions, and imprisonment for the remainder of his life. Venice maintained a neutrality of the utmost moment to France during the desperate struggle with Austria in 1796, when ten thousand even of Italian troops would have cast the balance against the rising fortunes of Napoleon; and he, in return for such inestimable services, instigated a revolt in its Continental dominions, which afforded him a pretence for destroying its independence, and handing over its burning democrats to the hated dominion of Austria. A majority of the Swiss fraternised with the Republicans, and called in the French forces in 1798; and in 1802 Switzerland was deprived of its liberties, its government,

and its independence. Prussia, by a selfish and unhappy policy, early withdrew from the alliance against France ; and for ten years afterwards maintained a neutrality which enabled that enterprising power to break down the bulwark of central Europe, the Austrian monarchy ; and on the very first rupture, he treated it with a degree of severity almost unparalleled in the annals of European conquest.

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While such was the conduct of Napoleon to the states which had earliest submitted and most faithfully adhered to his fortunes, his lenity towards the powers which had boldly resisted and steadily defied his ambition was not less remarkable. Austria, after a desperate warfare of five years, received at its termination the Venetian territories, more than an equivalent for all it had lost in the Low Countries ; and on occasion of every subsequent rupture, obtained terms so favourable as to excite the astonishment even of its own inhabitants ; until at length a princess of the house of Hapsburg was elevated to the throne of France, and a continued hostility of twenty years rewarded by a large share of the conqueror's favour. Russia had twice engaged in fierce hostility against France ; but the resentment of Napoleon did not make him forget his policy. He made the most flattering advances to Paul in 1800 ; and after the next struggle, the treaty of Tilsit actually gave an accession of territory to that formidable rival. With England, his most inveterate and persevering enemy, he was ever ready to treat on terms of comparative equality. He surrendered valuable colonies of his allies at the peace of Amiens ; and was inclined, in the last extremity, to have abandoned Malta rather than provoke a war with so dreaded a naval power, when his own maritime preparations were only in their infancy.

125.  
His lenity  
to the great  
powers  
which re-  
sisted him.

The inference to be drawn from these circumstances is, not that Napoleon towards the greater powers was actuated by a spirit of moderation, the reverse of what

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126.  
All which  
was a pre-  
lude to his  
grand final  
attack on  
England.

he evinced towards the lesser, for such a conclusion is at variance with the whole tenor of his life; but that his ambition in every instance was subordinate to his judgment, and that he studiously offered favourable terms to the states with whom he anticipated a doubtful encounter, till his preparations had rendered him master of their destinies. His long-continued favour to Prussia was but a prelude to the conquest of Jena and partition of Tilsit; his indulgence to Russia only a veil for his designs till the assembled forces of half of Europe were ready in 1812 to inundate its frontiers; his proffered amity to Great Britain, the lure which was to deceive the vigilance of its government till the Channel was studded with hostile fleets, and a coalition of all the maritime states had prepared a Leipsic of the deep for the naval power of England. Such being the evident design of the First Consul, as it has now been developed by time, and admitted by himself, there can be but one opinion among all impartial persons as to the absolute necessity of resuming hostilities, if not in 1803, at least at no distant period, and preventing the formidable increase of his resources during that interval of peace, which with him was ever but the time of preparation for a more formidable future attack, and might have been made instrumental in depriving Great Britain of all the security which she enjoyed from her insular situation and long-established maritime superiority.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES TO THE OPENING OF THE  
WAR WITH SPAIN.—MAY, 1803—DECEMBER, 1804.

THE recommencement of the war was followed by hostile preparations of unparalleled magnitude on both sides of the Channel. Never did the ancient rivalry of France and England break forth with more vehemence, and never was the animosity of their respective governments more warmly supported by the patriotism and passions of the people. The French, accustomed to a long career of conquest, and considering themselves, on land at least, as invincible, burned with anxiety to join in mortal combat with their ancient and inveterate enemies; and anticipated, in the conquest of England, the removal of the last obstacle which stood between them and universal dominion. The English hurled back with indignation the defiance they had received, warmly resented the assertion of the First Consul that Great Britain could not contend single-handed with France, and invited the descendants of the conquerors of Hastings to measure their strength with those in whose veins the blood of the victors of Cressy and Azincour yet ran. Ancient glories, hereditary rivalry, were mingled with the recollection of recent wrongs, and newly-won triumphs. The Republicans derided the military preparations of those who had fled before their arms in Holland and Flanders—anticipated in the conflagration of Portsmouth a fitting revenge for

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1.

Great preparations on both sides for the renewal of the war.



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the fires of Toulon—and pointed to the career of William the Conqueror as that which was to be speedily followed by the First Consul. The English reverted to the glories of the Plantagenet reigns; recounted with pride the career of Marlborough; and referred with exultation to the sands of Egypt, as affording an earnest of the victories they were yet to obtain over the veteran armies of France. Both parties entered, heart and soul, into the contest—both anticipated a desperate and decisive struggle; but little did either foresee the disasters which were to be encountered, or the triumphs that were to be won, before it closed.

2.  
Conquest of  
Hanover by  
the French.  
May 26.

The first military operation of the French ruler was attended with rapid and easy success. Ten days after the hostile message of the King of England to the House of Commons, the French army in Holland, now advanced to the frontiers of Hanover, received orders to put itself in motion, and accomplish the reduction of that electorate. The force intrusted to Mortier on this occasion was twenty thousand men; and the Hanoverian troops, whose valour was well known, amounted to nearly sixteen thousand; but the preponderating multitudes with which it was well known the First Consul could follow up, if necessary, this advanced guard, rendered all attempts at resistance hopeless. Some measures of defence were, however, adopted; and the Duke of Cambridge, in an energetic proclamation, enjoined the immediate assembly of the *levée en masse*; but the rapid advance of the French troops rendered all these efforts abortive. Count Walmoden made a gallant resistance at Borstell, on the shores of the Weser; but as there was no time for succours to arrive from England, and it was desirable not to involve that inconsiderable state in the horrors of a protracted and hopeless struggle, a convention was wisely entered into two days afterwards at Suhlingen, by which it was stipulated that the Hanoverian army should retire with the honours of war, taking with them their field-

artillery, behind the Elbe, and not bear arms against France during the remainder of the contest till exchanged. The public stores in the arsenals, amounting to nearly four hundred pieces of cannon and thirty thousand muskets, fell into the hands of the French; but what they valued more, were nineteen colours and sixteen standards, the trophies of the army of Prince Ferdinand during the Seven Years' War.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
129, 133.  
Ann. Reg.  
1803, p. 326.  
Dum. ix.  
204, 205.

The British government, upon being informed of these transactions, refused to ratify the capitulation, and loudly complained of the invasion of the German confederation by this irruption, in defiance alike of the privileges of the Elector of Hanover as a prince of the Empire, and the neutrality of his German states, which had been observed throughout all the late war, and was expressly provided for in the treaty of Lunéville. The consequence was, that Walmoden was summoned by Mortier to resume hostilities or lay down his arms. The brave Germans declared they would rather perish than submit to such a degradation, and, on the 27th, hostilities recommenced along the whole line. But the contest was too obviously unequal to permit either party to come to extremities. The French abated somewhat from the rigour of their first terms. The Hanoverian army was dissolved; the soldiers disbanded and sent home for a year; the officers retained their side-arms; those of the common men were given up to the civil authorities. The troops thus let loose afterwards proved of essential service to the common cause. They were almost all received into the English service, and, under the name of the King's German Legion, were to be seen side by side with the British in every subsequent field of fame from Vimeira to Waterloo.<sup>2</sup>

3.  
A convention  
is agreed to  
by the Hanoverian  
generals.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. ix.  
217, 220.  
Ann. Reg.  
1803, 326.  
Beamish, i.  
18, 19.

In the course of this incursion, the French armies set at naught the neutrality, not only of Hanover, but of all the lesser states in its vicinity. Mortier traversed without hesitation all the principalities, not merely which lay in

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4.  
Violation  
of neutral  
rights by  
the French  
generals.

his way on the road to Hanover, but many beyond that limit. Hamburg and Bremen were occupied, and the mouths of the Elbe and Weser closed against British merchandise. This uncalled-for aggression is not only of importance, as demonstrating the determination of the First Consul to admit of no neutrality in the contest, which was begun, but as unfolding the first germ of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which he mainly trusted afterwards in his hostilities against Great Britain. Unaccustomed, however, as the European powers hitherto were to such instances of lordly usurpation, this violation of neutral rights excited a very great sensation. In the north especially, the advance of the French standards to the Elbe, and the occupation of the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen by the troops of that nation, awakened a most extraordinary jealousy. Russia openly expressed her discontent, and Austria and Prussia made representations on the subject to the cabinet of the Tuileries; while Denmark, more courageous, actually assembled an army of thirty thousand men in Holstein, to prevent the violation of the Danish territory. But the Emperor was too much depressed by his long-continued disasters—Prussia too deeply implicated in her infatuated alliance with France—to resent by arms this violation of the German confederation; and Russia too far removed to take any active steps, when the powers more immediately interested did not feel themselves called on to come forward. Thus the jealousies of the North evaporated in a mere interchange of angry notes and diplomatic remonstrances; the troops of Denmark alone appeared in the field to assert the cause of European independence. Too weak to contend with the Republican legions, they were compelled to retire into their cantonments, after being treated with insulting irony in the French journals;<sup>1\*</sup> and the north of Germany permanently fell under the domi-

Ann. Reg.  
803, 326,  
27. Bign.  
ii. 138, 139.  
Jum. ix.  
107, 208.

\* "The military mania," said the *Moniteur*, "is a strange passion to seize little princes."—BIGNON, iii. 139.

nion of France, from which it was only delivered ten years after, by the disasters of the Russian campaign.

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1803.

5.

They extend  
themselves  
through  
Southern  
Italy.

Simultaneous with the conquest of Hanover by the French, was the march of an army into the south of Italy, and the occupation of the port of Tarentum by the Republican forces. St-Cyr received the command of the troops destined for this service, which were fourteen thousand strong; and on the 14th May he addressed a proclamation to the soldiers, which was soon after followed by the invasion of the kingdom of Naples. He advanced forthwith to Tarentum, which, with its extensive fortifications and noble roadstead, formed another outwork of France against the Eastern possessions of Great Britain. At the same time Tuscany was invaded, Leghorn was declared in a state of siege, and all the English merchandise found in that great seaport confiscated; the First Consul thus evincing here too that he was resolved to admit of no neutrality in a lesser state in the great contest which was approaching, and that, by a continued violation of the usages of war, he was determined at least to compel a change in the code of naval hostility. As usual, all these troops were to be maintained and paid by the countries where they were quartered. The formal protest by the ephemeral King of Etruria against the military occupation of his dominions, was hardly even noticed by the First Consul. In vain it was represented to him that the commerce and revenue of Tuscany were ruined by the measures of severity adopted towards the English merchandise; these considerations were as nothing in his estimation, compared to the grand design which he had in contemplation for overturning the power of Great Britain. At the same time the island of Elba, intrusted to General Rusca, was put in the best state of defence; Corsica was fortified at every accessible point; and ten thousand men laboured on the fortifications of Alessandria, the key, in Napoleon's estimation, to the Italian peninsula.<sup>1</sup> "I consider that fortress," said he, "as the possession of the

<sup>1</sup> Dum. x.  
16, 27.  
Bign. iii.  
140, 143.  
Bot. iv. 125,  
139.

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1803.

6.  
dara-  
s against  
glish  
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e 23.

whole of Italy; the rest is a matter of arms, that of political combination."

So vehement was the hostility with which the First Consul was animated against Great Britain, that it made him set the ordinary usages of war at defiance; and Sir Henry Dillon, who had been sent into Helvoeteluys with a flag of truce bearing despatches from Lord Keith, the British admiral on the station, to Commodore Valtenbeek the Dutch commander, was seized after his despatches had been delivered, and taken to Verdun, where he was detained five years, and at last only liberated on exchange. By a decree on 23d June, Napoleon formally commenced that virulent strife which he had so long maintained against the English commerce. It declared, "that no colonial produce, and no merchandise coming directly from England, should be received into the ports of France; and that all such produce or merchandise should be confiscated." Neutral vessels arriving in France were subjected to new and vexatious regulations, for the purpose of discovering from whence they had come; and any vessel coming from, or which "had touched at a harbour of Great Britain," was declared liable to seizure.<sup>1</sup>

um. x.  
52. Bign.  
142, 143.  
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parations  
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for the  
asion of  
tain.

But all these combinations, extensive as they were, sank into insignificance, compared to the gigantic preparations made on the shores of the Channel for the invasion of Great Britain. Everything here conspired to rouse the First Consul to unheard-of exertion. By accumulating the principal part of his troops on the shores of the Channel, he fixed the attention and excited the alarm of Great Britain, furnished a brilliant object of expectation to his own subjects, and obtained a pretext for maintaining an immense army on foot, without exciting the jealousy of the other European powers; while, if they conceived the design of attacking France, he had always at hand a vast force ready organised, capable of crushing them. Impelled by these different motives, he made the most extraordinary efforts to hasten

the preparations for a descent on Great Britain. The official journal openly announced his intention of putting himself at the head of the expedition, and called on all the departments to second the attempt. The public spirit of France, and the hereditary rivalry with which its inhabitants were animated against England, produced the most strenuous efforts to aid the government. A circular from the war office to the different towns and departments, called on them to furnish voluntary aids to the great undertaking. "Every vessel," said the war minister, "shall bear the name of the town or district which has contributed the funds for its formation; the government will accept with gratitude everything from a ship of the line to the smallest praaam. If, by a movement as rapid as it is general, every department, every great town covers its dockyards with vessels, soon will the French army proceed to dictate laws to Great Britain, and establish the repose of Europe, the liberty and prosperity of commerce, on the only basis which can insure their duration." Generally the people answered the appeal with acclamations, and soon all the workshops on the coasts were in activity, from the Texel to Bayonne. Forts and batteries, constructed on every headland and accessible point of the shore, both secured the territory of the Republic from insult, and afforded protection to the small craft proceeding from the places of their construction to the general points of rendezvous. The departments vied with each other in patriotic gifts and offerings; that of the Upper Rhine contributed three hundred thousand francs (£12,000) for the construction of a vessel to bear its name; that of the Côté d'Or furnished at its own expense a hundred pieces of cannon to arm the flotilla; and Bordeaux, albeit the first to suffer by the resumption of hostilities, manifested in an energetic address its cordial concurrence in the war. Such was the public spirit, even of those parts of the country which had been most convulsed during the Revolution, that

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
144. Norv.  
ii. 264. Dum.  
x. 33, 37.

Napoleon ventured upon the noble design of forming a Vendean legion, "all composed," to use his own words, "officers and soldiers, of those who have carried on war against us;" and its ranks were speedily filled by the remains of that unconquerable band.<sup>1</sup>

8.  
Object of  
these pre-  
parations.  
Works at  
Boulogne

The object to be gained by all these preparations was to assemble, at a single point, a flotilla capable of transporting an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with its field and siege equipage, ammunition, stores, and horses; and at the same time to provide so formidable a covering naval force as might insure its safe debarkation, notwithstanding any resistance that could be opposed by the enemy. Such a project, the most gigantic to be attempted by sea of which history makes mention, required the assembling of very great means, and no small share of fortune, for its success. But it was within the range of possibility, and the combinations made for its accomplishment were among the most striking monuments of the extensive views and penetrating genius of the First Consul. The harbour of Boulogne was taken as the central point for the assembling of the vessels destined for the conveyance of the troops. Its capacious basin, enlarged and deepened by the labour of the soldiers, was protected by an enormous tower, constructed on a reef amidst incredible difficulties arising from the action of the waves, and armed with heavy cannon capable of carrying to the distance of two miles; while similar excavations extended the neighbouring ports of Etaples, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse. To overcome the difficulty arising from the ebbing and flowing of the tide, and at the same time provide for the removal of the sand-bank and bar which obstructed the entrance of the harbour, enormous locks were constructed at the entrance of the basin, which was opened to receive the rising tide, and closed when it was full, and again opened to produce a torrent that would sweep away the sand and mud at low water.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Thiers, iv.  
430, 431.

Every harbour, from Brest to the Texel, was rapidly filled with gunboats of different dimensions; in the dockyards the shipwrights were universally put into activity; and as fast as the vessels were finished, they were sent round, under protection of the numerous batteries with which the coast abounded, to Cherbourg, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. The number and intrepidity of the British cruisers in the Channel rendered this a service both of difficulty and danger; but the First Consul was indefatigable, and by communicating his own incredible activity to all the persons in subordinate situations, at length made great progress in the assembling of naval forces within sight of the shores of Britain. No sooner were the English cruisers blown off their stations by contrary winds, than the telegraph announced the favourable opportunity to the different harbours; numerous vessels were speedily seen rounding the headlands and cautiously cruising along the shore; while the artillerymen stood at the numerous batteries with which it bristled, to open upon any ships of the enemy which might come within range in attempting to impede their passage. The small draught of water which the gun-boats required enabled the greater part of them to escape untouched, and concentrate in the roads of Boulogne: but a considerable number were intercepted and destroyed by the British cruisers, and innumerable deeds of daring courage were performed, in too many of which valuable blood was shed in the attainment of a comparatively trifling object.<sup>1</sup> \*

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9.

And in the  
other har-  
bours in the  
Channel.<sup>1</sup> Dum. x.  
38, 48. Big.  
iii. 144, 145.  
Norv. ii.  
261, 262.

The small craft assembled was of four different kinds, according to the weight and species of the troops which they were intended to convey. The praams, or largest sort, carried each six four-and-twenty pounders, and were

10.  
Description  
of the small  
craft  
bled.

\* In this partisan warfare, Captain Owen in the *Immortalité*, and Sir Sidney Smith in the *Antelope*, particularly distinguished themselves—See JAMES'S *Naval Hist.* iii. 294, 346.



intended rather to protect the smaller vessels which conveyed the troops than to be employed in the transport themselves. The next class bore four twenty-four pounders and one howitzer; they were intended to receive each from a hundred and fifty to two hundred men, and made flat-bottomed, in order to land them as near as possible to the shore. The third were armed each with two twenty-four pounders, and were capable of conveying eighty men each; while the smallest had a four-pounder at the poop and a howitzer at the stern, and bore from forty to fifty men each. The artillery were intended to be embarked in the larger vessels, the cavalry in those of a medium size, the infantry in the smallest; and so perfect were the discipline and organisation of the troops destined for the expedition, that each man knew the vessel on board of which he was to embark; and experiment proved that a hundred thousand men, with three hundred pieces of cannon, and their whole caissons and equipage, could find their places in less than half an hour. Upwards of thirteen hundred vessels of these descriptions were, in the course of the year 1803, collected at Boulogne and the adjoining harbours; and they were to carry three thousand pieces of heavy cannon, besides that of lighter calibre. Their concentric fire would, it was hoped, prove destructive to the large English vessels by which they would be assailed. A hundred or more might be sunk by the fire of the English line-of-battle ships and frigates, and ten or fifteen thousand lives lost; but what were they among such a host, and how could they be better sacrificed than in securing the means of crossing to the remainder? "You lose," said Napoleon, "a greater number every day in a single battle, and what battle ever promised such results as the invasion and conquest of England?"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. x.  
40, 45. Bign.  
iii. 145, 147.  
Thiers, iv.  
413, 417.

But, immense as these preparations were, it was not on them alone that the First Consul relied for the execution of his project. Large numbers of transports were at the

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11.

Napoleon  
visits Ant-  
werp, and  
orders im-  
mense work  
there.

same time assembled, which, without being armed, were designed for the reception of the stores and ammunition of the army; and Napoleon himself proceeded to the coast to hasten by his presence the preparations which were going forward, and judge with his own eyes of the measures which should be adopted. He visited all the material points in the maritime districts; inspected at Flushing the new docks and fortifications which had been commenced; and rapidly discerned in Antwerp the central point where the chief arsenal for the naval subjugation of England should be established. A decree of the 21st July directed that a dock should be there constructed, July 21. capable of containing twenty-five ships of the line and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller vessels; and those immense works were immediately commenced, which in a few years rendered this the greatest naval station on the Continent.\* Not content with the realities of that marvellous period, the minds of men, as usual in times of highly-wrought excitement, were inflamed by fictitious prodigies; and the announcement that, in excavating the harbour of Boulogne, a hatchet of the Roman legions and a medal of the Norman princes had been discovered, conveyed to the vivid imaginations of the French soldiers the happy omen that they were about to tread in the footsteps of Julius Cæsar and William the Conqueror.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
147, 149.  
Norv. ii.  
263, 264.  
Dum. x. 77,  
78. Thiers,  
iii, 416, 417.

\* The opinion of Napoleon was repeatedly and strongly expressed as to the great importance of Antwerp as a naval station to France. "He often declared," says Las Cases, "that all he had done for Antwerp, great as it was, was nothing compared to what he intended to have done. By sea, he meant to have made it the point from whence a mortal stroke was to be launched against the enemy; by land, to have rendered it a certain place of refuge in case of disaster, a pivot of the national safety; he intended to have rendered it capable of receiving an army in case of defeat, and sustaining a whole year of open trenches. Already all the world admired the splendid works erected at Antwerp in so short a time—its numerous dockyards, magazines, and basins; 'but all that,' said the Emperor, 'was nothing: it was only the commercial town; the military town was to be on the opposite bank of the Scheldt, where the ground was already purchased for its construction. There three-deckers were to have reposed, with all their guns on board, during the winter months; vast sheds were to have been constructed to shelter their huge bulk

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12.  
His design  
for the inva-  
sion.

But these naval forces, great as they were, constituted but a part of those which were destined to be employed in the invasion of Great Britain. The whole fleets of France and Holland, and soon after that of Spain, were engaged in the mighty enterprise. The design of Napoleon, which he himself has pronounced to have been the most profoundly conceived and nicely calculated which he ever formed, was to have assembled the fleet destined to compose the covering naval force at Martinique, by a junction of all the squadrons in the harbours of Spain and the Mediterranean in the West Indies; to have brought this combined armament rapidly back to the Channel while the British blockading squadrons were traversing the Atlantic in search of the enemy, raised the blockades of Rochefort and Brest, and entered the Channel with the whole armament, amounting to seventy sail of the line. It was under cover of this irresistible force that Napoleon calculated upon crossing over to England at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with whom he thought he would reach London in five days, and where he intended instantly to proclaim parliamentary reform, the downfall of the oligarchy, and all the objects which the English republicans had at heart. At the same time, and in order to distract the attention of the enemy, a descent with twenty thousand men, and a large store of arms, was to be made in Ire-

from the weather in peace; everything was determined on upon the most gigantic scale. Antwerp was to me a province in itself. It is one of the great causes of my exile to St Helena; for the cession of that fortress was one of the principal reasons which induced me not to agree to peace at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded. France, without the frontier of the Rhine, and Antwerp, is nothing.' All the difficulties attendant on the situation were nothing in the eyes of Napoleon: in his impatience to make the English feel the dangers of the Scheldt, which they had themselves often signalled as so formidable, he was indefatigable; and in less than eight years Antwerp had become a maritime arsenal of the first-rate importance, and contained a considerable fleet."<sup>1</sup> When Napoleon made these energetic remarks at St-Helena, he was far from anticipating that, in twelve years, a British squadron was to aid a French army in wresting this magnificent fortress from the ally of England, and restoring it to the son-in-law of France, and the swan of the tricolor flag!

<sup>1</sup> Las Cas. vii.  
43, 44, 56, 57.

land, where the malcontents were profuse in their promises of a general insurrection. But this was a diversion only; the decisive blow, as in all the enterprises of Napoleon, was to be levelled at the heart of the enemy's power in Great Britain. Numerous as were the chances against the successful issue of so vast a design, it will appear in the sequel how near it was to succeeding, how little the English were aware of the danger which really threatened them, and with what signal ingratitude they treated the gallant officer whose important combat defeated the most profound combination that the genius of Napoleon ever formed for their destruction.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Month. ii.  
227. Jom.  
Vie de Nap.  
ii. 20, 21.  
Las Cas. ii.  
277, 280.  
Thiers, iv.  
467.

But towards the success of this attempt a very great military as well as naval force was necessary; and the attention of the First Consul was early turned to the means of restoring the strength of that arm, which the expedition to St Domingo and detachments into Italy and Hanover had very much diminished. The soldiers, long habituated to the excitement and plunder of war, had become weary of the monotony of a garrison or pacific life; discipline was sensibly relaxed, and desertion, especially among the old soldiers, had increased to an alarming extent. The most energetic measures were immediately taken to arrest this evil; new regulations were introduced to insure a rigid enforcement of the conscription, and the height requisite for the service lowered to five feet two inches—a decisive proof that the vast expenditure of human life in the preceding wars had already begun to exhaust the robust and vigorous part of the population. Such was the rigour with which the conscription laws were now enforced, that escape became hopeless; and the price of a substitute, which ere long rose to the enormous sum of £500, rendered it totally impossible for the middle classes to avoid personal service. Napoleon was indefatigable on the subject. “Keep your eyes,” said he to the minister of war, “incessantly fixed on the recruiting; let not a day pass

13.  
And measures to enforce discipline in the army on the coast.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. x.

14.  
Humiliat-  
ing treaties  
agreed to by  
Switzer-  
land, Spain,  
and Portu-  
gal. Sept.  
27.

Oct. 19.

without your attending to it ; it is the greatest affair in the state." From necessity, then, not less than inclination, the military life became the sole object of ambition ; and the proportion of the number drawn to that of the youth who were liable to serve each year was so great, that, for the remainder of his reign, it practically amounted to a total absorption of half, sometimes almost of the whole, of the young men, as they rose to manhood, into the ranks of the army.<sup>1</sup>\*

Nor was Napoleon less solicitous, by means of foreign negotiations, to increase the disposable force which he could bring to bear against the common enemy. Ney, who had commanded in Switzerland, concluded a capitulation, by which sixteen thousand troops of that government were put at the disposal of France, and soon after placed in reserve of the Army of England at Compiègne ; while a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded between the two states, which stipulated that the Helvetic confederacy should in addition, if necessary, furnish eight thousand auxiliary troops to France ; General Pino led an Italian division across the Alps, to form part of the same armament ; while Augereau assembled a corps in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, to enforce the mandates of the consular government, if the courts of Madrid and Lisbon refused to conclude treaties on the footing of the orders sent out from the Tuileries. But there was no need for the precaution ; terror and French influence were already paramount at both those capitals, and the seal was put to the disgrace of the peninsula by the treaties concluded with Spain on the 19th October, and with Portugal on the 25th December. By the first of these conventions, a monthly payment of six millions of francs

\* It was calculated that 208,233 young men in the French empire annually attained the age of 20, the period when liability to serve commenced. Thus the first conscription of 1798, which required 200,000 men who had that year attained that age, absorbed nearly the whole persons liable, and the drawing of lots became a vain formality. The conscription in 1803 was 120,000, and it was seldom less, generally much greater, during the remainder of the war.—DUMAS. x. 65.

(£240,000 a-month, £2,880,000 a-year) was stipulated in favour of France, to be either remitted to Paris or employed in repairing the French ships of war in the Spanish harbours; several officers holding important situations in the Spanish army were to be dismissed for alleged offences against the French government; many stipulations in favour of the import of French manufactures, and their transit into Portugal, were agreed to; and the Spanish government engaged to procure the payment of at least a million of francs (£40,000) a-month by the Portuguese to the French government, as long as the maritime war lasted. By the second, Portugal purchased exemption from actual hostilities by an annual payment of 16,000,000 francs (£640,000) to Napoleon. The conclusion of these treaties was a virtual declaration of war by both Spain and Portugal against Great Britain, since it placed the pecuniary resources of both countries at the disposal of France during the continuance of the contest. Bitterly did the people of the Peninsula subsequently lament their degradation, and well did they then wipe off the stain on their honour.<sup>1</sup>

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Dec. 25.

<sup>1</sup> Norv. ii.  
265, 266.  
Bign. iii.  
200, 201,  
and 238.  
Martens,  
viii. 136.

No sooner, also, did the maritime war appear inevitable, than Napoleon concluded an arrangement with the United States of America, by which, in consideration of eighty millions of francs, (£3,200,000,) he ceded to them his whole rights, acquired by the convention with Spain, to Louisiana—anticipating thus, for a valuable consideration, the probable fate of a naval contest, and extricating from the hands of the British a valuable colonial possession, which would assuredly soon have become their prey; while, by a senatus-consultum issued on the 11th September, he at once, and of his own authority, annexed the whole of Piedmont to the French Republic. By these different means, Napoleon was enabled to put on foot a very large army for the invasion of Great Britain. An order addressed to the minister at war, on the 14th June. 1803, fixed the organisation of the army, which

15.  
Louisia  
sold to Ame-  
rica, April  
30, and  
Piedmont  
annexed to  
France.  
Vast force  
collected on  
the coast by  
the money  
thus gained.

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was divided into six corps, each of which was to occupy a separate camp, and be under a different commander. Ney, Soult, Davoust, and Victor, were to be found among the names of the generals. It extended along the whole coast, from the Texel to the Pyrenees. The first camp was in Holland, the second at Ghent, the third at St Omer, the fourth at Compiègne, the fifth at St Malo, the sixth at Bayonne. The whole troops assembled at these different points were intended to exceed a hundred and fifty thousand men, and their command was intrusted to the most distinguished generals of the army. Though all included under the name of the Army of England, their wide dissemination renders it probable that the First Consul had other objects in view besides the subjugation of Great Britain in their disposition; but the Continental powers shut their eyes to the danger which awaited them from the concentration of such powerful forces, and secretly rejoiced that the vast army from which they had all suffered so much was quietly cantoned at a distance from them on the shores of the ocean, intent on a remote and hazardous enterprise.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
22. Dum.  
x. 89, 91.  
Bign. iii.  
169, 170.  
Martens,  
vii. 160.

16.  
Military  
force and  
finances of  
France.

Great as these preparations were, they were not beyond the resources at the disposal of the First Consul. The army of France alone, without counting the subsidiary forces of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian states subject to its command, amounted to the enormous aggregate of 427,000 effective men, independent of the national and coast guards, which were above 200,000.\* Not satisfied with this huge force, the First Consul obtained a decree for the immediate calling out of 50,000 additional troops, from the persons liable to the conscrip-

The army consisted of—

Infantry, . . . . .	341,000
Artillery, . . . . .	26,000
Cavalry, . . . . .	46,350
Veterans, . . . . .	14,560

427,910

—See *Report of the Minister at War*, June 1803; DUMAS, ix. 117

tion for the years 1802 and 1803, who had not yet been called out owing to the peace, which raised the whole army to 477,000 men. Above 100,000 of these were fed, clothed, paid, and lodged at the expense of the allied states. The finances of the country, largely recruited by the contributions levied in other states, were in an equally flourishing condition. The revenue exceeded that of 1802, and amounted to 570,968,000 francs, or £23,000,000 sterling;\* while the immense subsidies paid by Spain and Portugal as the price of their pretended neutrality—by the Italian republic, in return for the alliance of France—and the maintenance by Hanover, Holland, Naples, and Tuscany, of all the troops cantoned in their respective territories, largely contributed to the increase of the resources of the Republic. In this way Napoleon, after making every allowance for the non-effectives, and garrisons in the interior, could reckon on a disposable force of at least 300,000 men, of which 150,000 formed the Army of England stationed on the coast, and the remainder were on the Rhine, or in Italy, to overawe the Continental powers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign., iii.  
245, 246.  
Thiers, iii.  
375.

But nothing daunted were the government or people of England by the formidable preparations which were directed against them. Relying on the patriotism and spirit of the people, the administration made the most vigorous efforts for the national defence, in which they were nobly seconded both by parliament and the people. Independent of the militia, eighty thousand strong, which

17.  
Prepara-  
tions of  
England to  
repel the  
danger.

\*The budget of 1803 stood thus :—

Direct contributions, . . .	305,105,000 francs or	£12,200,000
Registers, stamps, &c., . . .	200,106,000 —	8,000,000
Customs, . . . . .	36,924,000 —	1,480,000
Post-office, . . . . .	11,200,000 —	450,000
•Salt-tax, . . . . .	2,300,000 —	92,000
Lottery, . . . . .	15,826,000 —	610,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	570,961,000	or £22,832,000

—See DUC DE GAËTA, i. 304.

The annual subsidy paid by the Italian republic was 25,000,000 francs, or £1,000,000 sterling.—DUMAS, xi. 134.



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July 18.

were called out on the 25th March, and the regular army of a hundred and thirty thousand already voted, the House of Commons, on 28th June, agreed to the very unusual step of raising fifty thousand men additional by conscription, in the proportion of thirty-four thousand for England, ten thousand for Ireland, and six thousand for Scotland; which it was calculated would raise the regular troops in Great Britain to a hundred and twelve thousand men, exclusive of the troops in the colonies, besides a large surplus force for offensive operations. In addition to this, a bill was brought in shortly afterwards, to enable the King to call on the levy *en masse* to repel the invasion of the enemy, and empowering the lord-lieutenants of the several counties to enrol all the men in the kingdom, between seventeen and fifty-five years of age, in different classes, who were to be divided into regiments according to their several ages and professions. But all persons were to be exempt from this conscription who were members of any volunteer corps approved of by his majesty; and such was the general zeal and enthusiasm, that in a few weeks three hundred thousand men were enrolled, armed, and disciplined in the different parts of the kingdom, and the compulsory conscription fell to the ground. This immense force, which embraced all classes and professions of men, not only was of incalculable importance, by providing a powerful reserve of trained men to strengthen the ranks and supply the vacancies of the regular army, but contributed in a remarkable manner to produce a patriotic ardour and feeling of unanimity among the people, and lay the foundation of that military spirit which enabled Great Britain at length to appear as principal in the contest, and beat down the power of France, even on that element where hitherto she had obtained such unexampled success.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 1604,  
1627, 1630.

The spectacle now presented by the British islands was unparalleled in their previous history, and marked deci-

sively the arrival of a new era in the war—that in which popular sympathy was enlisted against the Revolution, and the military usurpations of France had roused a unanimous resolution to resist its aggression. In the multitudes who now thronged to the standards of their country, were to be seen men of all ranks and descriptions, from the prince of the blood to the labourer of the soil.\* The King had everything arranged for the expected invasion. He was to go himself to Chelmsford or Dartford; the Queen and royal family, with the treasure, were to be sent to Worcester; the artillery and stores from Woolwich, to be sent into the interior by the Grand-Junction Canal. In the great approaching conflict, every one had his post assigned him. The merchant left his counting-house, the lawyer his briefs; the farmer paused in the labours of husbandry, the artisan in the toils of his handicraft; the nobleman hurried from the scene of dissipation or amusement, the country gentleman put himself at the head of his tenantry. Everywhere were to be seen uniforms, squadrons, battalions: the clang of artillery was heard in the streets, the trampling of cavalry resounded in the fields. Instead of the peasant reposing at sunset in front of his cottage, he was seen hurrying, with his musket on his shoulder, to his rallying point. Instead of the nobleman wasting his youth in the ignoble pleasures of the metropolis, he was to be found inhaling a nobler spirit amidst the ranks of his rural dependants. In the general excitement, even the voice of faction was stilled. The heart-burnings and divisions on the origin of the war were forgotten; the Whigs stood beside the Tories in the ranks of the volunteers; from being a war of opinion, the contest had become one of nations, and, excepting in a few inveterate leaders of party in the legislature, one feeling seemed to pervade the whole British empire. Mr Sheri-

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1803.

18.

Numbers  
and warlike  
spirit of the  
volunteers.

\* The King reviewed in Hyde Park, in October, sixty battalions of volunteers, amounting to 27,000 men, besides 1500 cavalry, all equipped at their own expense, and in a remarkable state of efficiency. The total volunteers of the metropolis were 46,000.

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Aug. 10.  
Parl. Hist.  
xvi. 1694,  
697. Dum.  
x. 136. Pel-  
lew's Sid-  
mouth, ii.  
238.

19.  
Naval pre-  
parations.  
Dec. 2, 1802.

March 14,  
1803.

June 11.

2 James, vol.  
iii. Table,  
No. 12. Ann.  
Reg. 1803,  
621. App.  
Chronicle.

dan, with that independent and patriotic spirit which ever distinguished him, at the close of the session made an eloquent speech on moving the thanks of parliament to the volunteers and yeomanry for the zeal and alacrity with which they had come forward in defence of their country; and thunders of applause shook the House when he declared it to be the unalterable resolution, not less of the legislature than the government, that "no proposal for peace should be entertained while a single French soldier had footing on British ground."<sup>1</sup>

Nor was it at land only that preparations to resist the enemy on the most gigantic scale were made: the navy, also, the peculiar arm of British strength, received the early and vigilant attention of government. Fifty thousand seamen, including twelve thousand marines, had been, in the first instance, voted for the service of the year; but ten thousand additional were granted when it became probable that war would ensue, and forty thousand more when it actually broke out. Nelson, on the day on which war was declared, wrote a laconic and characteristic note to Mr Addington, offering his services, which, it may easily be believed, were gladly accepted.\* Great activity was exerted in fitting out adequate fleets for all the important naval stations the moment that hostilities were resumed, although the dilapidated state of the navy, in consequence of previous ill-judged economy, rendered it a matter of extreme difficulty. Seventy-five ships of the line, and two hundred and seventy frigates and smaller vessels, were put in commission. The harbours of France and Holland were closely blockaded; Lord Nelson rode triumphant in the Mediterranean; and, excepting when their small craft were stealing round the headlands to the general rendezvous at Boulogne, the flag of France, at least in large fleets, disappeared from the ocean.<sup>2</sup>

\* "Whenever it is necessary, I am *your* admiral.

"NELSON and BRONTE."

"HOUSE OF LORDS,  
9th March 1803."

*Life of Sidmouth.*

No small efforts in finance were required to meet these extensive armaments by sea and land ; but the resources of the country enabled government to defray them without difficulty. A property tax of 5 per cent, which it was calculated would produce £4,500,000 yearly ; additional customs to the amount of £2,000,000 a-year ; further excise duties, chiefly on malt, spirits, and wine, which were estimated at £6,000,000 ; and a loan of £12,000,000, were sufficient to enable government to meet the heavy expenses attendant on the renewal of the war, even on the extended scale on which it was now undertaken. These burdens, especially the income and malt taxes, were severe, but they were universally felt to be necessary ; and such was the general enthusiasm, that the imposition of war taxes in a single year to the amount of twelve millions and a half, did not excite a single dissentient voice in parliament, or produce any dissatisfaction in the country.\* What was still more extraordinary, this great increase of taxes proved entirely productive, and industry flourished with unabated vigour under the prodigious additional load thus imposed upon it.<sup>1</sup>

A long and interesting debate took place in parliament, upon the question whether London should be fortified. Colonel Crawford urged strongly the great danger of the capital, and the principal depot for our military and naval stores, being wholly undefended ; and maintained that, as matters then stood, the loss of a single battle might draw after it the surrender of the metropolis and chief arsenals of the kingdom, the effect of which, both in a political and military point of view, would be incalculable. Mr Pitt added the great weight of his authority on the same side, and strongly enforced the propriety, not only of strengthening the metropolis, or at least the arsenals in its vicinity, but of fortifying the principal headlands of the coast, in order to render landing by the enemy more difficult. "It is in vain to say," said he, "you should

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20.

Finances  
and new  
taxes of the  
year. June  
14.<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist  
xxxvi.1595

21.

Mr Pitt's  
speech on  
fortifying  
London.

\* See Appendix A, Chap. XXXVII.

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not fortify London, because our ancestors did not fortify it, unless you can show that they were in the same situation that we are. We might as well be told that, because our ancestors fought with arrows and lances, we ought to use them now, and consider shields and corslets as affording a secure defence against musketry and artillery. If the fortification of the capital can add to the security of the country, I think it ought to be done. If, by the erection of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between the safety and destruction of the capital. It will not, I admit, make a difference between the conquest and independence of the country; for that will not depend upon one or upon ten battles: but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives, with misery, havoc, and desolation spread over the country on the one hand, or the confounding the efforts and chastising the insolence of the enemy on the other.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi.1659,  
1662.

22.  
Reflections  
on this mea-  
sure.

These arguments were little attended to at the time, and the proposed measure was not adopted. But there can be no doubt that they were well founded, and that England might have had bitter cause to regret their neglect, if Napoleon, with a hundred thousand men, had landed on the coast of Sussex. For this opinion we have now abundant grounds, in the result of the invasions of Austria, Russia, and France, at a subsequent period, when possessed of much greater military resources than were then at the command of the British government, and the best of all authority in the recorded opinion of Napoleon himself. Central fortifications near or round the metropolis are of incalculable importance, in order to gain time for the distant strength of the kingdom to assemble when it is suddenly assailed; if they had existed on Montmartre and Belleville, the invasion of the Allies in 1814, instead of terminating in the submission of France, would probably have issued in a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine; and he is a bold man who on such a subject ven-

tures to dissent from the concurring opinion of Mr Pitt and Napoleon.\*

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23.

Fresh rebellion in Ireland.

This year was again distinguished by one of those unhappy attempts at rebellion, which have so frequently disgraced the history and blasted the prospects of Ireland. Though the country had been disturbed by the usual amount of predial violence and outrage, no insurrection of a political nature was apprehended; when suddenly, on the 14th July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, unequivocal symptoms of a fermentation of a more general character were observed in the population of Dublin. It was soon discovered that a conspiracy was on foot, the object of which was to force the castle and sack the harbour and stores of the capital, dissolve the connexion with England, and establish a republic in close alliance with France. But the means at the disposal of the conspirators were as deficient as the objects they had in view were visionary and extravagant. Eighty or a hundred persons,—under the guidance of Emmett, a brother of the chief who had been engaged in the former insurrection, a young man of an ardent and enthusiastic temperament,—proposed, on the 23d July, to assemble in open rebellion the peasantry from the adjoining counties, who were for that purpose to flock into the metropolis, under pretence of seeking for work in hay-making, on the eve of the festival of St James. With this motley array

14th July.

\* “ Napoleon says he frequently turned in his mind the propriety of fortifying Paris and Lyons; and this in an especial manner occurred to him on occasion of his return from the campaign of Austerlitz. Fear of exciting alarm among the inhabitants, and the events which succeeded each other with such astonishing rapidity, prevented him from carrying his designs into execution. He thought that a great capital is the country of the flower of the nation, that it is the centre of opinion, the general depot; and that it is the greatest of all contradictions to leave a point of such importance without the means of immediate defence. At the season of great national disasters, empires frequently stand in need of soldiers, but men are never wanting for internal defence, if a place be provided where their energies can be brought into action. Fifty thousand national guards, with three thousand gunners, will defend a fortified capital against an army of three hundred thousand men. The same fifty thousand men in the open field, if they are not experienced soldiers, commanded by skilled officers, will be thrown into confusion by the charge of a few thousand horse.

Napoleon's  
opini  
the s

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they were to march against a garrison consisting of above four thousand men. In effect, on the day appointed, the country labourers did assemble in vast numbers in St James's Street as soon as it was dark, and Emmett put himself at their head; but he soon discovered that the insurgents were rather disposed to gratify their appetite for assassination and murder, than engage in any systematic operations for the subversion of the government. In vain he and a few other leaders, animated with sincere though deluded patriotic feeling, endeavoured to infuse some order into their ranks, and lead them against the castle and other important points of the city. Instead of doing so, they murdered Lord Kilwarden, the venerable Lord Chief-Justice of Ireland, and Colonel Browne, a most worthy and meritorious officer, whom they met in the streets; and, equally incapable of resolute as humane conduct, were shortly after dispersed by two volleys from a subaltern and fifty men, who unexpectedly came on the rear of their savage and disorderly columns.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann Reg.  
1803, 300,  
312

24.  
Murder of  
the Lord  
Chief-Justice in Dub  
lin.

The fate of the Lord Chief-Justice was peculiarly deplorable. He arrived at the entrance of Thomas Street in his carriage, accompanied by his daughter and nephew, when the chariot was stopped, the venerable judge and his nephew dragged out and murdered by repeated stabs from the ruffians, who struggled with each other for the gratification of striking them with their pikes. Mean-

Paris ten times, in its former history, owed its safety to its walls: if, in 1000, it had possessed a citadel capable of holding out only for eight days, the destinies of the world would have been changed. If, in 1805, Vienna had been fortified, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the war; if, in 1806, Berlin had been fortified, the army beaten at Jena might have rallied there till the Russian army advanced to its relief: if, in 1808, Madrid had been fortified, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, and Somosierra, could never have ventured to march upon that capital, leaving the English army, in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, in its rear." Let not the English imagine that their present naval superiority renders these observations inapplicable to their capital: it was *after* the victory of Austerlitz that the necessity of fortifying Paris occurred to the victor in that memorable fight. Who will guarantee the navy of England in all future times against a maritime crusade, and a rout of Leipsic at the mouth of the Thames?—See NAPOLEON *in* MONTHOLON, ii. 278, 280.

while the young lady, whom they had the humanity to spare, fled in a state bordering on distraction through the streets, and arrived at the Castle in such agitation as to be hardly capable of recounting the tragic event which she had witnessed. A bystander, shocked at the savage ferocity of the murderers, exclaimed that the assassins should be executed next day; but the words recalled his recollection to the upright dying magistrate, and he raised his head for the last time to exclaim, "Murder must be punished; but let no man suffer for my death but on a fair trial, and by the laws of his country," and immediately expired. Memorable words to be uttered at such a moment by such a man, and eminently descriptive of that love of impartial justice which constitutes at once the first duty of a judge, and the noblest epitaph on his sepulchre!<sup>1</sup>

Emmett and Russell, the two leaders of the insurrection, were soon after seized, brought to trial, and executed. The former made no sort of defence, but when called upon to receive sentence, stood up and avowed the treason with which he was charged, glorying in his patriotic intentions, and declaring himself a martyr to the independence and liberties of his country. At his execution he evinced uncommon intrepidity and composure, received the communion of the Church of England, and died the victim of sincere but deluded patriotism. The remaining conspirators were pardoned, upon making a full disclosure of their projects and preparations, by the judicious lenity of government; and a bill was shortly after brought into parliament for the better suppression of insurrection, and the temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland, which passed both houses without any opposition. Such was the praiseworthy vigour exerted by government on this occasion, that two bills, the one suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, the other establishing martial law in the disturbed districts, were carried through all their stages and sent up to the house of Lords in one evening. They

25.  
Execution  
of the ring  
leaders.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1803, 311,  
312.

July 28.



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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 1671,  
1675. Pel-  
lew's Sid-  
mouth, ii.  
212.

were there passed with equal celerity, and the King having remained in town to give them the royal assent, they were despatched next day to Dublin. This unexpected display of vigour mainly contributed to check the farther progress of the insurrection. A frantic and unsuccessful attempt at the assassination of the King was made, in the same year, by Colonel Despard, a revolutionist of the most dangerous character, who was tried, condemned, and executed.<sup>1</sup>

26.  
Naval  
events of  
the year.

July 17.

Sept. 12 and  
23.

Notwithstanding the magnitude of the preparations on both sides, the naval operations of the first year of the war were inconsiderable. The French fleets were not yet in such a state of forwardness as to be able to leave their harbours in large masses; and the closeness of the British blockade prevented any considerable number of detached vessels from escaping. As usual, the effects of the English maritime superiority speedily appeared in the successive capture of the enemy's colonies. St Lucia and Tobago fell into their hands in July, and Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo in September. The planters in these sugar islands willingly yielded to the British forces, anticipating from them protection from their own slaves, whom the events in St Domingo and Guadaloupe had given them so much reason to dread, and a share in that lucrative commerce which, under the British flag, they could carry on with every part of the world, and which the almost total cessation of production in the French islands had thrown almost exclusively into their hands. Some angry disputes broke out in this year between the British government and the local legislature in Jamaica, in consequence of the refusal of the latter to contribute the requisite supplies to the support of the large military garrison of the island; but they gradually gave way in the following years, in consequence of the advantageous market for their produce which the war afforded them, and the approach of real danger from the combined fleets of France and Spain.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, p. 2.  
Bign. iii.  
158.

The first gleam of success came from the Eastern ocean, and, what was remarkable, from the merchant ships of England. Immediately after war was declared, Admiral Linois, with one sail of the line and three frigates, was by Napoleon directed to set sail from Pondicherry, where he was at the time, and escaped from the roads in consequence of the British admiral on that station being ignorant of the commencement of hostilities. Since that time he had cruised about the Indian archipelago, capturing detached ships, and doing considerable damage to British commerce. Emboldened by this success, he lay in wait for the homeward-bound China fleet, which he expected would prove an easy prey. On the 14th February, he descried the fleet leisurely approaching, in no expectation of encountering an enemy, and anticipated little opposition; but Commodore Dance, who commanded the British vessels, by a bold and gallant manœuvre defeated his efforts, and to his infinite honour saved the valuable property under his command from destruction. Dismissing the heavily laden and weaker vessels to the rear, he made the signal for the stronger and better equipped to bear down in succession upon the enemy; and so intimidated was the French admiral by their gallant bearing and vigorous fire, that after a few broadsides he took to flight, and was pursued for above two hours by his commercial victors! This gallant action, which confounded the enemy, and saved British property to the amount of a million and a half sterling, excited the greatest satisfaction throughout the nation.<sup>1</sup> Rewards were distributed with a liberal hand by the East India Company to the various commanders and their brave crews; and the commodore received the honour of knighthood from his Majesty's hands. Various attacks were made in the course of the summer on the Boulogne flotilla, and the squadrons of small craft proceeding to that destination; but although the utmost gallantry was uniformly displayed by the

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27.

Defeat of  
Linois by  
the China  
fleet.Feb. 15,  
1804.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 141,  
and Chron.  
409. Dum.  
xi. 64, 66,  
69.

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May 3.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 138,  
139.

28.  
Supplies and  
finances for  
1804.

<sup>2</sup> James, iii.  
App. Table,  
13. Ann.  
Reg. 1804,  
577. App.  
to Chron.  
Parl. Deb.  
ii. 351, 355.  
Pellew's  
Sidmouth,  
ii. 306.

officers and men engaged, the success obtained was in general very trifling, and bore no proportion to the loss sustained by the assailants. The only conquest worthy of record made by the British, either at sea or land, during the year 1804, was that of Surinam in the West Indies, which in the beginning of May yielded, to the great joy of the inhabitants, to a military and naval force under the command of Sir Charles Green, and Commodore afterwards Sir Samuel Hood; on which occasion a frigate and brig also fell into the hands of the victors.<sup>1</sup>

The supplies voted by parliament for the service of the year 1804 were much greater than for the preceding year, and the military and naval force kept on foot far more considerable.\* The expenditure swelled, independent of the charges of the debt, to no less than £53,000,000, of which £42,000,000 was for the current expenditure, and £11,000,000 for retiring of Exchequer bills. The land troops of the year amounted, including twenty-two thousand in India, to above three hundred thousand men,—exclusive of three hundred and forty thousand volunteers,—of whom one hundred and ninety thousand were regulars, and one hundred and ten thousand militia, nearly as well disciplined as the line†—an enormous force, capable, if properly directed,<sup>2</sup> not only of repelling any attempt at

\* See Appendix B, Chap. xxxvii.

† This force was distributed as follows:—

In the British Isles, . . . .	129,089
Colonies, . . . .	38,630
India, . . . .	22,897
Recruiting, . . . .	533
Militia in Great Britain, . . . .	109,947
Regular and Militia, . . . .	301,046
Volunteers in Great Britain, . . . .	347,000
Total in Great Britain, . . . .	648,046
Irish Volunteers, . . . .	70,090
Military, . . . .	718,046
Navy, . . . .	100,000
Grand Total in arms, . . . .	818,046

—See *Parl. Deb.* i. 1678, and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 19.

invasion, but of interposing with decisive effect in any strife which might take place between France and the great military powers of the Continent. The naval forces also were very considerably augmented, there being no less than one hundred thousand men, including twenty-two thousand marines, voted for the service of the year, and eighty-three ships of the line, and three hundred and ninety frigates and smaller vessels, in commission.<sup>1</sup>

But the magnitude of these forces, compared with the inconsiderable amount of the services rendered by them to the country, ere long revealed the secret weakness of the administration. It was in vain to disguise, and fruitless to deny, that the public expenditure could not long continue at the enormous height which it had now reached, and that unless some advantages commensurate to the sacrifices made were gained, the nation must in the end sink under the weight of its exertions. To the animation, excitement, and hope which generally prevailed at the renewal of the war, had succeeded the listlessness, exhaustion, and discontent which invariably, after a certain interval, follow high-wrought and disappointed feeling. The trifling nature of the success which had been gained, notwithstanding such costly efforts during the first year of the contest, produced a very general conviction that ministers, whatever their individual respectability or talents might be, were unequal as a body to the task of steering the vessel of the state through the shoals and quicksands with which it was surrounded; and, in particular, did not possess that weight and eminence in the estimation of foreign states, which were necessary to enable Great Britain to take her appropriate station as the leader of the general confederacy, which it was now evident was alone capable of reducing the Continental power of France. This feeling was strongly increased by the complaints which generally broke out as to the reduced and inefficient state of the navy under the management of Earl St Vincent; and it

29.  
General despondency  
which ensued in Britain.

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soon became painfully evident, from a comparison of the vessels in commission at the close of the former and commencement of the present war, that this important arm of the public defence had declined to a very great degree during the interval of peace; and that, under the delusion of a wretched, and in the end most costly economy, the stores on which the public salvation depended had been sold and dissipated to an extent in the highest degree alarming. This was the most serious fault of government, as it is of all administrations in Great Britain on the recurrence of peace; and Mr Addington afterwards admitted it was the cause which proved fatal to his administration. The consequence was, that, when war broke out, the navy was in an unprecedented state of dilapidation; and from the absence of convoys for our merchant fleets, and the neglect to apprise Admiral Rainier and the fleets in the East of the breaking out of hostilities, by an overland despatch, many severe losses, which might have been avoided, were sustained by the commercial interests.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pellew's  
Sidmouth,  
ii.167. Ann.  
Reg. 1804,  
129, 131.

<sup>30.</sup>  
Which is in-  
creased by  
the alarming  
illness of  
the King.

The public despondency, already strongly excited by these untoward events, was soon after increased to the highest degree by the alarming intelligence which spread abroad as to the health of the King. On the 14th February, it was publicly announced by a bulletin at

\* Mr Addington boasted during the peace, that, if war broke out, fifty ships of the line could be equipped in a month; but when this declaration came to be put to the test, it was discovered that the royal arsenals were almost emptied, and everything sold requisite for the naval defence of the country. Even the men-of-war on the stocks at the close of the contest had been left imperfect, and the hands employed upon them dismissed. In the general penury which prevailed, neither vessels could be procured for the King's squadrons, nor convoys provided for the merchant service. When the royal message was delivered to parliament, on 8th March 1803, there was hardly a ship of war either ready or in a state of forwardness; and the greatest aversion to the public service pervaded every department of the navy. The consequence was that, notwithstanding the utmost efforts to repair the ruinous economy and dilapidations of the two preceding years, the ships in commission on the 5th January 1804 were only 356, of which 75 were of the line; whereas in the commencement of 1801 the number had been 472, of which 100 were of the line.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 130, 131; and JAMES'S *Naval Hist.* iii. Tables No. 9 and 13.

St James's Palace that his majesty was indisposed; and a succession of similar notices soon left no doubt in the public mind that the disease was that mental malady which had plunged the nation in such general consternation fifteen years before. On this occasion the panic was still greater, from the alarming posture of public affairs, and the general distrust which prevailed as to the stability and capacity of the administration. But after an interval of a few weeks, it was announced that the most distressing symptoms had abated. On the 29th February, the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared in parliament, "that there was no necessary suspension of the royal functions." On the 14th March the Lord Chancellor stated in the house of Lords, that "he had since conversed with his majesty, and that his mental state warranted the Lords Commissioners in expressing the royal assent to several bills which had passed through parliament;" and on the 9th and 18th May, the King drove, to the infinite joy of the inhabitants, through the principal streets of the metropolis: though it was several months afterwards before he was restored to his domestic circle, or able to undertake the whole functions of royalty.<sup>1</sup>

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1804.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 27,  
29.

But during this interval of doubt and alarm, the minds of the great majority of men throughout the nation became convinced of the necessity of placing the helm of the state under firmer guidance, and all eyes were naturally turned to that illustrious statesman, who had retired only to make way for a pacific administration, and could now, in strict accordance with his uniform principles, resume the direction of the second war with revolutionary France. As usual in such cases, the gradual approximation of parties in the House of Commons indicated the conversion of the public mind; and it soon became evident that the administration was approaching its dissolution. On the 15th March matters came to a crisis. On that day Mr Pitt made a long and elaborate speech, in the course of which he commented with great severity on the malad-

31.  
All eyes are  
turned to  
Mr Pitt,  
and coalition  
against  
the ministry.

March 15.

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1804.

ministration of the royal navy under the present government, especially by the imprudent and culpable sale of stores during the peace, which had in a manner stripped the royal dockyards, and concluded by moving for returns of all the ships in commission in 1793, 1801, and 1803. He was cordially supported by Mr Fox and Mr Sheridan; and it became evident that a coalition had taken place between the Whig and Tory branches of the Opposition. The motion was lost by a majority of seventy; there being one hundred and thirty for it, and two hundred against it. But from the character and weight of the men who voted, it was easy to see that the ministry were rapidly sinking, and that they only retained office till their successors could be appointed, which the unhappy condition of the King rendered a doubtful period.<sup>1</sup> In effect, their majority went on continually declining; and on the 25th April, in a question on the army of reserve, it was only thirty-seven. It was now openly stated by ministers that they only held office during the continuance of a delicate state of public affairs; the Opposition, seeing their object gained, suspended all further attacks till the King's health was restored; and on the 12th May, the day after he had appeared in public, it was formally announced in the House of Lords that ministers had resigned, and their successors had been appointed.<sup>2\*</sup>

It was at first expected that a coalition was to be formed as the basis of the new administration; but it was soon discovered, both that there was an irreconcilable

May 12.  
<sup>2</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 80.  
84. Parl.  
Deb. i. 319,  
409.

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
i. 866, 927.

\* The King on this occasion pressed an earldom, as well as a pension, on Mr Addington, but he had the disinterestedness to decline both. The King was truly grieved at this refusal, and said to him, "You are a proud man, Mr Addington, but I am a proud man too, and why should I sleep uneasy on my pillow because you will not comply with my request? Why should I feel the consciousness that I have suffered you to ruin your family, and that through your attachment to me?" But the minister was immovable, and retired without either pension or title. Such were British statesmen in those days.—See *PELLERW's Life of Sidmouth*, ii. 289. The King had the highest opinion of Mr Addington's courage and principle, which were clearly evinced afterwards when he was Home Secretary, as Lord Sidmouth. "His heart," said his majesty, "always takes the lead of his head. Give me such a man, who is governed by principle, and not expediency."—*Ibid.*

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32.

Mr Pitt be-  
comes prime  
minister.

difference between the opinions of the leaders of the different parties on the chief subjects of policy, and also that there were scruples in the royal breast against the admission of Mr Fox, which rendered his accession to the cabinet nearly impracticable. The King had no objection to Mr Fox being included in the ministry, but positively refused to bestow upon him any office which might bring him into personal intercourse with himself; and as his friends would not consent to this restriction, the attempt to form a coalition administration failed.\* The new ministry, therefore, was formed exclusively of Tories; and a majority of it was composed of members of the late cabinet. The material changes were, that Mr Pitt was made First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in room of Mr Addington; Lord Melville First Lord of the Admiralty, in room of Earl St Vincent; and Lord Harrowby Foreign Secretary, in lieu of Lord Hawkesbury.† Lord Grenville, the able and faithful supporter of Mr Pitt during the former war, declined to take office, assigning as a reason that the ministry was formed on too narrow a basis, at a time when the public dangers called for a coalition of all the leading men in the state to give vigour and unanimity to the national councils—an opinion in which he was joined by a great proportion of the men of moderate principles throughout the country. Yet Mr Pitt probably judged rightly in constructing his cabinet entirely of men of his own principles, as experience has proved that no individual talent, how great soever,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Grenville's letter to Mr Pitt, Ann. Reg. 1804, 123, 125. Pellew's *Sidmouth*, ii. 285, 286.

\* Mr Pitt to George III., 7th May 1804. Pellew's *Life of Sidmouth*, ii. 287.

† The new Cabinet stood thus :—

Mr Pitt, Premier.

Duke of Portland, President of the Council.

Lord Eldon, Lord Chancellor.

• Earl of Westmoreland, Privy Seal.

Earl of Chatham, Master-General of the Ordnance.

Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control.

Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Lord Harrowby, Foreign affairs.

Earl of Camden, War and the Colonies.

Lord Mulgrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.



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33.

Vigorous  
measures of  
Lord Mel-  
ville for the  
restoration  
of the navy.

can withstand the loss of character consequent on an abandonment of principle. Thence it is that coalition administrations have seldom any long existence.

The vigour and decision of Mr Pitt's councils speedily appeared in the confederacy which he formed of the Continental states, on the greatest scale, to stem the progress of French ambition. Mr Addington had never been able array them in this manner, not so much from want either of inclination or ability, but from the want of that unanimity among them which was afterwards produced by Napoleon's murder of the Duc d'Enghien.\* Nor was the ability and energy of Lord Melville less conspicuous in the rapid restoration of the navy, from a state of unexampled decrepitude and decay, to a degree of exaltation and lustre unprecedented even in its long and glorious annals. Everything was to be done; for such was the mutilated and shattered state of the fleet, and to such an extent had the disastrous spirit of parsimonious reform been carried, that when stores and timber were offered at comparatively moderate terms, they were refused by the late Admiralty, and suffered to be sold to the agents of the country, rather than deviate from their pernicious economy, even in the purchase of those articles which were in daily consumption. The consequence was, that Lord Melville was compelled to accept the offers of timber, stores, and masts, at whatever price the contractors chose to demand; and the savings of one naval administration entailed a quadruple expenditure upon that which succeeded it. But by strenuous exertions, and at an enormous cost, the defects were at last made up; the

\* On 9th June 1804, M. Gentz, the celebrated Austrian political writer, wrote to Mr Addington:—"On a plus d'une fois accusé le ministère dont vous étiez le chef, de ne pas inspirer assez de considération aux puissances étrangères, et de compromettre par-là les intérêts essentiels de l'Angleterre. J'atteste solennellement la fausseté de cette assertion. Dans les dispositions où se trouvent malheureusement toutes les puissances continentales, rien, absolument rien, ne les aurait engagées—je ne dis pas à un système d'opposition et de vigueur contre l'ennemi commun, mais seulement au moindre concert, soit entre elles, soit avec votre gouvernement."—*M. Gentz à M. Addington, Vienna, 9th June 1804*—PELLEW'S *Life of Sidmouth*, ii. 297.

deficiencies were supplied by the purchase of East India vessels, and by contracting for the repairs of others; and the old practice of building prospectively for the service of future years, which had been abandoned in the fervour of ill-judged economy, was again resumed with the very best effects to the public service. The results of the admirable vigour and efficiency which the new First Lord of the Admiralty introduced into every part of the civil department of the navy, were soon conspicuous. Instead of three hundred and fifty-six vessels, including seventy-five of the line, which alone were in commission in the beginning of 1804, there were four hundred and seventy-three, including eighty-three of the line, ready for sea in the beginning of 1805; eighty vessels of war, including twenty-six of the line, were in a few months far advanced on the stocks; and the navy was already afloat which was destined to carry the thunder of the British arms to the shoals of Trafalgar.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> James, iii.  
App. Nos.  
12, 13, Ann.  
Reg. 137.

Nor was the conduct of Lord Melville less beneficial in the civil regulations introduced for the increase of the comfort and health of the sailors. Many admirable practical improvements were established, many experienced evils removed. The wives of absent seamen were allowed to draw a certain proportion of their wages during their absence, at the nearest harbour to their places of residence; several serious abuses as regarded the food, clothing, and pay of the men were corrected; and the foundation was laid for that excellent system of management which is ultimately, it is to be hoped, destined to wipe the stain of impressment, with all its concomitant evils, from the British constitution. The merits of the new Admiralty on these subjects, however, were neither generally known to, nor appreciated by, the country. In hostile projects they were, for the first year of their administration, by no means fortunate.<sup>2</sup> From unacquaintance with nautical subjects, they lent too credulous ears to the designs of visionary projectors: repeated unsuccessful attacks on the

34.  
And admirable civil  
regulations  
for that service.

<sup>2</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 141,  
143. Dum.  
xi. 26, 51.

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French flotilla tarnished the reputation of the navy; and the total failure of an attempt to blow it up by means of infernal machines, called Catamarans, exposed it to the ridicule of all Europe.

35.  
Alexander's  
difference  
with France.

While these vast preparations on either side were making in England and France for the prosecution of the war, events were occurring destined ere long to rekindle the flames of war on the Continent. Notwithstanding the high admiration which Alexander felt for Napoleon, and the open support which he had given to his policy in the matter of the German indemnities, events soon occurred which produced first a coldness, and at length a rupture between them. The first of these arose out of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulated that Malta should be placed under the guarantee of the great powers, and especially Russia, Austria, and Prussia. No sooner was the war renewed, than England made the most strenuous exertions to induce the Czar to accept the office of mediator between the contending powers in regard to this matter; and Napoleon could not refuse to accede to the proposal. After a long negotiation, however, it came to nothing. While Talleyrand was prodigal of protestations in regard to the sincere desire of the First Consul to submit to the decision of so magnanimous and just a potentate, he took care to make no concessions whatever calculated to restore the peace of Europe. The Russian monarch, by his rescript of 24th May 1803, insisted that, as a basis of the arrangement, the neutrality of the north of Germany and the Neapolitan territory should, in the event of war, be maintained inviolate, in terms of the secret articles of the treaty of 11th October 1801; but hardly was this basis laid down when Hanover was invaded by the army of Mortier, and Naples, as far as Tarentum, overrun by that of St-Cyr.<sup>1</sup>

May 24,  
1803.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
108, 111.  
Dum. x. 5  
and 6.

The consequence of this double breach of engagement eventually was the revival of the coalition. Russia and

France, indeed, easily came to an understanding on the subject of Switzerland—the Czar agreeing to leave the First Consul undisturbed in his usurpation over the Helvetic confederacy, provided he would not interfere with the Czar's own arrangements concerning the Ionian Isles; but, on other and more vital points, it was soon discovered that their pretensions were irreconcilable. Napoleon proposed that Malta should be garrisoned by Russian troops for as many years as should be deemed necessary; Lampedosa be ceded to Britain; Switzerland and Holland evacuated by the French troops; and the acquisitions of France in Italy recognised by England. The British government, on the other hand, offered to submit all their differences with France to the decision of Alexander, and insisted that the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Germany should be a part of the arrangement; but to this Napoleon positively refused to accede. This matter was soon warmly taken up by the Russian cabinet, especially after the occupation of Cuxhaven by the French troops, and the closing of the Elbe and the Weser against British vessels—measures utterly subversive of the neutrality of Germany, and in which the Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law of Alexander, whose territories were next threatened by Gallic invasion, was in an especial manner interested. The continued occupation of Tarentum by the French troops also irritated the Russian cabinet, as well as the failure to provide an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for his continental dominions, as stipulated in former treaties; and to such a height did the mutual exasperation arrive, that, before the end of 1803, M. Markoff, the Russian ambassador, was received with so much indignity in a public audience by the First Consul, that he was recalled, and M. d'Oubril, the chargé-d'affaires, alone left at the French capital.<sup>1</sup>

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1804.

36.

Which leads  
to the recall  
of the Rus-  
sian amb-  
sador from  
Paris.June 18,  
1803.<sup>g</sup>  
205, 225.  
Dum. 2

Prussia at first warmly seconded Russia in its remonstrances against the occupation of the north of Germany, and especially the levying of heavy requisitions on Ham-

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XXXVII.

1804.

37.

Napoleon  
gains over  
Prussia by  
hinting at  
its getting  
Hanover.

July 30,  
1803.

Nov. 1803.

burg and the Elector of Hesse-Cassel by the French troops. But Napoleon threw out a lure to the cabinet of Berlin, which speedily caused its efforts in that direction to slacken. He directed his diplomatic agents at that capital to drop hints, that possibly the electorate of Hanover might, in the event of Prussia withdrawing her opposition to France, be incorporated with her monarchy; and though the Prussian ministers did not venture to close at once with so scandalous an aggression, yet, actuated partly by the desire of securing so glittering a prize, partly by a wish to be freed from the disagreeable vicinity of the French soldiers, they proposed to Napoleon that his troops should evacuate Hanover, which should be occupied till a general peace by those of the Prussian monarchy. Napoleon declined to accede to such an arrangement, but offered, on condition of an alliance, offensive and defensive, being entered into with France, to cede in perpetuity Hanover to that power. Prussia had the virtue or the prudence to resist this insidious offer, and reverted to the proposal that the French troops should retire from the north of Germany, and the First Consul should respect the neutrality of the empire. It was suggested that, in consideration of this, Prussia should engage that, during the continuance of the war, France should neither be attacked by Germany, nor *across* Germany. This proposition, however, by no means suited the great designs which Napoleon had already formed of forcing all the neutral powers into a general confederacy against England; and, in consequence, the negotiation fell to the ground, leaving only the Prussian cabinet, unhappily for itself, a secret desire for the possession of the Hanoverian states, which long prevented them from joining in the general league against French usurpation.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
230, 333.

\* The working of this feeling may be discerned in the secret instructions sent to the Marquis Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, on 17th December 1803. He was directed, if possible, to conclude a convention, containing a secret article, in these terms:—"Without entering into any formal stipulation as to the fate of the electorate of Hanover, which the events of the

Matters were in this state when the arrest and execution of the Duc d'Enghien, to be immediately noticed, excited a unanimous feeling of horror through Europe, and universally overwhelmed the French partisans by the indignation which it aroused in every virtuous mind. The impulse given by this deed, not less impolitic than criminal, to the fermenting elements of a coalition against France, was immense. The court of St Petersburg went into deep mourning on the occasion, and sent orders to all its diplomatic ministers at foreign courts to do the same: that of Stockholm followed the example; and M. d'Oubril, on the part of the Russian Emperor, presented an energetic remonstrance on the occasion, both to the diet at Ratisbon and to the cabinet of the Tuileries. This produced a vigorous reply from the First Consul, written in his usual powerful manner, but with so little circumspection, that it was evidently calculated to widen instead of closing the breach already existing between the two powers. "The complaint of Russia on this matter," said he, "leads one to ask whether, when England meditated the assassination of Paul, and it was known that the proposed assassins were within a league of the frontier, the Russian government could have had any hesitation in seizing them? A war, conducive, as any struggle between France and Russia ever must be, to no other interests but those of England, will never be voluntarily undertaken by the First Consul; but, commence it who will, he would prefer it to a state of things inconsistent in the slightest degree with the equality subsisting between the great powers. He claims no superiority over them, but he will submit to no degradation. He interferes with none of the measures of the Russian cabinet, and he

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38.

Immense  
sensations  
excited  
the execu-  
tion of the  
Duc d'Eng-  
hien. March  
21.

maritime war and the negotiations for a general peace will determine, the First Consul, considering that the geographical position of Prussia renders these arrangements of more importance to her than to any other power, engages to keep chiefly in view the interest of his Prussian Majesty in all the discussions which the destination of that country may give rise to." Napoleon, however, declined to accede to any such half-measures."—See BIGNON, iii. 232, 233.

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<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1804, 644. Bign. iii. 439, 441.

39.  
The French government attempts a set-off, by falsifying Mr Drake's

at Stuttgart.

March 24, and April 11, 1804.

requires a corresponding forbearance on their part." Similar explosions took place between the diplomatic agents of the two powers at the diet of Ratisbon; and, resolved to have the lead in provoking a rupture, if it should arise, Napoleon sent instructions to his ambassador, General Hédouville, to quit St Petersburg in forty-eight hours, and leave only a chargé-d'affaires there. "Know," said he, "as your final instructions, that the First Consul has no desire for war; but he fears no human being."<sup>1</sup>

As a sort of counterpoise to the powerful feeling excited against them by the tragic fate of the Duc d'Enghien, the French government, shortly after that catastrophe, published, by means of Regnier, the head of the police, the particulars of some steps taken towards effecting a counter-revolution in France, in which Mr Drake, the accredited envoy of the British government at the court of Bavaria, and Mr Spencer Smith, the charge-d'affaires at the electoral court of Wirtemberg, were the chief agents. They made a very great handle of this transaction, and endeavoured, by a forced and unnatural construction of the expressions employed by these gentlemen, in their instructions to the leaders of the malcontent party in France, to make it appear that their object was not merely a counter-revolution, but the assassination of the First Consul. A simple quotation, however, of the expressions used, as given in their own report, is sufficient to demonstrate that this was not the case, and that nothing was aimed at but the subversion of the existing government; a project in which it was never supposed diplomatic characters were forbidden to engage towards powers in hostility with their country, and in which almost all the ambassadors of France, throughout the revolutionary war, were actively engaged.\* It clearly

\* Mr Drake's instructions to his agents are thus given in the official report by the French police:—"Art. 2. The principal object in view being the overthrow of the present government, one of the chief means of accomplishing this is by obtaining knowledge of the plans of the enemy. For this purpose it is of the utmost consequence to begin by establishing a correspondence with the dif-

appeared, however, that, though well qualified to meet the French forces in the field, England was no match for their police agents in a transaction of this description; for the publication of Regnier revealed the mortifying fact, that the whole correspondence both of Drake and Spencer Smith had been regularly transmitted, as fast as it took place, to the police of Paris; and that their principal correspondent in that city, M. Mehu de la Touche, was himself an agent of the police, employed to tempt the British envoys into this perilous enterprise.<sup>1</sup> But that neither the British government, nor their diplomatic agents, ever entertained any projects of assassination against the First Consul, or any other means of annoyance but those of open hostility, is admitted by the person who had the best opportunity of information on this subject—the private secretary of Napoleon himself;\* and it is difficult to see how the First Consul could object to diplomatic characters in other countries engaging in attempts to overturn revolu-

<sup>1</sup> Report by  
Regnier,  
April 14,  
1804. *State*  
*Pap*  
625. *Ann*  
*Reg.* 180

ferent bureaus for obtaining information as to the plans going forward, both for the exterior and the interior. 7. To gain over those employed in the powder-mills, so as to be able to blow them up as occasion may require. 8. It is necessary to gain over a certain number of printers and engravers who may be relied on, to print and execute everything that the confederacy may stand in need of. 9. It is much to be wished that a perfect knowledge be gained of the situation of the different parties in France, and particularly at Paris. 13. It is well understood, that every means must be taken to disorganise the armies both in and out of the Republic." The report adds, that in his intercepted correspondence, Mr Drake says, "If you see any means of extricating any of Georges' associates, do not fail to make use of them;" and again, "I earnestly request you to print and distribute a short address to the army. The main object is to gain partisans among the militia; for I am thoroughly persuaded that it is through *the army alone* that we can reasonably hope to gain the object so much desired." In a subsequent report, mention is made of a project for getting possession of the fortresses of Huningen and Strassburg; but nowhere is there the slightest allusion to the commission of assassination, or any illegal or disgraceful acts.—See *Report* by REGNIER, 24th March and 11th April 1804; *State Papers, Ann. Reg.* 1804, 620, 625.

\* "I can affirm," says Bourrienne, "with perfect confidence, that the British government have constantly rejected with indignation, not indeed the projects submitted to them for overturning the consular or imperial government, but all designs of assassination or personal violence against the First Consul and the Emperor. Positive proof of this will be found in the subsequent



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<sup>1</sup> Hard. Me-  
moirs, v.  
272.

40.  
Opinions of  
the diplo-  
matic body  
at Paris on  
the subject.

tionary governments in hostility with their own; when his own brother Joseph, during his embassy at Rome, was, with his knowledge and authority, actively engaged in a conspiracy which overturned the Papal government in 1797; and the French ambassador at Venice, in 1796, took so active a part in the democratic conspiracy which led to the destruction, by his means, of that ancient republic.<sup>1\*</sup>

The publication of the details of this abortive attempt at a counter-revolution in France, which were officially communicated to the whole foreign ambassadors at Paris, led to answers from all the members of that body, which are curious, as evincing the different degrees of subjection in which the European potentates were then kept by the French ruler. The answer of the Russian ambassador was evasive, amounting to nothing but a declaration in favour of the rights of nations; that of the Austrian was equally ambiguous; but those of Prussia and all the lesser powers were more or less an echo of the sentiments of the French government on the occasion, and clearly

part of these memoirs."—BOURRIENNE, v. 12. Again, the same author adds, "All the correspondence, which scandalised every honest man, on this subject, was the work of the perfidious suggestions of the secret agents of police, of whom Mehu de la Touche was the chief, who acted in the perilous but lucrative line of double espionage. I can affirm as a positive fact, that during the six years that I spent at Hamburg, I was in a situation to *know everything*; and I can with confidence affirm, that neither in my public character nor private relations have I ever discovered the smallest evidence to warrant the assertion that the English government was ever engaged in any plots of a dishonourable character."—BOUR. vi. 207.

\* "Should the Pope die," wrote Napoleon to his brother Joseph, when ambassador at Rome in 1797, "you must exert yourself to the utmost to prevent another being appointed, and to *bring about a revolution*."—*Confidential despatch of NAPOLEON to JOSEPH*, dated Passeriano, 29th September 1797 "What you have to do," said Talleyrand, in his confidential despatch of 10th October following, "is to take care that the *reign of the Pope shall cease*: and to encourage the disposition of the people for liberty, you must proclaim at Rome a representative government, and deliver Europe from the Papal supremacy; taking care, at the same time, to secure for us Ancona, with a suitable extent of maritime territory."—See HARDENBERG's *Memoirs*, v. 186, 192. These were the instructions of Napoleon and the French government to an ambassador at the court of a friendly power, for the purpose of revolutionising that very power; whereas the acts complained of on the part of the English diplomatic agents were all directed against France, with which their sovereign was in a state of declared hostility.

indicated the paramount ascendancy exercised over their minds by the ruler of its military force. Lord Hawkesbury, as the official organ of the British government, also published a manifesto on the subject, which was followed by an answer from Talleyrand on the part of the French cabinet; but the interest of these manifestoes was soon lost in the whirl of more important events, arising out of the ceaseless advance of French ambition.<sup>1\*</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> State Papers, 630, 638. Ann. Reg. 1804.

This attempt on the part of the French government to turn aside a portion of the odium which attached to them throughout Europe, in consequence of the violation of the territory of Baden and murder of the Duc d'Enghien, was attended with very little success. The Russian cabinet, now fully awakened to a sense of the imminent danger arising from the evident resolution of the First Consul to extend his power over the whole Continent, and feeling the personal slights put upon the Emperor Alexander in the correspondence of Napoleon, were resolute in demanding satisfaction; and on the 21st July a most important

41.  
Warlike note presented by d'Oubril on the part of Russia to Napoleon. July 21.

\* Lord Hawkesbury observed, in the British note:—"That his Majesty's government should disregard the feelings of such of the inhabitants of France as are justly discontented with the existing government of that country; that he should refuse to listen to their designs for delivering that country from the degrading yoke of bondage under which it groans, or to give them aid and assistance, so far as those designs are fair and justifiable—would be to refuse fulfilling those duties which every wise and just government owes to itself and to the world in general, under circumstances similar to the present. Belligerent powers have an acknowledged right to avail themselves of all discontents that may exist in countries with which they may be at war. The exercise of that right, even if in any degree doubtful, would be fully sanctioned in the present case, not only by the present state of the French nation, but by the conduct of the government of that country, which, since the commencement of the present war, has constantly kept up communications with the disaffected in the territories of his Majesty, and has assembled at the present moment on the coast of France, a corps of Irish rebels, destined to second them in their designs against that part of the United Kingdom. In the application of these principles, his Majesty has commanded me to declare, besides, that his government have never authorised a single act which could not stand the test of the strictest principles of justice, and of usages recognised and practised in all ages. If any minister, accredited at a foreign court, has kept up correspondence with persons resident in France, with a view to obtain information as to the designs of the French government, or for any other legitimate purpose, he has done nothing more than what ministers, under similar circumstances, have always been considered as having a right to do, and much less than the ministers and commercial

Note of Lord Hawkesbury on the subject. April 30.

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note was presented by M. d'Oubril, which at once announced the basis of a new coalition against France. In this able document it was stated, that no government could behold with indifference the dreadful blow given to the independence and security of nations by the recent arrest and execution of the Duc d'Enghien : that Russia, by the peace of Teschen, engaged to guarantee and act as mediator in the settlement of the German empire, and in that character was not only entitled, but bound to interfere in that matter : that, desirous to extinguish the flames of war, she had since proposed to act as mediator between France and England, but was not accepted : that since the renewal of the war the French government had evinced a determination to disregard all the rights of neutral powers, by marching its troops to the coasts of the Adriatic, and levying contributions on, and taking military possession of, the Hanse Towns, though these states had no connexion whatever with the depending contest : that Portugal and Spain had been compelled to purchase their neutrality by enormous pecuniary sacrifices : that Switzerland, Holland, and great part of Italy, were mere French provinces : that one part of the German empire was occupied by the French troops, and in another arrests were committed by French detachments, in open agents of France have done towards the disaffected in his Majesty's territories."

And answer  
of Talley-  
rand. Sept. 5.

To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand :—"In every country, and in every age, the ministry of diplomatic agents has been held in veneration among men; ministers of peace, organs of conciliation, their presence is an augury of wisdom, justice, and happiness. England, on the contrary, wishes that its diplomatic agents should be the promoters of plots, the agents of troubles, the correspondents of vile spies and profligate emissaries : it charges them to foment seditions, to provoke and reward assassination, and pretends to cover these infamous proceedings with the respect and inviolability that belongs to the ministers of kings and the pacificators of nations. 'Diplomatic agents,' says Lord Hawkesbury, 'are not permitted to conspire in the country where they reside, against the laws of that country, but they are subject to no such restriction in regard to the states for which they are not accredited.' Admirable restriction ! Europe will be covered with conspiracies, but the defenders of public right will have no cause of complaint : some distance will always intervene between the chief conspirator and his accomplices ; Lord Hawkesbury's ministers will pay the crimes which they instigate ; but they will have sufficient deference to appearances to avoid being at once their instigators and witnesses.

violation of the law of nations : that Russia had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France, but neither could she remain a passive spectator of the successive trampling under foot of all the weaker states of Europe by its armies ; nor could she overlook the insult offered to his Imperial Majesty in alluding to the death of his father, and advancing a totally groundless charge, in relation to that matter, against Great Britain, which France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it. The note concluded by declaring that M. d'Oubril had been ordered to state, that he could not prolong his stay in Paris unless the following points were adjusted :—" 1. That, conformably to the fourth and fifth articles of the secret convention of 11th October 1801, the French troops should be ordered to evacuate the kingdom of Naples ; and, having done so, its government should engage to respect the neutrality of that power during the remainder of the war. 2. That, in pursuance of the second article of the same treaty, the French government should agree in future to act in close concert with his Imperial Majesty for the settlement of the affairs of the Italian peninsula. 3. That he should engage, in conformity with the sixth article of the same convention, and of the promises so often repeated to Russia, to provide with-

Such maxims are the height of hypocrisy and audacity : never did government make so barefaced a sport of the opinion of cabinets and the conscience of nations. The Emperor is resolved to put a stop to proceedings so fatal to humanity ; and you are therefore invited to communicate to your government, that the French government will not recognise the English diplomacy in Europe, until the English cabinet shall cease to charge its ministers with war-like commissions, and restrain them to their proper functions." It is curious to recollect that this tirade, which proceeds entirely upon the false assumption that the British envoys were implicated in plots for assassination, emanated from Napoleon and Talleyrand, who directed Joseph Buonaparte, in 1797, to revolutionise Rome, the very state at which he was the ambassador of the French Republic.—See *State Papers, Ann. Reg.* 1804, 602 ; and DUMAS, x. 279-280. A similar attempt was made by the Prince of the Peace to charge Mr Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, with having let fall in conversation some expressions favourable to the assassination of Napoleon ; but this immediately drew forth a positive and indignant denial from that gentleman, and, from the degraded character of the Spanish favourite, obtained no credit in Europe.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 124-125.

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<sup>1</sup> State Pa-  
i, 648.

Reg.  
1804.

out delay an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for the losses he has sustained. 4. That, in virtue of the obligation implied in a common mediation and guarantee, the French government should engage to evacuate the north of Germany, and undertake to respect strictly in future the neutrality of the Germanic confederacy."<sup>1</sup>

42.  
Talleyrand's  
answer.

However just and conformable to the letter as well as the spirit of preceding treaties these demands may have been, it was hardly to be expected that the First Consul would accede to them, or permit France openly to recede before Russia; and it is therefore probable that, in making this demand in such peremptory terms, the Russian cabinet had it in view to establish a basis on which, at some future period, they might found the resumption of hostilities. M. Talleyrand answered the note on the 29th of the same month, and declared:—"Whenever the court of Russia shall fulfil the articles of its treaty with France, the latter will be ready to execute them with the same fidelity. If the cabinet of St Petersburg is of opinion that it has claims on that of Paris, in consequence of the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the secret convention of 1801, France also claims the execution of the third article of the same treaty, which provides that the two contracting parties shall not suffer their respective subjects to maintain any correspondence, direct or indirect, with the enemies of the two states—a wise provision, which has been totally neglected by the Imperial ambassador, M. Markoff, the true author of the disunion and coldness between the two powers, and who, during his residence at Paris, has even gone so far as to lend the asylum to which he was entitled to the hired agents of England. Was the mourning assumed by the Russian court for a man whom the French tribunals had condemned for having conspired against the safety of the First Consul, conformable to the letter or spirit of this article? The French government demands the execution of the ninth article of the secret convention, in which the two con-

tracting parties mutually guarantee the independence of the Republic of the Seven Isles, and that no foreign troops shall remain in it—a stipulation evidently violated by Russia, since she has continued to retain her troops there; reinforced them in an ostentatious manner; and changed the government of the country without any concert with France. Finally, France claims the execution of the eleventh article of the same treaty, which evidently requires that, instead of evincing a spirit so unduly partial to England, and rendering itself perhaps the first auxiliary of its ambition, Russia should unite with France to consolidate a general peace, and re-establish a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, to secure the liberty of the seas.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> State Papers, 649, 650. Ann. Reg. 1804.

The same views were more fully unfolded in a subsequent memorial presented by M. d'Oubril to the French cabinet on 28th August. The Russian minister there loudly complained that the King of Sardinia, stripped of all his continental dominions by the union of Piedmont to France, still remains without the indemnity so often promised by France; that the King of Sardinia and the north of Germany are still oppressed by the burdensome presence of the French troops; that the organisation of the whole of Italy has been changed by the innovations of the French government, without any concert with his Imperial Majesty; and replied to the charge of the cabinet of the Tuileries, with regard to the ninth article of the secret convention, “That if the Russian troops have a second time occupied the Ionian Islands, it is with the consent of the Ottoman Porte, at the request of the inhabitants, and in virtue of a previous concert with France. The Emperor only awaits the intelligence of his chargé-d'affaires' departure from Paris to give notice to the French mission to quit his capital. He beholds with regret the necessity under which he is laid of suspending his relations with a government which refuses to perform its engagements; but he will remain

43.  
Further memorial of  
Russia.

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in that suspensive position, which it lies on the French government to convert, if it pleases, into one of open hostility." This note remained without any answer; and on the day following, M. d'Oubril received his passports, with the intimation, however, that it was expected he would not cross the frontier till he received intelligence that the French chargé-d'affaires had left the Russian territories, and he remained accordingly at Mayence. War was not yet openly proclaimed between the two empires, but it could hardly be said that peace existed; and its open declaration was evidently postponed only for a convenient opportunity. And when the accession of Napoleon to the imperial throne was notified to the court of St Petersburg, the Emperor refused to recognise his new title, even after it had been acceded to by the sovereign whose dignity it appeared more immediately to affect—the Emperor of Austria. The warlike intentions of Russia during this year were not confined to diplomatic manifestoes. Independent of several lesser squadrons which were cruising in the Baltic, a fleet of nine ships of the line and several frigates passed the Sound, and sailed round by the straits of Gibraltar towards the Adriatic sea; while several expeditions from Sebastopol proceeded through the Dardanelles in the same direction, and disembarked seven thousand men in the Ionian Islands. The army was everywhere put on the most efficient footing; vacancies were filled up, new levies ordered, and everything done which could enable Russia to interpose with a weight proportioned to its strength in the great conflict which was approaching in Western Europe.<sup>1</sup> √

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1804, 951, 953. Bign. iii. 452, 454. Dum. xi. 53, 55.

44.  
Pacific system of Austria.

While the political horizon was thus overshadowed by clouds in the northern hemisphere, Austria continued faithful to her system of maintaining a strict neutrality, and repairing in silence the breaches in her army and finances which had been produced by the disasters of preceding years. An event occurred, however, in the

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course of the year, which proved that the spirit of the Imperial cabinet was far from being extinguished, and that Austria might still be calculated upon to bear a prominent part in any coalition which might be formed for the maintenance of the independence of Europe. The Elector of Bavaria had become entangled in some very unpleasant disputes with the nobles of the equestrian order, as they were called; (that is, the nobles who held directly of the empire, and were subject to no other jurisdiction, wherever their territories might be locally situated, who had fallen under his dominion on the partition of the indemnities.) The Elector, considering them as to all intents and purposes his subjects, had summoned them to meet him at Bamberg, to settle the point in dispute between them; but they had refused, and applied to the Emperor, who supported their pretensions to independence of the Elector's government. Upon this the Elector appealed to the First Consul; but, however well inclined he might have been, in general, to support any sovereign who resisted the jurisdiction and weakened the authority of the Emperor, he had no desire to see Austria added to the number of his enemies in the present threatening aspect of affairs in the north of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 190.  
Bign. iv.  
1, 9.

The Elector, therefore, received, to his no small astonishment, a notification that he must not oppose the rights of the Emperor in this particular, and also give satisfaction to Austria for the seizure of the Oberhausen, a district situated on the frontiers, near the Inn, the year before, and long the subject of contention between the two powers. By a solemn decree of the Aulic Council, the nobles of the equestrian order throughout the empire were confirmed in all the privileges which belonged to them before the division of the indemnities; and the execution of this decree by force of arms was committed to the Archduke of Austria, and the Electors of Saxony and Baden; a result which contributed in no small

45.  
Its conduct  
on the death  
of the Duc  
d'Enghien,  
and the af-  
fair of D  
and Spen  
Smith.  
Jan. 24.  
Jan. 28.



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degree to restore the influence of the Emperor throughout Germany, and to revive the ancient respect for the majesty of his undefined authority which preceding events had so much impaired. Careful, however, not to hazard the advantage thus gained by any premature or unsupported measure of hostility towards France, the cabinet of Vienna abstained from expressing any open indignation at the violation of the territory of the empire at Ettenheim, and gave an answer rather favourable than otherwise to the circular transmitted to the diplomatic body at Paris, relative to the affair of Drake and Spencer Smith. Nay, they at once ordered the French emigrants to quit their territories, when the First Consul represented that their residence there gave umbrage to the government of France. Notwithstanding these pacific steps, however, the armaments in the interior went on without intermission. Magazines were formed in Styria, Carinthia, at Venice, and in the Tyrol; the army was gradually increasing in strength, and reviving in spirit; and an attentive observer could discern, amidst a constant interchange of pacific assurances, appearances not a little indicative of an approaching rupture.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
12, 13, 19.  
Ann. Reg.  
1804, 180,  
194.

46.  
Recognises  
Napoleon's  
imperial  
title.

Matters were in this state between the cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries, when the elevation of Napoleon to the imperial dignity opened up, apparently, a fresh subject of discord between the two powers. But, instead of testifying any repugnance at this step, the Austrian cabinet had the address to make it a ground for adopting a measure which had been long in their contemplation, but for which a favourable opportunity had not yet arrived; viz. the assumption of the title of Emperor of Austria by the House of Lorraine, and rendering it hereditary in their family. After a long correspondence between the two cabinets, this matter was adjusted to their mutual satisfaction, and on the 11th August, immediately after Francis, in a full council, had recognised the title of Emperor Napoleon, he assumed for

himself and his successors in the Austrian dominions that of "Emperor of Austria." The motive for this step was declared to be "the preservation of that degree of equality which should subsist between the great powers and the just rank of the House and State of Austria among the nations of Europe." The step was justified on "the precedent formerly afforded by the assumption of the Imperial crown by the Czars of Russia, and more recently by the ruling sovereign of France;" and though it at first excited considerable jealousy among the lesser princes of Germany, yet they soon all recognised the new and hereditary title of the Emperor; and it was ere long acquiesced in by all the potentates of Europe, those under the influence of Napoleon, not less than those who were opposed to him—by the first, because it afforded some countenance to the recent assumption of the imperial dignity by the French ruler; by the latter, because it promised to consolidate in the Austrian dominions some counterpoise to his power.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> State Papers, 695, Ann. Reg. 1804, Bign. iv. 22, 29.

Aware that the cabinet of Vienna would endeavour, on the first favourable opportunity, to regain some of its lost possessions, and that its friendly dispositions could not with certainty be calculated upon for any length of time, Napoleon was urgent in his endeavours, during the whole of this year, to draw closer the cords which united France to Prussia. The murder of the Duc d'Enghien had awakened at Berlin, as elsewhere, the most profound feelings of indignation; and in the consternation with which it overwhelmed the friends of France, might be seen, says the panegyrist of Napoleon, the clearest evidence that, "more than even a crime, that act was a fault."<sup>2</sup> But though the anti-Gallican party was greatly strengthened, it was not placed in possession of power by that event. The policy of the cabinet still continued to be guided by French influence; and accordingly the King of Prussia was among the first of the greater powers which formally recognised the title of the French

47.  
Temporising  
policy of  
Prussia.

<sup>2</sup> Bign. iv. 32.

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1804.

Emperor. When the menaces of Russia gave reason to apprehend an immediate rupture in the north, it became of the utmost moment for Napoleon to secure, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of Prussia, in order that a barrier might be opposed to the march of the Muscovite troops across the north of Germany; and, on condition that the French troops in the electorate of Hanover should not be augmented, and that the burden of the war should not be laid upon the neutral states of that part of the empire, Prussia agreed to maintain a strict neutrality, and not to permit the march of Russian or any other foreign troops across her territories. In return for these concessions, which, though not so extensive as he desired, were yet of great moment to the French Emperor, Napoleon openly proclaimed, both in his diplomatic relations, and in the official columns of the *Moniteur*, his inclination to augment the strength of Prussia, and his intention not to let any pretensions of France upon Hanover stand in the way of the territorial aggrandisement of that power.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
30, 41. Ann.  
Reg. 1804,  
194, 195.  
*Moniteur*,  
28th July.

48.

The accession of Hardenberg to power produces no external change.

A change which occurred at this period in the Prussian ministry, was looked to by the diplomatists of Europe as likely to lead to a material alteration in its foreign policy; but it was not attended at first with the effects which were anticipated. Count Haugwitz, who for ten years had been the chief director of its diplomatic relations, and whose leaning towards the French alliance had been conspicuous throughout the whole of his administration, retired to his estates in Silesia: and the chief direction of affairs fell upon BARON HARDENBERG,\* a

\* Charles Auguste, Prince of Hardenberg, was born at Hanover on the 31st May 1750, of the eldest branch of a very old family which boasted its descent from the days of Henry the Fowler and Otho the Great. He received the rudiments of his education in his paternal home, and concluded it at the universities of Gottingen and Leipsic. Destined from early youth to the diplomatic line, he entered on his initiation into it in the administration of the electorate of Hanover, in which he received a subordinate situation; but, desirous of extending his information, he subsequently travelled through England, France, and Holland, terminating with Weimar, where he formed an intimacy, which continued for life, with the celebrated Goethe, who early appreciated his great

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statesman of great ability, who was known to be decidedly hostile to the revolutionary principle, the devastating effects of which he had had ample opportunities of appreciating in the course of his diplomatic career, and whose inclination towards the English and Russian alliance, already warmly espoused by the Queen, was expected to produce important effects on the fate of northern Europe. The new minister, however, proceeded at first in the footsteps of his predecessor; the negotiation for the occupation of Hanover, if not by Prussian, at least by Saxon or Hessian troops, instead of French, was resumed, though without success, as Napoleon showed an invincible repugnance to quitting his hold of that important part of the German territory; but the jealousy of Prussia was allayed by a renewed promise, that the French troops in that electorate should not exceed thirty thousand men; on condition of which the King engaged that France should not be disquieted from the side of his dominions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i  
41, 43.

An event, however, soon occurred, which put the subservience of Prussia to the test, and afforded the measure of the extent to which its cabinet was disposed to sacrifice its pretensions to the rank of an independent power to the ascendancy of the French alliance. Sir George Rumboldt, the English minister at Hamburg, was seized at his country villa within the territory of that free city, on the night of the 25th October, in virtue of an order for arrest signed by the French minister of police at Paris, and forwarded without delay to that capital, where he was lodged in the Temple, and all his papers

49.  
They remonstrate against the seizure of Sir George Rumboldt. Oct. 25.

abilities. As his talents soon became known, he was intrusted shortly after with several diplomatic missions to Great Britain, in the course of which, the clearness of his understanding and elegance of his manners were so conspicuous, that he soon acquired a distinguished place in the highest society of London. But this led to a great and unlooked-for misfortune, which led to his quitting the Hanoverian and entering the Prussian service. The Prince of Wales, then in the bloom of youth and fashion, distinguished Baroness Hardenberg, who was of the noble Danish house of Reventlow, and one of the most beautiful women of the age, by his particular notice; and the result was her separation from her husband, who, chagrined by this lamentable occurrence, abandoned for ever

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submitted to the inspection of the French government. This violent proceeding was not only a flagrant violation of the law of nations, in the person of the accredited minister of England in the circle of Lower Saxony, but a grave fault of policy, as it directly brought the Emperor of France into collision with the King of Prussia, the protector of that circle of the empire, and endangered all the amicable relations which with so much care had been nursed up for ten years between the two powers. It produced a very great sensation at Berlin. The party hostile to the French alliance represented it as a grievous slight upon the honour of Prussia, and such as, if unredressed, would for ever blast its influence in the north of Germany. Soon the opinion became universal, that the ambition of Napoleon knew no bounds, and that he was resolved to treat the independent states of Europe in the same manner as the provinces of his own empire. The conduct both of the King and the cabinet at this crisis, was worthy of the successors of the Great Frederick. The Prussian ambassador at Paris received instructions to make the most energetic remonstrances on the subject to the cabinet of

England and Hanover, and betook himself to the court of Brunswick, where he was received with open arms by the reigning duke, a soldier of the Great Frederick, who afterwards acquired such a deplorable celebrity in the campaign of 1792. He was immediately appointed privy councillor, and soon acquired a large share of the duke's confidence. Frederick the Great having died in 1786, he was sent by the Duke of Brunswick with the will which that monarch had deposited in his hands. It may be conceived how favourable was the reception which such a man, coming on such an errand, received at the court of Berlin. He was immediately offered a place in the Prussian civil service, which he accepted, and from that period his fortunes were indissolubly connected with those of that monarchy.

His first mission was to direct the administration of the provinces of Anspach and Baireuth, which it was in contemplation at that time to cede to Prussia; and he did this till the cession took place in 1791 with such probity and success, that his name is revered by the inhabitants, and the fame of his administration gained him a distinguished place in the estimation of the Prussian cabinet. He was in consequence transferred to the diplomatic line; was engaged in the secret negotiation of Pillnitz in 1791; and accompanied the King of Prussia in the famous invasion of France in 1792; a circumstance which gives peculiar value to his revelations of the political arrangements which rendered abortive all the efforts of the Allies in that campaign. In 1794 he was intrusted with a

the Tuileries, and the King wrote in person a confidential letter to the Emperor, expressing how deeply he had been hurt by the event. These representations had the desired effect: nothing was discovered in Sir George's papers tending to implicate either him or the British government in anything which could answer the purposes of Napoleon, and after a few days' confinement he was sent to Cherbourg, and delivered over with a flag of truce to the English cruisers, leaving to France only the disgrace of having violated the law of nations, and the independence of Germany, without any object, and having receded before the remonstrances of a comparatively inferior power.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 183,  
184. Bign.  
iv. 43, 46.

The first decided symptom of hostility towards France came from Sweden, a country removed by its situation from the immediate dangers of French invasion, and under the government of a prince of an ardent and chivalrous character, whose animosity to the revolutionary system had been long and powerfully marked. As Duke of Pomerania, that sovereign had a voice in the diet of the empire at Ratisbon; and his notes presented to that assembly on the subject of the Duc d'Enghien, had breathed an uncommon degree of spirit and indepen-

50,  
Hostile dis-  
positions of  
Sweden.

secret mission to the German provinces near the Rhine; the object of which was to procure from them an agreement to provide for the support of the Prussian armies, at the very time when that power was obtaining large subsidies from England for that purpose. The bad faith of the cabinet of Berlin was now quite apparent. Accordingly he received a very ungracious reception from the princes of the empire. The Count de Goltz, chief of the Prussian diplomacy, having died on the 6th February 1795, Hardenberg was appointed to succeed him, and, as his successor, he signed the treaty of Bale with France on the 15th May 1795. He was received in the most flattering manner at Berlin, on his return; and the extreme polish of his manners procured for him equal respect from the rude Republicans, who at that period directed the affairs of France. He was too clear-sighted, however, not to see the ruinous consequences to Prussia which would ensue from her submission to France and withdrawal from the European alliance; and accordingly, in the end of 1795, he retired from diplomatic affairs, and resumed his administrative duties at Anspach, where he remained strenuously exerting himself in promoting the happiness of the inhabitants till the end of 1804, when he was called to the direction of foreign affairs. Thenceforward his history is united with that of European diplomacy.—See *Biographie Universelle, Supplément*, lxi. 405, 411. (HARDENBERG.)

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<sup>1</sup> State Pa-  
pers, Ann.  
Reg. 1804,  
697.

<sup>2</sup> *Moniteur*,  
Aug. 14.

Sept. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Bign. iv.  
57. Ann.  
1804,  
195.

51.  
Which is  
taken ad-  
vantage of  
by Great  
Britain.  
Dec. 3.

dence.<sup>1</sup> This conduct, which was not more than might been expected from an intrepid sovereign who was married to a princess of the house of Baden, the potentate immediately insulted on that occasion, drew forth the pointed animadversions of the French Emperor; and in a series of articles inserted in the official part of the *Moniteur*, the King of Sweden was assailed in a manner which could hardly be tolerated by any independent power.<sup>2</sup> In one, in particular, a distinction was drawn between the Swedish nation, with whom the writer professed a desire to remain on a friendly footing, and its sovereign, a rash and headstrong young man misled by extravagant ideas. "Your merchant vessels," it added, "shall ever be well received in the ports of France; your squadrons, whenever they stand in need of them, shall be victualled in her harbours. She will see on their mast-heads only the colours of the Gustavuses who have reigned before you." When language such as this prevails between sovereigns, the transition is easy to a state of actual hostility. On the 7th September, a note presented by the Swedish ambassador, addressed *Monsieur* Napoleon Buonaparte, announced the termination of all confidential communication between the two governments, and at the same time the importation of French journals and pamphlets into Sweden was prohibited.<sup>3</sup>

Mr Pitt was too vigilant an observer not to perceive in this state of mutual irritation the means of establishing a convention favourable to the interests of Great Britain, and on the 3d December a treaty was concluded at London, between England and Sweden, by which it was stipulated that a depot should be established at Stralsund in Pomerania, or in the adjoining island of Rugen, for the formation of a legion which it was intended to form of Hanoverian troops, in the pay of Great Britain; and that an entrepot should be permitted in that town for the disposal of British colonial produce and manufactures. In return for these concessions, and

in order to enable the Swedish government to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence, a subsidy of eighty thousand pounds was promised by England. If these provisions did not amount to any act of open hostility against France, they at least demonstrated that Sweden was not disposed to enter into the projects of the Emperor Napoleon for the exclusion of British commerce from the continent of Europe; a disposition which amounted in his estimation to a declaration of war against the French empire.<sup>1</sup> At the time that Sweden was thus giving the first example of a decided resistance to France, the Ottoman empire also adopted a peremptory tone on the same subject. Retaining still a lively recollection of the evils they had sustained in consequence of the unprovoked attack of Napoleon on Egypt, they refused to recognise him as Emperor; and Marshal Brune, the French ambassador at Constantinople, after six months of vain attempts at negotiation, was compelled to quit that capital, which fell entirely into the views of the Russian party.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
57, 59. Ann.  
Reg. 1804,  
195. Mar-  
tens, viii.  
323.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. xi.  
56, 57.

While the northern and eastern powers were thus giving signs of approaching hostility to France, Napoleon was unceasingly extending his grasp over the Italian peninsula. By a treaty with the Ligurian republic, of October 20, the whole resources of Genoa were placed at the disposal of France, and that magnificent harbour became a great French naval station in the Mediterranean. The Emperor engaged to procure admission on favourable terms for the Ligurian manufactures into the states of Piedmont and Parma, and to cause its flag to be respected by the Barbary powers; in return for which he obtained six thousand sailors, and the free use of the arsenals, fleets, and harbours of the republic. Napoleon immediately took measures for the construction of ten ships of the line at Genoa.<sup>3</sup> "This," says the French historian, "was in effect an appropriation of Genoa to France: the Act of Incorporation of this republic with

52.  
Extension  
of French  
power in  
Italy.  
Oct. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Bign. iv.  
117, 119.



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53.  
Internal  
measures of  
Napoleon.

July 14.

the French empire, which soon after followed, was but a public proclamation of what then took place."

While negotiations of such moment were being conducted by the diplomatic body throughout Europe, and everything conspired to indicate an approaching rupture of the most terrible kind, Napoleon was actively engaged in measures calculated to rouse the spirit and heighten the enthusiasm of his own subjects. On the 14th July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, the inauguration of the Legion of Honour took place with all imaginable pomp in the splendid church of the Invalides at Paris, built by Louis XIV.; and on the same day the crosses of honour of that body were distributed by the generals in all the camps and garrisons of the empire. The profound policy of Napoleon was here singularly conspicuous, in selecting the anniversary of the first victory of the Revolution for the establishment of an institution calculated to revive the distinctions which it was its chief object to abolish, and blending in the public mind the recollection of republican triumph with the edifice and the associations which were most likely to recall the splendour of the monarchy. At the same time that this apparent homage to republican principles was paid at Paris, a measure of all others the most destructive to real freedom was carried into effect in the restoration of the ministry of police, with the crafty Fouché again at its head.<sup>1</sup>

July 15.  
<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
40, 41. Norv.  
ii. 336.

54.  
Splendid  
fête at Bou-  
logne.  
Aug. 16.

Shortly after the conclusion of this important ceremony in the capital, the Emperor repaired to the headquarters of the grand army at Boulogne; and there, on the 16th August, the anniversary of the fête of his tutelar saint, a spectacle of the grandest and most imposing kind took place. Marshal Soult received orders to assemble the whole troops in the camps at Boulogne and Montreuil, nearly eighty thousand strong, on the slopes of a vast natural amphitheatre, situated on the western face of the

diately to the eastward of the harbour of the former of these towns. In the centre of this amphitheatre a throne was placed, elevated on a platform of turf, at the summit of a flight of steps. The immense masses of soldiers were arranged in the form of the rays of a circle, emanating from the throne; the cavalry and artillery, stationed on the outer extremity, formed the exterior band of that magnificent array; beyond them, a vast multitude of spectators covered the slope to the very summit of the hill. The bands of all the regiments of the army, placed on the right and left of the throne, were ready to rend the air with the sounds of military music. At noon precisely, the Emperor ascended the throne amidst a general salute from all the batteries, and a flourish of trumpets unheard since the days of the Romans: immediately before him was the buckler of Francis I., while the crosses and ribands which were to be distributed were contained in the helmet of the Chevalier Bayard. His brothers, ministers, and chief functionaries, the marshals of the empire, the counsellors of state and senators, the staff of the army, its whole generals and field-officers, composed the splendid suite by which he was surrounded. Amidst their dazzling uniforms the standards of the regiments were to be seen: some new and waving with yet unsullied colours in the sun; many more torn by shot, stained with blood, and black with smoke—the objects of almost superstitious reverence to the warlike multitude by which they were surrounded. The Emperor took the oath first himself, and no sooner had the members of the Legion of Honour rejoined “We swear it,” than, raising his voice aloud, he said, “And you, soldiers! swear to defend, at the hazard of your life, the honour of the French name, your country, and your Emperor.” Innumerable voices responded to the appeal, and immediately the distribution of the decorations commenced, and the ceremony was concluded by a general review of the vast army,<sup>1</sup> who all defiled in the finest order before

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
40, 42.  
D'Abr. v.  
176, 178.  
Norv. ii.  
336, 338.

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55.  
His vexa-  
tion at the  
sion  
of his flotilla  
in the midst  
of it.

the throne where they had just witnessed so imposing a spectacle.

The chief of such a host might be excused for deeming himself the sovereign of the earth; but an event was approaching, destined to teach the French Emperor, like Canute the Dane, that there were bounds to his power, and that his might was limited to the element on which his army stood. It was part of the pageant, that a naval display should take place at the same time, and the eyes of Napoleon and his minister of marine, M. Decrès, were anxiously turned, towards the close of the ceremony, to the headlands round which it was expected the vanguard of the flotilla would appear. In effect, it did make its appearance at four o'clock; but at the same moment a violent tempest arose, the wind blew with terrific force, and several of the vessels, in the hands of their inexperienced mariners, were stranded on the beach. This untoward accident, though, practically speaking, of little importance, was yet in the highest degree mortifying to Napoleon, arriving as it did on such an occasion, in presence not only of his own troops, but of the English cruisers, and characteristic as it was of the impassable limits which the laws of nature had placed to his power. He retired chagrined and out of humour for the rest of the day; all the magnificence of his military display could not console him for the rude manner in which he had been reminded, at the highest point of its splendour, of his weakness on the other element, which required to be subdued before his dreams of universal dominion could be realised.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> D'Abr. vii.  
185, 187.  
Nov. ii.  
338.

56.  
General re-  
joicings over

This fête was celebrated in the other harbours of France by the completion of works of more durable utility, but everywhere with the same enthusiastic feeling. At Cherbourg it was signalised by discharges of artillery from the battery placed on the great sea-dike intended to break the fury of the waves which roll into

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XVI. and now completed by his illustrious successor. At Antwerp the rejoicings were equally sincere : several smaller vessels were launched on the occasion ; and already, its basins in a great state of forwardness, three ships of the line and a frigate almost completed, and immense preparations in the arsenals and dockyards, attested the impulse which the genius of the Emperor, in a single year, had given to the naval resources of France. Two days after the fête, the English cruisers stood into the harbour of Boulogne, and a heavy cannonade took place between them and the front line of the French flotilla. Napoleon, on board a gunboat with Admiral Bruix, was a spectator of the combat ; and after an exchange of long shots for two hours, the English ships stood off, not having succeeded in inflicting any serious damage on the enemy—a circumstance which afforded the French, little accustomed even to indecisive combats at sea, an opportunity for boundless exultation, and the happiest augury of success in the great maritime contest which was approaching. Napoleon was indefatigable in his endeavours to render Boulogne impregnable on the sea side. Before long he had five hundred pieces of cannon mounted on the batteries and towers commanding the entrance of the harbour. He directed the gunners to fire at the vessels, whether point blank or in a parabola, with bombs calculated to burst on board. “It is with projectiles which burst,” said he, “that you must attack wood.” Another proof among the many which history affords, that his penetrating genius had anticipated some of the most important changes which subsequent times were to bring forth in the warlike, as well as the civil, relations of men.<sup>1</sup>

Aug. 18.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vi.  
44, 47. Bign.  
iv. 124, 125.  
Thiers, iv.  
473.

No man knew better than Napoleon how to win the affections and excite the gratitude of his soldiers ; and it was to his wonderful powers in this respect, almost as much as to his political and military capacity, that his long-continued success was owing. To increase this effect,

57.  
Anecdotes  
of Napoleon  
at this  
period.

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and add to the naturally retentive powers of his memory, he inquired privately from the officers who were the veterans of Egypt or Italy in their regiments; and when he passed them in review, stopped the men who had been previously designated to him, and said,—“ Ah! you are a veteran. How is your old father? I have seen you at Aboukir or the Pyramids. You have not a cross; here is one for you!” and threw the cordon round the astonished soldier’s neck. It may easily be conceived what must have been the effect of such a demeanour, impressing as it did the soldiers with the belief that they were all known to the Emperor if they had distinguished themselves, and that any one might look, under such auspices, to becoming a marshal of the empire. It was not only in his own soldiers, however, that this great man appreciated heroic or generous conduct. No one set a higher value upon it in his enemies. When at Boulogne, two English sailors were brought before him, who had escaped from the depot at Verdun, and attempted to cross the Channel in a frail bark a few feet long, just capable of floating them, which they had constructed of wood which they found on the sea-beach. The daring nature of the attempt attracted the admiration of the Emperor, who said to them,—“ Is it really true that you have endeavoured to cross the sea in that bark?”—“ Ah! Sire,” they replied, “ if you doubt it, give us leave, and you will see us set out instantly.” “ I indeed wish it,” replied he: “ you are bold enterprising men; but I will not let you expose your lives. You are free. Further, I will cause you to be conducted on board an English ship: you shall return to London, and tell the English what esteem I have for the brave, even among my enemies.” He dismissed them with several pieces of gold each. This incident took such a hold of his imagination, that he recounted it to his companions in exile at St Helena. It was from the heights of Ambleteuse, near Boulogne,

visited it as a prisoner, beheld the coast of England. The day was so clear that, with the aid of a telescope, he could distinguish the houses. He wrote the same evening to Cambacérès:—"I have seen the coast of England, as distinctly as you see Mount Calvary from the Tuileries. It is a ditch which will be passed when you have the courage to attempt it."<sup>1</sup>

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Nov. 16,

1803.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.

201, 202.

Thiers, iv.

493.

From Boulogne the Emperor traversed the coast of the Channel as far as Ostend, everywhere reviewing the troops, inspecting the harbours, stimulating the preparations, and communicating to all classes the energy of his own ardent and indefatigable mind. It was on this occasion that, struck with the repeated attacks of the British cruisers on the gunboats crossing round the coast, he conceived the design, which he immediately carried into execution, of forming numerous squadrons of flying horse-artillery, to move parallel to the vessels along the shore, and protect them, by their fire from the headlands or beach, when assailed by the enemy. These movable artillery columns were to be constantly on the beach, ready to cover with their fire the gunboats moving along. "You must," said he to the minister of war, "make the hussars recollect that a French soldier should be at once a horseman, foot-soldier, and cannoneer. He should be able to undertake anything."\* From thence he proceeded to Aix-la-Chapelle, endeavouring by all means to revive the recollection of the empire of Charlemagne—an era of which, with Eastern servility, he was incessantly reminded in the adulatory addresses which flowed in from the mayors and constituted authorities in all the districts through which he passed. "God," said the prefect of Arras, "created Buonaparte, and rested from his labours,"—an excess of flattery which shortly drew forth from the faubourg St. Germain the witty addition, that he had better have reposed a little sooner.<sup>2</sup> This incident also is valuable as a historical fact, demonstrating how rapidly revo-

58.

Disgraceful  
adulation  
with which  
he was sur-  
rounded.

<sup>2</sup> Norv. ii.

347. Bour.

vi. 194, 195,

205.

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See c. xv.,  
§ 51, and  
D'Abr. vii.  
213, 214.  
Bour. vi.  
221, 222.  
Thiers, iv.  
477.

lutionary violence leads to Eastern despotism ; for in no part of France was democratic cruelty more vehement ten years before than in that very town of Arras, the scene of the unparalleled atrocities of Lebon, and the place where the guillotine had become so familiar an object, that it was employed by the little children to decapitate cats, birds, and mice, which had fallen into their hands.<sup>1</sup>

59.  
Vast designs  
of the Em-  
peror at  
Mayence for  
the Confede-  
ration of  
the Rhine.

More important changes were destined to result from the next station at which the Emperor rested, Mayence, where he received at the same time the congratulatory addresses of all the eastern provinces of France, and of all the lesser German potentates on the right bank of the Rhine, whom he was already preparing to mould into the frontier bulwark of his power. It was here that he first brought to maturity the design which he had already formed of a CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, under the protection of France, which would practically amount to an extension of its power into the heart of Germany.<sup>2</sup> Napoleon remained during the autumnal months at this great frontier fortress ; and while to the public eye he seemed engaged only in matters of parade and magnificence, receiving the congratulations of the adjoining states on his accession to the imperial throne, he was in reality incessantly occupied with those vast designs which ere long led to such memorable results both at land and sea. It was there that he first conceived the plan of that great combination to elude the British fleets, and concentrate an overwhelming force in the Channel, which so nearly proved successful in the following year, and placed the British monarchy in greater jeopardy than it had stood since the battle of Hastings ;<sup>3</sup> and it was there, too, that he matured the details of that astonishing march of his land forces from the shores of the Channel to the heart of Germany, which was so soon destined to lead to the triumphs of Ulm and Austerlitz. Nor were objects of internal utility and pacific improvement neglected amid these warlike designs. Numerous decrees for the encou-

<sup>2</sup> Marquis  
Lucchesini's  
Confederat.  
"he  
Bign. iv.  
127, 128.  
Nerv. ii.  
344.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of  
Sept. 29,  
1804. Dum.  
xi. 205.

agement of industry, as well as the advancement of science and the protection of the frontier, are dated from the places visited during this journey. One from the camp at Boulogne established nine prizes of ten thousand francs, (£400,) and thirteen of five thousand each, for useful inventions in agriculture and manufactures, proceeding on the noble desire expressed in the preamble, that "not only should France maintain the superiority she had acquired in science and the arts, but that the age which was commencing should advance beyond that which was drawing to a close:" one from Mayence, on 21st September, organised the institution of twelve colleges in the principal towns of the empire for the study of law: one from Dunkirk gave a new and more effective organisation to the body of engineers for roads and bridges throughout the state: while another put upon a new and much improved footing the important establishment of the Polytechnic School. But, in the midst of these pacific designs, the attention of the First Consul was still mainly fixed on the English expedition. His impatience, as the period approached when it was to be attempted, became extreme; and he had at that period fixed the time of its execution for the beginning, or, at latest, the middle of winter.<sup>1</sup> \*

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Sept. 11.

Sept. 21.

Aug. 25.  
July 16.  
<sup>1</sup> Bign. i  
130, 139.  
Norv. ii. 340,  
341. Thiers,  
iv. 493.

The close of the year was marked by a melancholy event, on which the British historian must dwell with pain, and which issued in lighting up the flames of war between England and Spain. The treaty of St. Ildefonso in 1796 has been already mentioned, by which Spain became bound to furnish France with an auxiliary force;† and also the subsequent convention of 19th October 1803,

60.  
Origin of the  
differences  
between  
England and  
Spain.

\* See NAPOLEON *au* GANTHEAUME, 23d Nov. 1803, and *au* Citoyen DAUGU, 12th Jan. 1804; THIERS, iv. 494, 495.

† This force was mutually stipulated at fifteen ships of the line and twenty-four thousand men; and this aid was to be furnished on the simple demand of the requiring party, without any inquiry into the policy or justice of the hostilities in which they were to be engaged; and by Art. ii. of the same treaty, the contracting parties were to assist each other with their whole forces, in case



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<sup>1</sup> Ante, chap.  
xxxvii. §14.

Dec. 13,  
1803.

by which this auxiliary force was commuted into a subsidy to the amount of £2,880,000 yearly, by the Spanish to the French government.<sup>1</sup> The hostile character of this treaty, and great amount of this subsidy, had long been a matter of jealousy to the British government, furnishing, as it evidently did, the sinews of war to France; and being, as it was, as directly applied to the fitting out of the armaments destined for the invasion of England, as if the gunboats, instead of being constructed with this treasure at Boulogne, had been fitted out at Cadiz or Corunna. As it was known, however, that the Spanish cabinet, in yielding to this tribute, was in truth constrained by necessity, the English government, from whom its amount was studiously concealed, was not at first disposed to make it the subject of complaint; and it was intimated, soon after the convention was agreed to, that England would not consider a small and temporary advance of money as any ground for the commencement of hostilities. In the close of the year, however, when rumours as to the magnitude of the payment had got abroad, the English ambassador stated in a formal note to the Spanish government, that if it amounted to anything like such a sum as three millions, Great Britain would consider it as a war subsidy, and as in itself equivalent to a hostile aggression against herself.\* In reply,

\* Mr Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, stated in this note: "With respect to the subsidy, his Majesty is perfectly sensible of the difficulties of the situation in which Spain is placed, as well by reason of her ancient ties with France, as on account of the character and habitual conduct of that power and of its chief. These considerations have induced him to act with forbearance to a certain degree, and have inclined him to overlook such pecuniary sacrifices as should not be of sufficient magnitude to force attention from their political effects. But it is expressly enjoined to me to declare to your Excellency, that pecuniary advances, such as are stipulated in the recent convention with France, cannot be considered by the British government but as a war subsidy—a succour the most efficacious, the best adapted to the wants and situation of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the interests of the British subjects, and the most dangerous to the British dominions; in fine, more than equivalent for every other species of aggression. Imperious necessity compels him now to declare these sentiments, and to add, that the passage of French troops through the territories of Spain would be considered as a violation of her neutrality, and that his Majesty would feel himself compelled to take the most decisive

the Spanish cabinet insisted that the amount of the subsidy was perfectly consistent with the neutrality which their court professed towards England, and not greater than would have been required to fit out the war contingent provided for in the former treaty. Thus the matter rested for six weeks, when the English ambassador presented a fresh and energetic remonstrance, upon the ground of the evident partiality and preference shown to French vessels over British, especially in the sale of prizes, and complaining of hostile preparations and armaments in the Spanish harbours.\* The Spanish government, in reply, strongly expressed their desire to give perfect satisfaction to the English cabinet on every subject excepting the subsidy, as to which they would not draw back from existing engagements; upon which the British ambassador stated, that his government wished for an indefinite suspension of hostilities on the ground of the subsidy, provided no other causes of complaint were given; but that if such took place, they would forthwith commence war without any further declaration of an intention to do so.<sup>1</sup>

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Feb. 18.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1805, 124.  
125. Parl.  
Deb. iii. 62,  
92.

Matters were in this state of jealous watching and suspended hostility, when, in the end of September, intelligence was received by the British government that several small detachments of French troops, amounting in all to fifteen hundred men, had proceeded from Bayonne to

61.  
Secret measures of hostility by the latter power.  
Sent. 29.

measures in consequence of that event." The Spanish minister replied: "Although the Spanish cabinet is penetrated with the truth, that the idea of aiding France is compatible with that of neutrality towards Great Britain, yet they have thought that they could better combine these two objects, by a method which, without being disagreeable to France, strips her neutrality towards Great Britain of that hostile exterior which military succours necessarily present."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 74, 91.

\* On the 18th February 1804, Mr Frere stated, in his note to the Spanish minister at Madrid: "I am ordered to declare to you, that the system of forbearance on the part of England depends entirely on the cessation of every naval armament within the ports of this kingdom; and that I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence here, if unfortunately this condition should be rejected. It is also indispensable that the sale of prizes brought into the ports of this kingdom should cease, otherwise I am to consider all negotiations as at an end, and I am to think only of returning to my superiors."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 89, 91.

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Ferrol, where a French naval force of four ships of the line was already lying, and that the Spanish government had transmitted orders for the arming, without loss of time, three ships of the line, two frigates, and several smaller vessels at that port; that similar instructions had been sent to Carthagena and Cadiz; that three first-rate line-of-battle ships had been directed to proceed from Cadiz to Ferrol, and that orders had been given to the packets to arm as in time of war. This information was accompanied by the alarming addition, that within a month eleven ships of the line would in this way be ready for sea at the latter harbour; that numbers of soldiers were daily arriving there from France; that the ships, though said to be bound for America, were victualled for three months only; that they merely waited the arrival of the treasure on board the frigates from America to throw off the mask; and that there did not appear a doubt of the hostile intentions of Spain.<sup>1</sup> In consequence of this intelligence, which was transmitted at the same time to Mr Frere at Madrid, warm remonstrances were presented to the Spanish government; and it was intimated by the British ambassador, "that the total cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain having been the principal condition required by England, and agreed to by Spain, as the price of the forbearance of Great Britain, the present violation of this condition can be considered in no other light but as a hostile aggression on the part of Spain, and a defiance given to England. These preparations become still more menacing from a squadron of the enemy being in the port where they are carrying on. In no case can England be indifferent to the armament which is preparing, and I entreat you to consider the disastrous consequences which will ensue, if the misery which presses so heavily on this country be completed by plunging it unnecessarily into a ruinous war." To this note the Prince of the Peace replied, on the part of the Spanish government,<sup>2</sup>—"The King of

<sup>1</sup> Admiral Cochrane's

Sept. 3, 5, and 11, 1804.  
Parl. Deb. iii. 95, 242, 243, and Sir R. Calder's Despatch. Ibid. 213.

Sept. 27.  
Mr Frere's note.

Oct. 3.  
<sup>2</sup> D. P. Cavallo's answer.

Spain has never thought of violating the agreement entered into with the British government. The cessation of all naval armaments against Great Britain shall be observed, as heretofore; and whatever information to the contrary may have been received is wholly unfounded, and derogatory to the honour of the Spanish nation.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iii. 95, 96.

Everything indicated that hostilities could not be averted many weeks, when they were unhappily precipitated by the measures of the British cabinet. No sooner was Admiral Cochrane's despatch, announcing the serious naval preparations at Cadiz, Carthagena, and Ferrol, received by the English government, than they transmitted orders to that officer to prevent the sailing of either the French or Spanish fleets from the harbour of Ferrol, and to intimate this intention to the French and Spanish admirals. At the same time they sent instructions to Lord Nelson on the Mediterranean, Admiral Cochrane on the Ferrol, and Lord Cornwallis on the Brest station, to despatch two frigates each to cruise off Cadiz, in order to intercept the homeward-bound treasure-frigates of Spain; and they directed these admirals to stop any Spanish vessels laden with naval or military stores, and keep them till the pleasure of the British government was known, but without committing any further act of hostility, either on such vessels or the treasure-frigates.<sup>2</sup>

62.  
Catastrophe  
which pre-  
cipitated  
hostilities.

These orders were unhappily most punctually executed. On the 5th October, a squadron of four British frigates off Cadiz, under the command of Captain Moore in the *Indefatigable*, fell in with the four Spanish frigates having the treasure on board, and the British officer immediately informed the Spanish commander that he had orders to detain his vessels, and earnestly entreated that this might be done without effusion of blood. The Spaniard, of course, declined to submit in this way to an equal force, and the consequence was, that an engagement took place, attended with a most lamentable result. In

<sup>2</sup> Orders,  
Sept. 18,  
19, and 25.  
Parl. Deb.  
iii. 118, 121.

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<sup>1</sup> Captain  
Moore's  
Despatch.  
Ann. Reg.  
1804, 557,  
and 144.

less than ten minutes one of the Spanish ships blew up with a terrific explosion. The three others were captured, with the valuable treasure, amounting to above £2,000,000 sterling, on board; but England had to lament a loss on the part of Spain of a hundred killed and wounded, besides two hundred and forty lost in the frigate which exploded, before any formal announcement of hostilities.<sup>1</sup>

63.  
Which at  
once brings  
on a war.

It is needless to proceed further with the details of this painful negotiation. The capture of the frigates produced the result which might have been anticipated, in an immediate declaration of war by Spain against Great Britain on the 12th December. Various attempts at explanation and apology were made by the English government, but Spain was too completely in the arms of France to forego such an opportunity of joining in the war; nor, indeed, after such an act of violence, could it be expected that any independent state would abstain from hostilities.<sup>2</sup> \* ✓

<sup>2</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iii. 99, 115.

This unhappy catastrophe produced a great and painful division of opinion among the people of Great Britain. While the ministerial party lamented the necessity under

Spanish  
manifesto.

\* The Spanish manifesto on this occasion stated: "It was very difficult for Spain and Holland, who had treated jointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations are reciprocally connected, to avoid finally taking part in the grievances and offences offered to their ally. In these circumstances his Majesty, proceeding on the principle of a wise policy, preferred pecuniary subsidies to the contingent of troops and ships with which he was bound to assist France by the treaty of alliance in 1796; and expressed, by his minister at the court of London, his decided and firm resolution to remain neutral during the war. But the English government, animated by a spirit of hostility against Spain, not only listened to the reclamations of individuals addressed to it, but exacted, as the precise condition on which they would consider Spain as neutral, the cessation of every preparation in her ports, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes brought into them. Though these conditions were urged in the most haughty manner, they were complied with, and religiously observed by the Spanish nation; when the English government manifested its secret and perverse aims by the abominable capture of four Spanish frigates, navigating in a state of profound peace, at the very moment when the English vessels were enjoying the full rights of hospitality in the harbours of Spain. Barbarous orders at the same time were given to detain and carry into its harbours as many Spanish ships as its fleets could meet with, to burn or destroy every Spanish ship below a hundred tons, and carry every one of larger dimensions into Malta."—*State Papers*, 700, 701; *Ann. Reg.* 1804.

To this it was replied in the British declaration of war: "The stipulations of

which government lay of adopting the steps which had led to so deplorable an effusion of human blood, they yet vindicated the measure as justifiable in itself, and unavoidable in the circumstances in which they were placed. But a large and conscientious body of their usual supporters beheld with pain what they deemed an unwarrantable invasion of the rights of nations, and loudly condemned the act as derogatory to the honour of the British name. The debates in parliament on this subject condensed, as usual, everything that was or could be urged on the opposite sides, clothed in all the force of language of which the great orators who then led the different parties were masters. On the one hand, it was urged by Mr Fox and Lord Grenville, "that there appeared nothing but inattention, negligence, and mystery on the part of the British government on this occasion. The Spanish government had been most eager to cultivate a good understanding with this country, and had made repeated applications for this purpose to the British cabinet; but the criminal negligence or supineness of ministers had at length forced them into the arms of

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64.

Arguments  
in parlia-  
ment  
against the  
conduct of

military and naval succours to a great extent by the treaty of 1796, followed by an obligation to put at the disposal of France, if required, the whole resources of the Spanish monarchy, gave Great Britain an incontestable right to declare, that unless she decidedly renounced that treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform its conditions, she could not be considered as a neutral power: that the monthly sum which Spain was bound to pay by the present convention far exceeded the bounds of forbearance, as it might prove a greater injury than any other hostility: that in consequence it had been intimated to the Spanish government, that England's abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that if either any French troops entered Spain, or authentic accounts were received of any naval armaments preparing in the harbours of Spain for the assistance of France, the British ambassador had instructions forthwith to leave Madrid: that the constant report of naval armaments in the ports of Spain had induced the British cabinet to give the Spanish government explicit warning on the 18th February 1804, that all further forbearance on the part of England must depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain; that notwithstanding the strongest assurances of the Spanish government that this should be the case, information was received from the British admirals that considerable bodies of French troops had arrived at Ferrol from France; and that orders had been given for fitting out four ships of the line and two frigates in that very harbour, in which four French line-of-battle ships were already assembled, so as to threaten to outmatch the British blockading force; that these circumstances

Reply by  
England

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France, and compelled them to permit the march of fifteen hundred French troops to Ferrol. Spain no doubt had, in 1796, entered into a treaty of alliance with France, which might well have been made the ground of hostility, but it was not made such; and when afterwards she commuted the military succours there stipulated into a fixed annual payment, to this, too, there was no serious objection stated. They told the Spanish government, indeed, that the continuance of the suspension of hostilities would mainly depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the harbours of Spain; but was this condition violated? Ships, indeed, were fitting out at Ferrol; but when remonstrated with on the subject, the Spanish government at once declared that their sole object was to transport troops to the coast of Biscay, where a rebellion had broken out; and at the same time the governor of Ferrol stated, that, to remove all uneasiness, the men should be put ashore, and sent round by land, however inconvenient. Not satisfied with these explanations, not waiting to see if they were well founded, we proceeded at once to the violence of assaulting their ships on the high seas. It is

compelled the British government explicitly to declare, by its ambassador at Madrid, that the continuance of peace required a complete and unreserved disclosure of the Spanish relations and engagements with France, which had hitherto been withheld; and that at the same time it became necessary to issue orders to prevent the sailing of the French or Spanish squadrons from Ferrol, and to intercept and detain the treasure-ships till its destination was divulged, and to send back any Spanish ship of war to the harbour from which she sailed, but on no account to detain any homeward-bound ships of war not having treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever."—See *Parl. Deb.* iii. 126, 130.

The statement in the Spanish manifesto, as to the orders given to Lord Nelson to destroy all vessels under one hundred tons, and send the others to Malta, is an exaggerated and mistaken allusion to these last instructions. No such orders were given by the British government. On the contrary, the instructions were, "not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic Majesty sailing from a port of Spain; but you are to require the commander of such ship to return directly to the port from whence he came, and only in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain him and send him to Gibraltar or England. You are not to detain any homeward-bound ship of war, unless she shall have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever." Directions are also given "to detain any Spanish ships or vessels laden with naval or military stores."—See *Orders*, 25th September and 25th November 1804, *Parl. Deb.* iii. 119, 121.

in vain to assimilate this to an embargo on an enemy's ships. Was there no difference between delaying merchant ships, which might be delivered back, and assaulting them on the high seas? Take a merchant's property, it might be restored to him; imprison seamen, they might be discharged; but burn, sink, or blow up ship and crew, and who can restore the innocent blood which has been spilt? The French branded us with the name of a mercantile people, and said that we were ever thirsting after gold. They would therefore impute this violence to our eagerness for dollars. Better that all the dollars and ten times their quantity were paid, so as this could wash away the stain which had been brought on our arms.

"In considering this question, we must carefully distinguish between the causes of a rupture which might have been set forth, and those which actually were made the ground of hostilities. The treaty of St Ildefonso was clearly an offensive treaty, and its existence was as clearly a ground on which war might have been declared. It was even more offensive than the Family Compact. But the grand objection to the conduct of ministers was, that they did not instantly take a decided line on the resumption of hostilities with France. They should then have required Spain to renounce the offensive articles of that treaty, or used every effort to cultivate a good understanding with that power, while yet her disposition was amicable. They did neither. The subsequent commutation of the warlike succours into a money payment, may possibly have been considered as an additional hostile act by ministers, but unquestionably they did nothing to evince this feeling to the court of Spain. Mr Frere remained, and was directed to remain, at Madrid, long after the commutation was known. Spain, in truth, was acting under the dread of French conquest, and therefore it was cruel to inquire rigidly into her conduct. The armament at Ferrol was quite inconsiderable, and had been admitted by Mr Frere himself to be destined

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65.  
On its con-  
duct with  
regard to  
the treasu-  
ships.



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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iii. 354, 362,  
448, 453.

66.  
Defence of  
the govern-  
ment by Mr  
Pitt.

for the conveyance of troops to Biscay. The orders for sailing had been countermanded, and the vessels directed, on the 16th September, to be laid up in ordinary; so that all ground of complaint had been removed before the English orders to stop the treasure-frigates had been given. Even the refusal to communicate the terms of the commutation treaty was no justification of the violence which had been committed, because that refusal was subsequent to the order which produced the capture.”<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, it was answered by Mr Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury—“The terms of the treaty of St Ildefonso, by which France and Spain mutually guarantee each other’s territories, and engage to furnish reciprocally a force of fifteen ships of the line and twenty-four thousand men, to be given upon the mere demand of the requiring party, and the additional obligation upon each, in case of need, to assist the other with their whole forces, lie at the foundation of this question, because they constituted the ground of the whole proceedings which the British government found themselves compelled to adopt. In whatever light this treaty be viewed, it could not be considered, on the part of Spain, but as a reluctant tribute to the overbearing dictates of its ambitious and tyrannic ally; and although conditions so plainly hostile would have justified the demand of an explicit and immediate renunciation from Spain, on pain of a declaration of war in case of refusal, yet a feeling of pity towards a gallant and high-spirited though unfortunate nation long dictated a delicate and temporising policy. But at the same time, the interests of this country imperatively required that a pledge should be given that this treaty should not be acted upon: and in reply to the representations of the English ambassador to that effect, the Prince of the Peace evinced, in August last, a disposition to elude, if possible, the demands of France. The requisitions of the First Consul, however, were urgent, and nothing short of a subsidy of £250,000 a-month, or £3,000,000

a-year, would be accepted; although the Spaniards were so sensible of the enormity of complying with such a demand, that they strongly urged that even a subsidy of £700,000 yearly would expose them on just grounds to a declaration of war from Great Britain. The particulars of this treaty, Spain, down to the very last moment, refused to communicate; and when urged on this subject, her government answered, ‘ You have no reason of complaint, because you do not know what we pay.’ From what we have learned, however, of the commutation which was finally agreed to, it is evident that, so far from being an alleviation, it was the greatest aggravation of the original treaty. At the very highest, the rated equivalent for fifteen ships of the line would be £1,000,000 yearly; so that, as the Spanish government has agreed to pay £3,000,000 annually, there remains £2,000,000 for the commutation of the land forces, being at the rate of £85 a man; whereas the equivalent for service of this kind usually given, and that agreed to in the treaty between this country and Holland in 1788, was £9 for each man; a fact which clearly demonstrates that the commutation is nearly ten times as injurious to Great Britain as the original treaty would have been.

“ The forbearance of ministers under such aggravated circumstances of provocation, was not founded upon blindness to the danger which the hostility of Spain, under French direction, might hereafter produce, but upon motives of policy adopting due preparations against that event. Their forbearance was expressly said to be conditional, and to depend as a *sine quâ non* on a total abstinence from naval preparations in all the harbours of Spain, and the prohibition of the sale of prizes in Spanish ports. When it is recollected that the total revenue of Spain does not exceed £8,000,000, and that she had consented to give £3,000,000, or not much less than the half of this sum, annually to France, these conditions cannot but be deemed exorbitant. It is in vain

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67.

On the successive provocations given by the Spanish

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to say that this enormous subsidy was subsequently acquiesced in. In all his notes to the Spanish government on this subject, Mr Frere accurately distinguishes between temporary connivance and permanent acquiescence; and reserved the right of making the subsidy the ground of hostility at some future period, even by itself; and much more, if any additional ground for complaint were given. Such was the state of affairs, when information was received from Admiral Cochrane that the condition on which alone the neutrality of Spain, under existing circumstances, had been connived at, had been violated by the Spanish government. That government were called upon to act upon that information, cannot be denied. The existence of formidable preparations in the ports of Ferrol, at the very time when a French squadron was lying blockaded there, and French troops were pouring in through the Spanish territory,—and the arming of the packets as in time of war, were such indications of approaching hostility as would have rendered the British government to the last degree culpable if they had not instantly adopted measures of precaution.

68.  
Defence of  
the capture  
of the fri-  
gates.

“What would have been said, if, through their negligence in doing so, the Ferrol, in conjunction with the Cadiz and Carthagena squadrons, had struck a blow at our interests, or co-operated with the French in any part of the great naval designs which they have in contemplation? The excuse that they were wanted to convey troops to quell an insurrection in Biscay, is a pretence so flimsy as to be seen through the moment it is stated. If such was really the object, why not transport the troops in small craft, or in ships of war armed *en flûte*? and why, for such a domestic transaction, range her line-of-battle ships alongside the French and Dutch in the harbour of Ferrol? Why arm the packets, if land operations in Biscay alone were in contemplation? The only question, in truth, is, not whether we have done too much, but whether we have done enough? It was clearly stated by

us, long before hostilities commenced, that if the conditions of neutrality were violated by Spain, we would consider it as a declaration of war: they were so violated, and we acted upon them as such. We would, in such circumstances, have been clearly justified in preventing the junction of the French, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, and intercepting the treasures destined for the coffers, not of Spain, but of France; but we adopted the milder expedient of stopping and detaining them only; and if they have subsequently been rendered good prize, it is entirely owing to the conduct of Spain herself, in refusing to communicate any particulars in regard to the commutation convention, and following that up by a declaration of war against this country.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iii. 366, 367.

Upon a division, the conduct of ministers in this affair was approved of by a majority of two hundred and seven in the Lower House; there being three hundred and thirteen in their favour, and one hundred and six on the other side. In the House of Lords a similar decision was given by a majority of seventy-eight; the numbers being one hundred and fourteen to thirty-six.<sup>2</sup>

69.  
The government is supported by parliament.  
Feb. 12,  
1805.  
<sup>2</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iii. 354, 463.

Thirty years have now elapsed since this question, so vitally important to the national honour and public character of England, was thus fiercely debated in parliament and the nation: almost all the actors on the stage are dead, or have retired into the privacy of domestic life, and the rapid succession of other events has drawn public interest into a different direction, and enabled us now to look back upon it with the calm feelings of retrospective justice. Impartiality compels the admission, that the conduct of England in this transaction cannot be reviewed without feelings of regret. Substantially, the proceedings of the English cabinet were justifiable, and warranted by the circumstances in which they were placed: but formally, they were reprehensible, and forms enter into the essence of justice in the transactions of nations. It is true the treaty of St Ildefonso was a per-

70.  
Reflections on the subject.

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1804.

fectly fair ground for declaring war; the commutation treaty was a still fairer; and even the armaments at Ferrol, if not explained, might have warranted the withdrawing of the ambassador at Madrid, and commencement of hostilities. Spain was in the most delicate of all situations in relation to Great Britain, after agreeing to the enormous war-subsidy stipulated by that treaty; and this the French historians cannot dispute, since they represent the accepting of a subsidy of £80,000 a-year from England, by the convention of the 3d December of that very year, as an overt act of hostility on the part of Sweden against France.<sup>1</sup> She was bound, therefore, in return for the forbearance which overlooked such excessive provocation, to have been studiously careful not to give offence in any other particular; and could not have complained if the crossing of the *Bidassoa* by one French company, or the arming of one frigate at Ferrol, had been followed by an immediate declaration of war on the part of Great Britain.

<sup>1</sup> B  
68.

71.  
And parti-  
culars in  
which En-  
land ap-  
pears to  
have been  
wrong.

But, admitting all this, conceding that ample ground for declaring war existed, the question remains, could the existence of these grounds warrant the commencement of hostilities without such a declaration, while the British ambassador was still at Madrid, and negotiations for the explaining or removal of the grounds of complaint were still in dependence? That is the material question; and it is a question on which no defence can be maintained for the conduct of England. True, the declaration of war would, in such circumstances, have been a piece of form merely: true, it would not have averted one shot from the treasure-frigates, and, on the contrary, led to their immediate capture instead of conditional detention. But it was a step which the usages of war imperatively required, and the want of which distinguishes legitimate hostility from unauthorised piracy. A line apparently as unsubstantial frequently separates the duellist from the assassin, or the legitimate acquirer

of property from the highway robber; and they have much to answer for, who, in the transactions of nations which acknowledge no superior, depart from one formality which usage has sanctioned, or one security against spoliation which a sense of justice has introduced. It is with painful feelings, therefore, that the British historian must recount the circumstances of this melancholy transaction; but it is a subject of congratulation, that this injustice was committed to a nation which was afterwards overwhelmed by such a load of obligation. Like the Protestant martyr at the stake, England held her right hand in the flames till her offence was expiated by suffering; and if Spain was the scene of the darkest blot on her character which the annals of the revolutionary war can exhibit, it was the theatre also of the most generous devotion and the brightest glories which her history has to record.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

NAPOLEON'S ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL THRONE, AND  
CORONATION.—JANUARY—DECEMBER, 1804.

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1804.

1.  
Favourable  
prospects of  
Napoleon's  
government  
in the be-  
ginning of  
1804.

It were well for the memory of Napoleon if the historian could stop here, and, after having recounted the matchless glories of his military exploits, conclude with the admirable wisdom of his civil administration, and the felicity with which, amidst so many difficulties, he reconstructed the disjointed elements of society after the Revolution. But history is not made up wholly of panegyric; and after discharging the pleasing duty of recording the great and comparatively blameless achievements which signalised the consulate, there remains the painful task of narrating the foul transactions, the dark and bloody deeds, which ushered in the empire. Everything seemed to smile upon Napoleon. In the civil administration, all were reconciled to the consulate for life, or submitted in silence to an authority which they could not resist. The army, dazzled by his brilliant exploits, had rallied round his standard, and sought only to give expression to its admiration for the illustrious chief who had raised to such an unprecedented height the glory of the Republican ensigns. The people, worn out with the sufferings and anxieties of the Revolution, had joyfully submitted to a government which had given them that first of blessings, security and protection, and, forgetting the dreams of enthusiasm and the fumes of democracy, returned to their separate pursuits,

and sought in the enjoyments of private life a compensation for the experienced vanity of their political anticipations. But amidst these seemingly auspicious circumstances many seeds of latent evil existed, and discontent and dissatisfaction prevailed to a great extent among the <sup>1</sup> *Thib.* 321. classes where they were least to be expected.<sup>1</sup>

This appeared, in an especial manner, among the generals and higher officers of the army. Bernadotte, though brother-in-law to Joseph Buonaparte, was constantly in opposition to the First Consul. Early attached to republican principles, he viewed with undisguised jealousy the evident approaches which the chief magistrate was making to arbitrary power; and in consequence of his influence, a number of officers in his staff and in the garrison of Rennes voted against the consulate for life. Moreau, however, was the head of the malcontent party. On every occasion he made it a point to oppose, to the increasing splendour of military dress and the routine of court etiquette, the simplicity and uniformity of republican costume. The conqueror of Austria traversed, amidst crowds of brilliant uniforms, the Place Carrousel, or the saloons of the Tuileries, in the plain dress of a citizen, without any sort of decoration. He declined on various pretences repeated invitations to the Tuileries, and at length was no longer asked to appear. He often manifested to the First Consul, when they met in public, a degree of coldness which must have estranged persons even less jealous of each other's reputation than the heroes of Marengo and Hohenlinden. Nothing could induce him to attend the ceremony performed in Notre-Dame on occasion of the concordat; and at a dinner of military men at his house on the same day, he openly expressed the greatest contempt for the whole proceeding. Female pique added to the many causes of discord which already existed between these rival chiefs: Madame Hulot, his mother-in-law, and Madame Moreau, his wife, were animated by the most violent jealousy at the elevation of Josephine, and unceasingly urged

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
1804.

2.  
Discontent  
of the re-  
publi



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

1804.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 321,  
323. Bour.  
v. 232. Las  
Cas. vii.  
247.

Moreau to step forward, and openly claim that place in society and the state to which his dignity and services so well entitled him. So far did this spirit of rivalry proceed, that Madame Moreau could not be hindered from breaking out into unseemly expressions, when, on one occasion of a visit, she was detained a few minutes waiting in the antechambers of Josephine; and on another she was only prevented by force from taking precedence, at a public assembly, of the wife of the First Consul.<sup>1</sup>

3.  
Pichegru in  
London, and  
royalist  
movements  
in France.

<sup>2</sup> Bign. iii.  
318. Norv.  
ii. 272.

While Moreau was thus insensibly and unavoidably becoming the leader of the discontented republicans in Paris, circumstances were preparing for another distinguished general of the Revolution the chief direction of the royalist party. Escaped from the deserts of Sinamari, Pichegru had found an asylum in London, where he entered into close correspondence with the French emigrants who endeavoured in that capital to uphold the sinking cause of the monarchy. His great abilities and acknowledged reputation procured for him the confidence of the British government, and he was occasionally consulted by them, especially in 1799, as to the probability of a royalist movement declaring itself in the south of France.<sup>2</sup> On the renewal of the war, various attempts had been made by the royalist emigrants in London to effect an insurrection in favour of the exiled family in different parts of France. The object of these attempts, of which the Count d'Artois and royal princes were cognizant, though not Louis XVIII., was the restoration of the Bourbons, and the effecting the expulsion of the First Consul from the throne; but it formed no part of the plan of any design, at least in which any of the royal family were participants, to imbrue their hands in his blood, or do aught to him that he had not repeatedly done to every state with which he was in hostility.\* The celebrated Chouan chief, Georges, was

\* "I must do Louis XVIII.," said Napoleon, "the justice to say, that I

the soul of the conspiracy. He had resisted all the offers of the First Consul, who was anxious to engage him in his service; and, in a secret interview, the elevation and disinterestedness of his character excited the admiration of that keen observer of human character.\* Since that time he had resided chiefly in London, and was deeply implicated, along with Pichegru, in a conspiracy which had for its object to rouse the royalist party in France, and overturn the government of the First Consul.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
1804.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
274. Bign.  
iii. 318.  
Norv. ii. 272.  
Thiers, iv.  
518.

On the existence of these opposite elements of conspiracy, emanating from the extremes of the republican and royalist parties, Fouché founded the project of uniting them in a conspiracy which might at once prove ruinous to both, and restore him to that consideration in the eyes of the First Consul, which it had been his unceasing object to regain since his dismissal from office. The words of the *senatus-consultum* removing him from the police were constantly present to his mind,—that “if difficult circumstances should again arise, there was no one to whom the ministry of police might so fitly be intrusted;” and if he could only engage the two greatest generals in the Republic, next to the First Consul, in a conspiracy

4.  
Project of  
Fouché for  
getting up a  
conspiracy of  
republicans  
and royal-  
ists.

never discovered his participation in any plot against my life, although such were constantly in agitation elsewhere; his operations were confined to systematic plans and ideal changes.”—*LAS CASES*, ii. 368.—“La conspiracy,” says Thiers, “fut référé à Louis XVIII., alors retiré à Varsovie. Ce prince, toujours peu d’accord avec son frère le Comte d’Artois, dont il disapprouva la stérile et imprudente activité, repoussa cette proposition.”—*Consulat et l’Empire*, iv. 518.

\* “You cannot be permitted,” said Napoleon to him in 1800, “to remain in the *Merbihan*; but I offer you the rank of lieutenant-general in my armies.”—“You do me injustice,” replied Georges; “I have taken an oath of fidelity to the house of Bourbon, which I will never violate.” The First Consul then offered him a pension of a hundred thousand francs if he would abandon the cause of the king and remain quiet; but he was proof also against this temptation. He learned soon after that an order for his arrest had been given, and set off the same day for Boulogne, from whence, with M. Hyde de Neuville, he reached England in safety.<sup>2</sup> Napoleon, alluding to this interview, observed—“Georges evinced that elevation of character which belongs to a great mind; but he was so enthusiastic in favour of his own party, that we could come to no understanding. His mind was cast in the true mould; in my hands he would have done great things. I knew how to appreciate his firmness of character;”

<sup>2</sup> Beauch.  
iv. 512.

<sup>3</sup> Bour. vi.  
158, 159.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

1804.

against his government, there seemed to be no doubt that he would attain the object of his ambition. With this view, in the end of 1803, he began to instigate some of their mutual friends to effect a reconciliation between these illustrious characters. The Abbé David was the first person employed in this service; but having been arrested and sent to the Temple, his place was supplied by General Lajolais, a relation of Generals Klengen and Wurmser, who came to London, arranged with Pichegru the period of his departure for Paris, and returned soon after to the French capital to prepare matters for his reception there.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
272, 273.  
Novr. ii.  
273.

5.  
The royal-

coast.  
Jan. 1

Meanwhile Georges, Polignac, and the other conspirators, had been landed on the coast of Normandy, and had cautiously and secretly advanced to Paris, not with the view of engaging in any plot at that time, but to obtain accurate information as to the real state of the royalist party in the capital. All their measures were known to the police by means of secret information communicated by Lajolais and other traitors in the party; the points of their descent, the places where they were to sleep every night, were regularly detailed to Fouché. Everything was made easy by the agents of the police. They were allowed to come to the capital, and remain there for a considerable time unmolested. Several meetings took place between Georges, Pichegru, Lajolais, and the other leaders of the party, and Moreau had a conference with Pichegru on the Boulevard de la Madeleine, and another in his own house.\* The principles of

Artful mea-  
sures of  
Fouché to  
draw them  
on.  
Feb. 17.

\* The accurate intelligence which the secret police of Fouché had of all the proceedings of the royalist leaders, and the art with which they led them into the snare prepared for them, is completely proved by the proclamation published by the government on the day of their arrest. "In the year 1803," said Regnier, the head of the police, "a criminal reconciliation took place between Pichegru and Moreau, two men between whom honour should have placed an eternal barrier. The police seized at Calais one of their agents at the moment when he was preparing to return for the second time to England. In his possession were found all the documents which proved the reality of an accommodation inexplicable on any other principle but the bond which crime occasions. Meanwhile the plot advanced. Lajolais, the friend and confidant of Pichegru,

Moreau, however, were those of the Revolution, and therefore it was impossible that he could agree with the royalists upon ulterior measures, however hostile they might both be to the First Consul. In truth, the only purpose of the conferences was to put the Chouan chiefs in possession of the views of this illustrious leader of the republican party. The agents of Fouché had given the royalists to understand that Moreau would readily enter into their views; but in this they soon found that they had been completely deceived; and accordingly it was proved at the trial, that Moreau declared to Pichegru that he knew of no conspiracy whatever; and that Polignac was heard to say to one of the party, "All is going wrong; we do not understand each other: Moreau does not keep his word; we have been deceived." Discouraged by these appearances, the conspirators were about to leave Paris, and Georges was on the point of setting out for la Vendée.<sup>1\*</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVII.  
1804.

<sup>1</sup> Bour v.  
283, 287.  
Norv. ii.  
274, 275.

But matters had now arrived at that point when Fouché deemed it expedient to divulge the information

passed over secretly from Paris to London, and from London to Paris, communicating to Moreau the sentiments of Pichegru, and to Pichegru those of Moreau. The brigands of Georges were all this time preparing, underhand at Paris, the execution of their joint projects. A place was fixed on between Dieppe and Treport, at a distance from observation, where the brigands of England, brought thither in English ships of war, disembarked without being perceived, and there they met with persons corrupted to receive them—men paid to guide them during the night, from one station to another, as far as Paris. There they found rooms ready hired for them by trusty guardians; they lodged in different quarters at Chaillot, in the Rue du Bac, in the faubourg St Marceau, in the Marais. Georges and eight brigands first disembarked; then Coëter St-Victor and ten others; and in the first days of this month, a third party arrived, consisting of Pichegru, Lajolais, and others; the conspirators met at the farm of la Potterie; Georges and Pichegru arrived at Paris. They lodged in the same house, surrounded by thirty brigands, whom Georges commanded. They met with General Moreau; the day, the hour, the place, where the first conference was held, were known; a second was fixed on, but not accomplished: a third and a fourth took place in the house of Moreau himself. The traces of Georges and Pichegru have been followed from house to house; those who aided in their debarkation; those who, under cloud of night, conducted them from post to post; those who gave them an asylum at Paris, their confidants, their accomplices, Lajolais, the chief go-between, and General Moreau, have been arrested."—BOUR. v. 293—295.

\* This is established by the testimony of Napoleon himself:—"Real (the

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

1804.

6.

Fouché re-  
veals the  
plot to Na-  
poleon, and  
is restored  
to power.  
Arrest of the  
conspirators.

he had acquired, and reap the fruit of his intrigues. He had previously written to Napoleon that "the air was full of poniards," and prepared him, by various mysterious communications, to expect some important intelligence. Regnier, who was intrusted with the duties though not the situation of minister of police, was totally ignorant of what was going forward, and confidently maintained that Pichegru had dined a few days before in the neighbourhood of London, when Fouché arrived with evidence that he had been for some time in Paris. Napoleon upon this devolved the further conduct of the affair upon the ex-minister, whose superior information was now clearly manifested, and the immediate charge of the matter was intrusted to Real, one of his creatures, with orders to take his instructions from Fouché alone. At length, matters being ripe for the *denouement*, the whole suspected persons, to the number of forty-five, with the exception of Moreau, Georges, and Pichegru, who had not yet been discovered, were arrested at once in Paris, and thrown into prison. Among them were two young men of noble family and generous dispositions, destined to a melancholy celebrity in future times,—Counts Armand and Jules Polignac. Moreau was the first of the three who was seized. Charles d'Hozier, one of the prisoners, had attempted to commit suicide in prison, and his dying declarations, wherein he had implicated that general, were made use of as a ground to order his arrest, although the subsequent report by Regnier admitted that the police had been throughout privy to all his meetings with the

head of the police) told me," said Napoleon, "that when Moreau and Pichegru were together, they could not come to an understanding, as Georges would undertake nothing but for the interest of the Bourbons. He had therefore a plan, but Moreau had none; he wished to overturn my power, but had no person in view to put in my place. It was no wonder, therefore, they could not come to terms of agreement."—BOUR. vi. 160.—M. Picot, a secret agent employed in the affair, said in his deposition, "Que souvent il a entendu parler du Général Moreau, et que les chefs ont répété devant lui qu'ils étaient fâchés que les Princes aient mis Moreau dans l'affaire, mais qu'il ignore quand Georges a vu Moreau."—*Troisième Déclaration de Louis Picot*, 14th February 1804; THIERS, iv. 556.

conspirators. Returning from his country estate to Paris, he was seized and conveyed to the Temple; and on the morning of the 17th, all Paris was astonished by the following order of the day, addressed to the garrison of the capital. "Fifty brigands have penetrated into the capital; Georges and General Pichegru were at their head. Their coming was occasioned by a man who is yet numbered among our defenders—by General Moreau, who was yesterday consigned to the hands of the national justice. Their design was, after having assassinated the First Consul, to have delivered over France to the horrors of a civil war, and all the terrible convulsions of a counter-revolution."<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
1804.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the consternation which prevailed in Paris on this intelligence being promulgated. Moreau was looked up to by a numerous and powerful party, especially in the army, as one of the greatest men of the Revolution; his name was rendered illustrious by the most glorious exploits; the simplicity and modesty of his private life had long endeared him to all classes, and especially to the numerous body who were enamoured of republican manners. To find so illustrious a name coupled with those whom they regarded as brigands, to hear the known supporter of republican principles accused of a design to bring about a counter-revolution, was so violent a revulsion, so inconceivable a change, as to excite in the highest degree the suspicions and passions of the people. The Revolutionists regarded Moreau as the leader of their party, and the only consistent supporter of their principles; the soldiers looked back with pride to his military achievements, and burned with indignation at the incredible imputations cast upon his honour; the ancient and ill-extinguished jealousy of the armies of Italy and the Rhine, broke forth again with redoubled fury;<sup>2</sup> the latter openly murmured at his arrest, and declared that the First Consul was about to sacrifice the greatest general of the Republic to his

7.  
Consternation which the announcement of the plot excites in Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Norv. ii.  
276. Bour.  
v. 274, 207.  
  
<sup>2</sup> Norv.  
277. Nap.  
vii. 243.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
1804.

ambitious designs. He had then good cause to congratulate himself that Richepanse and twenty-five thousand of the conquerors of Hohenlinden had met with an untimely end on the shores of St Domingo.\*

8.  
Arrest of  
Pichegru.

Feb. 28.

Napoleon, however, was not intimidated. The arrest of Moreau was soon followed up by that of Pichegru, who was seized in his bed a fortnight after. It was not without difficulty that this renowned leader was made prisoner; his ready presence of mind, undaunted spirit, and prodigious personal strength, rendered it no easy matter to secure him even under circumstances the most favourable to the assailants. He was at length betrayed by an old friend, in whose house he had sought refuge.† This infamous wretch, who was named Leblanc, had the baseness to reveal his place of retreat for a hundred thousand crowns. "His treachery," says Napoleon, "was literally a disgrace to humanity." Guided by this traitor, and fully informed as to the means of resistance which Pichegru always had at his command, a party of police, strongly armed, entered his bedroom at night, by means of false keys, furnished by their perfidious assistant. They found the general asleep, with a lamp burning on a table near the bed, and loaded pistols by his side. Advancing on tiptoe, they overturned the table so as to extinguish the light, and sprang upon their victim before he was aware of their approach. Suddenly awaking, he exerted his strength with undaunted resolution, and struggled long and violently with the assailants. He was at length, however, overpowered by numbers, bound hand and foot,

\* "The crisis," says Napoleon, "was of the most violent kind: public opinion was in a state of fermentation; the sincerity of government, the reality of the conspiracy, were incessantly called in question. All the violent passions were awakened; the rumours of change were incessant; the storm was tremendous."—LAS CASES, vii. 243, and iii. 361.

† "Pichegru's seizure was owing to his generosity in declining to receive another asylum, where he would have been perfectly safe. An old aide-de-camp of his, M. Lagrenée, who had retired from the service some years before, and a man of undoubted honour, besought him to take refuge in his house; but he positively refused to endanger, by accepting the offer, a man who had given so striking a proof of attachment to his person."—BOUR. vi. 11, 12.

and conducted, naked as he was, to the Temple. The arrest of Pichegru was immediately followed by a decree of the senate, which suspended for two years trial by jury in all the departments of the Republic, "for the crimes of treason, attempts on the person of the First Consul, or the exterior or interior security of the Republic." For this purpose the tribunals were organised in a different manner, agreeably to the direction of the law of 23d Floreal, 1802. All the persons accused in Paris were sent for trial to the tribunal of the department of the Seine, where trial by jury had been suspended.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXVIII  
1804.

<sup>1</sup>eb. 26.  
Bign. iii.  
327, 328.  
Bour. vi. 10,  
11. Las  
Cas. iii.  
363.

Georges, however, was still at liberty, although a rigid blockade prevented his leaving Paris; but he did not long escape the vigilance of the police. On the 9th March, he was arrested as he was crossing the Place of the Odéon, at seven in the evening, in a cabriolet. He never went abroad without being armed; his capture in that public manner cost the life of one man, whom he shot dead as he stopped his horse, and he desperately wounded another who advanced to seize him in the carriage. He was instantly conducted to the Temple, and treated with such rigour that, when Louis Buona-  

9.  
And of  
Georges  
Cadoudhal.  
March 9.

parte went to see him the next day in prison, he found him lying on his mattress, with his hands strongly manacled, and bound across his breast—a spectacle which excited the indignation of that humane prince, as well as that of General Lauriston, who was present on the occasion. When examined before the judge of police, Georges openly avowed his intention to overturn the First Consul. "What was your motive for coming to Paris?—To attack the First Consul.—What were your means of attack?—By force.—Where did you expect to find the means of applying force?—In all France.—There is then a conspiracy extending over all France, under the direction of you and your accomplices?—No; but there was a *réunion* of force at Paris.—What were the projects of yourself and your associates?—To place a Bourbon in the room



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
1804.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
37, 45. Cap.  
Hist. de la  
Rest. ii. 159.  
Nouv. ii.

of the First Consul.—What Bourbon did you mean to place on the throne?—Louis Xavier Stanislaus formerly, whom we now designate Louis XVIII.—What weapons were you to use?—Weapons similar to those of his escort and guard.” Moreau, however, was treated in a very different manner; he met with the most respectful attention, and was surrounded by military men who would not have permitted any insult to be offered to so illustrious a character.<sup>1</sup>

10.  
y  
character  
of the Duc  
d’Enghien.

On the day after the arrest of Georges, a meeting of the council of state was held, in which Napoleon took a step from which his memory will never recover. He decided the fate of the DUC D’ENGHIEN. This young prince, son to the Duc de Bourbon, and a lineal descendant of the great Condé, was born, apparently to the highest destinies, at Chantilly, on 2d August 1772. While yet a boy, he accompanied his father in his flight from Paris on July 16, 1789, and had ever since remained in exile, attached to the noble but unfortunate corps which, under the Prince of Condé, continued, through adverse equally as prosperous fortune, faithful to the cause of the monarchy. A noble countenance, a commanding air, and dignified expression, bespoke, even to a passing observer, his illustrious descent, while the affability of his manners and generosity of his character justly endeared him to his numerous companions in adversity. On all occasions in which they were called into action, these shining qualities displayed themselves. Ever the foremost in advance, he was the last to retreat, and by his skill and bravery eminently contributed to the brilliant success gained by the emigrant corps at Bertsheim in an early period of the war. On that occasion a number of Republican prisoners fell into the hands of the Royalists; the soldiers loudly demanded that some reprisals should be made for the sanguinary laws of the Convention, which had doomed so many of their comrades to the scaffold; but the young prince replied,<sup>2</sup> “ The blood

Sept. 2,  
1793.

<sup>2</sup> Refutat. de  
M. le Duc  
de Rovigo,  
134.

of our companions, shed in the most just of causes, demands a nobler vengeance. Let them live. They are Frenchmen, they are unfortunate ; I put them under the safeguard of your honour and humanity.”\*

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
1804.

It was on the fate of a prince thus richly endowed with every noble virtue, that the council of state, under the presidency of the First Consul, sat at Paris on the 10th of March 1804. So resolved had Napoleon been to arrest and put to death a prince of the blood, that he had previously sent down Savary to the coasts of Biville, where the landing of one was expected, with orders instantly, on seizure, to deliver the prince, whoever he might be, to a military commission, and have him shot.† And having now got his suspicions fixed on the Duc d'Enghien, he had been studying the maps of the Rhine all morning, to devise the best mode of his arrest. It appeared from the depositions of two of the prisoners who had been apprehended, that a mysterious person had been present at some of the meetings of the Royalist chiefs, who was treated by Georges with the utmost respect, and in whose presence none of the persons assembled sat down.‡ Sus-

11.  
His arrest is unjustly resolved on by Napoleon and the council of state.

\* The Prince of Condé, grandfather of the Duc d'Enghien, had acted in an equally generous manner, when a proposal was made to him by a person who offered to assassinate the First Consul. In a letter to the Comte d'Artois, he gives the following account of the transaction :—" Yesterday, a man arrived here (in London) on foot, as he said, from Paris to Calais. His manner was gentle, and tone of voice sweet, notwithstanding the errand on which he came. Understanding that you were not here, he came to me at eleven o'clock in the morning, and proposed, with the greatest simplicity, to get quit of the usurper in the most expeditious manner. I did not give him time to conclude the details of his project, but instantly rejected them with the horror they were fitted to inspire, assuring him, at the same time, that if you were here you would do the same ; that we should ever be the enemies of the man who had usurped the power and throne of our king, as long as he excluded him from it ; that we had combated him with open arms, and would do so again, if an occasion should present itself ; but that we would never carry on hostility by such means, which were suited only to the Jacobins ; and that, if they betook themselves to crimes, certainly we should not follow their example. I then sent for the Baron de Roll, who confirmed all that I had said of your determination in that respect."—*Réfutation de M. LE DUC DE ROVIGO*, 49 ; *Pièces Just.* No. 1.

Generous conduct of his grandfather, on a proposal to assassinate Napoleon. Jan. 24, 1802.

† THIERS' *Consulat et l'Empire*, iv. 567.

‡ The description they gave was as follows :—" Every ten or twelve days, their master received a visit from a person with whose name they were unac-

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XXXVIII.  
1804.

picion turned on some prince of the blood as the only person to whom these marks of respect were likely to be shown; and no one was thought to answer the description so completely as the Duc d'Enghien, who at that period was at Ettenheim, a chateau situated on the right bank of the Rhine, in the territories of the Duke of Baden, and four leagues from Strassburg. A confidential officer was despatched to that city to make inquiry; he ascertained that the duke was frequently at its theatre, lived a very retired life, was sometimes absent for ten or twelve days together, and appeared passionately fond of hunting, in which the greater part of his time was employed. On this slender basis did this iniquitous council of state, under the immediate direction of Napoleon, hold it established that the Duc d'Enghien was the mysterious stranger alluded to in the depositions of Georges' associates. Upon this Napoleon himself dictated and signed an order for his arrest in a neutral territory, with such minute directions for the seizure of the prince and his conveyance to Strassburg, that it was evident his destruction was already resolved on.\* Cambacérès, the second consul, who had voted in the Convention for the death of Louis, made the strongest remonstrances against this proposed measure, especially its accomplishment by means of a violation of the neutral territory of Baden; but Napoleon cut him short by the observation,—“ You have *become* singularly chary of the blood of the Bourbons. I know and respect the motive which makes you speak so; it is your devotion to me.<sup>1</sup> I thank you, but

\* BOUR. v.  
305, 306.  
ROVIGO, ii.  
34, 37.  
MÉMOIRS, iv.

quainted, but who was evidently a man of high importance. He appeared to be about thirty-six years of age, his hair was light, his height and size of ordinary dimensions, his dress elegant; he was always received with great respect, and when he entered the apartment all present rose, and remained standing, without the exception even of MM. Polignac and Rivière. He was frequently closeted with Georges, and on these occasions they were always alone.”—ROVIGO'S *Memoir*, 11.

\* Napoleon enjoined the officer intrusted with the mission to take two hundred dragoons, and send three hundred more, with four pieces of light cannon, to Kehl, and a hundred men, with two pieces of cannon, from New Brisach.—See ROVIGO, ii. 266; *Pièces Just.* No. 1.

not submit to be killed without defending myself. I am determined to make these people tremble ; I will teach them to remain quiet.”\*

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.  
1804.

The truth was, that the unfortunate prince was at Ettenheim, on account of a passion with which he was inspired for the Princess de Rohan, an emigrant lady of distinction in that neighbourhood, and it was to visit her that he was absent for the periods which, as it seemed to the suspicious mind of the First Consul, could have been for no other purpose but to concert measures with Georges in the French metropolis. His mode of life is thus described by Savary, who afterwards was so deeply implicated in his execution. “Several emigrants had arrived in the environs, and were entertained by the prince. He was passionately fond of the chase, had a *liaison de cœur* with a French lady who shared his exile, and was frequently absent for several days together. This may easily be conceived, when it is recollected what a passion for the chase is, and what the attractions of the mountains of the Black Forest.”<sup>1</sup> In reality, he had never been at Paris at all, nor engaged in any conspiracy whatever against either the government or life of the First Consul ; and the mysterious stranger who was supposed to be him, in the conferences with Georges, afterwards turned out to be Pichegru.<sup>2</sup>

12.  
Occupation  
of the Prince  
at that time.

<sup>2</sup> Bour. v.  
307. Rev.  
ii. 59.

The designs of the First Consul were too faithfully carried into effect. The execution of the order was

\* “Le Consul Cambacérès eut le courage de résister ouvertement à l’avis qu’on arrêterait le Duc d’Enghien. Il s’efforça de montrer tout ce qu’avait de dangereux une résolution de cette nature, soit pour le dedans, soit pour le dehors, et le caractère de violence qu’elle ne pouvait manquer d’imprimer au gouvernement du Premier Consul. Il fit valoir surtout cette considération, qu’il serait déjà bien grave d’arrêter, de juger, de fusiller un prince du sang royal, même surpris en flagrant délit sur le sol Français, mais que l’aller chercher sur le sol étranger, c’était, indépendamment d’une violation de territoire, le saisir quand il avait pour lui toutes les apparences de l’innocence, et se donner à soi toutes les apparences d’un abus odieux de la force. Il conjura le Premier Consul, pour sa gloire personnelle, pour l’honneur de sa politique, de ne pas se permettre un acte qui replacerait son gouvernement au rang de ces gouvernements révolutionnaires, dont il avait mis tant de soin à se distinguer.”—CAMBACÉRÈS, *Mémoires*, ii. 297 ; THIERS, *Consulat et l’Empire*, iv. 593-594.

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13.  
He is seized  
and conducted  
to Strass-  
burg. Vain  
intercession  
of Josephine.

intrusted to General Ordaner, who, following punctually the directions he had received, set out from New Brisach with three hundred gens-d'armes, and arrested the prince in his bed at night on the 15th March, in Ettenheim, on the German side of the Rhine. He was immediately conducted to Strassburg, with all his papers and all the persons in the house, and intelligence despatched to Paris by the telegraph of his arrest. When it was known at the Tuileries that he had been seized, Josephine, who never failed to exert her influence on behalf of misfortune, implored the First Consul to show mercy. She threw herself on her knees, and earnestly begged his life : but he said, with a stern air, "Mind your own matters ; these are not the affairs of women ; let me alone." His violence on this occasion exceeded anything that had been witnessed since the terrible explosion of jealousy on his return from Egypt. He was so prepossessed with the idea that the Bourbon princes were one and all leagued in a plot against his life, that he was incapable of exercising the natural powers of his mind in considering the evidence on the subject. "I am resolved," said he, "to put an end to these conspiracies ; if the emigrants will conspire, I will cause them to be shot. I am told there are some of them concealed in the hotel of M. de Cobentzell" (the Austrian ambassador ;) "I do not believe it ; if it were so, I would shoot Cobentzell along with them. The Bourbons must be taught that they are not to sport with life with impunity ; such matters are not child's play."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
316, 341.

14.  
He had been  
vainly warn-  
ed of his  
danger, and  
is removed  
to Vincen-  
nes.

M. Talleyrand, aware of the imminent danger which the duke ran if he continued in his residence at Ettenheim, had secretly sent him warning to remove, through the lady to whom he was attached at that place, and similar intelligence was at the same time transmitted by the King of Sweden, by means of his minister at Carlsruhe. It augments our regret at the issue of this melancholy tale, that he was only prevented from

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XXXV.  
180.

availing himself of the intelligence, and escaping the danger, by the tardiness of the Austrian authorities in procuring him passports. Upon receiving the warning he resolved to join his grandfather, but in doing so it was necessary that he should pass through part of the Austrian territories. The English ambassador at Vienna wrote for this purpose to the Austrian government to demand a passport for the duke, and it was their tardiness in answering that occasioned the delay, which permitted his arrest by Napoleon, and cost him his life. Orders arrived at Strassburg from Paris, on the 18th March, to have the Duc d'Enghien forthwith forwarded to the capital. The carriage which conveyed him arrived at the barriers of Paris on the 20th, at eleven o'clock forenoon. He was there stopped, and detained for above five hours, until orders were received from the First Consul. No council was summoned; Napoleon took upon himself alone the disposal of his fate. At four in the evening orders arrived to have him conducted by the exterior barriers to VINCENNES—an ancient castellated fortress of great strength, a mile and a half beyond the faubourg St Antoine, which had been long used as a state prison—and it was dark before he arrived there. A century and a half before, his ancestor the great Condé had been imprisoned in the same fortress by orders of Cardinal Mazarin. Everything was already prepared for his reception; not only his chamber was ready, but his grave was dug.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
304, 305,  
328, 330.  
Rev. ii. 300.

No sooner was Napoleon informed of the arrival of the Duc d'Enghien at the barriers, than he wrote out and signed an order\* for his immediate delivery to a military commission, to be tried for bearing arms against the

\* The order was as follows :—

“*Paris, 29 Ventôse, Ann. 12.*

“The government of the Republic decree as follows :—

“Art. 1.—The late Duke d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the Republic; of having been and still being in the pay of England; of being

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1804.

15.

Where he is  
delivered  
over to a  
military  
commission  
by Napo-  
leon's or-  
ders.

Republic, for having been in the pay of England, and engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic. Murat united his entreaties to those of Josephine, but without effect. Napoleon received his representations with a severe air, taxed Murat with pusillanimity, and said he would spare his cowardice by himself signing the order, which he accordingly did. It was directed to Murat, the governor of Paris, who forthwith sent for General Hullin and six of the senior colonels of regiments in Paris, to form a military commission. They immediately proceeded to Vincennes, where they found Savary, with a strong body of *gendarmérie d'élite*, in possession of the castle and all the avenues leading to its approach. The subsequent proceedings cannot be better given than in the words of M. Harel, the governor of the castle. "In the evening of the 20th March, when the prince arrived at the barrier, they sent to inquire of me whether I could lodge a prisoner in the castle. I answered that I could not, as no rooms were in repair but my own chamber and the council hall. They desired me to prepare a room for a prisoner, who would arrive in the evening, and to *dig a grave in the court*. I said that would not be easy, as the court was paved. They replied, I

engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic, shall be delivered over to a military commission, composed of seven members named by the governor of Paris, who shall assemble at Vincennes.

"The grand judge, minister of war, and general governor of Paris, are charged with the execution of the present decree.

"The First Consul (signed) BUONAPARTE.

"By the First Consul (signed) HUGHES MARET.

"A true copy.

"The General-in-Chief, Governor of Paris,"

"(Signed) MURAT."

See *Mémoire de M. DUPIN sur les actes de la Commission Militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien*, 88; *Pièces Just.* No. 2.

In Murat's order, following on this decree, the commission was directed to "assemble immediately at the castle of Vincennes, to take cognisance, without separating, of the accused, on the charges set forth in the decree of the government."—*Ibid.* 93.

must then find another place; and we fixed on the ditch, where in effect it was prepared. The prince arrived at seven in the evening; he was dying of cold and hunger, but his air was by no means melancholy. As his room was not yet ready, I received him into my own, and sent out to get food in the village. The prince sat down to table, and invited me to partake his refreshments. He put many questions about Vincennes, and told me he had been brought up in the environs of the castle, and conversed with much kindness and affability. He repeatedly asked, What do they want with me? what are they going to do with me?—but these questions made no alteration in his tranquillity, and indicated no inquietude. My wife, who was unwell, was in bed in an alcove in the same room, concealed by a tapestry; her emotion was extreme, for she was foster-sister to the prince, had enjoyed a pension from his family before the Revolution, and she at once recognised him by his voice.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
328, 330,  
331. Biog.  
des Con-  
temporains,  
Art. D'En-  
ghien. Rev.  
ii. 239.  
Thiers, iv.  
600, 601.

The duke went to bed shortly after; but before he had time to fall asleep the officers arrived, and conducted him into the council-chamber. General Hullin and six other officers were there assembled; Savary appeared soon after the interrogatories began, and took his station in front of the fire, immediately behind the president's chair. The accused was charged with “having borne arms against the Republic; with having offered his services to the English government, the enemies of the French people; with having received and accredited the agents of the English government, and furnished them with the means of obtaining intelligence, and conspired with them against the exterior and interior security of the state; with having put himself at the head of an assemblage of emigrants and others in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France in the territory of Baden; carried on communications in Strassburg calculated to disturb the peace of the adjoining departments, and favour the views of England;”<sup>2</sup> and being engaged in the conspiracy set on

16.  
Gross ini-  
quity com-  
mitted to-  
wards him.

<sup>2</sup> Jugement  
sur le Duc  
d'Enghien,  
Mem. par  
Dupin, 49.



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XXXVIII.

1804.

<sup>1</sup> Dupin,  
12, 13.

foot at Paris against the life of the First Consul, and being about, in case of its success, to enter France." The law, in such a case, required that a counsel should be allowed to the accused; but none was permitted to the prince, and he was obliged, at midnight, to enter unaided upon his defence.<sup>1</sup>

17.  
He is con-only,  
ut any  
evidence.

No evidence whatever was brought forward against the accused; no witnesses were examined; the documentary evidence consisted only of one single writing, namely, the act of accusation.\* The whole case against him rested upon the answers he gave to the interrogatories put by the commission, and they were clear, consistent, and unequivocal, openly avowing the truth, but containing not one single admission which could be tortured into evidence of his culpability.† "There were," says Savary, the warmest apologist of Napoleon, "neither documents, nor proofs, nor witnesses, against the prince; and in his declaration he emphatically denied the accusation brought against him. His connexions with England, in the rank in which he was born, his correspondence with his grand-

\* "On n'avait," says Savary, "*qu'un seul document* pour toute pièce de charge et de décharge; c'était l'arrêt des consuls du 20 Mars. La minute du jugement rédigée à Vincennes le porte textuellement, 'Lecture faite des pièces tant à charge qu'à décharge au nombre d'une.'"—ROVIGO, ii. 251.

† The material parts of the declaration were as follows:—

Being asked if he had taken up arms against France, he answered, "That he had served through the whole war; that he had never been in England, but had received a pension from that power, and had no other means of subsistence; that he had resided for two years and a half at Ettenheim in the Brisgau, by permission from the sovereigns of that country; that he had applied for permission to reside at Friburg, also in the Brisgau, and remained only at Ettenheim for the pleasures of the chase; that he had corresponded with his grandfather in London, and also with his father, whom he had never seen since 1795; that he had been commander of the advanced-guard since 1796, and acted with the advanced-guard before that time; that he had never seen General Picquegru, and had no connexion whatever with him; that he knew he desired to see him, but he congratulated himself upon his not having seen him, if it were true that he had intended to make use of the vile means ascribed to him; that he had no connexion with General Dumourier, and never saw him; and that since the peace he had occasionally corresponded with some of his comrades in the interior of the Republic on their own affairs and his, but no correspondence had taken place of the kind alluded to in the interrogatory."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See the declarations in Savary, ii. 275. Pièces Just. No. iv.

The iniquities committed on the trial of the Duc d'Enghien were so nume-

father, the Prince of Condé, could not be considered as evidence of any conspiracy. And even if it had been otherwise, what judge is so ignorant as not to know that the admissions of an accused person are never sufficient to condemn him, if unsupported by other testimony?"—"I must confess," says General Hullin, "the prince presented himself before us with a noble assurance; he indignantly repelled the aspersion of having been, directly or indirectly, engaged in any conspiracy against the life of the First Consul, but admitted having borne arms against France, saying, with a courage and resolution which forbade us even for his own sake to make him vary on that point, 'that he had maintained the rights of his family, and that a Condé could never re-enter France but with arms in his hands. My birth, my opinions, render me for ever the enemy of your government.'"<sup>1</sup>

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1804.

<sup>1</sup> Rev. ii.  
252. Hul-  
lin, 7, 8.

At the conclusion of his declaration, the prince added : —" Before signing the present *procès verbal*, I earnestly request to be permitted to have a private audience of the First Consul. My name, my rank, my habits of thought,

18.  
His noble  
demeanour  
before the  
judges.

rous as to render it one of the most atrocious proceedings recorded in history. 1. The neutral territory of the Grand-duke of Baden was violated by an armed force, without a shadow of reason, to arrest an individual engaged in no overt acts of hostility, upon the mere suspicion of his being engaged in correspondence with the conspirators in France. 2. The arrest was illegal, on the footing of having borne arms against the Republic; for the decrees of the Convention and Directory on that subject, inhuman as they were, applied only to emigrants taken in France, or in any enemy's or conquered country, and Baden was neither the one nor the other, but a friendly state. 3. The laws against the emigrants did not apply to the Bourbons, who were a class apart, and were for ever banished from the French territory; and, even such as these laws were, they had been universally mitigated in practice since the accession of the First Consul. 4. The military commission was incompetent to try plots undertaken against the Republic, the cognisance of these being confined to the ordinary tribunals. 5. The whole proceedings at Vincennes were illegal, as having been carried on, contrary to law, in the night; as no defender or counsel was assigned to the accused; as no witnesses or documents were adduced against him; as his declarations admitted nothing criminal, and, if they had, they would not *per se* have warranted a conviction; as the conviction did not specify of what he was found guilty, and left a *blank* for the laws under which the sentence was pronounced—all directly in the face of statutory enactments.—See an able *Memoir* by DUPIN, i. 20; *Discussion des Actes de la Commission Militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien*.

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<sup>1</sup> Hullin, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Hullin,  
13, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Rev. ii.  
250.

19.  
His sentence  
and execu-  
tion.

and the horror of my situation, induce me to hope that he will accede to that demand." A member of the commission proposed that the request should be forwarded to Napoleon; but Savary, who was behind the president, represented that such a demand was inopportune.<sup>1</sup> The request, however, made such an impression, that when the sentence was about to be made out, the president took up the pen, and was beginning to write a letter, expressing the wish of the prince to have an interview with Napoleon; but Savary whispered to him, "What are you about?"—"I am writing," said he, "to the First Consul, to express the wish of the commission and of the accused."—"Your affair is finished," replied Savary, taking the pen out of his hand: "that is my business."<sup>2</sup>—"In truth," says Savary, "General Hullin had received the most severe instructions. Even the case of the accused demanding an interview with the First Consul had been provided for, and he had been prohibited from forwarding such a communication to the government."<sup>3</sup>

Without a vestige of evidence against the prince, did this iniquitous military tribunal, acting under the orders of a still more iniquitous government, find him guilty of all the charges, and order him to be immediately executed. After the interrogatory had ceased, and while the commission were deliberating with closed doors, he returned to his chamber and fell asleep. "He was so well aware of his approaching fate," says Harel, "that, when they conducted him by torch-light down the broken and winding staircase which led to the fosse where the execution was to take place, he asked where they were taking him, and pressing my arm, said, 'Are they going to leave me to perish in a dungeon, or throw me into an *oubliette*?' " When he arrived at the foot of the stair, and, entering into the fatal ditch, saw, through the gray mist of the morning, a file of men drawn up, he uttered an expression of joy at being permitted to die the death of a soldier, and only requested that a confessor might be

sent for: but this last request was denied him. He then cut off a lock of his hair, which he delivered with his watch and ring to the officer who attended him, to be forwarded to the Princess de Rohan and his parents; and turning to the soldiers, exclaimed, "I die for my king and for France!" calmly gave the word of command, and fell pierced by seven balls. His remains were immediately thrown, dressed as they were, into the grave which had been prepared the evening before at the foot of the rampart.<sup>1\*</sup>

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XXXVIII.  
1804.

<sup>1</sup> Mém. sur  
le Duc d'En-  
ghien, ii.  
171, 172.  
Rev. Vindi-  
cation, 40.  
Bour.v. 332,  
333.

No other authority than that of Napoleon himself is required to stamp the character of this transaction. Immediately after the execution was over, Savary hastened to the First Consul to inform him of what had been done. He received the account with much emotion. "There is something here," said he, "which surpasses my comprehension. Here is a crime, and one which leads to nothing." The prince's innocence was soon completely demonstrated. Hardly were his uncoffined remains cold in their grave, when the witnesses who had spoken of the mysterious personage who met with Georges, and was supposed to be the Duc d'Enghien, upon being confronted with Pichegru, at once recognised him as the person to whom they had alluded. "The First Consul," says Savary, "upon receiving this information, mused long, and gave vent, by an exclamation of grief, to his regret at having consented to the seizure of that unhappy man. Notwithstanding his obvious interest to have the affair cleared up, he enjoined absolute silence regarding it,<sup>2</sup> either because he considered such conduct most condu-

<sup>20.</sup>  
His inno-  
cence is  
completely  
established  
after his  
death.

<sup>2</sup> Rev. ii. 57.

\* The spot where this murder was committed is marked by a little cross in the bottom of the fosse of Vincennes, on the side of the forest, about twenty yards from the drawbridge leading into the inner building. The author visited it in August 1833, when the cannon on the ramparts were loaded with grape-shot, and the whole walls of the fortress were covered with workmen armed to the teeth, converting the Gothic edifice into a stronghold destined to bridle the licentious population of Paris, and establish the military despotism of Louis Philippe. The monument of feudal power, the scene of despotic cruelty, the instrument of revolutionary punishment, arose at once to the view. "Les hommes agissent," says Bossuet, "mais Dieu les mène."

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1804.

21.

Napoleon's  
ati  
sel  
at St He-  
lena.

cive to his interest, or because he was unwilling to confess the error into which he had fallen.

The murder of the Duc d'Enghien was so atrocious a proceeding, that almost every one concerned in it has made an effort to throw the blame off his own shoulders, and implicate more deeply the other actors in the bloody tragedy. Savary, General Hullin, and Napoleon himself, have all endeavoured to vindicate themselves at the expense of their associates in the crime; but the only inference which can justly be drawn from a comparison of their observations is, that they were all guilty, and the First Consul most of all. In commenting on this subject, which frequently recurred to his thoughts during the solitude of St Helena, he at times ascribed the catastrophe to a deplorable excess of zeal in the persons by whom he was surrounded;<sup>1</sup> at others to an unfortunate prepossession, taken up at an unguarded moment, when he was worked up to madness by the reports he received of conspiracies and plots in every direction around him;<sup>2</sup> but in his testament he reverted to the more manly course of admitting the deed, taking upon himself its whole responsibility, and endeavouring to justify it on reasons of state necessity. "I arrested the Duc d'Enghien," said he in that solemn instrument, "because that measure was necessary to the security, the interest, and the honour of the French people, when the Comte d'Artois maintained, on his own admission, sixty assassins. In similar circumstances I would do the same."<sup>3</sup> As if any reasons of honour, interest, or security, can ever call for or justify the death of an innocent man without either inquiry, evidence, or trial.\*

vii. 257.

<sup>2</sup> Las Cas.  
vii. 253,  
257.

<sup>3</sup> Test. de  
Nap. sec. 6,  
in Antom-  
archi, ii.  
App.

<sup>4</sup> Las Cas.  
vii. 258.

<sup>5</sup> Savary's  
Vindication,  
60.

\* It is but justice to Napoleon, however, to add, that he said at St Helena:—"Most certainly, if I had been informed in time of certain features in the opinions and character of the prince, and especially if I had seen a letter which he wrote to me, but which was never delivered, God knows for what reason, till after he was no more, most certainly I would have pardoned him."<sup>4</sup> Savary asserts that Napoleon said to Réal, after hearing the circumstances of the prince's death,—“Unhappy T——, what have you made me to do?”<sup>5</sup> And Napoleon said to O'Meara at St Helena, that Talleyrand had kept the duke's

A memorable retribution awaited all the actors in this bloody tragedy. Murat, seized eleven years afterwards on the Neapolitan territory, when attempting to excite the people to a revolt, was delivered over to a military commission, tried under a law which he himself had made, and shot. General Hullin, after having spent, as he himself said, "twenty years in unavailing regrets; bowed down by misfortune; blind, and unhappy," wished for the grave to relieve him from his sufferings;<sup>1</sup> Savary lived to witness calamities to himself and his country, sufficient, in his own words, to draw from his eyes tears of blood;<sup>2</sup> and Napoleon, vanquished in war, precipitated from his throne, stripped of his possessions, was left an exile amidst the melancholy main, to reflect on the eternal laws of justice which he had violated, and the boundless gifts of fortune which he had misapplied.\* Whether Providence interferes in the affairs of mankind by any other method than by general laws, and through the indignation which deeds of violence excite in the human heart, must remain for ever a mystery; but in many cases the connexion between national not less than individual crime, and its appropriate punishment, is so evident as to be obvious even on the surface of history. The murder of the Duc d'Enghien lighted again the flames of Continental war, and induced that terrible strife which ultimately brought the Tartars of the desert to the walls of Paris. From it may be dated the commencement of that train of events which precipitated Napoleon from the throne of Charlemagne to the rock of St Helena.

When the melancholy event was known in Paris on the morning of the 21st, a universal stupor and conster-

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1804.

22.

Remarkable retribution which overtook all the actors in the murder.

<sup>1</sup> Hullin's Memoirs, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Savary, iv. 362.

<sup>3</sup> O'Meara, i. 321, 346.

\* "Ὡδε τις κακούργος ὦν

Μη μοι, το πρῶτον βῆμ' εἰν δρᾶμῃ καλῶς

Νικᾶν δοκεῖτω τὴν δίκην, πρὶν αὖ πελᾶς

Γραμμῆς ἔκηται, καὶ τέλος καμψῇ βίου."

EURIPIDES, *Electra*, 959.

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XXXVIII.

1804.

23.

Consterna-  
tion which  
the act ex-  
cites in  
Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Rev. ii. 45.  
Bour. v. 339.  
Bign. v. 343.  
Thiers, iv.  
608.

24.  
And in the  
foreign am-  
bassadors.

<sup>2</sup> M. Darl-  
berg's letter,  
March 22,  
1804, Paris.  
Rev. ii. 290.

nation prevailed. Few were to be found who approved of the deed; distrust, terror, anxiety, were depicted in every countenance. It was openly stigmatised by a great proportion of the people as a bloody and needless assassination; among none was the general grief more poignant than among the warmest partisans of Napoleon. The bright morning of the consulate seemed overcast, and the empire to be ushered in by deeds of oriental cruelty. Crowds issued daily through the Barrière du Trône, to visit, in the fosse of Vincennes, the spot where the victim had suffered; a favourite spaniel, which had followed the prince to the place of execution, faithful to death, was to be seen constantly lying on the grave. The interest excited by its appearance was so strong, that by an order of the police the dog was removed, and all access to the place prohibited. The First Consul received a select circle in the evening at the Tuileries. He spoke much on Tacitus, and the Roman emperors whose deeds he has recounted. At length reverting to the subject which occupied every mind, he said, "They wished to stab the Revolution to the heart in my person: I will defend it, for *I am the Revolution*. This will not be doubted from this day. They see of what I am capable."<sup>1</sup>

The consternation which prevailed among the members of the diplomatic body was still greater. Couriers were instantly despatched to St Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and London; and the ambassadors of all the powers at Paris met to concert measures on the subject. "All Paris," says M. Darlberg, the plenipotentiary of Baden, "is in consternation; Europe will shudder at the deed. We are approaching a terrible crisis: the ambition of Buonaparte knows no bounds; nothing is sacred in his eyes: he will sacrifice everything to his passions. MM. Cobentzell, Lucchesini, and d'Oubril are concerting measures on the part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia."<sup>2</sup> M. Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs, gave a ball on the night of the day on which the prince was executed;

but its aspect was mournful, and several members of the diplomatic body sent their apologies. The cabinet of Prussia presented an energetic note, complaining of the violation of the territory of Baden; while that of Russia ordered a court mourning for the prince's death, which was worn by all the ambassadors of that power at foreign courts, and addressed a vigorous remonstrance to the French government. The higher classes at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, were vehement in their condemnation of the sanguinary proceeding; the indignation of the English people, the impassioned tone of the English press, knew no bounds; and already were to be seen, both in the state of the diplomatic relations of the European powers, and the feelings awakened in their subjects, the seeds of the coalition which brought the Continent in arms to the fields of Austerlitz and Eylau.<sup>1</sup>

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1804.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
345. Ann.  
Reg. 1804.  
State Pa-  
pers, 642.  
Bour. vi.  
4, 5. Rev.  
ii. 244. M.  
Darlberg's  
letter,  
March 22,  
1804. Rev.  
ii. 290.  
Thiers, v.  
2, 3.

That indignation which the monarchies of Europe did not as yet venture openly to express, a single courageous individual, but one whose weight was equal to a nation in arms, did not hesitate immediately to manifest. The illustrious author of the "*Génie du Christianisme*," M. CHATEAUBRIAND, had been recently appointed ambassador of France to the republic of the Valais, and he was presented to the First Consul on the morning of the 21st, to take leave preparatory to his departure. He observed at the time a striking alteration on the visage of the First Consul, and a sombre expression in his countenance; his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal what was passing in his mind; but Chateaubriand knew of nothing at the time to which it could have been owing. Hardly had he left the Tuileries when intelligence arrived of the death of the Duc d'Enghien; he instantly sent in his resignation of the appointment. This intrepid conduct excited a vehement burst of anger in the breast of the First Consul; and the friends of Chateaubriand were in the greatest alarm every morning for a considerable time, expecting to hear of his arrest during the night;

25.  
Courageous  
conduct of  
M. Chateau-  
briand.



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1804.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
348, 349.  
Bign. iii.  
344.

but the Princess Eliza, who entertained the highest admiration for that great author, at length succeeded in averting a tempest which, in its outset, might have proved fatal to one of the brightest ornaments of modern literature. From that period, however, may be dated the commencement of that enmity between him and the First Consul, which continued uninterrupted till the Restoration.<sup>1</sup>

26.  
Opinion  
which Na-  
poleon en-  
tertained of  
him.

Napoleon was strongly irritated by any opposition to his wishes, or resistance to his will, and accordingly he never forgave Chateaubriand for the public reproof administered on this memorable occasion; but his feelings had no influence on his judgment, and no man could better appreciate dignified or heroic conduct in an adversary. Although, therefore, the author of the "Genius of Christianity" never afterwards received encouragement from the First Consul, he occupied a high place in his esteem; and this continued in exile, even after the essential injury done by that author to his cause by the celebrated pamphlet on the "Constitutional monarchy," published at the Restoration. "Chateaubriand," said he, "has received from nature the sacred fire; his works attest it; his style is not that of Racine, it is that of a prophet. There is no one but himself in the world who could have said with impunity in the Chamber of Peers, that 'the great-coat and hat of Napoleon placed on the end of a stick on the coast of Brest, would make Europe run to arms from one end to another.'"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Nap. i.  
Mont. iv.  
248. Bour.  
v. 349, 359.

27.  
Death of  
Pichegru.

This tragic event was soon followed by another still more mysterious. Early on the morning of the 6th April, General Pichegru was found strangled in prison. Since his apprehension he had undergone ten separate examinations, in the course of which he had been repeatedly confronted with Georges, Lajolais, and all the witnesses who were examined against them. On all occasions, however, he had evinced an unconquerable firmness and resolution. No one was injured by his answers; and

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nothing whatever had been elicited from him calculated to effect the great object of implicating Moreau in the conspiracy. Such was the effect produced by his courageous demeanour, that Réal, the police magistrate, said openly before several persons on coming from one of his examinations,—“What a man that Pichegru is!” In all his declarations he was careful to abstain from anything which might involve any other person, and exhibited a grandeur of character and generous resolution in his fetters, which excited the admiration even of his enemies. He positively refused, however, to sign any of his judicial declarations; alleging as a reason, that he was too well acquainted with the arts of the police, who, having once got his signature, would by a chemical process efface all the writing which stood above it, and insert another statement, containing everything which they wished him to admit. He loudly announced his intention of speaking out boldly on his trial, and in particular declared that he was resolved “to unfold the odious means by which he and his companions had been entrapped into the conspiracy by the police: that they had now become fully sensible of the Machiavelian devices which had been practised upon them, from the facility given to their landing and coming to Paris, and the utter nullity of all the reports they had received of the general disposition in their favour: that having had their eyes at length opened, they were only solicitous to get out of Paris, and were making preparations for that purpose when they were arrested by the police.” This intention to speak out at the trial was in an especial manner declared on the day of his last examination before Réal, and next morning, at eight o’clock, he was found strangled in his cell.<sup>1</sup>

Germinal  
16.  
<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
23, 31. Bign  
iii. 411.

The surgeons who were called to examine the body of the deceased signed a report, in which they stated that “the body was found with a black silk handkerchief hard twisted round the neck by means of a small stick about five inches long, which was kept tight on the left cheek, on

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28.

The surgeons' report on his death, and presumptions against Napoleon.

which it rested, by one end, which prevented it from unwinding, and produced the strangulation which had terminated in death." The gendarmes in attendance declared that they heard no noise, except a considerable coughing on the part of the general, which lasted till one, when it ceased; and that the sound resembled that of a person who had difficulty of respiration. This is all the light which positive evidence throws on this mysterious transaction: but it were well for the memory of Napoleon if moral presumptions of greater strength than any such testimony did not incline to the darker side.\* "When you would discover," says Machiavel, "who is the author of a crime, consider who had an interest to commit it." Judging by this standard, moral presumption weighs heavily against the First Consul. He was on the eve of the greatest step in his life. The imperial sceptre was within his grasp, and the public authorities had already been instructed to petition him to assume the crown of Charlemagne. At the same time the crisis was of the most violent kind. The royalist party were in the highest state of excitement, in consequence of the execution of the Duc d'Enghien; the republicans, in sullen indignation, awaited the trial of Moreau.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi. 31, 32. Rev. ii. 55. Ann. Reg. 1804, 638. State Papers.

29.

Reflections on the probable privy of the First Consul to his death.

In these critical circumstances it was impossible to over-estimate the effect which might have been produced on such inflammable materials by the bold declarations of Pichegru at his trial, openly denouncing the intrigues and treachery of the police, and tearing aside the veil which concealed the dark transactions by which Fouché had precipitated the leaders of the opposite parties into measures so eminently calculated to aid the ascent of

\* It is not the least interesting circumstance in this melancholy story, that Pichegru had been the school companion of Napoleon at the military academy of Brienne. They had been bred up in the same house, and it was he who taught Napoleon the four first rules of arithmetic. Though considerably older than the First Consul, they had received their commissions as lieutenants of artillery at the same time. Now the one was about to ascend the throne of France, while the other was strangled in a dungeon.—See BOURRIENNE, vi. 1, 315.

Napoleon to the throne. The First Consul, it is true, had no cause either to be apprehensive of Pichegru, or to doubt his conviction at the trial. But his ministers had every reason to fear the effect which might be produced by the revelations made by so energetic and intrepid a character, and the strongest grounds for believing that he would utterly negative all attempts to implicate his great rival Moreau in the conspiracy. In these circumstances, private assassination became the obvious expedient, and within the gloomy walls of the Temple numerous wretches were to be found, trained to crime, and profoundly versed in all the means of perpetrating it in the way most likely to avoid detection. There can be no reasonable doubt, therefore, that Pichegru was murdered, but there is no positive evidence to connect Napoleon with the act; and the probability is, that it was perpetrated by Fouché and the police, to prevent the exposure of the infamous means used by them to implicate both Moreau and the royalists in the trammels of the conspiracy, which they had so much reason to apprehend from the illustrious captive's known character and declared resolution.

This view is strongly confirmed, when it is recollected, on the other hand, that Pichegru himself had no conceivable motive for committing suicide. Death to so old a soldier and determined a character could have few terrors: and the experience of the Revolution has proved that its prospect hardly ever led to self-destruction. He had uniformly and energetically declared his resolution to speak fully out at the trial, and nothing had occurred to shake that determination, for his own condemnation he must from the first have regarded as certain. Voluntary strangulation in the way in which Pichegru perished, if not an impossible, is at least a very difficult act; the religious impressions which he had preserved from his youth upwards rendered it highly improbable on his part; and the secrecy which government maintained in regard to his declarations, necessarily led to the conclusion that

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30.  
Confirmation  
of the  
probability  
of his assassi-  
nation  
from his pre-  
vious ex-  
pressions.

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they contained matter which it was deemed advisable to bury in the tomb. So universal was the impression produced by these circumstances, that M. Réal, on the morning of his death, said, "Though nothing can be more apparent than that this was a suicide, yet it will always be said that, despairing of conviction, we strangled him in prison ;"<sup>1</sup> a *cri de conscience* which, coming from such a character, at so early a period, is not the least remarkable circumstance in this mysterious case. Bourrienne, Napoleon's private secretary, declares it as his firm conviction that he was murdered ;<sup>2</sup> and Savary, while he denies this himself, tells us that the belief of his assassination was so general, that a high functionary, a friend of his own, spoke of it some years afterwards as a matter concerning which no doubt could be entertained, and mentioned the gendarmes as the persons by whom the bloody deed had been carried into execution.<sup>3</sup>\* The populace of Paris, struck by the mysterious circumstances of his death, ascribed it to the Mamelukes who had accompanied Napoleon from Egypt, and had been trained to such deeds in the recesses of the eastern seraglios.<sup>4</sup>

31.  
Speech of  
Georges to  
his fellow-  
prisoners,  
before being  
brought to  
trial.

At length, after long and tedious preparatory examinations, Moreau, Georges, the two Polignacs, de Rivière, and the other accused, were brought to trial. To diminish the chance of an acquittal, advantage was taken of the clause in the constitution which permitted trial by jury in certain cases to be dispensed with, to pronounce it immediately for the department of the Seine, where the

Napoleon's  
defence of  
himself on  
this subject  
at St Helena.

\* In discoursing on this subject at St Helena, Napoleon observed, "that he would be ashamed to defend himself against such a charge ; its absurdity was so manifest on its very face. What could I gain by it ? A man of my character does not act without sufficient motives. Have I ever been known to shed blood from mere caprice ? Whatever efforts may have been made to blacken my memory, those who know me are aware that my nature is foreign to crime ; there is not in my whole career a single act of which I could not speak before any tribunal on earth—I do not say without embarrassment, but with advantage. In truth, Pichegru saw that his situation was desperate ; his daring mind could not endure the infamy of punishment ; he despaired of my clemency, or despised it, and put himself to death. Had I been inclined to commit a crime, it was not Pichegru, but Moreau, that I would have struck."<sup>5</sup> Had Napoleon's veracity been equal to his ability as a chronicler of the events of his time, this

<sup>5</sup> Las Cus.  
vii. 344.

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trial was to take place. Before leaving the Temple, Georges harangued the other prisoners in the court, and earnestly recommended prudence and moderation, and that they should abstain from criminating each other. The solemnity of the occasion, and the recollection that it was from the same walls that Louis XVI. had been taken to the scaffold, had subdued to a sadder and milder mood his naturally daring and vehement character. "If in the trials which await us," said he, "your firmness should ever forsake you, look on me; recollect that I am with you; remember my fate will be the same as your own. Yes! we cannot be separated in death, and it is that which should console us. Continue, then, mild and considerate towards each other; redouble your mutual regards; let your common fate draw tighter the bonds of your affection. Look not back to the past. We are placed in our present position by the will of God; in the hour of death let us pray that our country, rescued from the yoke which oppresses it, may one day be blessed under the rule of the Bourbons. Never forget that it was from the prison which we are about to quit that Louis XVI. went forth to the scaffold. Let his sublime example be your model and your guide."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
47. Thiers,  
iv. 558.

Early on the 28th May, the doors of the Palace of Justice were thrown open, and the trial began. An immense crowd instantly rushed in, and occupied every avenue to the hall; the doors were besieged by thousands, urgent to obtain admittance. The public anxiety rose to the

32.  
Trial of  
Moreau,  
Georges,  
and others.

passage would have been deserving of the highest consideration; but the slightest acquaintance with his writings and actions must be sufficient to convince every impartial person that he had no regard whatever to truth in anything that he either said or wrote; and fired off words as he would do shot in a battle, to produce a present effect, without the slightest idea that they ever would be sifted by subsequent ages, or ultimately recoil upon himself. He forgets that it was to secure the conviction of Moreau, and cut off the decisive evidence that he could give in favour of him, that the private assassination of Pichegru became expedient, and that the more he elevates the character of the republican general who was brought to trial, the more he magnifies the probability of the destruction of the royalist chief whose testimony might have led to his acquittal.

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highest pitch. Persons of the chief rank and greatest consideration in Paris were there; the remnants of the old nobility, the leaders of the modern Republic, flocked to a scene where the fate of characters so interesting to both was to be determined. The prisoners, to the number of forty-five, were put to the bar together. Public indignation murmured aloud at seeing the conqueror of Hohenlinden seated amidst persons, many of whom were regarded as the hired bravos of England. In the course of the trial, which lasted twelve days, a letter from Moreau to the First Consul, written from the prison of the Temple, was read, in which he stated his case with so much simplicity and candour, that it produced the most powerful effect on the audience.\* The result of the trial was, that Moreau's innocence was completely established, or rather the prosecutor totally failed to prove any criminal connexion on his part with the conspirators. Not one witness could fix either a guilty act or important circumstance upon him.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
115, 119.  
Rev. ii. 61.  
63.

33.  
Amount of  
the admis-  
sion on  
which  
Moreau  
was con-  
demned.

He admitted having seen Pichegru on several occasions, but positively denied that he had ever been in presence of Georges; and, though two witnesses were adduced who swore to that fact, their testimony was inadmissible by law, and, at all events, unworthy of credit, being that

Letter of  
Moreau to  
Napoleon.

\* Moreau there said, "In the campaign of 1797 we took the papers of the Austrian staff: amongst them were several which seemed to implicate Pichegru in a correspondence with the French princes; this discovery gave us both great pain, but we resolved to bury it in oblivion, as Pichegru, being no longer at the head of the army, was not in a situation to do injury to the Republic. The events of the 18th Fructidor succeeded; disquietude became universal; and two officers who were acquainted with that correspondence, represented to me the necessity of making it public. I was then a public functionary, and could no longer preserve silence. During the two last campaigns in Germany, and since the peace, he has occasionally made remote and circuitous overtures to me as to the possibility of entering into a correspondence with the French princes, but I considered them so ridiculous that I never made any answer.

"As to the present conspiracy, I can equally assure you that I have not had the smallest share in it. I repeat it, General; whatever proposition may have been made to me, I rejected it at once in my own mind, and regarded it as the most absurd of projects. When it was represented to me that the occasion of a descent into England would be favourable to a change of government, I answered that the senate was the authority to which all Frenchmen would look

of accused persons under trial for the same crime.\* Throughout the whole trial his demeanour was dignified, mild, and unassuming. On one occasion only his indignant spirit broke forth, when the president accused him of a desire to make himself dictator:—"Me dictator!" exclaimed he, "and with the partisans of the Bourbons! Who, then, would be my supporters? I could find none but in the French soldiers, of whom I have commanded nine-tenths, and saved above fifty thousand. They have arrested all my aides-de-camp, all the officers of my acquaintance, but not a shadow of suspicion could be found against any one, and they have all been set at liberty. Can there be such folly as to suppose that I proposed to make myself dictator by means of the partisans of the old French princes, who have combated for the royalist cause since 1792? Do you really believe that these men, in twenty-four hours, should have been so suddenly changed as to make me dictator? You speak of my fortune, of my income; I began with nothing, and might now have been worth fifty million francs; I possess only a house and a small property attached to it; my allowances amount to forty thousand francs, and let that be compared with my services."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
115, 123,  
124. Rev.  
ii. 61, 64.

As the case went on, and the impossibility of convicting Moreau on the capital charge preferred against him

in case of difficulty, and that I would be the first to range myself under its authority. Such overtures made to me, a private individual, wishing to keep up no connexions, neither in the army, nine-tenths of which have served under my orders, nor in the state, imposed upon me no duty but that of refusal; the infamy of becoming an informer was repugnant to my character; ever judged with severity, such a person becomes odious, and deserving of eternal reprobation, when he turns against those from whom he has received obligations, or with whom he has maintained terms of friendship. Such, General, have been my connexions with Pichegru; they will surely convince you that rash and ill-founded conclusions have been drawn from a conduct on my part perhaps imprudent, but far from criminal." These words bear the stamp of truth, and they embrace the whole of what was proved against Moreau. Not one of the one hundred and nineteen witnesses examined at the trial said more against him.—BOURRIENNE, vi. 118, 120.

\* Lajolais and Picot were the persons who spoke to it. Lajolais was the secret agent of Fouché throughout the whole transaction; and both were fellow-prisoners at the bar with Moreau.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Rovigo, i.  
63.



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34.

Intense in-  
terest ex-  
cited at  
Paris.

became apparent, the disquietude of the First Consul became extreme. He sent in private for the judges, and questioned them minutely as to the probable result of the process; and as it had become impossible to convict him of any share in the conspiracy, it was agreed that he should be found guilty of the minor charge of remotely aiding them. Some of the judges proposed that he should be entirely acquitted, but the President Hemart informed them that such a result would only have the effect of impelling the government into measures of still greater severity; and therefore this compromise was unanimously agreed to. Napoleon strongly urged a capital sentence, in the idea probably of overwhelming his rival by a pardon; but the judges returned the noble answer, "and if we do so, who will pardon us?" In truth, the temper of the public mind was such, that any capital sentence on so illustrious a person would probably have produced a violent commotion, and it was extremely doubtful whether the soldiers of the army of the Rhine would not have risen at once to his rescue. So intense was the interest excited by his situation, that when Lecourbe, one of the bravest and most distinguished of his lieutenants, entered the court with the infant child of Moreau in his arms, all the military present spontaneously rose and presented arms, and if Moreau had given the word, the court would that moment have been overturned, and the prisoners liberated. Whenever he rose to address the judges, the gendarmes, by whom he was guarded, rose also, and remained uncovered till he sat down. In fact, the public mind was so agitated, that the influence of Moreau in fetters almost equalled that of the First Consul on the throne.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
124, 126.  
Bign. iii.  
420.

The demeanour of Georges throughout the whole trial was stoical and indifferent; he rejected the humane proposals made to him by Napoleon to save his life, if he would abandon his attempts to reinstate the Bourbons, saying, "that his comrades had followed him into France,

and he would follow them to death." Armand and Jules de Polignac excited the warmest interest, by the generous contest which ensued between them as to which had been really implicated in the conspiracy, each trying to take the whole blame upon himself, and to exculpate the other.\* When the debates were closed, and the judges retired to deliberate, the public anxiety rose to the highest pitch; they remained four-and-twenty hours in consultation; and all the while, the court, and all its avenues, were thronged with anxious multitudes. The most breathless suspense prevailed when the judges returned to the court; and Hemart, seating himself in the president's chair, read out the sentence, which condemned Georges Cadoudal, Bouvet de Lozier, Rusillon, M. de Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, Picot, Coster St-Victor, and others, to the number of sixteen, to death; and Moreau, Jules de Polignac, Leridanô, Rolland, and a young girl named Issay, to two years' imprisonment.<sup>1</sup>

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difference of  
Georges,  
and con-  
demnation  
of the pri-  
soners.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
133, 140  
Bigr. iii.  
421. Rev.  
ii. 62, 63.

Though the preservation of Moreau's life, which had been placed in such imminent hazard, was universally considered as a subject of congratulation, yet the condemnation of so great a number of persons, many of whom belonged to the highest society in Paris, to death together, spread a general consternation through the capital. During four years of a steady and lenient administration, the people had not only lost their indifference, but acquired a horror, at the shedding of blood; and a catastrophe of this sort, which recalled the sanguine scenes under the Convention, diffused universal

36.  
Public feel-  
ing on this  
subje

\* Armand de Polignac first declared publicly, that he alone was accessory to the conspiracy, and that his brother was entirely innocent, and earnestly implored that the stroke of justice might fall on him alone. On the following day, his brother Jules rose and said, "I was too much moved yesterday at what my brother said to be able to attend to what I was to advance in my own defence; but to-day, when I am more cool, I implore you not to give credit to what his generosity has prompted him to suggest in my behalf. If one of us must perish, I am the guilty person. Restore him to his weeping wife; I have none to lament me; I can brave death. Too young to have enjoyed life, how can I regret it?"—"No," exclaimed Armand, "you have life before you; I alone am the guilty person; I alone ought to perish."—Bour. vi. 138, 139.

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<sup>1</sup> *Rev.* ii. 63,  
64. *Bour.*  
vi. 140, 141.37.  
Clemency  
of the First  
Consul, after  
the convictions  
were  
obtained.

distress. To this feeling soon succeeded a sense of the gross injustice done to Moreau, found guilty upon the unsupported declarations of two conspirators who were condemned along with himself; and with so strong a sense of the iniquity of the conviction in the breast of the judges, that they were obliged to sentence him to a punishment, ridiculous and inadequate if he were guilty, oppressive if he were innocent.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon, however, was not really cruel; he was, on the contrary, in general averse to measures of severity, and only callous to all the suffering they occasioned, when they seemed necessary either for the projects of his ambition, or the principles of his state policy. His object in all these measures was to attain the throne, and for this purpose the death of the Duke d'Enghien, which struck terror into the royalists, and the condemnation of Moreau, which paralysed the republicans, seemed indispensable. Having attained these steps, he yielded not less to his own inclinations than to the dictates of sound policy in pardoning many of the persons convicted. Murat, immediately after the sentence was pronounced, repaired to Napoleon, and earnestly entreated him to signalise his accession to the imperial throne by pardoning all the accused; but he could not obtain from him so splendid an act of mercy. Josephine, never wanting at the call of humanity, exerted her powerful influence in favour of several of the persons under sentence; many other persons at the court followed her example; and some were pardoned, in particular Lajolais, in consideration of the services they had rendered to the police during the conspiracy. In these different ways, Bouvet de Lozier, Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, Armand Gaillard, and three others, experienced the mercy of the First Consul. Madame Remusat, an attendant of Josephine, and Josephine herself, first implored the pardon of Polignac, but were repulsed with a severe air. He yielded, however, to the tears of Madame Polignac, who contrived

to throw herself at his feet as he left the council chamber. Napoleon no sooner saw her, than he gave a look of anger at Josephine, whom he suspected, with reason, of having obtained entrance for the suppliant; but at length he "yielded," as he said, "to the tears of a wife." The remainder were executed on the 25th June, on the Place de Grève; they all underwent their fate with heroic fortitude, protesting with their last breath their fidelity to their king and country; and Georges, in particular, insisted upon dying first, in order that his companions, who knew that he had been offered his pardon by the First Consul, might see that he had not deserted them in the extreme hour.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
142, 144.  
Rev. ii. 66.  
Thiers, v.  
150.

Napoleon asserted to Bourrienne, shortly after the trial was over, that he had been greatly annoyed by the result of the process, chiefly because it prevented him from utterly extinguishing Moreau as the head of a party in the state; that assuredly he never would have suffered him to perish on the scaffold; but that his name, withered by a capital conviction, would no longer have been formidable, and that he had been led to direct a prosecution, from his Council assuring him that there could be no doubt of a conviction.\* He added, that if he had foreseen the result, he would have privately urged Moreau to travel, and even have given him a foreign embassy to colour his departure.<sup>2</sup> After the sentence was pronounced, he acted with indulgence to his fallen rival. On the very day on which he requested permission to retire to Ame-

38.  
His intend-  
ed lenity to  
Moreau.

<sup>2</sup> Bour. vi.  
156, 157.  
Rev. ii. 66.

\* Napoleon's policy in this, as in many other respects, was the same as Voltaire has so finely ascribed to Cæsar:—

"Je sais quel est le peuple : on le change en un jour;  
Il prodigue aisément sa haine et son amour.  
Si ma grandeur l'aigrit, ma clémence l'attire :  
Un pardon politique à qui ne peut me nuire,  
Dans mes chaînes qu'il porte un air de liberté,  
Ont ramené vers moi sa faible volonté.  
Il faut couvrir de fleurs l'abîme où je l'entraîne,  
Flatter encore ce tigre à l'instant qu'on l'enchaîne;  
Lui plaire en l'accablant, l'asservir, le charmer,  
Et punir mes rivaux en me faisant aimer."

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
159. Ann.  
Reg. 1804,  
165. Rev.  
ii. 65, 66.

rica, Napoleon granted it; he purchased his estate of Gros Bois, near Paris, which he conferred upon Berthier, and paid the expenses of his journey to Barcelona, preparatory to embarking for the United States, out of the public treasury. His ardent mind had been singularly captivated by the stern resolution of Georges: after his sentence was pronounced, he sent Réal to the Temple, and offered, if he would attach himself to his service, to give him a regiment, and even make him one of his aides-de-camp. But the heroic Vendean remained faithful to his principles even in that extremity, and preferred dying with his comrades to all the allurements of the imperial service.<sup>1</sup> \*

<sup>39.</sup>  
Death of  
Captain  
Wright, in  
prison, at

One other deed of darkness belongs to the same period in the government of Napoleon. Captain Wright, from whose vessel Pichegru had been disembarked, was afterwards captured, after a gallant resistance, by a flotilla of gunboats, on the coast of the Morbihan, and brought with all his crew to Paris, where they were examined as witnesses on the trial of Georges. By a singular coincidence, he was confined in the very cell he had formerly occupied when a prisoner along with Sir Sidney Smith. Previous to his separation from his brother officers, being aware what dangers awaited him from the animosity of the First Consul, he declared in the most solemn manner to them, that come what may, he would not lay violent hands on himself; and that, if he was found dead in prison, they might rely upon it that he had been murdered.

His opinion

\* "There is one man," said Napoleon, "among the conspirators whom I regret, that is Georges. His mind is of the right stamp; in my hands he would have done great things. I appreciate all the firmness of his character, and I would have given it a right direction. I made Réal inform him, that if he would attach himself to me, I would not only pardon him, but give him a regiment. What do I say? I would have made him one of my aides-de-camp. Such a step would have excited a great clamour; but I should not have cared for it. Georges refused everything. He is a bar of iron. What can I now do? He must undergo his fate, for such a man is too dangerous in a party; it is a necessity of my situation." This is a sufficient proof that Napoleon was aware that assassination formed no part of the design of the conspirators against him, for assuredly he would never have taken the chief of such a band into his service.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Bour. vi.  
159.

This intrepid man, who had formerly been a prisoner with Sir Sidney Smith in the Temple, and afterwards a lieutenant on board his ship, when he stopped the Eastern career of Napoleon at Acre, positively declined to give any evidence, saying, with the spirit which became a British officer, "Gentlemen, I am an officer in the British service; I care not what treatment you have in reserve for me; I am not bound to account to you for the orders I have received, and I decline your jurisdiction." He added, after his deposition, taken in prison, was read over in court, that "they had not annexed to that declaration the threat held out to him, that he should be shot if he did not reveal the secrets of his country."<sup>1</sup> Some time after this, but the precise date is not known, as it was not revealed by the French government for long afterwards, Captain Wright was found in his cell in the Temple with his throat cut from ear to ear. By whom this was done remains, and probably will ever remain, a mystery. The French authorities gave out that he had committed suicide in prison, from despair at the victories of the French over the Austrians; but the character of that officer, and the letters he had written shortly before his death, in which he positively declared he had no intention of laying violent hands on himself, rendered that event extremely improbable. The previous threats which he publicly declared on the trial had been addressed to him, and the strong desire which the French government had to implicate the English cabinet in a conspiracy against the life of the First Consul, in order to weaken the force of public indignation in Europe at the death of the Duc d'Enghien, render it more than probable that he was cut off in order to extinguish the evidence which he could give, as to the disgraceful methods resorted to by the police to extort declarations from their prisoners; or possibly, as was asserted in England at the time, to destroy the traces of torture on his person.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. v.  
135, 136.  
Rev. ii. 60  
Scott. v.  
126, 128.

<sup>2</sup> Scott, v.  
127, 129.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805. Sir  
Robert Wil-  
son's Egypt,  
72. O'Meara,  
i. 275.

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40.  
Napoleon  
resolves to  
assume the  
Imperial  
crown.

It was in the midst of these bloody events that Napoleon assumed the IMPERIAL CROWN, and the last shadow of republican freedom was transformed into the reality of Byzantine servitude. Eighteen months before, he had declared in the council of state, "that the principle of hereditary succession was absurd, irreconcilable with the sovereignty of the people, and impossible in France; four years before that, he had announced to the Italian states, "that his victories were the commencement of the era of representative governments;" and already he was prepared to adopt a measure which should establish that absurd and impracticable system in that very country, and overturn, within all the states that were subjected to his influence, those very representative institutions. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum*, was the principle of his policy. He never looked back to the past, nor attempted to reconcile former professions with present actions; success, not duty, was the ruling principle of his conduct; he deemed nothing done while anything remained to do.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 454.

41.

plains his  
murdering  
the Duc  
d'Enghien.

It was neither from a thirst for blood, nor a jealousy of the Bourbons, that he put the Duc d'Enghien to death. Expedience, supposed political expedience, was the motive. "When about to make himself emperor," says Madame de Stael, "he deemed it necessary, on the one hand, to dissipate the apprehensions of the revolutionary party as to the return of the Bourbons; and to prove, on the other, to the royalists, that when they attached themselves to him, they finally broke with the ancient dynasty. It was to accomplish that double object that he committed the murder of a prince of the blood, of the Duc d'Enghien. He passed the Rubicon of crime, and from that moment misfortune was written on his destiny."<sup>2</sup> Interposing boldly, like the Committee of Public Salvation between the Dantonists and Hebertists, between the royalists and republicans, he struck redoubtable blows at both: proving to the former, by the sacrifice of their brightest ornament, that all prospect of reconciliation with them was at an

<sup>2</sup> Rév.  
Franc.  
ii. 328.

end ; to the latter, by the trial of their favourite leader, that all hopes of reviving in the people the dreams of democratic enthusiasm were extinguished. At the same time, to the great body of revolutionary proprietors, the millions who had profited by the preceding convulsions, and were desirous only to preserve what they had gained, he held out the guarantee of a hereditary throne, and a dynasty competent to restrain all the popular excesses of which the recollection was so deeply engraven on the public mind.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
377.

The season chosen for the first broaching of these ideas, which had been long prospectively present to the thoughts of all reflecting persons, was shortly after the death of the Duc d'Enghien, and when a vague disquietude pervaded the public mind as to the result of the conspiracies and trials which had excited so extraordinary an interest. In a secret conference held with Cambacérès, immediately after the Duc d'Enghien's death, he stated his reasons for assuming the imperial crown. He observed that France desired a king, a thing which must be obvious on the slightest observation ; that every day it was recovering from some follies which had been put into its head, and that, of all follies, the Republic was the greatest ; that France was so completely disabused on this subject, that it would take a Bourbon if it did not get a Buonaparte ; that the return of the Bourbons, however, would be a great calamity, because it would alarm all the revolutionary interests, and therefore that the assumption of the crown by himself was a matter of necessity.\* To the council of state Napoleon was more guarded. In a secret conference with several of the leading members of the senate, held six days after that event, Napoleon represented to them the precarious state of the Republic, dependent as it was on the life of a single individual, daily exposed to the daggers of assassins ; he passed in review the different projects which might be adopted to

42.  
First  
broaching  
of the pro  
ject to th  
senate

\* CAMBACÉRÈS, *Memoirs*, ii. 321 ; THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, v. 73.



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March 27.

give it more stability—a republic, the restoration of the ancient dynasty, or the creation of a new one; and discussed them all as a disinterested spectator, totally unconnected with any plans which might ultimately be adopted. The obsequious senators, divining his secret intentions, warmly combated the transference of power to any other hands, and conjured him to provide as soon as possible for the public weal by making supreme power hereditary in a race of sovereigns, commencing with himself. Feigning a reluctant consent, he at length said: “Well, if you are really convinced that my nomination as emperor is necessary to the welfare of France, take at least every possible precaution against my tyranny; yes, I repeat it, against my tyranny; for who knows how far, in such a situation, I may be tempted to abuse the authority with which I may be invested?” The project thus set on foot was the subject of secret negotiation for above a month between the senate and the government. It was agreed that the first public announcement of it should come from the tribunate, as the only branch of the legislature in which the shadow even of popular representation prevailed. So completely had the strength of that once formidable body been prostrated, and its character changed by the alterations made on its constitution when the consulate for life was proclaimed, that it proved the ready instrument of these ambitious projects. Everything was arranged with facility for acting the great drama in presence of the nation. The moment was chosen; the dispositions were made; the speeches, addresses, and congratulations agreed on; the parts assigned to the principal actors, before the curtain drew up, or the people were admitted to the spectacle. At length, on the 25th April, the representation began in the hall of the tribunate.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>i.</sup>  
79, 380.  
Bour. vi. 52.  
Thib. 455.  
De Stael,  
Rév. Franç.  
ii. 329, 330.

MM. Curée and Siméon were the most distinguished orators on the side of the government in that branch of the legislature. “Revolutions,” said they, “are the dis-

cases of the body politic; everything which has been overturned was not in reality deserving of censure. There are certain bases of public prosperity at the foundation of every social edifice. Seasons of discord may displace them for a time, but ere long their own weight restores them to their natural situation; and if a skilful hand superintends the reconstruction of the building during that period of returning stability, they may regain a form which shall endure for centuries. It is in vain that we are reminded of the long continuance of the ancient dynasty. Principles and facts alike oppose their restoration. The people, the sole fountain and depository of power, may displace a family by virtue of the same authority by which they seated them on the throne. Europe has sanctioned the change by recognising our new government. The reigning family in England have no other title to the throne but the will of the people. 'When Pepin was crowned, it was only,' says Montesquieu, 'a ceremony the more, and a phantom the less.' He acquired nothing by it but the ornaments of royalty; nothing was changed in the nation. When the successors of Charlemagne lost supreme authority, Hughes Capet already held the keys of the kingdom: the crown was placed on his head because he alone was able to defend it.

"An eternal barrier separates us from the return of the factions which would tear our entrails, and that royal family which we proscribed in 1792 because it had violated our rights. It is only by placing the crown on the head of the First Consul, that the French people can preserve their dignity, their independence, and their territory. Thus only will the army be assured of a brilliant establishment, faithful chiefs, intrepid officers, and the glorious standards which have so often led it to victory: it will neither have to fear unworthy humiliations, disgraceful disbanding, nor horrid civil wars, where the bones of the defenders of their country are exposed to the

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43.  
The tribu-  
nate is put  
forward to  
make the  
proposal in  
public.  
April 25.

44.  
Speech of  
the mover  
on the oc-  
casion

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winds. Let us hasten, then, to demand hereditary succession in the supreme magistrate; 'for in voting this to a chief,' as Pliny said to Trajan, 'we prevent the return of a master.' But at the same time let us give a worthy name to so great a power; let us adorn the first magistrate in the world by a dignified epithet; let us choose that which shall at once convey the idea of the first civil functions, recall glorious recollections, and in no ways infringe on the sovereignty of the people. I see, for the chief of the national power, no name so worthy as that of EMPEROR. If it means victorious consul, who is so worthy to bear it? What people, what armies were ever more deserving of such a title in their chief? I demand, therefore, that we lay before the senate the wish of the nation, that Napoleon Buonaparte, at present First Consul, be declared Emperor, and in that quality remain charged with the government of the French Republic; that the imperial dignity be declared hereditary in his family; and that such of our institutions as are only sketched out be definitely arranged." No sooner was the harangue delivered than a crowd of orators rushed forward to inscribe their names on the tribune to follow in the same course. The senate of Augustus was never more obsequious.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
55, 56. Bign.  
iii. 381, 382.

45.  
Honourable  
resistance  
of Carnot

Notwithstanding the headlong course which public opinion was following towards the establishment of despotic power, and the obvious necessity for it to stay the discord from which such boundless suffering had ensued, there were some determined men who stood forward to resist the change, undeterred by the frowns of power, unseduced by the cheers of the multitude, uninstructed by the lessons of experience. Carnot in the tribunate, and Berlier in the council of state, were the foremost of this dauntless band. There is something in the spectacle of moral courage, of individual firmness withstanding public transports, of conscious integrity despising regal seductions, which must command respect, even when

advocating a course which is impracticable or inexpedient. "In what a position," said Carnot, "will this proposition place all those who have advocated the principles of the Revolution! When hereditary succession to the throne is established, there will no longer remain a shadow to the republic of all for which it has sacrificed so many millions of lives. I cannot believe that the people of France are disposed so soon to abandon all that has been so dearly acquired. Was liberty, then, only exhibited to man to increase his regrets for a blessing which he never can enjoy? Is it to be for ever presented to his eyes as the forbidden fruit to which he must not reach out his hand? Has nature, which has inspired us with so pressing a desire for this great acquisition, doomed us in its search to continual disappointment? No! I can never be brought to regard a blessing so generally preferred to all others, without which all others are nothing, as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, and that the system which it goes to establish is easier of institution, and more stable in duration, than either arbitrary power or an unrestrained oligarchy." Every one respected the courage and motives of these upright men; but the fallacy of their arguments was not the less apparent, the public tendency to despotism not the less irresistible. In the council of state the hereditary succession was carried by a majority of twenty to seven; and in the tribunate by a still larger majority, Carnot alone voting in the minority.<sup>1</sup>

The theatrical representation thus got up in the tribunate, and the exchange of addresses, consultations public and private, which followed, soon produced the desired effect. In Napoleon's words, it was now evident that the pear was ripe. Addresses flowed in from all quarters—from the army, the municipalities, the cities, the chambers of commerce—all imploring the First Consul to ascend the imperial throne, and vying with each other in the extent of their servile adulation. Their general

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
61, 62.  
Bign. iii.  
362, 363.  
Thib. 460.46.  
Universal  
adulation  
with whi  
Napoleon  
was sur-  
rounded.  
His ansv  
to the senate.

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strain was :—" Greatest of men, complete your work ; render it as immortal as your glory. You have extricated us from the chaos of the past ; you have overwhelmed us with the blessings of the present ; nothing remains but to guarantee for us the future." To the address of the senate, imploring him to assume the purple, Napoleon replied :—" We have been constantly guided by the principle that sovereignty resides in the people ; and that therefore everything, without exception, should be rendered conducive to their interest, happiness, and glory. It is to attain this end that the supreme magistracy, the senate, the council, the legislative body, the electoral body, and all the branches of administration, have been instituted. The people of France can add nothing to the happiness and glory which surround me ; but I feel that my most sacred as my most pleasing duty is to assure to its children the advantages secured by that revolution which cost so much, and above all, by the death of so many millions of brave men who died in defence of our rights. It is my most earnest desire that we may be able to say, on the 14th July in this year—

May 4. ' Fifteen years ago, by a spontaneous movement, we ran to arms, we gained liberty, equality, and glory.' Now these first of blessings, secured beyond the possibility of chance, are beyond the reach of danger ; they are preserved for you and your children. Institutions, conceived and commenced in the midst of the tempests of war, both without and within, are about to be secured, while the state resounds with the designs and conspiracies of our mortal enemies, by the adoption of all that the experience of ages has demonstrated to be necessary to guarantee the rights which the nation has deemed essential to its dignity, its liberty, and its happiness."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
65, 70.

In this answer is to be found the key to the whole policy of the First Consul on the throne, and the secret of the astonishing facility with which he established, on

the ruins of revolutionary passions, the most despotic throne of Europe. Aware that the great body of mankind are incapable of judging on public affairs, but perfectly adequate to a perception of their private interests, he invariably observed the principles there set forth of carefully protecting all the revolutionary *interests*, and constantly addressing the people in the *language* of revolutionary equality, while at the same time he was depriving them of all political power, and imposing on them the *reality* of Asiatic despotism. By steadily adhering to these rules, he succeeded in at once calming their interested fears, and flattering their impassioned feelings; by constantly holding out that the people were the source of all power, he blinded them to the fact that they had ceased to be the possessors of any; and by religiously respecting all the *interests* created by the Revolution, he rendered the nation indifferent to the abandonment of all the *principles* on which it was founded.\*

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47.

Key which it affords to his whole policy on the throne.

All things being at length matured, the senate, by a decree on the 18th May, declared Napoleon EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH; but referred to the people the ratification of their decree, which declared the throne hereditary in his family, and that of his brothers, Joseph and Lucien. The obsequious body hastened to St Cloud with the

48.

He is declared Emperor of the French  
General concurrence of the nation.

\* Napoleon precisely adopted the course for transforming democracy into despotism, recommended in the powerful lines of the Italian poet:—

——“Intorpidir dei pria

Gli animi loro; il cor snervare affatto;  
Ogni dritto pensier svolger con arte;  
Spegner virtude (ove pur n'abbia), o farla  
Schernò alle genti; i men feroci avverti  
Tra' famigliari; e i falsamente alteri  
Avvilire, onorandoli. Clemenza,  
E patria, e gloria, e leggi, e cittadini,  
Alto suonar; più d'ogni cosa, uguale  
Fingerti a' tuoi minori—Ecco i gran mezzi,  
Onde in ciascun si cangi a poco a poco  
Prima il pensar, poi gli usi, indi le leggi;  
Il modo poscia di chi regna; e in fine,  
Quel che riman solo a cangiarsi, il nome.”

ALFIERI, *La Congiura de' Pazzi*, Act ii. scene 1.

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decree, where the Emperor received them with great magnificence. "Whatever," said he, "can contribute to the good of the country, is essentially connected with my happiness. I submit the law concerning the succession to the throne to the sanction of the people. I hope France will never repent of the honours with which she has environed myself and my family. Come what may, my spirit will cease to be with my posterity from the moment that they shall cease to merit the love and the confidence of the great nation." The appeal to the people soon proved that the First Consul, in assuming the imperial dignity, had only acted in accordance with the wishes of the immense majority of the nation. Registers were opened in every commune of France, and the result showed that there were 3,572,329 votes in the affirmative, and only 2569 in the negative. History has recorded no example of so unanimous an approbation of the foundation of a dynasty; no instance of a nation so joyfully taking refuge after the storms of democracy in the stillness of despotism.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
337, 388.  
Moniteur,  
May 18.

49.  
Rank conferred on his family, and creation of the marshals of the empire.  
May 19.

Various changes, necessarily flowing from this great step, immediately followed. On the day after his accession, the senate published a *senatus-consultum*, by which the imperial dignity was established in the Buonaparte family, and the rank and precedence of his relations, as well as of the other dignitaries of the empire, were regulated. Various important alterations were made by this decree on the constitution, if constitution it could be called, which had only the shadow of representative institutions with the reality of military despotism; but they will more appropriately come to be considered in the chapter relating to the internal government of the Emperor.\* The whole real powers of government were, by the new *senatus-consultum*, vested in the senate and the council of state; in other words, in the Emperor. The legislative body continued its mute inglorious functions. The

\* *Infra*, Chap. L. §§ 35-70.

tribunate, divided into several sections, and obliged to discuss in these separate divisions the projects of laws transmitted to it by the legislative body, lost the little consideration which still belonged to it, and paved the way for its total suppression, which soon after ensued. In everything but the name, the government of France was thenceforward an absolute despotism. Napoleon's next step after ascending the throne was to create the marshals of the empire, and it was ordered that they should be addressed as M. le Maréchal. Those first named were eighteen in number, well known in the annals of military glory—Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Massena, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davoust, Bessières, Kellermann, Lefebvre, Pérignon, and Serrurier. He already projected the creation in their favour of those new patents of nobility, which were destined to commemorate the most glorious events of the empire, and form a phalanx of Paladins to defend the imperial throne.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
76, 78. B. g. ii.  
iii. 393, 401.  
Art. 96.  
Senatus-  
consultum,  
19th May.

On the same day, Napoleon fixed the titles and precedence of all the members of his family. He directed that his brothers and sisters should receive the title of imperial highness; that the great dignitaries of the empire should adopt that of most serene highness; and that the address of "my lord" should be revived in favour of these elevated personages. Thenceforth the progress of court etiquette and oriental forms was as rapid at the Tuileries as in the Byzantine empire. "Whoever," says Madame de Stael, "could suggest an additional piece of formality from the olden time, propose an additional reverence, a new mode of knocking at the door of an antechamber, a more ceremonious method of presenting a petition, or folding a letter, was received as if he had been a benefactor of the human race."<sup>2</sup>\* The code of im-

50.  
Rapid pro-  
gress of  
court eti-  
quette.

<sup>2</sup> Rév.  
Franc. ii.  
334, 335.  
Bour. vi.  
77, 78.

\* The French might have addressed to Napoleon on this occasion the words of Sertorius to Pompey in Corneille :—

" Est-ce être tout Romain qu'être chef d'une guerre  
Qui veut tenir aux fers les maîtres de la terre !



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51.  
Dignified  
protest of  
Louis  
XVIII.

perial etiquette is the most remarkable authentic record of human baseness that has been recorded by history."

No sooner did he receive intelligence of the assumption of the imperial crown by Napoleon, than Louis XVIII., on the shores of the Baltic, hastened to protest against an act so subversive of the rights of his family. "In taking the title of Emperor," said the exiled prince, "Buonaparte has put the seal to his usurpation. That new act of a revolution, in which everything has been fundamentally null, cannot doubtless impair my rights; but being accountable for my conduct to other sovereigns, whose rights are not less injured than my own, and whose thrones are shaken by the principles which the senate of Paris has dared to put forth—accountable to France, to my family, to my honour, I should consider myself guilty of betraying the common cause if I preserved silence on this occasion. I declare, then, after renewing my protest against all the illegal acts committed since the commencement of the Revolution, that, far from recognising the new title conferred on Buonaparte by a body which has itself no legal existence, I protest against that title, and all the subsequent acts to which it may give rise." This protest was so little regarded by the French government, that it was published on the 1st July in the *Moniteur*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iii.  
389, 391.  
*Moniteur*,  
1st July.

52.

His corona-  
tion by the  
Pope re-  
solved on.

p.  
xxxvii. § 59.

Immediately after his return to Paris, from his tour to Flanders and the coast, already mentioned,<sup>2</sup> in the end of September, Napoleon commenced preparations for the important solemnity of his coronation. Although the spirit of the age was still essentially irreligious, and the

Ce nom, sans vous et lui, nous serait encore dû ;  
C'est par lui, c'est par vous, que nous l'avons perdu.  
C'est vous qui sous le joug traînez des cœurs si braves ;  
Ils étaient plus que rois, ils sont moindres qu'esclaves ;  
Et la gloire qui suit vos plus nobles travaux  
Ne fait qu'approfondir l'abîme de leurs maux :  
Leur misère est le fruit de votre illustre peine :  
Et vous pensez avoir l'âme toute Romaine !"

*Sertorius*, Act iii. scène 2.

forcing through the concordat with the Pope had exposed his government to a ruder shock than did the abrogation of all the political privileges acquired by the people during the Revolution,\* still Napoleon was well aware that, with a large proportion at least of the rural population, the consecration of his authority by the ceremony of coronation was an essential particular, and that to all, of whatever latitude of opinion, it was of great political importance to prove that his influence was so unbounded as to compel the head of the church himself to officiate on the occasion. The Papal benediction appeared to be the link which would unite the revolutionary to the legitimate regime, and cause the faithful to forget, in the sacred authority with which he was now invested, the violence and bloodshed which had paved his way to the throne.† Napoleon, for these reasons, had long resolved not only that he should be crowned according to the forms of the French monarchy, but that the ceremony should be performed by the head of Christendom; and for this purpose, a negotiation had for some months been in dependence with the holy see. There was no precedent, indeed, of such an honour being conferred on any crowned head excepting the Emperors of Germany, the successors of the Cæsars, since the days when Stephen III. consecrated the usurpation of Pepin, and

\* "At that period (in 1804) there prevailed," says the French historian, "in the Republic a complete indifference on religious subjects; and the apathy of the nation in that respect was such, that it would not leave to any legislator the power of choosing for it any species of Christian worship. This state of things is well worthy of consideration; and it existed in the great majority of the nation to such a degree, that the organisation of the Catholic worship by the concordat appeared to the people a more daring innovation than the overthrow of the national representation on the 19th Brumaire. Religion at that period had no hold of the affections, I had almost said none of the necessities of the people: the spirit of the age since the days of Louis XV. had been entirely philosophical."—NORVINS, ii. 326-7.

† "I will allow the generals of the Republic," said Napoleon, "to exclaim as long as they please against the mass: I know what I am about: I am working for posterity." Though indifferent as to religion himself, he saw clearly that in the end it rules the great body of mankind, and that the irreligious fanaticism of the age was probably destined to be as short-lived as its democratic fervour had been.—See BOURRIENNE, vi. 223.

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poured the holy oil on the head of the founder of a new dynasty, and on that of his son Charlemagne; but this only rendered him the more desirous to secure for himself an honour of which there had been no example for ten centuries; and his achievements certainly would not suffer by a comparison with those of the illustrious founders of the Carolingian dynasty. Early in June, accordingly, a negotiation had been opened with the Vatican for the coronation of the Emperor by the Pope in person; and although considerable difficulties were at first started by the cardinals, in order to enhance the merit of compliance, and, if possible, obtain some concessions to the church, for so great an act of condescension on the part of its head, yet, such was the ascendancy of French influence, and the terror inspired by Napoleon's arms, that at length the consent of the Consistory was obtained. Accordingly, in reply to a letter of Napoleon, dated from Mayence on the 15th September, the Pope agreed to officiate at the consecration, and announced the speedy commencement of his journey to France. On the day following, a concordat was concluded for the Italian republic, on terms precisely similar to those already agreed on with the French government.<sup>1</sup>

Sept. 15.  
<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
143. Bot.  
iv. 136, 142.  
Dum. xi.  
75.

53.  
Arrival of  
the Pope at  
Paris.  
Nov. 25.

The ceremony was fixed for the 2d December, in the cathedral church of Notre Dame at Paris. The Pope arrived on the 24th of November at Fontainebleau, where the Emperor went to congratulate him on his approach. They met at a cross in the forest on the road to Lyons, about a mile to the southward of the palace, which is still shown to travellers. Napoleon was on horseback; but they both alighted at the same time, and immediately remounted the Pope's carriage — the Emperor entering first, and placing his Holiness on his right hand. They drove together to Fontainebleau, from whence Pius VII. proceeded alone to Paris.\* He was everywhere received

\* It is a remarkable coincidence, that Fontainebleau, where Napoleon, in the pride of apparently boundless power, met the Pope coming to his coronation,

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with extraordinary demonstrations of respect, and lodged at the Tuileries in magnificent rooms in the Pavillon of Flora, where, by a delicate attention, he found his sleeping apartment furnished exactly like that which he had recently left on the Monte Cavallo. His arrival at Paris created an extraordinary sensation; among the small remnant of the faithful, of joy at beholding the head of the church within a city so recently defiled by the orgies of infidelity; among the more numerous body of the irreligious or indifferent, of curiosity and astonishment at the extraordinary changes which had so rapidly converted the cathedral where, ten years before, the goddess of Reason was enthroned amidst crowds of revolutionary admirers, into the scene where the august ceremony of coronation was to be performed by the head of the church on the founder of a new race of sovereigns. How sceptical or indifferent soever the great bulk of the people may have been, they were universally impressed with feelings of respect for the venerable pontiff who displayed, in the trying circumstances in which he was placed, so large a portion of Christian charity and forbearance; and on some occasions on which the brutality of democratic prejudice strove to expose him to insult, his demeanour was so mild and benevolent as to excite the unanimous admiration of all who witnessed it.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
225, 227.  
Bign. iv.  
141, 143.  
D'Abr. vii.  
216.

On the day before the coronation, the senate and tribunate presented, with great pomp, the result of the

was also the witness, ten years after, of his abdication and fall. But the life of the Emperor is full of such extraordinary and apparently mysterious combinations. \* Immediately after his accession to the consulship, he was intent on a negotiation to obtain for France the island of ELBA, the scene of his first exile; and not a month before his coronation, he dictated orders to Villeneuve for the conquest of ST HELENA, the destined theatre of his imprisonment and death.—See BOURRIENNE, vi. 233.

\* When visiting the Imperial printing-office, one of the workmen was ill-bred enough to keep on his hat in the presence of his Holiness. A murmur of disapprobation arose among the crowd, which the Pope observing, stepped forward and said, with the most benevolent aspect, "Uncover yourself, young man, that I may give you my benediction: no one was ever the worse of the blessing of an old man." The spectators were profoundly affected by this incident.—BOURRIENNE, vi. 227.

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54.

Result of the  
appeal to the  
people on the  
subject of the  
hereditary  
succession.

appeal made to the French people on the subject of the hereditary succession of his family. Sixty thousand registers had been opened. Out of 3,574,898 votes, as already noticed, only 2569 were in the negative. Such was the result, after fifteen years' experience, of the democratic fervour of 1789! In reply to a laboured harangue from François de Neufchâteau, the orator of the legislature on this occasion, Napoleon said — "I ascend the throne where I have been placed by the unanimous voice of the people, the senate, and the army, with a heart penetrated with the splendid destinies of a people whom, in the midst of camps, I first saluted with the title of the Great. From my youth upwards my thoughts have been entirely occupied with their glory; and I now feel no pleasure nor pain but in the happiness or misfortune of my people. *My descendants will long sit on this throne.* In the camps they will be the first soldiers of the army, sacrificing their lives for the defence of their country. As its first magistrates, they will never forget that contempt for the laws and the overthrow of the social edifice are never occasioned except by the weakness and vacillation of princes. You, senators, whose counsels and aid have never been wanting in the most difficult circumstances, will transmit your spirit to your successors. Remain ever as you now are, the firmest bulwarks and the chief counsellors of the throne, so necessary to the happiness of this vast empire."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vi.  
233.

55.

Ceremony  
of the coro-  
nation.  
Dec. 2.

The ceremony of coronation took place on the day following, with the utmost possible magnificence, in the cathedral of Notre Dame. The day was intensely cold, but clear and bright; the procession was long and gorgeous, and the whole luxury and magnificence of the empire were displayed within these venerable walls. Carriages glittering with gold and purple trappings, horses proudly caparisoned, liveries resplendent with colour, dazzled the multitude in the streets through which the cortège passed;

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XXXVIII.  
1804.

while a sea of ostrich feathers, rich embroidered court-dresses, and a host of stars, ribbons, and uniforms, added to the imposing aspect of the scene within the cathedral. The bewildered republicans who witnessed the ceremony, beheld with pain pages in attendance on the Empress's carriage, and swords used as part of full dress, as under the ancient regime. The multitude, though dazzled by the spectacle, was far from testifying the enthusiasm which had been evinced in the fêtes of the Revolution. After taking the oath prescribed by the senatus-consultum of 18th May 1804,\* and receiving the papal benediction, the Emperor, with his own hands, took the crown and placed it on his head; after which he himself, with perfect grace, crowned the Empress, who knelt before him. The general aspect of this interesting scene may be still seen in the picture of David, whose fortune it has been to be the means of transmitting to posterity so many of the memorable scenes of this heart-stirring epoch.<sup>1†</sup>

1 D'Abbr. vii.  
249, 259.  
Bour. vi.  
235, 236.  
Bagn. iv.  
145, 146.

On the day following, a military spectacle of a still more animating kind took place in the Champ-de-Mars. Napoleon had there laid aside his imperial robes. He appeared in the uniform of a colonel of the Guard, to distribute to the colonels of all the regiments present in Paris, and deputations from all those absent, the EAGLES which were thenceforward to form the standards of the army.

56.  
Distribution  
of eagles to  
the arm

\* The oath was in these words :—"I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic; to respect, and cause to be respected, the laws of the Concordat and the liberty of worship; to respect, and cause to be respected, equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the sale of the national domains; to impose no tax but by legal authority; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour; and to govern with no other views but to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people." —BIGNON, iv. 144.

† The Duchess of Abrantès, who, as the wife of the governor of Paris, was very near the Emperor on this occasion, mentions, that immediately after crowning the Empress he cast a look of almost intolerable intelligence on her. He thought doubtless of her mother, Madame Permon, and the Rue des Filles de St Thomas, where she had refused his hand ten years before, in the humbler state of his fortunes. What must have been the Duchess's feelings

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
77, 78. Bour.  
vi. 238, 239.

57.  
Second protest of Louis XVIII. on occasion of Napoleon's coronation.

Dec. 2.

In the midst of the plain in front of the Ecole Militaire, a throne was placed, on which the Emperor and Empress were seated. The spot selected was nearly the same with that where, fifteen years before, the unfortunate Louis XVI. had sat beside the president of the National Assembly. At a signal given, the troops closed their ranks, and grouped in dense masses round the throne; then the Emperor, rising from his seat, said in a loud voice, "Soldiers! there are your standards. These eagles will serve as your rallying-point. They will ever be seen where your Emperor shall deem them necessary for the defence of his throne and of his people."<sup>1</sup>

On occasion of the ceremony of the coronation, Louis XVIII. renewed, in yet more emphatic terms, his protest against the usurpation of Napoleon. "On the shores of the Baltic, in the sight and under the protection of heaven, strengthened by the presence of my brother and of the Duc d'Angoulême, and by the concurrence of the other princes of the blood; calling to witness the royal victims, and those whom honour, fidelity, patriotism, and duty, have subjected to the revolutionary axe, or the thirst and jealousy of tyrants; invoking the manes of the young hero whom impious hands have torn from his country and future glory; offering to our people, as a pledge of reconciliation, the virtues of the angel whom Providence has snatched from fetters and death to offer an example of every Christian virtue, we swear, that never will we abandon

on the destiny which might have been her mother's at that moment?—D'ABRANTÈS, vii. 261, 263.

When Napoleon was paying his court to Josephine, shortly before their marriage, neither of them having a carriage, they walked together to the notary Raguideau, to whom the latter communicated her design of marrying the young general. "You are a great fool," replied the cautious formalist; "and you will live to repent it. You are about to marry a man who has nothing but his cloak and his sword." Napoleon, who was waiting in the antechamber unknown to Josephine, overheard these words, but never mentioned them to her till the morning of the coronation, when he sought for Raguideau. The astonished old man was brought into the presence of the Emperor, who immediately addressed him, with a good-humoured smile, "What say you now, Raguideau; have I nothing but my cloak and sword?"—BOURRIENNE, vi. 237, 238.

the heritage of our fathers, or break the sacred bond which unites our destinies to theirs; and we invoke, as witness to our oath, the God of St Louis, the Judge of the rulers of men." Who could have foreseen, at the date of this coronation and this protest, that the bones of Louis XVIII. would repose in the royal vaults of St Denis, while those of Napoleon were to be committed to the grave, under a solitary willow on the rock of St Helena! <sup>1</sup>

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The coronation of the Emperor was followed by a series of rejoicings, assemblies, and fêtes, which lasted for upwards of two months. The vast expenditure, both of the court and the numerous civil and military functionaries of government; the great concourse of strangers, and unwonted splendour of the dresses and decorations, caused an unusual degree of activity among the shopkeepers and manufacturers of Paris, and contributed not a little to reconcile that important and democratic body to the imperial regime, which had now succeeded the terrors of the Revolution. Without possessing the whole elegance or finished manners of the old regime, the Imperial court was remarkable for the lustre and beauty of its assemblies, over which the grace and affability of Josephine threw their principal charm. But not one moment did Napoleon withdraw from state affairs for such amusements. Through the midst of the whole, he laboured eight or ten hours a-day with his ministers, and was already deeply engaged in those great designs which led to such decisive results in the succeeding years. <sup>2</sup>

53.  
Splendour  
of t  
peri

vii. 240, 260

The Pope had been led to expect, in return for his condescension in travelling to Paris to crown the Emperor, some important benefits for the holy see; and the cabinet of the Vatican looked forward to the restoration of the three legations annexed to the Italian republic by the treaty of Tolentino. But, however much Napoleon might appreciate the importance of obtaining the papal benediction to his throne, he was not a man to relinquish any

59.  
Napoleon  
refuses any  
accession o  
territory t  
the holy s



CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

1804.

<sup>1</sup> De Pradt,  
Quatre Con-  
cordats, 173.  
Bign. iv.  
113, 114.

60.  
Reflections  
on these  
events.

of the substantial advantages of power and territory on that account, and he was little disposed to imitate the magnificent liberality of his predecessor Charlemagne to the Catholic church. He accordingly replied to the petition of the Pope for the three legations—"France has dearly purchased the power which it enjoys. We cannot sever anything from an empire which has been the fruit of ten years of bloody combats. Still less can we diminish the territory of a neighbouring potentate, which, in confiding to us the powers of government, has imposed upon us the duty of protection, and never conferred upon us the power of alienating any part of its possessions."<sup>1</sup>

Such was the termination of the political changes of the French Revolution: such the consequences of the first great experiment tried in modern Europe of regenerating society by destroying all its institutions. Born of the enthusiasm and philanthropy of the higher and educated classes, adopted by the fervour and madness of the people, coerced by the severity of democratic tyranny, fanned by the gales of foreign conquest, disgraced by the cupidity of domestic administration; having exhausted every art of seduction, and worn out every means of delusion, it sank at length into the torpor of absolute power. But it was not the slumber of freedom, to awaken fresh and vigorous in after days: it was the deep sleep of despotism; the repose of a nation, for the time at least, worn out by suffering; the lethargy of a people who, in the preceding convulsions, had destroyed all the elements of durable freedom. For twelve years the Republic, or its shadow, under the consulate, had existed. It terminated in the hands of a victorious soldier. "Such," says Thiers, "will be the end of all republics which are not hushed to repose in the arms of oligarchy."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Thiers, v.  
153.

There is a remarkable difference between the state of the public mind and the disposition of the people in England during the usurpation of Cromwell, and in France under the empire of Napoleon. Both were

military despotisms, originating in the fervour of preceding times; but the philosophic observer might discern under the one symptoms of an unconquered spirit, destined to restore the public freedom when the tyranny of the moment was overpast; in the other, the well-known features of Asiatic servility—the grave, in every age, of independent institutions. The English nobility kept aloof from the court of the Protector; he strove in vain to assemble a house of peers; the landed proprietors remained in sullen silence on their estates. Such was the refractory spirit of the commons, that every parliament was dissolved within a few weeks after it had assembled; and when one of his creatures suggested that the crown should be offered to the victorious soldier, the proposal was rejected by a great majority of the very Assembly which he had moulded in the way most likely to be subservient to his will. But the case was very different in France. There the nation rushed voluntarily and headlong into the arms of despotism. The First Consul experienced scarcely any resistance in his strides to absolute power either from the nobility, the commons, or the people; all classes vied with each other in their servility to the ruling authority; the old families eagerly sought admittance into his antechambers; the new greedily coveted the spoils of the empire; the cities addressed him in strains of Eastern adulation; the peasants almost unanimously seated him on the throne. Rapid as his advances to despotic authority were, they could hardly keep pace with the desire of the nation to receive the chains of a master; and with truth might he apply to all his subjects what Tiberius said of the Roman senate:—"O homines, ad servitutem parati!"\*

We should widely err, however, if we supposed that this extraordinary difference was owing either to any inherent servility in the French character, or any deficiency in the thirst for freedom among the inhabitants of that country

\* "Oh, men! prepared for slavery."—TACITUS.

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XXXVIII.

1804.

62.

Which was  
all owing to  
the violence  
and injustice  
of the  
French con-  
vulsion.

when the contest commenced. There never was a nation more thoroughly and unanimously imbued with the passion for liberty and equality, than the French were during the early years of the Revolution; and in the prosecution of that object they incurred hardships, and underwent sufferings, greater, perhaps, than any other people ever endured within an equal time. It was the irreligious spirit in which it was nursed, the magnitude of the changes accomplished by the Revolution, the prostration of all the higher classes which it induced, which produced this effect. When France emerged from that convulsion, almost all the old families were destroyed; commerce and manufactures were ruined, and the only mode of earning a subsistence which remained to the classes above the cultivators of the soil, was by entering into the service, and receiving the pay, of government. Necessity, as much as inclination, drove all into subservience to the reigning authority; if they did not pay court to persons in power, they had no alternative but to starve. Necker, in his last and ablest work, had already clearly perceived this important truth. "If by a revolution in the social system, or in public opinion," says he, "you have destroyed the class of great proprietors, you must consider yourselves as having *lost the elements requisite for the formation of a tempered monarchy*, and must turn, with whatever pain, to a different constitution of society. I do not believe that Buonaparte himself, with all his talent, his genius, and his power, could succeed in establishing in France a constitutional hereditary monarchy. There is a mode of founding a hereditary monarchy, however, widely at variance with all the principles of freedom; the same which introduced the despotism of Rome; the force of the army, the Prætorian guards, the soldiers of the East and the West. May God preserve France from such a destiny!" What a testimony to the final result of the Revolution, from the man who, by the duplication of the Tiers Etat, had so great a share in commencing it!<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Necker, *Dernières Vues*, 235, 240.

Madame de Stael has well explained the prodigious and unprecedented accumulation of power and influence which was concentrated in the hands of the First Consul, when reconstructing the disjointed members of society after the preceding convulsions. "Every mode of earning a subsistence had disappeared during ten years of previous suffering. No person could consider himself secure of his livelihood; men of all classes, ruined or enriched, banished or rewarded, equally found themselves at the mercy of the supreme power. Thousands of Frenchmen were on the list of emigrants; millions were the possessors of national domains; thousands were proscribed as priests or nobles; tens of thousands feared to be so for their revolutionary misdeeds. Napoleon, who fully appreciated the immense authority which such a state of dependence gave him, took care to keep it up. To such a one he restored his property, from another he withheld it; by one edict he gave back the unalienated woods to the old proprietors, by another he suspended the gift. There was hardly a Frenchman in the whole kingdom who had not something to solicit from the government, and that something was the means of subsistence. The favour of government thus led, not to an increase of vain or frivolous pleasures, but to a restoration to your country, a termination of exile, the bread of life. That unheard-of state of dependence proved fatal to the spirit of freedom in the nation. An unprecedented combination of circumstances put at the disposal of a single man the laws passed during the Reign of Terror, and the military force created by revolutionary enthusiasm. All the local authorities, all the provincial establishments, were suppressed or annulled; there remained only in France a single centre of movement, and that was Paris; and all the men in the provinces who were driven to solicit public employment were compelled to come to the capital to find their livelihood.<sup>1</sup> Thence has proceeded that rage for employment or situations under

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

1804.

63.

Vast concentration of influence at this period in the hands of govern

<sup>1</sup> De Stael, Rév. Franc ii. 259, 261 372, 373.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII.

1804.

64.  
Total de-  
struction of  
the liberty  
of the press.

government, which has ever since devoured and degraded France."

Another element which powerfully contributed to the same effect, was the complete concentration of all the influence of the press in the hands of government, in consequence of the changes and calamities of former times. "The whole journals of France were subjected," says the same author, "to the most rigorous censure; the periodical press repeated, day after day, the same observations, without any one being permitted to contradict them. Under such circumstances, the press, instead of being, as it is so often called, the safeguard of liberty, becomes the most terrible arm in the hand of power. In the same way as regular troops are more formidable than militia to the independence of the people, so do hired *writers* deprave and mislead public opinion, much more than could possibly take place when men communicated only by words, and formed their opinions on facts which fell under their observation. When the appetite for news can be satisfied only by continued falsehood; when the reputation of every one depends upon calumnies, universally diffused, without the possibility of their refutation; when the opinions to be advanced on every circumstance, every work, every individual, are submitted to the observations of censors, as a file of soldiers to the commands of their officers, the art of printing becomes what was formerly said of cannon, 'the last logic of kings.'"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De Stael,  
Rév. Franç.  
ii. 263, 264.

65.  
Inference in  
political  
science to  
which this  
leads.

These profound observations suggest an important conclusion in political science, which is, that the press can be regarded as the bulwark of liberty only as long as, independent of it, the elements of freedom exist in the different classes of society; and that, if these elements are destroyed, and the balance in the state subverted, either by an undue preponderance of popular or regal power, it instantly changes its functions, and, instead of the arm of independence, becomes the instrument of oppression. It

immensely augments the power of the weapons with which the different classes of society combat each other ; but the direction which this great engine receives, and the objects to which it may be directed, are as various as the changing dispositions and fleeting passions of mankind. In a constitutional monarchy, where a due balance is preserved between the different classes of society, the cause of freedom is strengthened by its influence ; but in another state of things it may be perverted to very different purposes, and become, as in republican America, the organ of democratic, or, in imperial France, the instrument of sovereign oppression. The only security, therefore, for durable freedom, is to be found in the preservation of the rights and liberties of all classes of the people, in the due ascendancy of wealth and education, as well as the energy and independence of popular industry ; and the gates to oriental servitude may be opened as wide by the fervour of popular ambition, or the vehemence of democratic injustice, as by the weight of regal oppression, or the force of military power.

CHAP.  
XXXVIII  
1804.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN TO THE  
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.—JAN.—OCT. 1805.

“THE world,” said Napoleon, “believe me the enemy of peace ; but I must fulfil my destiny. I am forced to combat and conquer in order to preserve. You must accomplish something new every three months in order to captivate the French people. With them, whoever ceases to advance is lost.”<sup>1</sup> Continual progress, fresh successions of victories, unbounded glory, were the conditions on which he held the throne. He knew well that the moment these failed, his authority would begin to decline. With him, therefore, constant wars and evident advances towards universal dominion, were not the result merely of individual ambition, or dictated by an insatiable desire to extend the boundaries of France ; they were the necessary consequence of the circumstances in which he was placed, and the temper of the times in which he lived. They arose inevitably from a military conqueror arriving at the supreme direction of a nation, when it was heated by the pursuit of revolutionary ambition. As this system, however, required a continual sacrifice of the rights and interests of other nations, in order to feed the vanity and gratify the passions of one, it involved in itself, like every other irregular indulgence, whether in nations or individuals, the principles of its own destruction. He fell at last, not because he opposed, but because he yielded to

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

1805.

1.

Necessity to  
which Napo-  
leon was ex-  
posed of con-  
stant war.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
81. De  
Stael, Dix  
Ans d'Exil,  
15.

the evil spirit of his times ; because, instead of checking, he fanned the flame of revolutionary ambition, converted by his genius into that of military conquest ; and continually advanced before a devouring fire, which precipitated him in the end upon the snows of Russia and the rout of Waterloo.

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XXXIX.  
1805.

But although well aware that it was on such perilous conditions, and such alone, that he held the throne, no man knew better than Napoleon the importance of concealing their existence from the eyes of mankind, and representing himself as compelled, on every occasion, to take up arms in order to defend the dignity or independence of the empire. It was his general policy, accordingly, when he perceived that unceasing encroachments during peace had roused a general spirit of resistance to his ambition, and that a general war was inevitable, to make proposals of accommodation to the most inveterate of his enemies, in order to gain the credit of moderate intentions, and throw upon them the odium of actually commencing hostilities. In pursuance of this system, he was no sooner convinced, from the turn which his diplomatic relations with Russia and Sweden had taken, that a third coalition was approaching, than he made pacific overtures to the English government.<sup>1</sup> His letter on this subject, addressed, according to his custom, to the King of England in person, was of the following tenor :—

2.  
But to disguise it, he proposes peace to Great Britain.

Jan. 2.  
<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
83, 84.

“Sire, my brother,—Called to the throne by Providence and the suffrages of the senate, the people, and the army, my first feeling was the desire for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity : they may continue their strife for ages ; but will their governments in so doing fulfil the most sacred of the duties which they owe to their people ? And how will they answer to their consciences, for so much blood uselessly shed, and without the prospect of any good whatever to their subjects ? I am not ashamed to make the first advances. I have, I flatter myself, sufficiently proved to the world that I

3.  
His letter to the King of England.



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XXXIX.

1805.

fear none of the chances of war. It presents nothing which I have occasion to fear. Peace is the wish of my heart ; but war has never been adverse to my glory. I conjure your Majesty, therefore, not to refuse yourself the satisfaction of giving peace to the world. Never was an occasion more favourable for calming the passions, and giving ear only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. If that opportunity be lost, what limit can be assigned to a war which all my efforts have been unable to terminate ? Your Majesty has gained more during the last ten years than the whole extent of Europe in riches and territory : your subjects are in the very highest state of prosperity : what can you expect from a war ? To form a coalition of the Continental powers ? Be assured the Continent will remain at peace. A coalition will only increase the strength and preponderance of the French empire. To renew our intestine divisions ? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances ? Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To wrest from France her colonies ? They are to her only a secondary consideration ; and your Majesty has already enough and to spare of those possessions. Upon reflection you must, I am persuaded, yourself arrive at the conclusion, that the war is maintained without an object ; and what a melancholy prospect for two great nations to combat merely for the sake of fighting ! The world is surely large enough for both to live in ; and reason has still sufficient power to find the means of reconciliation, if the inclination only is not wanting. I have now at least discharged a duty dear to my heart. May your Majesty trust to the sincerity of the sentiments which I have now expressed, and the reality of my desire to give the most convincing proofs of it !”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1805, 236.

4.  
Answer of  
sh.  
ent.

The forms of a representative government would not permit the King of England to answer this communication in person ; but Lord Mulgrave, the minister for foreign affairs, on the 14th January, addressed the follow-

ing answer to M. Talleyrand :—" His Britannic Majesty has received the letter addressed to him by the chief of the French government. There is nothing which his Majesty has more at heart than to seize the first opportunity of restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, provided it is founded upon a basis not incompatible with the permanent interests and security of his dominions. His Majesty is persuaded that that object cannot be attained but by arrangements which may at the same time provide for the future peace and security of Europe, and prevent a renewal of the dangers and misfortunes by which it is now overwhelmed. In conformity with these sentiments, his Majesty feels that he cannot give a more specific answer to the overture which he has received, until he has had time to communicate with the Continental powers, to whom he is united in the most confidential manner, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of the sentiments by which he is animated, and of the lively interest which he takes in the security and independence of Europe."<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXIX.  
1805.

This reply, which in a manner disclosed the existence of a coalition against France, or at least of negotiations tending to such an end, completely answered the purpose of Napoleon. It both revealed to the subjects of his empire the necessity of extensive armaments, and gave them an opportunity of comparing what they deemed the pacific intentions and moderation of the Emperor with the projects of ambition which were entertained by the coalesced sovereigns. The press, which in his hands, as it invariably does in the hands of every despotic power, whether military or popular, had become the most terrible and slavish instrument in benighting mankind, resounded with declamations on the forbearance and wisdom of the youthful conqueror. The real causes of the war—the occupation of Italy, the invasion of Germany, the subjugation of Switzerland—were studiously kept out of view;

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
86. State  
Papers,  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 247.

5.  
Great influence of the French press in Napoleon's favour.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

1805.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
89. De  
Stael, ii.  
262, Sur la  
Rév. Franç.

the encroachments of the Allies, the ambition of kings, the lust of the coalition, alone were referred to. Public opinion, formed on the only arguments the people were permitted to hear, prepared unanimously to support the ruler of France, in the firm belief that in so doing they were not following out any projects of offensive ambition, but preparing only for the maintenance of domestic independence.<sup>1</sup>

6.  
Speech of  
Napoleon to  
the senate.  
Dec. 25,  
1804.

This general delusion was increased by the eloquent and seducing expressions in which Napoleon addressed himself to the legislative body at the opening of the session in the close of the year 1804: "Princes, magistrates, soldiers, citizens!" said he, "we have all but one object in our several departments—the interest of our country. Weakness in the executive is the greatest of all misfortunes to the people. Soldier, or First Consul, I have but one thought: Emperor, I have no other object—the prosperity of France. *I do not wish to increase its territory, but I am resolved to maintain its integrity.* I have no desire to augment the influence which we possess in Europe; but I will not permit what we enjoy to decline. *No state shall be incorporated with our empire;* but I will not sacrifice my rights, or the ties which unite us to other states." Such were the expressions by which he blinded the eyes of his subjects at the very time that he was taking measures, as the event showed, for the incorporation of the Ligurian republic with France, and the progressive extension of its dominion over the Ecclesiastical States and the whole Italian peninsula. No man ever knew so well as Napoleon how, by the artful use of alluring expressions, to blind his people to the reality of the projects which he had in view; none ever calculated so successfully upon the slight recollection and exclusive attention to present objects which have ever characterised that volatile people; and none ever so successfully practised the great art of revolutions, to rouse effort by the language of generosity, and apply it to the purposes of selfishness.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Bign. iv.  
163, 164.

This session of the legislative body was distinguished by an important step in French finance, highly characteristic of the increased wisdom and milder administration by which that great department was now governed. This was the commencement of the system of *indirect* taxation, and the consequent diminution of that enormous load of direct burdens which, amidst all the declamations of the revolutionists, had been laid during the preceding convulsions upon the French people. It has been already mentioned,<sup>1</sup> that the territorial burdens of France, during the progress of the Revolution, had become enormous; the land-tax amounting to a full fifth of the whole profit derived from cultivation by the nation, and the inequality in the distribution of this burden being so excessive, that in many places the landowners paid thirty, forty, fifty, and even eighty per cent on their incomes.<sup>2</sup> The enormity of the evil at length attracted the attention of the Emperor, and his sagacious mind at once perceived the superiority of taxes on consumption, which, confounded with the price of the articles on which they were laid, were hardly felt as a grievance, over an enormous direct payment from the proprietors to the government, which fell with excessive and intolerable severity upon a particular class of society. Under his auspices, accordingly, a system of indirect taxes was organised, under the name of *Droits Reunis*, which soon came to form an important branch of the public revenue.\* In the very first year, though their amount was very inconsiderable, they enabled

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

1805.

7.

Commence-  
ment of in-  
direct taxa-  
tion in  
France, and  
flattering  
state of the  
finances.<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, chap.  
xxxv. § 5.<sup>2</sup> *Duc de*  
*Gaeta*, i.  
196, 197.

Dec. 1804.

\* The income of France during the year 1804 was eighteen millions of francs higher than in 1803, and was as follows :—

Direct Taxes,	.	.	313,749,000, francs, or £12,550,000	
Registers,	.	.	198,584,000, ...	7,950,000
Customs,	.	.	41,485,000, ...	1,700,000
Excise, first year,	.	.	3,895,000, ...	156,000
Post-Office,	.	.	10,471,000, ...	420,000
Lottery,	.	.	16,658,000, ...	660,000
Salt-tax,	.	.	3,220,000, ...	130,000
			588,062,000, ...	£23,566,000

—DUC DE GAETA, i. 304.

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the government to diminish the territorial impost by 1,200,000 francs, or £48,000. The revenue, as laid before the Chambers, though not a faithful picture, exhibited a progressive increase in all its branches, and enabled the Emperor, without any loans, with the assistance only of the great contributions levied on Spain, Portugal, Italy, and other allied states, to meet the vast and increasing expenses of the year.<sup>1</sup> On the 31st December, a flattering exposition of the situation of the empire was laid before the Chambers by M. Champagny, the minister of the interior, and the intention announced of effecting constitutional changes in the Italian and Batavian republics, similar to that recently completed in the French empire. The splendid picture which these representations drew of the internal prosperity of France gave rise to the eulogium on Napoleon, which acquired a deserved celebrity at the time :—"The first place was vacant : the most worthy was called to fill it : he has only dethroned anarchy."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Duc de Gaeta, i. 196, 197, 215. Bign. iv. 158, 159.

te Pa-  
Ann.  
g. 1804,  
284. Bign.  
iv. 68.

8.  
Public an-  
nouncement  
of the al-  
liance with  
Russia in

ming  
speech to  
parliament.  
Jan. 15.

Events of still greater moment were announced to the British parliament in the speech from the throne; and the negotiations which then took place were of the greater importance that they formed the basis on which, at the conclusion of the war, the arrangements at the Congress of Vienna were mainly formed. From the ground then taken, Great Britain, amid all the subsequent vicissitudes of fortune, never for one moment swerved. In the speech from the throne, the King of England observed :—"I have received pacific overtures from the chief of the French government, and have in consequence expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may be consistent with the permanent interest and safety of my dominions; but these objects are closely connected with the general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation without previous communication with those powers on the

Continent with whom I am engaged in confidential intercourse and connexion with a view to that important object, and especially the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iii. 3.

It was not without foundation that Mr Pitt thus publicly announced the formation of political connexions which evidently pointed to a third coalition. His ardent mind had long perceived, in the coldness which had taken place between France and Russia, and the almost open rupture with Sweden, the elements from which to frame a powerful confederacy against that formidable empire; and considerable progress, through his indefatigable efforts, had been made, not only in arranging the basis of such a confederacy, but in obtaining the co-operation of the power whose aid was indispensable to its success—the cabinet of Vienna. Assured at length of the friendly disposition of the Austrian government, notwithstanding the caution and reserve which, from their exposed situation, they were compelled to adopt, Mr Pitt, four days after the meeting of parliament, presented a confidential communication to the Russian ambassador in London, in which the basis of the principles of the coalition was distinctly laid down. It was proposed—1. To reduce France to its former limits, such as they were before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the countries rescued from France, such arrangements as, while they provide in the best possible manner for the happiness and rights of their inhabitants, may at the same time form a powerful barrier against it in future, and for this purpose to incorporate the Low Countries with Prussia; 3. To unite the kingdom of Etruria to Tuscany, restore Lombardy to Austria, and annex Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont; 4. To take measures for establishing a system of public right throughout Europe. “The first of these objects,” continues the note, “is certainly the one which

9.  
Important  
negotiations  
with the  
Russian  
ambassador  
London.  
Jan. 19.

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. Off-  
. vii.  
59. Bign. iv.  
192, 193.

10.  
Basis here  
assumed for  
the whole  
revolution-  
ary war.

the views of his Majesty and of the Emperor (of Russia) would wish to be established, without any modification or exception ; and nothing less can completely satisfy the wishes which they have formed for the security and independence of Europe." The co-operation of Austria was alluded to in the same document ; for it goes on to state—  
" His Majesty perceives with pleasure, from the secret and confidential communications which your Excellency has transmitted, that the views of the court of Vienna are perfectly in accordance with this principle, and that the extension which that court desires can not only be admitted with safety, but even carried farther with advantage to the common cause."<sup>1</sup>

But it is worthy of especial notice, that, even in this secret and confidential note, there is not a hint of either reducing the ancient limits of France, or imposing a government on it contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants ; an instance of moderation in nations, suffering at the moment so severely from the ambition of that country, which is in the highest degree remarkable, and rendered the confederacy worthy of the glorious success which ultimately attended its exertions. The note, indeed, is the noblest monument of the prophetic wisdom, as well as impartial justice, with which Mr Pitt conducted the war against the Revolution. It is truly wonderful to see that great statesman thus early tracing the outline of the general policy of the great coalition which, ten years afterwards, effected the deliverance of Europe ; and it is a memorable instance of national perseverance as well as moderation, to behold the same objects unceasingly pursued by his successors, during ten years of the most violent oscillations of fortune, and no severer terms at length imposed upon the vanquished than had been agreed to by their conquerors in the outset of the strife, and at the highest point of the enemy's elevation.\*

Diplomatic relations of a friendly character had already

\* See Appendix A, Chap. xxxix.

taken place between the cabinet of St Petersburg and that of Berlin. So early as 24th May 1804, the latter, alarmed at the rapid strides of France in the north of Germany, had concluded a secret convention with the former, by which it was stipulated that so long as the First Consul limited himself to 30,000 men in the north of Germany, the two courts should remain quiescent; but if other states in the neighbourhood should be invaded, they should unite their forces and act in concert for the common defence. But the death of the Duke d'Enghien produced warmer feelings, and rapidly led to a disposition towards a coalition in the northern courts, though the long-established jealousy of Prussia still marred the conclusion of a lasting alliance. A treaty was concluded between Russia and Sweden, for the avowed purpose of "maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and providing for the independence of Germany." Immediately afterwards, a Russian corps disembarked in Pomerania, to act in conjunction with the Swedish forces. This treaty proved a source of jealousy and disquietude to the Prussian cabinet, and the diplomatic relations between Berlin and St Petersburg soon assumed a spirit of hostility, which augured little good to the confederacy which England was striving to bring about between the great powers of Europe. Count Winzingerode was in consequence despatched to Berlin by the Emperor Alexander, to endeavour to induce the Prussian cabinet to enter into the designs of England and Russia; but notwithstanding the leaning of Baron Hardenberg, its chief minister, and the influence of the Queen, the old jealousy of Austria still prevailed, and Prussia persisted in that evident partiality to the French alliance which was destined to be rewarded by the catastrophe of Jena and partition of Tilsit.<sup>1</sup>

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11.

Treaty between Russia, Prussia, and Sweden. And continued jealousy of Prussia towards Austria.

<sup>1</sup> Bi  
194,  
197. *AMERS*,  
v. 24, 25.

The supplies voted in the British parliament for the service of the year amounted to no less than £44,559,521 of war taxes, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain

12.  
Supplies for  
1805.



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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iii. 551, 546,  
and v. 23.

and Ireland, exclusive of £4,534,000, as separate charges for England, besides £28,032,000 as permanent expenses, making a total of £77,125,521 yearly expenditure. The ways and means, including a loan of £20,000,000, amounted to £43,992,000 for Great Britain, and £3,500,000 for Ireland, besides a permanent revenue for both countries of £32,381,000; in all £79,873,000.\* The new taxes imposed to meet the interest of the loan were no less than £1,560,000, consisting chiefly of additions to the salt-duty, to the postage of letters, to the legacy duty, and to those levied on horses employed in husbandry, or in agricultural operations.<sup>1</sup>

13.

The disturbed state of Ireland again rendered the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act indispensable, which accordingly passed both houses by a very large majority. Indeed, the continued anarchy of that beautiful island now began to spread among the thoughtful and observant in Great Britain a mournful conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that its people either had not received from nature the character, or had not reached by industry the stage of civilisation, requisite for the safe enjoyment of a free constitution; and that the passions consequent on the exercise of its powers would permanently distract its inhabitants, and desolate its surface. But though these views were beginning to spread among the thoughtful few, they took no root among the thoughtless many: party-spirit fastened on Ireland as the best field whereon to achieve its triumphs; all the chief attacks on the ministry began to be directed through its concerns, and, like the Debateable land between England and Scotland in former days, it was in consequence subjected to a species of government distracted by passions utterly fatal to lasting prosperity.<sup>2</sup> In this session of parliament also, the report of the select committee upon the tenth and eleventh naval reports was printed, in regard to the treasuryship of the navy under the manage-

May 27.  
"Tenth Re-  
port, Parl.  
Deb. v. 1,  
210. App.  
iii. 589.

\* See Appendix B, Chap. XXXIX.

ment of Lord Melville—proceedings upon which the spirit of party immediately fastened with more than usual acrimony, and which were subsequently made the means of effecting the overthrow of the statesman who had elevated the British navy from a state of unexampled dilapidation to the highest point of its triumph and glory.

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1805.

The grounds of this charge against Lord Melville, which is a matter of more importance in the domestic history of Britain than in the general transactions of Europe, were, 1st, That he had applied the public money to other uses than those of the navy departments under his control, in violation of an express act of parliament; and, 2d, That he had connived at a system, on the part of the treasurer of the navy, of appropriating, for a time at least, the public money under his charge to his own uses; in consequence of which, if the public had sustained no actual loss, they had at least run a considerable risk, and been deprived of the profits arising from such temporary use, which should all have been carried to the public credit. These charges were brought forward, in a speech of distinguished ability and vehemence, by Mr Whitbread, a mercantile gentleman of great eminence in London, a perfect master of business and a powerful debater, who for long afterwards assumed a prominent place in the ranks of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Mr Pitt, without denying the facts detailed in the report, called the attention of the house to the real import of what was established in evidence—viz. that no loss had been sustained by the public, every shilling drawn out by the treasurer of the navy having been replaced in the hands of the bankers; and that it did not appear that Lord Melville had been aware of the private purposes of profit to which that gentleman had applied the money, and most certainly had not derived one farthing of personal advantage from that irregularity.<sup>1\*</sup> After an animated debate,

14.  
Charges  
against Lord  
Melville.

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
ix. 255, 326.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 67,  
72.

\* "I never," said Mr Whitbread, "charged Lord Melville with participating in the plunder of the public, because that had not appeared."—*Parl. Deb.* iv. 611.

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Mr Whitbread's resolutions were carried by the casting-vote of the Speaker, the numbers being two hundred and sixteen on each side.

15.  
His im-  
peachment  
and acquit-  
tal.

This was too important a blow against the administration of Mr Pitt, not to be followed up with the utmost vigour by the Whig party, and was felt most keenly by that minister. It led to various subsequent proceedings; and so vehement did the opinion of the public become in consequence of the incessant efforts made by the press in the interest of the Whigs, to keep it in a state of agitation, that, on the 6th May, Mr Pitt announced in parliament, that Lord Melville's name had been erased from the list of privy councillors: and the thanks of the House of Commons were voted to the commissioners who had prepared the report, "for the zeal, ability, and fortitude, with which they had discharged the arduous duties intrusted to them." The noble lord had resigned his situation as First Lord of the Admiralty two days after the resolutions of the House of Commons were passed. These proceedings led to the impeachment of Lord Melville, in the following year, in the House of Peers, but he was acquitted by a large majority on all the charges, after a trial of great length and perfect impartiality; and in the interim, the nation, from whose service he had been removed, was saved from imminent danger and possible destruction by the memorable victory, to which his efforts as First Lord of the Admiralty had so mainly contributed, at Trafalgar.<sup>1</sup>

June 12,  
1806.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1806, 86,  
88, 127.  
Parl. Deb.  
iv. 602, 606.

16.  
Commence-  
ment of the  
debates on  
the Catholic  
question.  
Argument  
of Mr Fox  
and Lord  
Grenville  
for the re-  
peal of the  
disabilities.

This session of parliament was distinguished also by the commencement of those memorable debates on the removal of the existing disabilities from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, which continued, with little intermission, to agitate the legislature for five-and-twenty years. The question was argued with the utmost ability in both houses of parliament; and to a subsequent generation, which has witnessed the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill, and is familiar with its effects, it is a matter both of

interest and instruction to behold the light in which it was then viewed, and the arguments adduced for and against the measure by the greatest men of the age. On the one hand, it was argued by Mr Fox, Lord Grenville, and Mr Grattan, "That, in considering the claims of the Roman Catholics to exemption from the disabilities under which they laboured, it is material to recollect that they do not form a small or inconsiderable sect, but compose three-fourths of the population of Ireland, and embrace, according to some, three, according to others, five millions of its inhabitants. It would indeed be a happy thing if we were all united in religious as well as in political and constitutional opinions; but that, unfortunately, cannot now be hoped for, and the question is, what is to be done under existing circumstances? That parliament has long, too long, acted upon the distinction of religious faith, is indeed certain; but, in justice to the memory of King William, it must be observed, that the system of exclusion did not commence with his measures, but arose in a subsequent reign, when the opinion unfortunately became prevalent, that the Roman Catholics were the irreconcilable enemies of the Protestant establishment of Ireland, and the Protestant government of England; and upon that assumption, without any proof, the step was taken of excluding them from all share in the constitution. Not content with this, means were devised, by penalties, proscriptions, and disabilities, to drive the whole Catholic peasantry from the island, or reduce them to the state of a poor, ignorant, and illiterate population.

"Such was the state in which the Roman Catholics of Ireland were at the accession of his present Majesty; and under his government the measures pursued have indeed been a contrast to the dark and bigoted system of his predecessors. Under his auspicious rule a system of progressive amelioration has been introduced, by measures which were the more effectual because they were gradual, which have by degrees reversed the whole former system.

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17.  
The comparative toleration enjoyed under George III. Reasons which induced its being only partial.

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You have given them full toleration, and the benefits of education; taken away those odious measures which produced the disunion of families; restored the industry of the country, by granting to the people a participation in the fruits of the soil, and allowed them a full share of its benefits, withholding from them only the exercise of the elective franchise. By these means the people have rapidly advanced in wealth, agriculture, commerce, and general civilisation: the magnanimity of Great Britain acknowledged the right of an independent government, and at length, in 1792, they were admitted, by being permitted to vote at elections for members of parliament, to a full participation of all the privileges of British subjects, excepting those for which the present petition prays. Here, therefore, was a system of gradual relaxation introduced; and here, for a time, a stand was made: not because reasons existed which rendered it doubtful whether any further concessions should ever be made, but because there were many considerations which made it appear desirable that the last relaxations should not be made in the Irish parliament. That parliament had not arisen, like the British, from the wants and necessities of many centuries, but it was constituted at once, with the defined object of making the legislature a Protestant one, to the exclusion of three-fourths of the population. In these circumstances it was more than doubtful whether the sudden admission of Catholics into that legislature, founded as it would have been on a constituency embracing a great majority of persons of that persuasion, might not have endangered the Protestant interests of Ireland, and possibly its connexion with this country.

“But that obstacle is now removed; the Irish members no longer form a separate assembly, but are merged in the general parliament of the empire; and the same prudential considerations which forbade the admission of Catholics into the Irish parliament, where they would have formed a dangerous majority, recommend their entrance into the

British, where they can never exceed a small minority. It cannot be denied that the Catholics of Ireland conceived great hopes, that by the operation of the Union they would be relieved of their disabilities. No authorised assurance was ever given, no promise was made to them, that such a measure would result from that step: but still, by the arguments of those who supported it, and the course of reasoning both within and without doors, hopes were given that the subject of Catholic emancipation would be more favourably considered than it had hitherto been; and those who promoted the measure undoubtedly gave the Catholics to understand, that their claims would meet with the most impartial consideration from the united parliament. It is this pledge which you are now called upon to redeem: you are required not to concede Catholic emancipation, but to go into a committee to consider whether their demands can with safety be granted.

“ Every government unquestionably has the power to impose restrictions and disabilities upon a particular and suspected class of its subjects: but it must ever be a question of expedience whether such power should be exercised or not. What valid objections can be now urged against the removal of religious disabilities? We are not now to go back, in the nineteenth century, to a disquisition on the justice as well as expedience of the great principles of toleration. They are universally admitted: it lies with the opponents of emancipation to make out the exception of their case from the general rule. We are told that it is impossible for a Roman Catholic to be a loyal subject, and great pains have been taken to inculcate this doctrine. If true, this principle would lead to this result; that you must undo all that you have done; recall every concession you have made, and begin a crusade to drive the Catholics out of Ireland. But does history warrant the assertion that they bear this extraordinary character? Have not Protestants and Catholics been equally mingled in the ranks of the disaffected? And

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18.

Argument  
in favour of  
further re-  
laxation,  
from the  
Irish parlia-  
ment having  
now merged  
in the Eng-  
lish one.

19.

The present  
expedience  
of that re-  
laxation  
urged.

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have not many bright examples of the loyalty and fidelity of the popish priesthood and peasantry occurred, especially during the critical period of the American war? Lamentable as were the disorders of Ireland at the close of the last century, yet it is now evident that they arose from causes foreign to their religion: from the heartburnings consequent on the unhappy system of middle-men, and the false relation of landlord and tenant, or the contagion of revolutionary principles from a neighbouring state. And the tranquil condition of three-fourths of the Catholic population for years past, may surely now plead as strongly in their favour as their former discontents could militate against them.

20.  
The injury  
done to the  
Catholic po-  
pulation by  
the exclu-  
sive system.

“The period has now arrived when one of two things must be done with respect to Ireland. Either you must go back and restore the degrading and exclusive system of Queen Anne, or you must go on and conciliate the Catholics, by admitting them to a full participation in the blessings of the British constitution. No middle course is practicable. They have already received too much to be coerced by force; too little to be won by affection. They have got everything, excepting the right to seats in parliament and eligibility to the higher offices in the army, the navy, and the law. It is in vain to say that such exclusion is not an injury. To many it is a most substantial disadvantage, because it deprives them of the just reward for their talents and exertions: to all it is a galling bar, a badge of servitude; and he knows little of human nature who is not aware that such vexatious restraints, though accompanied with little real hardship, are frequently productive of more violent heartburnings than serious personal injuries. If they came into this house, do you really believe they would attempt to overturn the hierarchy of the country? What could five or six, or indeed fifty or sixty Catholics do to accomplish such an object, in the midst of a Protestant legislature tenfold more numerous? Similar arguments were urged

against the admission of Presbyterian members, but have they ever been found in hostility to the English Establishment? and has not, on the contrary, the removal of religious disabilities been the grand cause of the pacification and loyalty of the once distracted and rebellious inhabitants of Scotland?" Mr Pitt supported the claims of the Catholics generally, but lamented that they had been brought forward at that particular moment, under circumstances which left little, if any, hope of the question being satisfactorily adjusted.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iv. 651, 653,  
670, 684,  
1014, 1020.

On the other hand, it was strenuously argued by Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Sidmouth, Mr Perceval, and Lord Chancellor Eldon: "Independent of the obvious reasons against this measure at the particular time at which it is now pressed upon the country, there are other objections applicable to every time and to any circumstances under which this subject can be brought forward. In considering this question, it is indispensable to distinguish between toleration and the concession of political power. The first should ever be granted in its fullest extent; the second should be withheld when the granting of it may endanger the other institutions of society. The Catholics have proved themselves, by their conduct in Canada and elsewhere, to be as loyal subjects in some places as the British empire can boast: but their present claims in Ireland do not relate to their condition as subjects, but to their title to political power. No system, it is true, can be considered as perpetual, and some power must everywhere exist capable of abrogating the laws of the state according as circumstances may render this necessary; but there are some landmarks between the governors and the governed *non tangenda non movenda*, except on the ground of the clearest expedience or the most overbearing necessity. The principles of the Revolution, as established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, have always been considered as of this description. That great and glorious change was not brought about by

21.  
Answer of  
Lords Haw-  
kesbury,  
Sidmouth,  
and Eldon.



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1805.

speculative opinion or the passion for visionary improvement; it was the result of necessity and of experienced evils; and the great statesmen by whom it was effected had the courage to put to themselves the question, whether the inconvenience of having a king of a different religion from that established in the country, or the evil of breaking in upon the legal order of succession to the crown, were the greater calamity; and they decided in favour of the latter. Now, is it not a necessary consequence of this limitation of the crown to persons of the Protestant faith, that the immediate advisers, officers, and counsellors of the crown should be of the same persuasion? What would be more preposterous than in a government, where the law is above the crown, and has altered its channel of descent, to allow the ministers, the chancellor, the judges of the land, to be of the religion most hostile of all to the Establishment?

22.  
Argument  
against  
emancipation  
from  
the subor-  
dination of  
the Catholics  
to a foreign  
power.

“What would be the practical effect of a removal of the restrictions and limitations which our ancestors have adopted for the security of the constitution? There are many classes of Dissenters who differ from the Church of England as widely on doctrinal points, and more widely on ecclesiastical government, than the Roman Catholics; but the vital difference is, that they do not appeal to a foreign power for instruction or direction. It is this which constitutes the grand distinction between the Roman Catholics and all other descriptions of Christians; and it is this which it is in a peculiar manner of importance to consider, in judging of their claims to political power. It is not their profession of a different faith which renders them dangerous; it is the submission to a foreign authority—the constitution of an *imperium in imperio*, only the more dangerous that it is founded on a spiritual basis, which all conscientious persons will ever prefer to any temporal authority. In the Catholic religion, above all others, the jurisdiction and authority of the priesthood

interfere in a great part of the civil and domestic concerns of life. If religion and the state are distinct and at variance, and the Catholic is compelled to decide between them, he must decide for his religion and against the state. The question is not, whether Catholics may be loyal subjects—whether they should enjoy toleration, or obtain civil rights or civil liberty,—for all that they already have,—but whether they are to obtain *political power* of every description, when they refuse, and on the principles of their religion ever must refuse, to acknowledge the complete authority of the state.

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“The practical effect of the extension of the elective franchise to the Catholics of Ireland has been, to produce in most of its counties something very nearly approaching to universal suffrage. It is the opinion of those best acquainted with the internal state of Ireland, that, if the doors of parliament are once thrown open to the Catholics, the influence of the priests will infallibly be exerted in favour of the Catholic candidates, and as certainly against the Protestants : and thus the influence of property would be operating on the one side, and that of religion on the other. Such a state of things would not only create much internal confusion and disorder, but it could not fail to operate most injuriously with respect to the lower orders of the people, who must unavoidably, and on many occasions, become the victims of these contending interests. The present condition of the Continent renders it in an especial manner inexpedient to make the proposed concessions at this time. Whoever contemplates the late extensions of the power of France, must be convinced that the Roman See is substantially under the power of Napoleon. The Pope has been compelled to travel to Paris, a thing unheard-of for ten centuries, to place a revolutionary crown on the head of that fortunate usurper ; and he looks, doubtless, for some considerable return for so extraordinary a mark of condescension. Can there be any doubt, therefore, of the complete dependence upon

29.  
The present  
inexpedi-  
ency of  
further con-  
cessions.

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the French government in which he is placed ? and would it not be the height of madness in us, knowing Napoleon's inveterate hostility to this country, to weaken our means of resistance by the admission to political power of those who are necessarily subject to a power over which he has such a control ?

24.  
Inefficiency  
of all past  
concession  
to allay the  
discontents  
of the coun-  
try. It is  
rejected by  
a large ma-  
jority.

“Mr Emmett and all the leaders of the Irish insurgents have declared, in their examinations before the Secret Committee of the Irish Lords, ‘that the mass of the people do not care a feather for Catholic emancipation ; neither did they care for parliamentary reform, till it was explained to them as leading to other objects which they did look to, particularly the abolition of tithes.’ It is evident, therefore, from their testimony, as well as from the reason of the thing itself, that the great body of the Catholics would not consider what you are now called upon to grant as any desirable boon or material concession. We are ready to give them every reasonable liberty or franchise, but not to surrender the state into their hands. The expectation that concession, as such, will lead to peace, is unfortunately contradicted by the whole history of Ireland, where it has invariably been found that yielding has induced disturbance and anarchy ; and the public peace has been preserved only by a severe code, which, how painful soever, was, in time past at least, indispensable. The severity of that code we deprecate as much as any of the advocates of the Catholics ; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that under it Ireland enjoyed absolute tranquillity for nearly a century, and that since its relaxation it has been disgraced by two rebellions, and has constantly been more or less the theatre of disturbance. Let us, therefore, seeing the results of the preceding parts of the experiment have been so doubtful, avoid rash innovations and shun additional changes. The future destiny of our country is not in our own hands : kingdoms may rise and fall, flourish or decay ;<sup>1</sup> but let us not be ourselves the instruments of that blow which may occasion our

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
iv. 674, 691,  
695, 700,  
783, 803.

destruction, and recollect that it is only by a steady adherence to that system which we have received from our forefathers that we can hope to exist with safety, or to fall, if fall we must, with honour."

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The motion to go into a committee on the Roman Catholic petition was negatived by a great majority in both houses: in the Peers by one hundred and seventy-eight to forty-nine: in the Commons by three hundred and thirty-six to one hundred and twenty-four.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
v. 842, 1059.

In forming an opinion on this subject, interesting from the principles which it embraces, and still more from the consequences to which they lead, it is impossible to deny that it is involved in extraordinary difficulty. Not theory, but experience, is the antagonist with which liberal principles have here to contend. How convincing soever the argument in favour of the complete removal of religious disabilities may be, and how pleasing soever the prospect of constructing a society in which opinion is as free as the air we breathe, and actual delinquency alone can impose disability, it is impossible to deny that the experiment, when put into practice, has, hitherto at least, signally failed. Catholic emancipation has at length been carried; but it has produced none of the benefits which its advocates anticipated, and realised many of the evils which its opponents predicted. When it is recollected that it was argued that concession to the Irish Catholics would only lead to additional demands; that the whole influence of the priests would be thrown on the popular side, and the peace of the country be perpetually disturbed by the conflict between numbers and property, it is impossible now to dispute the justice of the objections stated to the change; and melancholy experience has taught us that Mr Perceval's and Lord Hawkesbury's words were prophetic. Ireland has never been so distracted as since Catholic emancipation was granted: the total suspension of the constitution has in consequence repeatedly since been forced as a measure of absolute

25.  
Reflections  
on this sub-  
ject. Total  
failure of Ca-  
tholic eman-  
cipation to  
pacify the  
country.

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necessity upon government; and, without stilling the waves of discontent in the island, that long-debated change has fixed the firebrand of discord in the British empire. Consequences so disastrous, so different from what they anticipated, have filled with astonishment the friends of toleration. Many have come to doubt whether its doctrines are in reality so well founded as abstract argument would lead us to suppose: others have settled into the belief that, however just in themselves, they were inapplicable to the circumstances of an old empire, essentially founded upon an opposite set of principles; and that, in the attempt to draw a decayed beam out of the edifice, the whole structure has fallen into ruins.\*

26.  
Causes of  
this apparent  
anomaly.

In truth, however, the total failure of Catholic emancipation affords no grounds for doubting, in the general case, the great principles of religious toleration; it only shows that other and deeper sources of evil were operating in Ireland, to which that measure, though founded in the abstract on just principles, could furnish no sufficient antidote: and that Great Britain is experiencing, in the endless difficulties consequent on the possession of that island, the same law of moral retribution of which France, ever since the Revolution, has furnished so memorable an example. When rightly considered, the state of that country is pregnant with political instruction; it shows

\* The following table exhibits the steady and rapid increase of crime in Ireland since the Catholic Relief Bill was passed:—

	COMMITTALS.	CONVICTIONS.
1828, Catholic disabilities in force, . . .	14,683	9,269
1829, Relief Bill passed in March, . . .	15,271	...
1830, . . . . .	15,794	9,902
1831, Reform agitation, . . . . .	16,192	9,605
1832, Ditto, . . . . .	16,036	9,759
1833, Tithe agitation begun, . . . . .	17,819	11,444
1834, Coercion Act in force, . . . . .	21,381	14,523

Thus the committals in Ireland had increased a half in six years after the disabilities were removed from the Catholics. When it is recollected that not a third part of the atrocious crimes in that country are ever made the subject either of committal or trial, it may safely be concluded from this instructive table, that during that period crime has more than doubled over its whole extent.—See *Parl. Papers*, June 14, 1835.

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that nations which commit injustice cannot escape punishment: and in its present wretchedness may be discerned additional grounds for that love of real freedom, and detestation of revolutionary ambition, the enforcement of which constitutes the great moral of the present times.

I. The first circumstance which has left an incurable wound in Ireland, and through it in the whole British empire, is the enormous and unpardonable extent to which the confiscation of landed property had been carried in former times. Without referring to historical details, it is sufficient to observe, that at least four-fifths, probably five-sixths, of the soil of Ireland has, at different times, changed hands in this violent manner, and that the great majority of the persons on whom the forfeited estates have been bestowed were English soldiers of fortune, noble proprietors, or companies resident in Great Britain. The consequences of this spoliation have been to the last degree disastrous. As the unjust forfeiture of property is the most cruel of all acts of oppression, because it extends to distant generations the injury done to the present, so it is the one of all others which most certainly leads to its own punishment. Invariably it leaves the seeds of undying animosity between the descendants of the oppressors and oppressed—between the owners of the soil and the peasantry who till their lands. Landed confiscation has been to Ireland what a similar deed of injustice was to France—a festering sore which has never been healed. In both countries restitution has become impossible, from the multitude of new interests which have been created: therefore, by both countries retribution must be endured.

II. The ghastly wound thus opened in Ireland by the barbarity of feudal injustice might, however, in the course of ages have been healed, as the evils of Norman confiscation were in Great Britain, were it not for another circumstance, of peculiar and lamentable malignity, which

27.  
The immense confiscation of land in former times.

28.  
The vesting of the forfeited estates in absentees.

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has continually kept it open. This is the unhappy bestowing of the estates upon persons resident in this country, and the consequent introduction of the system of middle-men and absentee proprietors into the neighbouring island. These evils necessarily flowed from the first great act of injustice ; for it was not to be supposed that English noblemen would leave their baronial palaces to dwell in the comparatively barbarous realm of Ireland ; and they soon found that, without middle-men interposed between them and the cultivators of the soil, they could not realise anything whatever out of their possessions. Thence necessarily followed in close and rapid succession the interposition of a number of tenants, many holding their estates for a long term of years, between the landlords and the peasantry ; the continual impoverishment of the rural cultivators, by the necessity of maintaining out of the produce of their labour such a multitude of superiors ; and the ruinous right of the landlord to distrain the effects of the subtenant for the arrears of rent due by his principal,—a privilege which, in its application to a country so situated, rendered the growth of agricultural capital impossible, and chained the people to habits of indigent existence and unlimited increase of population. The Irish landlords have long clung with blind tenacity to this blasting privilege, inconsistent with any degree of prosperity in their country, as the only means of realising any rents out of their tenantry—a parallel case to the strong attachment of the holders of national domains in France to the revolutionary law of succession, the certain destroyer of anything like general freedom in their country ; and another example of that law of nature which induces men, who have profited by the fruits of injustice, to adhere with infatuated obstinacy to the very institutions which are calculated to bring about its punishment.

III. The unhappy vicinity to Great Britain, and the supposed necessity of having a similar form of govern-

ment and national representation for the two countries, however different their character and state of social advancement, has contributed still further to perpetuate the disorders of Ireland, and distract its indigent peasantry by the passions and the ambition which centuries of freedom, and an extensive distribution of property, alone enable its more advanced neighbour to bear with safety. Experience has now placed it beyond a doubt that Ireland is not capable of bearing the excitement of, or disregarding the passions consequent on, a popular constitution. The state of civilisation to which she has arrived is not adequate to such a trial: the passions consequent on the unhappy wounds in her bosom are too strong to endure them without convulsions.\* Could the wishes of philanthropy be granted, what Ireland should receive for half a century is *a wise and humane, but despotic government*, which, while encouraging every branch of industry, alleviating every source of suffering, aiding every opening to employment, should, at the same time, rigorously punish crimes in every rank, close every avenue to democratic ambition, terminate the exercise of all ruinous privileges, and extinguish every hope of revolu-

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29.

And total  
unfitness of  
the Irish at  
present for  
a free con-  
stitution.

\* The atrocious crimes over Ireland in the last months of 1832, three years after Catholic emancipation had passed, were at the rate of six thousand a-year. In the year immediately following the passing of the Coercion Act, they were, over the whole country, reduced three-fifths; and in the county of Kilkenny, and a few other baronies where its extraordinary powers were put in force, they had been reduced from one thousand five hundred and sixty-one to three hundred and thirty a-year.—See *Parl. Report*, May 8, 1833, and May 14, 1834. “The disturbances of Ireland,” said Marquis Wellesley, while viceroy of that country in 1834, “have in every instance been excited and inflamed by the agitation of the combined projects for the abolition of tithes, and the destruction of the union with Great Britain. I cannot employ words of sufficient strength to express my solicitude that his Majesty’s government should fix the deepest attention on the intimate connexion marked by the strongest characters in all these transactions, between the system of agitation and its inevitable consequence, the system of combination leading to violence and outrage: they are inseparably cause and effect: nor can I, after the most attentive consideration of the dreadful scenes passed under my view, by any effort of my understanding separate one from the other in that unbroken chain of indissoluble connexion.” So strongly are the Irish themselves convinced of their inability to bear the excitement of a free constitution, at least in periods of agitation, that Mr Littleton, the Irish Secretary under Earl Grey’s administration, stated in



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tionary elevation. It is thus, and thus only, that the apparently incurable disorders of her social condition could be removed; that habits of industry could become general; artificial wants and a higher standard of comfort reduce to due subjection the principle of population; and a foundation be laid in the growth of an opulent middle-class in society, for the safe and pacific exercise of those powers which, when prematurely conceded, destroy in a short time the only durable foundation of real freedom.

30.  
Important  
observations  
of Mr Locke  
on tolera-  
tion.

IV. It was long ago observed by the great champion of religious freedom, Mr Locke, that the principles of toleration are not to be applied to those who hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics, or who arrogate to themselves any peculiar privilege or power in civil concerns, or acknowledge any foreign or alien ecclesiastical authority.\* The distinction which he draws between toleration to those who merely differ from government in religious belief, and those who acknowledge a foreign spiritual authority, and are animated by an undying desire to regain the lost possessions or ascendancy of the Catholic church, is in the highest degree important, and throws

parliament, that he had never met with a single person of any shade of political opinion in Ireland, and he had mingled with all, who did not cordially approve of the Coercion Act of 1833, and earnestly wished for its renewal.—*Mirror of Parliament*, 19th July 1834.

\* Locke's words, which are very remarkable, are as follows:—"Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is, when men arrogate to themselves, and those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative, covered over with a precious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promise, that princes may be dethroned by those who differ from them in religion, or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves; for these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth. But, nevertheless, we find those who teach the same things in other words. For what else do they mean who teach that no faith is to be kept with heretics? Their meaning is, forsooth, that the privilege of breaking faith belongs to themselves, for they declare all that are not of their communion are heretics. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox—that is, in plain terms, to themselves—any peculiar power or privilege above other

a precious ray of light upon the darkness with which the calamities consequent on Catholic emancipation have shrouded not only the prospects of the British empire, but the great principles of religious toleration itself. These calamities are not chargeable upon the doctrines of religious freedom abstractly considered; they are the fatal results of the combination of religious difference in the case of the Catholics, with the poisonous intermixture of ecclesiastical ambition, civil rancour, and political passion. The Catholics are dangerous, not merely because they profess different religious tenets, but because they belong to an ecclesiastical power which formerly numbered the British Islands among the brightest jewels of its tiara, and will never cease to labour to extirpate the faith which despoiled it of that ancient part of its heritage. Temporal passion, political ambition, revenge for injury, are here mixed up, in overwhelming proportions, with the abstract question of religious freedom.

Unlimited toleration the Irish Papists are clearly entitled to, and have long possessed; but to concede to them political power was the same error as it would

mortals in the concerns of religion, or who, under pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these *have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate*, as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government and possess themselves of the *estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects*, and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrates so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

"Again, that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince; for by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be enlisted, as it were, for soldiers against his own government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the court and the church afford any remedy to this inconvenience, when both are subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only influence to persuade the members of his own church to whatever he lists, but can enjoin it them on the pain of eternal fire."—*First Letter on Toleration; Works*, vi. 46, 47.

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31.

Dangerous  
mistake in  
giving the  
Irish politi-  
cal power.

have been in the Carthaginians to have permitted, on their shores, an armed and fortified settlement of Romans: or for England to have allowed an intrenched camp of the soldiers of Napoleon to be constructed on the coast of Kent. The unjust spoliation of the church at the Reformation, has introduced an apple of discord between England and Ireland, which can never be removed. Nor is the comparatively inconsiderable number, at first, of such an organised band of aliens, any reason for despising its ultimate dangers: for such a body, by taking advantage of the divisions of the ruling power, and attaching itself to the malcontents in the bosom of the state, can almost always in the end attain a supremacy over both the contending factions. A few hundred English merchants appeared as suppliant settlers on the banks of the Ganges; but no sooner did they gain the privilege, professedly for defence, of constructing forts and batteries, than they went on from one acquisition to another, till they had subjected a hundred millions of Hindoos to their dominion.

32.

Measures of  
Napoleon at  
this period.

While the British parliament was occupied with these momentous discussions, and the British people, little conscious of the imminent danger which threatened them from the power of Napoleon, were eager in the pursuit of the abuses opened up by the tenth report of the Naval Commissioners, that great conqueror was busied with the twofold object of consolidating in all the affiliated republics his newly acquired authority, and directing the vast naval and military preparations destined for the invasion of this country. With the double view of attaining the former of these objects, and disguising the real designs by which he hoped to effect the latter, he introduced a change into the government of all the states dependent upon France; placed on his head the iron crown of Lombardy; and surrendered himself, in appearance, to the magnificent fêtes by which the impassioned people of Italy

celebrated the supposed era of their regeneration. But during the whole time his eyes were fixed on the shores of the Channel; and the minutest movements of the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, which were all to co-operate in the expedition, as well as of the vast army destined for his immediate command, were regulated by his indefatigable activity, while he was to appearance engaged only in the pomp and magnificence of an imperial progress.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Norv. R.*  
3 65, 367.  
*Dum. xi.*  
149, 141.

Holland was the first of the independent republics which underwent the change consequent on the assumption of the crown by Napoleon. The continuance of the republican rule in that country was altogether at variance with the institutions which he proposed to establish in all the states subjected to his control; but as it appeared too violent a transition to make so old a commonwealth pass at once from democracy to monarchy, an intermediate preparatory state was imposed upon it by the Emperor. The whole powers of the constitution were by this change vested in a single magistrate, who, to conciliate the patrician party, was styled the Grand Pensionary. This new constitution, organised at Paris, the great manufactory of institutions of that description, was prepared by the French government with the aid of M. Schimmelpenninck, the Dutch ambassador at that capital, — a respectable man, who rapidly entered into the views of the Emperor, and was rewarded with the office of Grand Pensionary himself. The Dutch, incapable of resistance, yielded to this as they had done to all the preceding changes. The democrats were indignant at beholding a single governor concentrate in his hands all the powers of government; but the Orange party were secretly gratified at seeing so effectual a curb imposed on their revolutionary antagonists; and augured better things of this constitution than they had done of any which had before been forced upon their country.<sup>2</sup> The new constitution, accepted on the 22d March by the legislative

33.  
Change of  
government  
in Holland.

March 22.  
April 30.  
<sup>2</sup> *Bign. iv.*  
199, 200.

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34.  
And as-  
sumption  
of the iron  
crown of  
Lombardy  
by the  
French Em-  
peror.

body, soon received the sanction of the great majority of the inhabitants.

More important changes soon after ensued in the Italian states. The original design of Napoleon was to have erected the Italian republic into a separate kingdom,

placed his brother Joseph on the throne : and this choice was highly agreeable to the Cisalpines ; but that prince declared he would not accept it, unless the Emperor would give the new kingdom that without which it could not exist—a tract of sea-coast and a harbour in the Mediterranean—and relieve it from the burdensome tribute of 25,000,000 francs (£1,000,000) yearly paid to the French government. These conditions by no means answered the views of Napoleon, and therefore he changed his design, and resolved to place the crown of Lombardy on his own head, and send his son-in-law, Eugene Beauharnais, to Milan, to govern the kingdom in the character of viceroy. This design was first opened to Count Melzi and a deputation from the Italian republic, who attended at Paris on occasion of the coronation of Napoleon as Emperor of France. Their consent was without difficulty obtained ; and it having been arranged that the proposal should appear to come from the Italians themselves, Count Melzi, in a studied harangue, delivered in presence of the French senate, called upon Napoleon to establish a monarchical form of government and hereditary succession, as the only means of averting the evils with which their infant institutions were threatened. He then read aloud the fundamental articles of the act of settlement, by which Napoleon, Emperor of France, was declared King of Italy, with the right of succession to his sons, natural or adopted, and male heirs.<sup>1</sup>

March 18.  
<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv.  
152, 153.  
gn  
9,  
Dum. xi.  
133, 134.

35.  
Napoleon  
assumes the  
crown of  
Lombardy.

On the following day the Emperor appeared in great pomp in the senate, and conferred on his sister Eliza the principality of Piombino. The act of settlement of the Italian crown was then read ; the members of the deputation took the oath of fidelity to their new sovereign,

and he declared, "That he accepted, and would defend, the iron crown; and that even during his lifetime he would consent to separate the two crowns, and place one of his natural or adopted sons upon the throne as soon as the British, French, and Russian troops have evacuated respectively Malta, Naples, and the Ionian Islands." This great change was proclaimed with due solemnity at Milan on the 31st of March, when Eugene Beauharnais, who had already assumed the command of the army, acted as viceroy, and received the homage of the principal authorities. On the same day the new constitution of the kingdom was promulgated by an imperial and royal decree. The former and singular establishment of three colleges of electors, consisting of proprietors, men of letters, and men of business, was kept up in the new kingdom; but in every other respect its institutions were an exact copy of those established in the French empire.<sup>1\*</sup>

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March 31.

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv.  
154, 156.  
Dum. xi.  
137, 138.

The better to conceal the great designs which he was at this time bringing to maturity for the concentration of his land and sea forces for the invasion of Great Britain, Napoleon resolved to proceed to Italy, and dazzle the world by the splendour of the ceremonies attendant on his assumption of the iron crown of Charlemagne. For this purpose he set out for Turin, by the route of Fon-

36.  
His journey  
into Italy.

April 2.

\* Napoleon on this occasion made the following speech in the senate:—"Powerful and great is the French empire, but greater still is our moderation. We have in a manner conquered Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany; but in the midst of such unparalleled success we have listened only to the counsels of moderation. Of so many conquered provinces, we have retained only that one which was necessary to maintain France in the rank among nations which she has always enjoyed. The partition of Poland, the provinces torn from Turkey, the conquest of India, and of almost all the European colonies, have, in a manner, turned the balance against us. To form a counterpoise to such acquisitions we must retain something, but we keep only what is useful and necessary. Great would have been the addition to the wealth and resources of our territory, if we had united to them the Italian republic; but we gave it independence at Lyons; and now we proceed a step further, and solemnly recognise its ultimate separation from the crown of France, deferring only the execution of that project till it can be done without danger to Italian independence."—Botta, iv. 157.

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tainebleau and Lyons, corresponding daily with the minister of marine, and retiring from the magnificence of entertainments and the reception of adulatory addresses to direct the minutest details of the great armament which he was collecting in every harbour, from the Texel to Cadiz, and from Toulon to Venice, for this grand expedition. Nothing leaves so strong an impression of the vast ability and indefatigable activity of his mind, as the study of the numerous, minute, and lucid orders which he addressed during every day of this journey to the minister of marine, and the admirable sagacity with which almost all the conceivable chances of those numerous squadrons were calculated and provided for by his all-seeing intellect.\* But while these were the objects of his secret meditation, very different were the occupations in which to external appearance he was engaged. At Lyons he inspected the rising manufactures of that city, in which the five pacific years of his government, and the exclusion of British manufactures from the Continent in consequence of the war, had already induced an extraordinary degree of prosperity. In crossing Mont Cenis, he surveyed the great works in progress for the formation of the magnificent road which now traverses that mountain. At Turin he relinquished the royal palace to the Pope, who had reached that place on his return to Rome, and lodged in the Castle of Stupinigi, a country residence of the kings of Sardinia, which had been splendidly fitted up for his reception. He there received accounts of the successful passage of the Straits of Gibraltar by the Toulon squadron, and its junction with the Spanish fleet of Admiral Gravina at Cadiz, of which the details will immediately be given.<sup>1</sup> Overjoyed at this intelligence, he

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv.  
156, 160.  
Dum. xi.  
141, 145.  
Bign. iv.  
217.

\* This correspondence is to be found entire in General Mathieu Dumas's work, having been put into his hands by the Duchess Decrès, widow of the minister of marine, to whom it was addressed.—See DUMAS, xi. 195, 286.—*Pièces Just.* It leaves no doubt whatever as to the reality of Napoleon's designs for the invasion of this country, and the extraordinary combination of chances which alone prevented them from being carried into effect.

moved on with alacrity to Asti and Alessandria, and at the latter place seemed wholly engrossed with the immense fortifications in progress round its walls, destined to render it one of the greatest fortresses in the world.

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Splendid pageants had for some time been in preparation on the field of Castiglione, and on that of Marengo, where the destinies of Italy had so recently been fixed. Twenty-five thousand men on the first of these fields, under Augereau and Lannes, represented the battle of which it had been the theatre. Thirty-four battalions and seven squadrons were assembled on the latter, to imitate the manœuvres of the battle which had given it immortality; while the Emperor and Empress, seated on a lofty throne which overlooked the whole field, were to behold, in mimic war, the terrible scenes which once had occurred upon it. The day was bright and clear; the soldiers, who from daybreak had been on their ground, impatiently awaited the arrival of the hero: and shouts of acclamation rent the sky when he appeared with the Empress, in a magnificent chariot drawn by eight horses, surrounded with all the pomp of the empire, and ascended the throne, before which the manœuvres were to be performed. Many of the veterans who had been engaged in the action were present, among whom the soldiers in an especial manner distinguished Marshal Lannes, who had borne so large a portion of the brunt of the Imperialist attack in that terrible strife. After the feigned battle was over, the soldiers defiled before the Emperor, upon the most distinguished of whom he conferred, amidst the loud acclamations of their comrades, the crosses and decorations of the Legion of Honour.<sup>1</sup> The splendid equipments of the men, the proud bearing of the horses, the glitter of gold and steel which shone forth resplendent in the rays of the declining sun, and the interesting associations connected with the spot, produced an indelible impression on the minds of the spectators, and contributed not a little to fan the military spirit

37.  
Splendid  
pageant on  
the field of  
Marengo.  
May 5.

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv.  
157, 161.  
Dum. xi.  
141, 147.  
Bign. iv.  
217, 218.  
Thiers, v.  
399.



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38.

May 8.

among the indolent youth of Italy, whom Napoleon was so desirous to rouse to more manly feelings prior to the great contest with Austria, which he foresaw was approaching.

On the day following, the Emperor continued his journey, passed the Po at Mezzona Costa amidst the shouts of a prodigious concourse of people, and proceeded to Pavia, where he received the adulatory addresses with which the learned men of Italy lauded the dispenser of its wealth and influence. His triumphal entry into Milan took place on the 8th; and, amidst the fêtes and rejoicings which preceded his coronation, the designs were formed for the greater part of those splendid public edifices which now adorn that beautiful city, and have consoled its inhabitants for all the sacrifices they were obliged to make during the remainder of the war to the ambition of their sovereign. Then were projected the gorgeous additions to the cathedral, which now shoots up its hundreds of marble pinnacles and thousands of white statues, pure as the driven snow, in glittering splendour, into the clear blue heaven; the chaste design of the arch of the Simplon; the noble sweep of the amphitheatre; and the other works which, unhappily for the arts, were in part left incomplete at the fall of Napoleon. A fortnight was devoted to the reception of congratulatory addresses from the foreign and Italian potentates; among which were in an especial manner noticed those from the King of Naples and the King of Prussia—two powers, particularly the latter, whose neutrality was of essential importance in the great struggle which was approaching. The better to testify his good understanding with Prussia, the Emperor, at the reviews of the troops, wore the decorations of the black and red eagle, sent to him on the occasion by Frederick-William.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
219, 220.  
Bot. iv. 160,  
165. Per-  
sonal obser-

Napoleon had in the first instance, as has been mentioned, offered the crown of the kingdom of Italy to his brother Joseph; but he, divining the secret wishes of

the Emperor regarding it, had the prudence to decline the hazardous offer. He now proceeded to his own coronation. After reposing a thousand years in the treasury of Monza, the iron crown of Charlemagne was brought forth to encircle the brows of Napoleon. On the 26th May the ceremony of the coronation was conducted with the utmost magnificence, in the cathedral of Milan. The dresses, the decorations, the ornaments, were even more sumptuous on this occasion than on the preceding one, splendid as it was, at Paris. First came forth from a side entrance the Empress Josephine, dressed in gorgeous habiliments, dazzling with the lustre of diamonds. She was received with loud acclamations. But the lofty aisles shook with thunders of applause when, a few minutes after, the Emperor appeared, arrayed in his imperial robes, bearing on his head the imperial diadem, and in his hands the crown of Charlemagne and the sceptre of justice. The Cardinal Caprara officiated instead of the Pope on the occasion: Napoleon placed the iron crown on his own head, pronouncing at the same time the historical words, *Dio me la died': guai a chi la tocca*.<sup>\*</sup> He afterwards, as at Paris, himself crowned Josephine, who knelt at the high altar at his feet. *Te Deum* was afterwards sung, according to the ancient custom of the kings of Lombardy, in the Ambrosian church. Fireworks, fêtes, and illuminations closed the day; and nothing was omitted which could captivate the ardent imaginations of the Italians, or flatter the pleasing illusion that the days of national independence had at length arrived, and the reign of Tramontane authority ceased for ever.<sup>1</sup>

Among the numerous congratulatory addresses presented on this occasion to the Emperor, not the least remarkable was that from the King of Naples, couched in the warmest terms of flattery and adulation. At that very time, however, Napoleon had intercepted a secret correspondence of Queen Caroline with the Imperial cabinets

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30.

Is crowned  
with the iron  
crown of  
Charle-  
magne.

<sup>1</sup> Bot  
165, 1  
Dum.  
149, 101.  
Bign. iv.  
220, Thiers,  
v. 399.

40.  
Adulatory  
addresses  
from Naples  
and Genoa.

\* "God has given it me: beware of touching it."

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of Vienna and St Petersburg, which left no doubt of the understanding of that court with the enemies of France; and he in consequence, in his answer to the address, gave way to one of those sallies of passion to which he was occasionally subject, and which, to so contemptible an enemy, and for the deeds of a high-spirited queen, was in a peculiar manner unworthy of his character. A more important deputation was soon after received from the senate of Genoa; and the terms in which the Doge addressed the Emperor left no doubt as to the important alterations in the political situation of that republic which were soon to take place. "In regenerating the people of this country," said that chief magistrate, "your Majesty has contracted the obligation to render it happy: but this cannot be done unless it is governed by your Majesty's wisdom and valour. The changes which have taken place around us have rendered our insulated situation a source of perpetual disquietude, and imperiously call for a union with that France, which you have covered with imperishable renown. Such is the wish which we are charged to lay at your Majesty's feet. The reasons on which it is founded prove sufficiently that it is not the result of any external suggestion, but the inevitable consequence of our actual situation."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
151, 153.  
Bign. iv.  
221, 222.

41.  
Napoleon's  
reply

Napoleon replied in words, memorable as containing the death-warrant of one of the oldest and most distinguished republics of modern Europe. "Circumstances have frequently compelled me, within the last ten years, to interfere in your internal situation. I have constantly endeavoured to introduce peace, and contribute to the spread of those liberal principles which alone could restore to your government that splendour with which it formerly was surrounded; but I am now convinced of your inability to accomplish by yourselves anything worthy of your ancient renown. Everything has changed. The new maritime code which the English have adopted, and compelled the greatest part of Europe to recognise; the right

which they have assumed of blockading places not in a state of siege, which in effect is nothing else than a right to annihilate at their pleasure the commerce of every other people; the continual ravages of your coasts by the corsairs of Barbary: all conspire to render your insulated existence to the last degree precarious. Return, therefore, to your own country. I shall shortly follow you there, and put the seal to the union which my people and you have contracted. The barriers which separate you from the remainder of the Continent shall, for the common good, be removed, and things restored to their natural situation." The secret motive of Napoleon is here conspicuous. The annexation of Genoa to France was a part of his general maritime system, and suggested by his inveterate hostility to this country.<sup>1</sup>

A few days afterwards a decree appeared, formally incorporating the Ligurian republic with the French empire, and dividing its territory into three departments, —of Genoa, Montenotte, and the Appenines. Shortly after, the ancient standard of the republic was taken down in all the forts and vessels, and the tricolor hoisted in its stead. Thus was the French territory, for the first time, fairly extended beyond the Alps, a large surface of sea-coast added to its dominion, its frontiers advanced far into the Appenines, and brought to adjoin the Tuscan states; while one of the oldest republics in Europe, which for fourteen hundred years had maintained a separate existence, often illustrated by great and heroic actions, sank unheeded into the arms of death. Napoleon's secret motive for this act of rapacity, like most of the actions of his life, was the unextinguishable desire with which he was animated of subverting the power of Great Britain. This distinctly appeared from his letter to the Arch-Chancellor of that republic, on the advantages to be derived from this acquisition.<sup>2</sup>\*

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
154, 155.  
Bign. iv.  
239.

42.  
Incorporation of  
Genoa with  
France, and  
Napoleon's  
secret designs in that  
step.  
June 9.

Aug. 11.  
<sup>2</sup> Dum. xi.  
155, 156.  
Martens,  
vii. 685.

\* "My sole reason for uniting Genoa to the empire was the obtaining the command of its naval resources; and yet the three frigates which its port con-

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1805.

43.

Eugene appointed vice-roy of Italy, and great improvements in his kingdom.

Before quitting the capital of Milan, Napoleon presided at the opening of its legislative assembly, and laid the foundation of those great improvements in its social institutions which have survived the transitory sovereignty of their author. The annual expenses of the kingdom were fixed at a hundred million francs, or £4,000,000; the military establishment cost thirty millions, the civil only six; and a very considerable portion of the revenue was allotted to the departments, to be laid out in canals, bridges, and other works of public ornament or utility. The Code Napoleon was introduced, which still continues, from its experienced utility, to regulate the decisions of its courts of law, notwithstanding the change of government: the order of the Iron Crown was instituted, and the authority and powers of the viceroy, Eugene Beauharnais, were defined by an express statute. Napoleon, after having received as king the oath of allegiance of his son-in-law as viceroy, pronounced a discourse which terminated with these words, sufficiently expressive of the military direction which he was so anxious to give to the ambition of Italy: "I have given fresh proofs of my desire to further, by every means in my power, the happiness of the Italian people. I trust that, in their turn, they will endeavour to occupy in reality the place which they have already obtained in my mind;<sup>1</sup> and they will never do so till they are persuaded that military virtue

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi. 157, 159. Bign. iv. 223, 224. Martens, viii. 310.

tains are not yet armed. Genoa will never be truly French till it furnishes six thousand sailors to my fleets. It is neither money nor soldiers which I wish to extract from it. Sailors, old sailors, are the contribution which I require. You must establish a naval conscription there. It is in vain to talk of governing a people without occasioning frequent discontent. Do you not know that, in matters of state, *justice means force* as well as virtue? Do you think I am so sunk in decrepitude as to entertain any fears of the murmurs of the people of Genoa? The only answer I expect or desire to this despatch is, *sailors, ever sailors*. You are sufficiently acquainted with my resolution to know that this desire is not likely to be ever diminished. Think of nothing in your administration, dream of nothing, but sailors. Say whatever you please in my name; I will consent to it all, provided only that the urgent necessity of furnishing sailors is expressed with sufficient force."—BIGNON, v. 78.

So tenacious was Napoleon on this subject, and so provident was he of the future at this period of his government, that he wrote shortly

is the chief bulwark of nations. The time has now come when the brilliant youth, who now waste the best years of their lives in the indolence of great cities, should cease to fear the fatigues and the dangers of war."

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1805.

Notwithstanding the heavy burdens with which they were oppressed under the government of Napoleon, and the unexampled calamities with which it closed, the Italians were highly satisfied with his administration, and still look back with fond regret to the *Regno d'Italia* as the brightest period of their modern existence. Part of this, no doubt, is to be ascribed to the expenditure and animation consequent on the presence of the Viceroyal court at Milan, and the natural gratification which the people experienced at the elevated position which, as subjects of Napoleon, they occupied in the theatre of Europe. But still more was owing to the wisdom and moderation of Eugene's internal administration, and the admirable principles of government which he received from the sagacity and experience of Napoleon. In the management of the kingdom of Italy, he followed the maxims which deservedly gave, and so long preserved to the Romans, the empire of the world. Unlike the conquered states of the other European monarchies, the inhabitants of Lombardy felt the foreign yoke only in the quickened circulation of wealth, the increased vent for industry, the widened field for exertion. Honours, dignities, emoluments, all were reserved for Italians:

44.  
Popularity  
of Napo-  
leon's gov-  
ernment in  
Italy, and  
great works  
which he

after to the same minister when on the eve of setting out for the Rhine:

"To secure victories we must think only of defeats. Never lose sight of the chance of my army in Italy being compelled to fall back on Alessandria—nay, on Genoa. Let the artillery, the arsenals, the magazines there, be in a condition to stand a siege." Again, from Strassburg, on 1st October: "Never lose sight of the provisioning of Genoa. I must have there at least three hundred thousand quintals of wheat. My war-projects are vast, but in the midst of them all never lose sight of Genoa. Even if besieged, still remain at your post there. Take such measures that in no event can you run short of corn. Say boldly on all occasions that Genoa is indissolubly united to France. Repeat that the man who, on their mountains, dissipated the hosts of Austria and Sardinia with thirty thousand men, is not now likely to yield to the menaces of the coalition, when he has three hundred thousand in the centre of Germany."—Brenon, v. 79, 80.

Sept. 16, from  
St Cloud.

Oct. 1, from  
Strassburg.

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1805.

hardly a magistrate or civil functionary was of foreign birth. Everywhere great and useful undertakings were set on foot; splendid edifices ornamented the towns; useful canals irrigated the fields: if the burdens of the people were heavy, they had at least the gratification of perceiving that a large portion of their produce was reserved for domestic objects, and that they received back, in the rewards of industry, a part of what they had rendered to the service of the state. In the satisfaction arising from this judicious system of government, they forgot that the heavy tribute of a million sterling yearly was remitted to Paris, and that the higher situations in the army were exclusively occupied by Frenchmen: a system under which the soldiers of Italy came to perform glorious actions before the close of the war, and which seems to be the only method by which even a temporary revival of the military spirit can be communicated to nations enervated by the long enjoyment of peace, and the establishment for centuries of the refinements of civilisation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
226. Dum.  
xi. 147, 149.

45.  
His progress  
" through the  
Italian

Still keeping his eyes fixed on the shores of the Channel, and corresponding daily with his minister of marine for the regulation of all the squadrons destined to co-operate in the English expedition, Napoleon visited the other towns of the north of Italy. Verona, Mantua, Parma, successively felt the animating influence of his presence, and in each he left some lasting mark of the grandeur of his conceptions, and the minute attention which he paid to the wants and interests of his subjects. At Bologna he received a deputation from the republic of Lucca, complaining of the vexatious dominion of the oligarchy, under whose influence they had fallen; and to whom he promised a government, in the person of his sister Eliza, which should be completely in harmony with the institutions of the other states in northern Italy; veiling thus, as he always did, his projects for the advancement and elevation of his family under an air of

for the national welfare; and affecting the greatest deference for the public choice, when he was in effect depriving the people of all influence, either in the election of their government or in the administration of affairs.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv.  
170, 171.

At length, on the 30th June, he made a triumphal entry into Genoa, and celebrated the union of that city with France by fêtes and rejoicings of unparalleled magnificence. He there met, and had a long secret conference with, the Abbé, now Cardinal Maury, who joyfully accepted his offer to return to Paris, where he became high in favour at court. At the gates of the city he was received by the magistrates, with the keys: "Genoa, named the Superb from its situation," said they, "is now still more so from its destiny: it has thrown itself into the arms of a hero. Jealous in many ages of its liberties, it is now still more so of its glory; and therefore it places its keys in the hands of one above all others capable of maintaining and increasing it." In the principal church of the city he received the oaths of allegiance of the leading inhabitants, amidst the thunder of artillery from the overhanging forts, batteries, and the vessels in the harbour; and then commenced the fêtes, which, in splendour and variety, exceeded anything seen in Italy in modern times. All that Eastern imagination had fancied, all that poetic genius had ascribed to fairy power, seemed realised on this memorable occasion. The singular and romantic situation of the city; its blue sea and cloudless skies; its streets of marble and lofty palaces; its embattled shores and overhanging forts; its proud domes, surmounting one another in gay theatric pride; and its lovely bay, glittering with the sails of innumerable barks, were peculiarly fitted to give animation and lustre to the spectacles. Splendid, above all, were the fireworks and illuminations at night; spreading from the Lanterne on the west to the extremity of the Mole on the east, seeming to ascend to heaven in the mountains

46.

Magnificent  
fêtes at  
Genoa.



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XXXIX.

1805.

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv.  
172, 176.  
Thiers, v.  
399, 278.

above, and to descend to the deep in the reflection of the water beneath. Never, in the proudest days of its greatness, amidst the triumphs of Doria or the glories of La Meloria, did Genoa present so magnificent a spectacle as in these the last of its long existence. It was amidst the roar of artillery and the blaze of illumination, that this venerable republic descended into an unhonoured tomb. Such is modern Italian patriotism!<sup>1</sup>

47.  
Extinction  
of Lucca,  
and incorpo-  
ration of  
Parma and  
Placentia  
with France.

The same period witnessed the extinction of the republic of Lucca; the promises of Napoleon were fulfilled. It was bestowed, as a separate appanage, along with Piombino, on his sister, the Princess Eliza. Such was the comment on the saying of Napoleon nine years before, that the days were passed in which republics could be swallowed up by monarchies! Finally, he put the last hand to the organisation at this time of Italy, by a decree, after his return to Paris, incorporating the states of Parma and Placentia with the French empire, under the title of the twenty-eighth military division. His ascendancy in Italy was now complete: Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia were incorporated with the empire: he reigned at Milan by the title of king, and in Lucca and Tuscany, through the ephemeral governments of the Princess Eliza and the King of Etruria.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Bot. iv.  
176. Bign.  
iv. 236, 237.  
Martens,  
vii. 681.48.  
Increasing  
jealousy of  
Austria, and  
change in its  
ministry.

These prodigious strides towards universal dominion did not escape the notice of the other powers of Europe. The resolution of Russia and England was already fixed; but Mr Pitt had no small difficulty in the outset in bringing the views of the cabinet of St Petersburg to a practical bearing. The ideas of the Emperor Alexander, moulded by the philanthropic dreams of his preceptor Laharpe, and afterwards by the visions of Czartorinski and the Abbé Piacoli, were strongly turned towards the coercion of the Revolution by a moral influence of which Russia was to be the head. He contemplated the adjustment of the differences of France and England by a congress of European powers, somewhat similar to those

which afterwards arose out of the Grand Alliance. He proposed that both parties should abate somewhat of their pretensions; that France should withdraw from Italy and Germany, but retain the frontier of the Rhine and the Alps; and that England should evacuate Malta. He strongly urged the construction of two frontier kingdoms, to be a check on France—one in the Low Countries, one to the south of the Alps—the reconstruction upon a sure footing of the Germanic Empire, and the establishment of such a code of public law for Europe as might supersede the sad necessity of warfare between separate states. With great address Mr Pitt adopted whatever was capable of immediate application in these projects, and adjourned to a more tranquil period what appeared impracticable. At length, though not without considerable difficulty, he brought the Russian cabinet to see that the great thing at present was to provide a barrier against the encroachments of France, leaving the reconstruction of society for a period when security had been attained. But although Russia was thus in the end brought to take her proper part in the European alliance, it was not so easy a matter to get the other powers to engage in the contest. The temporising policy of the cabinet of Vienna, desirous to gain time, and prepare for those redoubtable blows which they well knew, in the event of hostilities, would be in the first instance directed against themselves, rendered it necessary during the first part of the year to delay the rupture. The utmost that could be done, in the first instance, was to procure the conclusion of a secret convention, signed at Vienna on the 6th November 1804, of a defensive and precautionary nature. By this treaty Austria agreed, in the event of France making farther strides in Italy, to bring 235,000 men into the field to co-operate with 115,000 Russians, and in the event of success, her frontier was to be advanced to the Adda, and she was to obtain Salzburg and the Brisgau. But nothing was done under this treaty; and it was only

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1805.

June 1805.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi.  
160, 164.  
Thiers, v.  
322, 347,  
402.

very recently it has been brought to light.\* The rapid advances of Napoleon in Italy, however, at length roused the indignation of the Austrian nobility. M. Winzingerode, the Russian ambassador, daily found the cabinet more inclined to adopt his views as to the necessity of a general and combined effort to arrest the common danger; and at length the force of general opinion became so great, that it produced a change in the cabinet, and total alteration in the external policy of government. The illustrious president of the council, M. Cobentzel, who had long been at the head of the pacific party, resigned, and was succeeded by Count Baillet Latour; and Prince Schwarzenberg received the situation of vice-president of the Aulic Council. This change was decisive; the war party was now predominant; and it was only a question of time and expedience when hostilities should be commenced.<sup>1</sup>

49.  
Treaty offensive and defensive between Russia and England, and its objects.  
April 11.

Russia and England, more removed from the danger, and therefore more independent in their resolutions, had proceeded considerably farther in the formation of a coalition. On the 11th April a treaty was signed at St Petersburg, which regulated the terms and the objects of the contracting parties, and the forces they were respectively to employ in carrying these into execution. The preamble set forth, "As the state of suffering in which Europe is placed demands immediate remedy, their majesties have mutually determined to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for fresh encroachments on the part of the French government. They have agreed, in consequence, to employ the most speedy and efficacious means to form a general league of the states of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the present concert." The forces to be employed, independent of those furnished by England, were fixed at five hundred thousand men; and the objects of the league are declared to be—"1. The evacuation of the country of

\* See THIERS, v. 355.

Hanover, and of the north of Germany. 2. The establishment of the independence of the republics of Holland and Switzerland. 3. The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will admit. 4. The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, including the island of Elba, by the French forces. 5. The introduction of an order of things into Europe which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations. To enable the different powers who may accede to the coalition to bring forward the forces respectively required of them, England engages to furnish subsidies, in the proportion of £1,250,000 sterling for every 100,000 of regular troops sent into the field.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
vi. Apr. 2  
to 5. Mar-  
tens, viii.  
230. Tiers,  
v. 230, 311.

By separate articles, signed between England and Russia only, it was agreed that the objects of the alliance should be attempted as soon as 400,000 men could be ready for active service; of which Austria was expected to furnish 250,000, Russia 115,000, and the remaining 35,000 were to be supplied by Hanover, Sardinia, and Naples. By another separate article, Russia engaged to march forthwith an army of 60,000 men to the frontiers of Austria, and 80,000 to those of *Prussia*, “to be able to co-operate with the said courts in the proportions established by the treaty, and to support them respectively, in case they should be attacked by France;” and that, independently of the 115,000 men to be engaged in active operations, the Emperor of Russia should keep bodies of reserve and of observation upon his frontiers. The advantages of the treaty, so far as subsidies were concerned, were to be extended to Austria and Sweden, if in the course of the year 1805 they brought their forces into action; the Emperor of Russia agreed, if necessary, to bring 180,000 men into the field, on the same conditions as to supplies as the original 115,000; and the

50.  
Subsequent  
articles of  
agreement:  
and provi-  
sion for ex-  
tending the  
treaty to  
Austria,  
Sweden, &c.

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
vi. App. 5  
to 10. Sepa-  
rate articles.  
Martens,  
vii. 332.

contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against any power which should unite with France in the contest which was approaching. Finally, a separate article of great importance settled the ultimate objects of the coalition, and the intentions of the Allies in regard to the states which they might rescue from the dominion of France, in a manner alike consistent with good faith, justice, and moderation.<sup>1</sup> \*

51.  
At length  
the acces-  
sion of Aus-  
tria to the  
alliance is  
obtained.

Notwithstanding the definite terms of this treaty, considerable difficulty existed, and delay was incurred, in arranging the terms of the Austrian co-operation. Not that the cabinet of Vienna was backward in their disposition to promote the objects of the coalition, but that the deplorable state of their finances rendered it impossible for them to bring any considerable forces into the field till they had received large subsidies from Great Britain, and that it was highly inexpedient to commence hostilities till these had arrived, as the exposed situation of their territories rendered it certain that they would be the first objects of attack. In the end, however, by the indefatigable efforts of Mr Pitt on the part of England, and M. Novosiltzoff on that of Russia, these difficulties were overcome, and the cordial co-operation of Austria to the alliance was obtained. The Austrian minister at St

They disclaim  
all intention  
to control the  
French in the  
choice of their  
government.

\* "The Emperor and King being disposed to form an energetic concert, with the sole view of insuring to Europe a solid and lasting peace, founded upon the principles of justice, equity, and the law of nations, are aware of the necessity of a mutual understanding at this time with regard to those principles on which they will act as soon as the events of the war may render it necessary. These principles are, *in no degree to control public opinion in France*, or in any other countries where the combined armies may carry on their operations, *with respect to the form of government which it may be proper to adopt*; nor to appropriate to themselves, till a peace should be concluded, any of the conquests made by one or other of the belligerent parties; to take possession of the towns and territories which may be wrested from the common enemy, in the name of the country or state to which they of right belong; and in all other cases in the name of all the members of the league; and, finally, to assemble at the termination of the war a general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations on a more definite basis than has been possible heretofore, and to insure their observance by a federative system founded upon the situation of the different states of Europe."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. Ann. 6, 7

Petersburg, Count Stadion, forcibly represented the dilapidated state of the Imperial finances, and insisted on a subsidy of £3,000,000, one-half to be immediately paid, in order to bring the troops into the field, and the other by monthly instalments after the campaign had commenced.<sup>1</sup> These terms were at length agreed to by the British ambassador, it being stipulated that the Emperor of Austria should forthwith embody a force of not less than three hundred and twenty thousand men, and that the advance to be made by Great Britain, under the name of *première mise en campagne*, or preliminary payment, should be made on this calculation.<sup>2</sup> On the same day a treaty was concluded between Russia and Austria; and active negotiations ensued between the Aulic Council and the Russian war-minister relative to the measures to be pursued in the prosecution of their joint hostilities.<sup>3</sup>

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1805.

<sup>1</sup> Count Stadion's note. Aug. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Lord G. L. Gordon's answer. Aug. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Parl. Deb. vi. 11, 17. Martens, viii. 334.

Much less difficulty was experienced in arranging the terms of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Sweden, which had already, by the treaty of 3d December 1804, evinced a desire to range itself under the banners of England. By a convention, concluded at Helsingborg on the 31st August 1805, it was provided that England should pay monthly £1800 for every 1000 men who co-operated in the common cause; and as the garrison of Stralsund was taken at 4000 men, who were not included in the subsidy, the periodical payment for them amounted to £7200. By a subsequent convention, signed at Beckcagsog, 3d October 1805, the number of Swedish troops to be employed in Pomerania was fixed at 12,000 men, for whom England was to pay at the rate of £12, 10s. per annum for each man, besides five months' subsidy in advance, as outfit for the campaign, and £50,000 to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence.<sup>4</sup> Thus, by the effects of the incessant advances of Napoleon towards universal dominion, and the genius and influence of Mr Pitt, were the discordant elements of European strength

52.  
Sweden al-o is included.

<sup>4</sup> Parl. Deb. vi. App. 18, 24. Martens, viii. 350.

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1805.

again arrayed, notwithstanding the terror inspired by former defeats, in a firm coalition against France, and a force was assembled amply sufficient, as the event has proved, to have accomplished the deliverance of Europe, if ignorance or infatuation had not misdirected them when in the field. Diplomacy had done its part; War was now required to complete the undertaking. Mr Pitt might then have said with Wallace, when he had assembled the Scottish peers and the forces of his country in the war of independence on the field of Falkirk—"Now, gallants! I have brought you to the ring: dance as you may."

53.  
Prussia in  
vain endeav-  
oured.  
July 10.

It was still, however, a great object, if possible, to engage Prussia in the alliance; and, for this purpose, M. Novosiltzoff was despatched to Berlin, and the successive annexations of Genoa, Parma, and Placentia, to France, gave him great advantages in the representations which he made as to the necessity of opposing a barrier to its future progress. Fearful of the strife which was approaching, and apprehensive of being cast down from the position which she occupied in the shock of such enormous powers, Prussia made the most energetic efforts to avert the collision, and, for this purpose, the cabinet of Berlin despatched M. Zastrow, aide-de-camp to the King, to St Petersburg. Under the mediation of Prussia, a negotiation between the courts of Russia and France took place, which for three months averted the commencement of hostilities, but led to no other result. Neither party was sincere in the desire for an accommodation; and if either had, the pretensions of the opposite powers were too much at variance to render a pacification possible. France was resolutely determined to abandon none of its acquisitions on the Continent, alleging as a reason that they were necessary to form a counterpoise to the vast increase of territory gained by Russia in the East, by Austria in Italy, and by England in India;<sup>1</sup> and the Emperor Alexander replied, with reason, that recent

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
258, 269.  
Dum. xii.  
92, 95.  
Thiers, v.  
349, 351.

events had too clearly demonstrated that the acquisitions of France were out of all proportion to those of the other powers—a fact of which the necessity of a general coalition to form a barrier against its ambition afforded the clearest evidence.\*

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1805.

Notwithstanding all the efforts of Britain and Russia, however, it was found impossible to overcome the leaning of Prussia towards the French interest. The real secret of this partiality was, not any insensibility to the dangers to be apprehended to the independence of Germany from the power of France, on the part of the cabinet of Berlin, or its able director Baron Hardenberg, but the effect of the glittering prize which her ministers had long coveted in the electorate of Hanover. The Prussian government could never divest itself of the idea that, by preserving a dubious neutrality, and reserving their interposition for the decisive moment, they might without danger add that important acquisition to their dominions. In effect, Napoleon, well aware of this secret bias, withdrew, in the close of July, twelve thousand men from the Hanoverian states; and the Prussian ministers then dropped hints as to “the revival of the King’s wishes as to Hanover,” and at length openly broached the project of taking provisional possession of that electorate, “as the union of the Con-  
tinentals dominions of his Britannic Majesty to Prussia is of such consequence to that monarchy, that it can never relinquish the prospect of gaining such an acqui-  
sition.”

54.  
Prussia per-  
sists in her  
neutrality,  
from the  
hope of get-  
ting Hano-  
ver.

July 31.

Aug. 9.

\* The real points in dispute between France and Russia will be better understood from the following extract from the *Moniteur* at this period, than it can be from the reserved and formal style of diplomatic notes. “What have France and Russia to embroil them? Perfectly independent of each other, they are impotent to inflict evil, but all-powerful to communicate benefits. If the Emperor of France exercises a great influence in Italy, the Czar exercises a still greater over Turkey and Persia. If the cabinet of Russia pretends to have a right to affix limits to the power of France, without doubt it is equally disposed to allow the Emperor of the French to prescribe the bounds which it is not to pass. Russia has partitioned Poland: it is but fair that France should have Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. It has seized upon the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the northern provinces of Persia; can it deny that the right of self-preservation gives France a title to demand an equivalent in Europe? Do you wish a general congress in Europe? Let every power



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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
268, 272.  
Thiers, v.  
351, 354.

55.  
And at  
length  
agrees to

that elec-  
torate.

Aug. 14.

tion, provided it can be done without compromising the character of his Majesty." There was the real obstacle. The King of Prussia, notwithstanding all the immediate advantages of the acquisition, was stung with the secret reproaches of conscience at the idea of thus appropriating the possessions of a friendly power, at the very moment when that power was making such efforts, without the idea of selfish recompense, for the deliverance of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

The struggles of conscience, however, became daily weaker. The King at length put the question to his ministers, "Can I, without violating the rules of morality, without being held up in history as a prince destitute of faith, depart, for the acquisition of Hanover, from the character which I have hitherto maintained?" The woman that deliberates is lost. It was easy to see in what such contests between duty and interest would terminate. Before the middle of August, the Prussian cabinet intimated to the French minister at Berlin their willingness to conclude a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French government, on the footing of the annexation of Hanover to their dominions. Napoleon eagerly closed with so advantageous an offer, and joyfully agreed to rid himself of a dangerous enemy at the expense of England. Duroc was forthwith sent from Paris to conclude its terms, and arrived there on the 1st September. Subsequent unforeseen events prevented the treaty being signed, and saved Prussia from this last act

begin by restoring the conquests which it has made during the last fifty years. Let them re-establish Poland, restore Venice to its Senate, Trinidad to Spain, Ceylon to Holland, the Crimea to the Porte, the Caucasus and Georgia to Persia, the kingdom of Mysore to the sons of Tippoo Saib, and the Mahratta states to their lawful owners, and then the other powers may have some title to insist that France shall retire within her ancient limits. It is the fashion to speak of the ambition of France. Had she chosen to preserve her conquests, the half of Austria, the Venetian states, the states of Holland and Switzerland, and the kingdom of Naples, would have been in her possession. The limits of France are in reality the Adige and the Rhine. Has it passed either of these limits? Had it fixed on the Salza and the Drave, it would not have exceeded the bounds of its conquests." It is not difficult to trace the hand of Napoleon in these able remarks.—*Moniteur*, 18th July 1805; and DUMAS, xii. 96, 97.

of cupidity and infatuation; but in the meanwhile the precious moments were lost. The French forces were enabled to pour in irresistible multitudes, through the Prussian dominions, upon the devoted host at Ulm; and the battle of Austerlitz overthrew the independence of Germany, and exposed Prussia, unaided, to the mortal strokes of the French Emperor. By such combinations of selfishness and folly was Napoleon aided in his project of elevating France to supreme authority in Europe, and for such wretched objects was that sincere alliance of all its powers long prevented, which would at any time have opposed an effectual barrier to his progress! <sup>1</sup>\*

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
266, 273.  
Thier., v.  
410.

Threatening as was the present state of the Continent, Napoleon was not one whit diverted by it from his projected descent upon Great Britain. On the contrary, it only furnished an additional reason for pushing the preparations for that great undertaking with additional vigour; he being well aware that if England was destroyed, the Continental coalition would soon fall to pieces, and that a blow struck on the banks of the Thames would more effectually attain this object than one either in the basin of the Danube, or on the shores of the Vistula. For this purpose, in the midst of the splendid pageants in Italy, on which their magnificence had caused the eyes of all Europe to be fixed, the Emperor, accompanied by Josephine, set out late on the evening of the 8th July

<sup>56.</sup>  
Napoleon  
repair- to  
Boulogne  
to superin-  
tend the  
English ex-  
pedition.

\* The Prussian ministers having demanded a frank statement of the intentions of Napoleon in the event of such an alliance, the following note was presented by the French minister to Baron Hardenberg:—"The peace of the Continent will be the fruit of the alliance between France and Prussia. It will be enough for this purpose for Prussia to say, that she makes common cause with France in any war which may have for its object to change the present state of Italy. What danger can Prussia fear, when the Emperor engages to support it with eighty thousand men against the Russians—when it will have for auxiliaries Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, Baden, the Emperor engaging to obtain for the King the possession of Hanover, while his allies will only be called on to guarantee the present state of Italy? The Emperor offers Hanover, absolutely and without any condition; and the King may judge from that whether or not he is disposed to be generous towards his German allies." The Prussian minister replied:—"It is with the most lively gratitude that the King has

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from Turin, and travelled with such extraordinary rapidity, that, outstripping all his escorts, he reached Fontainebleau on the morning of the 11th, having accomplished the journey of above five hundred miles in less than sixty hours. Cambacérès and all his ministers were there, with full details of the armament both by land and sea. Scarcely had he completed the necessary examination, when, devoured with anxiety for the return of the combined fleet from the West Indies, which he daily expected, he continued his journey to the coast, there to peril his crown and life on the most gigantic undertaking ever projected by man since the invasion of Greece by the arms of Xerxes. For this purpose, shortly after his return from Italy, he repaired to the camp at Boulogne, there to inspect in person the vast military force arrayed on the shores of the Channel, and to direct the distant movements of the fleets, by which he hoped to obtain, for a time at least, the mastery of the seas, and the means of safely disembarking that mighty host within a few days' march of London. Shortly after his arrival, he reviewed 100,000 men on the sands of Boulogne. The line was three leagues long; never had he seen himself at the head of such a force, and rarely, if ever, had the world seen so splendid a military spectacle. The Emperor was in the highest spirits, as well he might, at the splendid appearance of his troops, and was confident of success the moment the fleet appeared, which he hourly expected. To Admiral Decrès he wrote on the 4th August—"The English do not know what awaits them. If we are masters of the Channel for two hours, *England has lived its time.*" To Cambacérès he said at

received the proposition made by the intervention of the French minister. He experiences the greatest satisfaction at the proposal made to *exchange the electorate of Hanover for a guarantee of the present state of Italy*, in order to avert a war on the Continent, and lead towards peace with England. His Majesty is desirous to see the independence of Switzerland established, as well as that of Holland, and the part of Italy not allowed by Prussia to France. If on these subjects his Imperial Majesty will explain himself in a positive manner, the King will enter with pleasure into the details necessary for a definitive arrangement."—See BIGNON, iv. 271, 272.

the same time, who was representing the preparations of Austria—"A few days will suffice to cross the strait, and when the sea is passed, the coalition is struck at the heart. The arm of Austria is struck down, the moment London is taken. Trust to me and my activity: I will astonish the world by the grandeur and rapidity of my strokes."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
277. Thiers,  
v. 400, 409,  
412. Memo-  
rial, t. 132.

The army which Napoleon had now assembled for this great enterprise was one of the most formidable, in point of numerical strength, and beyond all question the most perfect in point of military organisation, which had ever been brought together since the days of the Roman legions.\* It amounted to 114,000 effective combatants, the total on the rolls being 132,000; 432 pieces of cannon, and 14,654 horses, assembled in the camps at St Omer, Bruges, Montreuil, and Boulogne, besides 24,000 at the Texel and Helvoetsluys, 10,000 on board the combined

Immense  
force col-  
lected on  
the coasts of  
the Channel  
for that ob-  
ject.

\* The composition of this vast armament around Boulogne was as follows: it is one of the most curious records of the age of Napoleon.

Infantry,	.	.	.	.	.	76,798
Cavalry,	.	.	.	.	.	11,640
Cannoneers,	.	.	.	.	.	3,780
Waggoners,	.	.	.	.	.	3,780
Non-combatants,	.	.	.	.	.	17,476
Total,						113,474
Gun-boats,	.	.	.	.	.	1,339
Transport vessels,	.	.	.	.	.	954
Which would carry,	.	.	.	.	.	161,215 men.
and horses,	.	.	.	.	.	6,059
Guns mounted on armed vessels,	.	.	.	.	.	3,500
Horses,	.	.	.	.	.	7,394
Fusils (spare,)	.	.	.	.	.	32,337
Cartridges,	.	.	.	.	.	13,000,000
Flints,	.	.	.	.	.	1,268,400
Biscuits (rations,)	.	.	.	.	.	1,434,800
Bottles of brandy,	.	.	.	.	.	236,230
Tools,	.	.	.	.	.	30,375
Saddles,	.	.	.	.	.	10,560
Field-pieces,	.	.	.	.	.	432
Rounds of ammunition,	.	.	.	.	.	86,400
Loads of hay,	.	.	.	.	.	70,370
Do. oats,	.	.	.	.	.	70,370
Sheep,	.	.	.	.	.	4,924

—See DUMAS, xii.; *Tables*, 1, 2, 3, fronting p. 304.

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fleet, and the like force at Brest, ready to embark in the squadron of Admiral Gantheaume; in all, 158,000 men, in the highest state of discipline and equipment. The stores of ammunition, warlike implements, and provisions collected, were on an unparalleled scale of magnitude, and amply evinced the reality of the design which the Emperor had in view. Each cannon had 200 rounds of ammunition; the cartridges were 13,000,000; the flints 1,200,000; the biscuits, 2,000,000; the saddles, 10,000; and 5,000 sheep were ready to accompany the army in its embarkation. Provisions for the immense multitude for three months had been collected: the hospital arrangements were perfect; and 2293 vessels—capable of transporting 160,000 men and 6000 horses—of which 1339 were armed with above 3500 pieces of cannon, independent of the artillery which accompanied the army, awaited, in the harbours of Boulogne, Etaples, Ambleteuse, Ostend, and Calais, the signal to put to sea.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xii. 33, 37, and oppo- site p. 304. Jom. ii. 66, 68. Thiers, v. 413.

58.  
Its admir-  
able organ-  
isation and  
equipment.

During its long encampment on the shores of the Channel, this great army had been organised in a different manner from any that had yet existed in modern Europe. It is a curious circumstance, that the genius of Napoleon, aided by all the experience of the Revolutionary wars, reverted at last to a system extremely similar to that of the Roman legions; and to the vigour and efficiency of this organisation, which has never since been departed from, the subsequent extraordinary successes of the French armies may in some degree be ascribed. At the commencement of the Revolution, the divisions of the army, generally fifteen or eighteen thousand strong, were hurried, under the first officer that could be found, into the field; but it was soon found that there were few generals capable of skilfully directing the movements of such considerable masses of troops; while, on the other hand, if the divisions were too small, there was a want of that unity and decision of movement which was requisite to insure success. Selecting a medium between these two extremes, Napoleon

, adopted a double division. His army was divided, in the first instance, into corps composed of from twenty to thirty thousand men each, the direction of which was intrusted to a marshal of the empire. Each of these corps had, in proportion to its force, a suitable allotment of field and heavy artillery, its reserve, and two or three regiments of light cavalry; but the heavy cavalry and medium horse, or dragoons, were united into one corps, and placed under the command of one general.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xii.  
401, 406.  
Jom. Vie de  
Nap. ii. 37,  
58.

The organisation of the Imperial Guard was precisely the same, with this difference only—that it was considered as the reserve of the whole army, and as such more immediately under the command of the Emperor himself. Each corps was formed into four or five divisions, varying in strength from five to seven thousand men, commanded by generals of division, who received their orders from the general of the corps. The troops in these divisions always remained under the same officers; the divisions themselves belonged to the same corps; no incorporation or transposition, excepting in cases of absolute necessity, arising from extraordinary casualties in war, disturbed the order established in the camps. In this way the generals came to know their officers, the officers their soldiers; the capacity, disposition, and qualities of each were understood. An *esprit de corps* was formed, not only among the members of the same regiment, but among those of the same division and corps; and the general of division took as much pride in the precision with which the regiments under his orders performed their combined operations, or the marshal in the perfection of the arrangements of the corps under his direction, as the captain of dragoons did in the steadiness with which his men kept their line in a charge, or the sergeant in the cleanness of the appointments of the little subdivision intrusted to his care. Next to the Imperial Guard, and noways inferior to it in the splendid appearance which it presented, was the *Corps d'Elite* of grenadiers which Junot had formed

59.  
Organisa-  
tion of the  
Imperial  
Guard, and  
Junot's  
splendid  
grenadiers.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

1805.

Dum. xii.  
v. 411.  
ii. 58  
rs. v.

at Arras. It consisted of ten battalions of 800 men each, selected from the grenadier companies of regiments not intended to form part of the expedition. Their appearance and martial air were in the highest degree magnificent; and Napoleon, by whom these qualities were highly appreciated, destined them for the perilous honour of being first landed on the British shores.<sup>1</sup>

60.  
-...ure of  
the camps  
in which  
the soldiers  
were lodged.

The camps in which the soldiers were lodged, during their long sojourn on the shores of the Channel, were characterised by the same admirable system of organisation. They were laid out, according to the usual form, in squares intersected by streets, and composed of barracks constructed on a uniform plan, according to the materials furnished by the country in which they were situated. At Ostend they were composed of light wood and straw; at Boulogne and Vimireux, of sharp stakes cut in the forest of Guenis, supported by masonwork. These field-barracks were extremely healthy: the beds of the soldiers, raised two feet above the ground, were composed of straw, on which their camp-blankets were laid; the utmost care was taken to preserve cleanliness in every part of the establishment. Constant employment was the true secret both of their good health and docile habits. Neither officers nor soldiers were ever allowed to remain any time idle. When not employed in military evolutions, they were continually engaged either in raising or strengthening the field-works on the different points of the coast, or levelling down eminences, draining marskes, or filling up hollows, to form agreeable esplanades in front of their habitations, and where their exercises were performed. The different corps and divisions vied with each other in these works of utility or recreation: they even went so far as to engage in undertakings of pure ornament; gardens were created, flowers were cultivated, and, in the midst of an immense military population, the aspect of nature was sensibly improved.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Dum. xii.  
25, 26.

Satisfied with their lot in this great encampment, the

soldiers<sup>2</sup> were singularly tractable and obedient. Constantly occupied and amused by the spectacle of sea-fights, or frequent reviews and mock battles, they neither murmured at the exactions of a rigid discipline, nor experienced the usual monotony and languor of a pacific life in camps. The good effects of distributing the corps into divisions were here soon rendered conspicuous. The general commanding each division became not only personally acquainted with all his officers, but had an opportunity of correcting anything defective in the discipline of the men; and the soldiers, from constant exercises, and the habit of acting together in large masses, acquired a degree of precision in the performance of manœuvres on a great scale, which never before had been equalled in the French armies, and embraced everything that was really useful or suitable to the French character in the discipline of the Great Frederick.<sup>1</sup>

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XXXIX.

1805.

61.

Rapid improvement in the character and habits of the army.

<sup>1</sup> Dum.  
20, 22.

No man knew better than Napoleon, from his own experience, as well as from the calamities which an obstinate adherence to the opposite system had inflicted upon his opponents, that the general-in-chief, especially if far removed from the theatre of operations, cannot with advantage prescribe the details of subordinate movements. In his campaigns, consequently, each marshal received *general* instructions as to the line of operations which he was to adopt, and the end to which his efforts were to be directed; but he was left entirely master of the means by which these objects were to be attained. And although Napoleon was frequently extremely minute in his directions to his lieutenants, yet he always left them a general discretion to adopt them or not, according to circumstances; insomuch that a commander, in his estimation, would have committed a serious fault if he had followed the letter of his instructions when a change of circumstances called for a deviation from them. The same system of confidence was established between the marshal and his generals of division, to all of whom a certain

62.

Ample powers intrusted to the marshals of corps and generals of divisions.



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XXXIX.

1805.

discretionary power in the execution of orders was intrusted; a confidence for the most part well deserved by the ability and experience of these officers. In one respect only the changes of Napoleon at this period were of doubtful utility, and that was in virtually suppressing the *état major*, or general staff, by enacting that the rank of colonels in it should be abolished; an ordinance which, by closing the avenue of promotion, at once banished all young men of ability from that department, and degraded what had formerly been the chief school of military talent into a higher species of public couriers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
58, 60. Dum.  
xii. 408, 412.

63.  
And vigilant watch-  
ing to which  
they were  
subjected.

But though Napoleon left to each officer, in his own sphere, those discretionary powers which he knew to be indispensable, it is not to be supposed that he was negligent of the manner in which their several duties were discharged, or that a vigilant superintendence was not kept up, under his direction, of all departments in the army. On the contrary, he exercised an incessant and most active watchfulness over every officer intrusted with any service of importance in the vast army subject to his orders. Nothing escaped his vigilance. Continual reports addressed to headquarters informed him how every branch of his service was conducted; and if anything was defective, an immediate reprimand from Berthier informed the person in fault that the attention of the Emperor had been attracted to his delinquency. Incessant and minute instructions, addressed to the generals, commissaries, and functionaries of every description connected with the army, gave to all the benefit of his luminous views and vast experience. With the extension of his forces, and the multiplication of their wants, his powers appeared to expand in an almost miraculous proportion; and the active superintendence of all, which seemed the utmost limit of human exertion when only fifty thousand men required to be surveyed, was not sensibly diminished when five hundred thousand were assembled. Above all,

the attention of the Emperor was habitually turned to the means of providing for the subsistence of his troops; a branch of service which, from the prodigious increase of his forces, and the rapidity with which he moved them into countries where no magazines had been formed, required, in an extraordinary degree, all the efforts of his talent and reflection. To such a length was this superintendence of the Emperor carried, that it was a common saying in the army, that every officer who had anything of importance to perform imagined that the imperial attention was exclusively directed to himself: while, in fact, it was divided among several hundreds, perhaps thousands, who stood in a similar predicament.\* By this unexampled vigilance, seconded by the great abilities of the officers and generals under his command, the army destined for the invasion of England acquired a degree of perfection, in point of discipline, organisation, and military habits, unprecedented since the days of the Roman legions.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

The arrangements connected with the flotilla were as extraordinary and perfect as those of the land forces. It was organised in as many subdivisions as there were sections in the army; and all the stores, baggage, and artillery were already on board; so that nothing remained but the embarkation of the men. The French

64.  
Organisa-  
tion of the  
flotilla.

\* Ample evidence of the truth of these observations exists in the correspondence of the Emperor, still preserved in the archives of Paris, or in the custody of his generals, and which, if published entire, would amount to many hundred volumes. From the valuable fragments of it published in the appendices to General Mathieu Dumas, and the works of General Gourgaud and Baron Fain, on the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, as well as the letters of Napoleon contained in Napier's History of the Peninsular War, some idea may be formed of the prodigious mental activity of the man who, amidst all the cares of empire, and all the distraction of almost incessant warfare, contrived, during the twenty years that he held the reins of power, to write or dictate probably more than the united works of Lope de Vega, Voltaire, and Sir Walter Scott. His secret and confidential correspondence with the Directory, published at Paris in 1819, from 1796 to 1798 only, a work of great interest and rarity, amounts to seven large closely printed volumes; and his letters to his generals during that time must have been at least twice as voluminous.

Vast extent  
of his corre-  
spondence  
with his offi-  
cers.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

1805.

y  
Mem. ii.  
256, 260,  
Dum. xii.  
35, 37.65.  
Arguments  
for and  
against its  
success.

genius, adapted beyond that of any other people in Europe for the organisation of large bodies, shone forth here in full lustre. Such was the perfection to which the arrangements had been carried, that not only every division of the army, but every regiment, had a section of the flotilla allotted to it, consisting of nine gunboats for each battalion; the point and vessel of embarkation was assigned to every man, horse, gun, and carriage in that prodigious array: and, from constant practice, they had arrived at such precision in that most difficult branch of their duty, that it was found by experiment that a corps of twenty-five thousand men, drawn up opposite the vessels allotted to them, could be completely embarked in the short space of ten minutes.<sup>1</sup>

The chances of success with this immense force and flotilla was anxiously discussed in Napoleon's presence by Admirals Decrès and Bruix, who deservedly stood highest in his confidence. "In a narrow sea, or near the shore," said the former, "when it can bring its thousands of guns to bear on a few vessels, the flotilla is exceedingly formidable; that is like attacking an army in a defile with a cloud of intrepid sharpshooters. But suppose them in the open sea, with a fresh gale, which would facilitate the movements of the English vessels as much as it would impede those of your small craft, would they not run the greatest risk of being run down or sunk by the giants whom they would have to combat?" "We might lose," answered Bruix, "perhaps a hundred vessels out of two thousand; but with the remaining nineteen hundred you would get clear over, and that is enough for the ruin of England."—"Yes," replied Decrès, "if the destruction of that hundred did not produce discouragement to the nineteen hundred, which would induce confusion and ruin, especially if, as is not unlikely, the naval officers lost their presence of mind at the sight of so vast and awful a disaster."<sup>2</sup> Napoleon took a deep interest in their discussion, but with his usual intrepidity he inclined to the bolder side. "Let us," said he, "but

<sup>1</sup> Thiers, v.  
174, 175,  
189.

be masters of the straits for six hours, and we are the masters of the world.”\*

CHAP.  
XXXIX.

1805.

66.

His secret  
project  
effectin

The object of Napoleon, in this immense accumulation of gunboats and armed vessels, was not to force his way across the Channel by means of this novel species of naval force, but merely to provide transports for the conveyance of the troops, and withdraw the attention of the enemy, by their seeming adaptation for warlike operations, from the quarter whence the force really intended to cover the descent was to be obtained. The problem to be solved was, to transport one hundred and fifty thousand men in safety to the shores of Kent; and no man knew better than Napoleon that to engage in such an enterprise, while the English were masters of the sea, was a vain, or, in the most favourable view, a perilous attempt. From the beginning, therefore, he resolved not to hazard the embarkation till, by a concentration of all his naval forces in the Channel, while the English fleets were decoyed to distant parts of the world, he had acquired, for the time at least, a decided command of the passage. The great object, however, was to disguise these ultimate designs, and prevent the English government from adopting the means by which they might have been frustrated.

\* “L’escadre de Rochefort, composée de cinq vaisseaux, dont un à trois ponts, et de quatre frégates, est prête à lever l’ancre; elle n’a devant elle que cinq vaisseaux ennemis. L’escadre de Brest est de vingt-un vaisseaux. Ces vaisseaux viennent de lever l’ancre pour harceler l’Amiral Cornwallis, et obliger les Anglais à avoir là un grand nombre de vaisseaux. Les ennemis tiennent aussi six vaisseaux devant le Texel, pour bloquer l’escadre Hollandaise, composée de cinq vaisseaux, de quatre frégates, et d’une convoi de quatre-vingts bâtiments. Le Général Marmont a son armée embarquée. Entre Etaples, Boulogne, Vimeux, et Ambleteuse, deux nouveaux ports que j’ai fait construire, nous avons 270 chaloupes canonnières, 534 bâtiments canonnières, 396 péniches, en tout 1200 bâtiments, portant 120,000 hommes et 10,000 chevaux. Soyons maîtres du détroit six heures, et nous sommes maîtres du monde. Par le retour de mon courrier, faites-moi connaître le jour où il vous sera possible, abstraction faite du temps, de lever l’ancre; instruisez-moi de ce qu’a fait l’ennemi, et où se tient Nelson. Méditez sur la grande entreprise dont vous êtes chargé, et, avant que je signe définitivement vos derniers ordres, faites-moi connaître la manière que vous pensez être la plus avantageuse de les remplir.” —*Napoleon à l’Amiral Latouche-Tréville, à Toulon, 2 Juillet 1805.* THIERS, *Consulat et l’Empire*, v. 189.

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For this end it was that the Boulogne flotilla was armed, and the prodigious expense incurred of constructing above two thousand warlike vessels, bearing several thousand pieces of cannon. Not one of these guns was meant to be fired; they were intended only as a veil: the real covering force was to assemble at Martinique, and was to return suddenly to Europe, while the British squadrons were despatched to distant points to succour their menaced colonial possessions. The stratagem, thus ably conceived, was completely successful. Not one person in the British dominions, except the sagacious Admiral Collingwood, penetrated the real design. The French fleets returned in safety from the West Indies to the European latitudes, leaving Nelson three weeks' sail in the rear; and when the Emperor was at Boulogne, in August 1805, at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men, sixty ships of the line were assembled in the Bay of Biscay, where the united British squadrons did not amount to much more than half that force.<sup>1</sup>\*

1 Jom. ii. 70.  
Napoleon in  
Month. ii.  
20, 21. Las  
Cases, ii.  
277, 280.  
Thiers, v.  
189, 190.

67.

Various ac-  
tions with  
the British  
ff

Towards the success of this profound design, it was of importance to accumulate as much as possible of the flotilla at Boulogne; and in the prosecution of this object, many actions took place between the English cruisers and the vessels advancing round the coast. They answered the double purpose of habituating the sailors to naval

Autograph  
note which  
he has him-  
self left on  
the subject.

\* The following valuable note, written by Napoleon at the time of his leaving the camp at Boulogne, in September 1805, explains fully the particulars of this great project:—

“What was my design in the creation of the flotilla at Boulogne?

“I wished to assemble forty or fifty ships of the line in the harbour of Martinique, by operations combined in the harbours of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest; to bring them suddenly back to Boulogne; to find myself in this way, during fifteen days, the master of the sea; to have one hundred and fifty thousand men encamped on the coast, three or four thousand vessels in the flotilla, and to set sail the moment that the signal was given of the arrival of the combined fleet. That project has failed. If Admiral Villeneuve, instead of entering the harbour of Ferrol, had contented himself with joining the Spanish squadron, and instantly made sail for Brest and joined Admiral Gantheaume, my army would have embarked, and it was all over with England.

“To succeed in this object, it was necessary to assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men at Boulogne; to have there four thousand transports, and immense *matériel*, to embark all that, and nevertheless to prevent the enemy

warfare, and perpetuating the illusion that it was by means of the armed force of the flotilla that the descent was to be effected. The vigour and boldness of the British cruisers knew no bounds in their warfare against this ignoble species of opponents, when coasting along under cover of the numerous batteries by which the coast was guarded. But notwithstanding all their efforts, the success achieved, from the impossibility of getting sufficiently near the enemy, was more than counterbalanced by the severe loss of life sustained in those perilous services. The most important of these was a series of actions from the 17th to the 19th July, when the Dutch flotilla, under the command of Admiral Verhuel, accomplished the passage from Dunkirk to Ambleteuse, near Boulogne. They were annoyed almost the whole way by the English vessels under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, and Captain Owen in the *Immortalité* frigate; but the weight of the attack was reserved for the rounding of Cape Gris Nez. The British ships approached within musket-shot, and poured in their broadsides with great effect into the French vessels as they were weathering that dangerous point, but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the batteries arranged on the cliffs under Marshal Davoust, that they were unable to prevent the flotilla from reaching the place of their destination with very little loss. The rapid

from divining my object. It appeared scarcely practicable to do so. If I had succeeded, it would have been by doing the converse of what might have been expected. If fifty ships of the line were to assemble to cover the descent upon England, nothing but transport-vessels were required in the harbours of the Channel, and all that assemblage of gunboats, floating batteries, and armed vessels was totally useless. Had I assembled together three or four thousand unarmed transports, no doubt the enemy would have perceived that I awaited the arrival of my fleets to attempt the passage; but by constructing praams and gunboats, I appeared to be opposing cannon to cannon; and the enemy was in this manner deceived. They conceived that I intended to attempt the passage by main force, by means of my flotilla. They never penetrated my real design; and when, from the failure of the movements of my squadrons, my project was revealed, the utmost consternation pervaded the councils of London, and all men of sense in England confessed that England had never been so near its ruin."—*See the original in DUMAS, xii. 315, 316; and Napoleon in N, iii. App. 384.*

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xii.  
42, 48.  
James, iii.  
434, 440.

and incessant cannonade both by the batteries on shore, and the English cruisers, and the vivid interest excited among an immense crowd of spectators from the neighbouring camps by the passage of the flotilla through such a perilous defile, formed together a brilliant spectacle, which awakened the most animating feelings among the military and naval forces of France.<sup>1</sup>

68.  
Operations  
of the com-  
bined fleets  
of France  
and Spain  
to second  
the enter-

While the Emperor, on the heights of Boulogne, was actively engaged in reviewing the different corps of his army, and inspecting the immense preparations for the expedition, the different squadrons of his empire were rapidly bringing on the great crisis between the naval forces of the two countries. Early in the year, Napoleon took advantage of the open hostilities which had now ensued between England and Spain, to conclude at Paris a secret convention for the combined operation of the squadrons of both countries; and the important part there allotted to the fleets of Spain leaves no room for doubt that their co-operation had been foreseen and arranged with Napoleon long before the capture of the treasure-frigates, and that that unhappy event only precipitated the junction of the Spanish forces, already calculated on by Napoleon for the execution of his great design. By this convention it was stipulated that the Emperor should provide at the Texel an army of thirty thousand men, and the transports and vessels of war necessary for their conveyance; at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, one hundred and twenty thousand men, with the necessary vessels of war and transports; at Brest, twenty-one ships of the line, with frigates and smaller vessels capable of embarking thirty thousand men; at Rochfort, six ships of the line and four frigates, with four thousand men; at Toulon, eleven ships of the line and eight frigates, having nine thousand land troops on board;<sup>2</sup> and Spain, in return, bound herself to have thirty ships of the line and five thousand men ready, and provisioned for six months, in the harbours of Ferrol, Cadiz,

<sup>2</sup> Dum. xi.  
96, 97.  
Thiers, v.  
294, 295.

and Carthægena—in all, thirty-eight French ships of the line and thirty Spanish, and one hundred and seventy thousand men, all to be employed in the invasion of England.

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But their destination was as yet kept secret, it being provided, “that these armaments shall be maintained and destined to operations on which his Majesty reserves the explanations for a month, or to the general charged with full powers to that effect.” When it is recollected that the fleets of Spain composed nearly a half of the naval forces thus assembled by Napoleon for the great object of his life, and that without this addition his own would have been totally inadequate to the undertaking, no doubt whatever can remain that their co-operation had for years before been calculated on by his far-seeing policy ; and this must increase the regret of every Englishman, that, by the unhappy neglect to declare war before hostilities were commenced, Great Britain was put formally in the wrong, when in substance she was so obviously in the right. The English government, after the breaking out of the Spanish war, lost no time in taking measures to meet the new enemy which had arisen. Sir John Orde, with five ships of the line, commenced the blockade of Cadiz ; Carthægena also was watched ; and a sufficient fleet was stationed off Ferrol. But still these squadrons, barely equal to the enemy’s force in the harbours before which they were respectively stationed, were totally unequal to prevent its junction with any superior hostile fleet which might approach ; and thus, if one division got to sea, it might with ease raise the blockade of all the harbours, and assemble the combined armament for the projected operations in the Channel. This was what in effect soon happened.<sup>1</sup>

69.  
Measures of  
defence by  
the English  
government.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1805, 219,  
221. Dum.  
xi. 97, 99.

Napoleon, anxious for the execution of his designs, sent orders for the Rochfort and Toulon squadrons to put to sea. On the 11th January the former of these, under the command of Admiral Missiessy, set sail, and



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1805.

70.

The Toulon  
and Roch-  
fort squa-  
drons put to  
sea.  
Jan. 11.  
Jan. 15.

Feb. 22.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1805, 219,  
221, Jom.  
ii. 71. Dum.  
xi. 110, 113,  
123.

made straight for the West Indies, without meeting with any English vessels. The Toulon squadron put to sea about the same time; but having met with rough weather, it returned to Toulon considerably shattered in four days after its departure.\* The Rochfort fleet was more fortunate: it arrived at Martinique on the 5th February, and after having landed the troops and ammunition destined for that island, made sail for the British island of Dominica, where the admiral landed four thousand men, under cover of a tremendous fire from the line-of-battle ships. General Prevost, the governor, who had only five hundred regular troops in the island, immediately made the best dispositions which the limited force at his command would admit to resist the enemy. He retired deliberately, disputing every inch of ground, to the fort of Prince Rupert, in the centre of the island; and the French commander, not having leisure for a regular siege, re-embarked and made sail for Guadaloupe, after destroying the little town of Roseau. He next proceeded to St Kitt's and Nevis, in both of which islands he levied contributions and burned some valuable merchantmen; after which he embarked, without attempting to make any impression on the military defences. The arrival of Admiral Cochrane with six sail of the line having rendered any further stay in the West Indies dangerous, Admiral Missiessy returned to Europe, after throwing a thousand men into Santo Domingo, and compelling the blacks to raise the siege of that place, and regained Rochfort in safety in the beginning of April, to await another combination of the French and Spanish squadrons.<sup>1</sup>

The successful issue of this expedition excited the greatest alarm in Great Britain, from the evidence which it afforded of the facility with which, notwithstanding the

\* "These gentlemen," said Nelson, when he heard of this unexpected return, after having gone to Malta in search of the enemy, "are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyons gale. We have buffeted them for twenty-one months, and not carried away a spar."—SOUTHERN'S *Life of Nelson*, ii. 214.

utmost vigilance of the blockading squadrons, the enemy's fleets might leave and regain their harbours, and carry terror into her most distant colonial possessions. But it was far from answering the views of Napoleon, who had prescribed to his admiral a much more extensive set of operations; viz. to throw succours into Martinique and Guadaloupe, take possession of St Lucia and Dominica, regain Surinam and the other Dutch colonies, put the few remaining strongholds of St Domingo in a respectable state of defence, and make himself master of St Helena. The instructions for this expedition are dated by the Emperor from Strassburg, September 29, 1804, shortly before his coronation. Strange combination in his destiny, to have contemplated the capture of the rock of St Helena on the eve of his coronation, as he had the reduction of the island of Elba at the period of his being created First Consul for life!<sup>1</sup>

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XXXIX.

1805.

71.  
Alarm excited in

<sup>1</sup> Dum. x....  
205, Pièces  
Just. Thiers,  
v. 391, 392.

More important results followed the next sortie of the enemy, which took place on the 30th March, from Toulon. On that day Admiral Villeneuve put to sea with eleven ships of the line and eight frigates—while Nelson, who purposely remained at a distance to entice the enemy from the protection of their batteries, was at anchor in the Gulf of Palma—and made straight for Carthagen, with the intention of joining the Spanish squadron of six sail of the line in that harbour. But, finding them not ready for sea, the French fleet passed the Straits of Gibraltar, raised the blockade of Cadiz, from whence Sir John Orde retired to unite with the Channel fleet off Brest, and formed a junction with the Spanish ships in that harbour, and one French sail of the line which was lying there. Increased by this important accession to eighteen ships of the line and ten frigates, the combined fleet, having on board ten thousand veteran troops, set sail next day, April 9, for the West Indies. About the same time the Brest squadron, under Admiral Gantheaume, consisting of twenty-one ships of the line,

72.  
The combined fleet  
steers for the  
West Indies.

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1805.

put to sea, and remained three days off the isle of Ushant before they retired to their harbour, on the approach of Admiral Cornwallis with the Channel fleet, which only amounted to eighteen. Napoleon, however, reiterated his orders to Gantheaume to put to sea; and that gallant admiral made the utmost efforts to do so, but an extraordinary calm, which continued almost without interruption through the whole of April and May, rendered it impossible for him to obey his instructions, without engaging the English fleet, which lay off the harbour, which he deemed it too hazardous to encounter. Finding that the vigilance of the blockading squadron could not be eluded, Napoleon relinquished the plan of effecting a junction between the Toulon and Brest squadrons at sea, and enjoined Gantheaume to remain at Brest, and await there the arrival of the combined fleet from the West Indies, which he hoped would raise the blockade.<sup>1</sup>

8.  
Dum. xi.  
124, 128.  
Thiers, v.  
392, 393.

73.  
Uncertainty  
of Nelson.  
He at length  
follows to  
the West  
Indies.

Meanwhile Nelson was in the most cruel state of anxiety. He was bearing up from the Gulf of Palma for his old position off Toulon, when, on the 4th April, he met the *Phœbe* brig with the long-wished-for intelligence that Villeneuve had again put to sea, and when last seen was steering for the coast of Africa. Upon this he immediately set sail for Palermo, under the impression that they had gone to Egypt; but, feeling assured by the 11th, from the information brought by his cruisers, that they had not taken that direction, he instantly turned and beat up, with the utmost difficulty, against strong westerly winds, to Gibraltar; devoured all the while by the utmost anxiety lest, before he could reach them, the enemy might menace Ireland or Jamaica. In spite of every exertion, he could not reach the Straits till the 30th April, and even then the wind was so adverse that he could not pass them, and was compelled to anchor in Mazari bay, on the Barbary coast, for five days.\* At length, on the

\* On this occasion, Nelson wrote to Sir Alexander Ball, at Malta:—"My good fortune, my dear Ball, seems flown away. I cannot get a fair wind, nor

5th May, he received certain information that the combined fleet had made for the West Indies, and amounted to eighteen sail of the line and ten frigates. Nelson had only ten sail of the line and three frigates; his ships had been at sea for nearly two years; the crews were worn out with fatigue and watching; and anxiety had so preyed upon his naturally ardent mind, that his health had seriously suffered, and his physician had declared an immediate return to England indispensable to its recovery. In these circumstances, this heroic officer did not an instant hesitate what course to adopt, but immediately made signal to hoist every rag of canvass for the West Indies. "Do you," said he to his captains, "take a Frenchman a-piece, and leave all the Spaniards to me. When I haul down my colours I expect you to do the same, but not till then."<sup>1</sup>\*

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XXXIX.  
1805.

<sup>1</sup> South. ii.  
216, 219,  
220. Ann.  
Reg. 1805,  
225.

The combined fleet had four weeks the start of Nelson; but he calculated, by his superior activity and seamanship, upon gaining ten days upon them during the passage of the Atlantic. In fact, Villeneuve reached Martinique on the 14th May, while Nelson arrived at Barbadoes on the 4th June; but in the interim the allied squadrons had done nothing except capturing the Diamond Rock, near Martinique, by a few ships detached for that purpose, which was reduced, after a most gallant

74.  
He searches  
in vain for  
the enemy  
there.

even a side-wind. Dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what to do when we leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain account of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill-luck will go far to kill me; but as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down, whatever I may feel."—SOUTHEY, ii. 217.

\* The uncertainty as to the destination of Nelson's squadron filled Napoleon, whose mind, not less than that of his great opponent, was anxiously intent on the result of the momentous events now in progress, with the utmost disquietude. On the 9th June 1805, immediately before leaving Milan, he wrote to the minister of marine:—"We cannot discover what has become of Nelson: it is possible that the English have sent him to Jamaica; but I am of opinion that he is still in the European seas. It is more than probable that he has returned to England to revictual, and place his crews in new vessels, for his fleet stands greatly in need of repairs, and his squadron must be in very bad condition." Even Napoleon's daring mind could not anticipate Nelson's heroic passage of the Atlantic in these circumstances, in pursuit of a fleet nearly double his own.—DUMAS, xi. 169.

Simultaneous  
anxiety of  
Napoleon as  
to Nelson's  
destination.

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XXXIX.

June 7.

resistance on the part of the small British force by which it was occupied. Overjoyed at the discovery that the enemy were in those seas, and that all the great British settlements were still safe, Nelson, without allowing his sailors any rest, instantly made sail for Trinidad, thinking that the French fleet had gone to attempt the reduction of that colony; and so far was he misled by false intelligence, that he cleared his fleet for action on the evening of the 7th June, hoping, on the following day, to render the mouths of the Orinoco as famous in history as those of the Nile. But when morning broke not a vessel was to be seen, and it was evident that the British fleet had, by erroneous information, accidentally or designedly thrown in their way, been sent in an entirely wrong direction. Had it not been for this circumstance, and had Nelson acted upon his own judgment alone, he would have arrived at Port Royal just as the French were leaving it, and the battle would have been fought on the same spot where Rodney defeated De Grasse five-and-twenty years before. But as it was, the opportunity was lost, and the greatest triumph of the British navy was reserved for the European seas. The activity of Nelson in this voyage was unparalleled, and has called forth the generous eulogium even of the French historians. "Nelson," says Thiers, "displayed the most astonishing activity. Arrived at Barbadoes in the beginning of June, he continued the pursuit, without a moment's hesitation, with nine ships of the line only, and not finding the enemy, instantly returned to England with eleven. What activity! what energy! This affords another proof that in war, and war at sea as well as at land, the quality of forces is of far more moment than their quantity. Nelson with eleven ships of the line confidently pursued Ville-neuve, who trembled with twenty, manned by gallant sailors."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> South. ii. 222, 223.  
Dum. xii. 1,  
6. Thiers,  
v. 425, 426.

In truth, the combined fleet had sailed from Martinique on the 28th May, and instantly steered for the north;

having been joined while there by Admiral Magon with two additional ships of the line, which raised their force to twenty line-of-battle ships. This reinforcement also brought the last instructions of Napoleon, dated Pavia, 8th May 1805, which were to raise the blockade of Ferrol, and join the five French ships of the line, and ten Spanish, which awaited them in that harbour; make sail from that to Rochefort, join the five ships of the line under Missiessy at that place; and with the whole united squadrons, amounting to forty ships of the line, steer to Brest, where Gantheaume awaited them with twenty-one. Napoleon at first thought of making the combined fleet, on its return from the West Indies, make for the west of Ireland, and, sailing round that island the reverse order of the Spanish armada, enter the Channel by the Straits of Dover. But on consideration he abandoned that plan as too circuitous and dilatory, and adopted the shorter and more direct one of uniting the whole fleets in the Bay of Biscay, raising the blockade of Brest, and entering the Channel with the whole combined armament. This final plan was formed during a fête at Pavia. With this formidable combined fleet, amounting to fifty sail of the line, which would have greatly overmatched any force the British government could muster in the Channel, was Villeneuve to proceed to Boulogne, and cover the passage of the flotilla. His instructions were to shun a battle unless it was unavoidable; and if it was so, to bring it on as near as possible to Brest, in order that the fleet of Admiral Gantheaume might take a part in the engagement. "The grand object of the whole operations," said Napoleon, "is to procure for us a superiority for a few days before Boulogne. Masters of the Channel for a few days, a hundred and fifty thousand men will embark in the two thousand vessels which are there assembled, and the expedition is concluded."<sup>1</sup> Every contingency was provided for: the chance of the fleets going round about was foreseen; and stores of provisions were

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XXXIX.

180

75.

Combined  
fleet had re-  
turned to  
Europe.  
secrDum. xi.  
247, 254.  
Pièces Just.  
Thiers "  
396, 3

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XXXIX.

1805.

76.  
Entire suc-  
cess hitherto  
of Napo-  
leon's de-  
sign, which  
is penetrated  
by Nelson.

collected both at Cherbourg and the Texel, in the event of the general rendezvous taking place in either of these harbours.

Hitherto everything had not only fully answered, but even exceeded Napoleon's expectations. The design he had so long had in contemplation had never been penetrated by the British government. On the contrary, Nelson was in the West Indies; he had been decoyed to the mouths of the Orinoco when the French admiral was returning to Europe with twenty sail of the line, eighteen days in advance of his indefatigable opponent; while the British squadrons which blockaded Ferrol and Rochefort seemed totally inadequate to prevent the junction of the combined fleet with the vessels of war in those harbours.

May 28.

June 13.

Villeneuve had sailed on the 28th May from Martinique: and on the 13th June, Nelson, on arriving at Antigua, for the first time received such intelligence as left no doubt that the combined fleet had returned to Europe. Disdaining to believe what the gratitude of the delivered colonists led them to allege, that the enemy had fled at the mere terror of his name before a fleet not half their amount, he immediately suspected some ulterior combination, but without being able to penetrate what it was; and instantly despatched several fast-sailing vessels to Lisbon and Portsmouth, in order to warn the British government of the probable return of the whole fleet of the enemy to Europe. To this sagacious step, as will immediately appear, the safety of the British empire is mainly to be ascribed. Nelson himself, without allowing his sailors a moment's rest, set sail the very same day for Europe, and on the 18th July reached Gibraltar; having, from the time he left Tetuan bay, twice crossed the Atlantic, and visited every one of the Leeward Islands, with a fleet which had been two years at sea, in seventy-eight days;<sup>1\*</sup> an instance of vigour and rapidity of

July 18.  
<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1805, 228,  
229. South.  
ii. 224, 225.  
Dum. xii.  
6, 7.

\* From April 30th to July 18th.

naval movement unparalleled in the annals of the world.\*

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Great was the despondency in the British islands at the intelligence of a fleet of such strength having proceeded to the West Indies, where it was well known no English force at all capable of resisting it was to be found. But the Admiralty, in the midst of the general alarm, took the most energetic measures to avert the danger, by instantly ordering to sea every man and ship that could be got in readiness, and despatching Admiral Collingwood, with a squadron of five ships of the line, to cruise off Gibraltar, and act as circumstances might require. That sagacious officer, alone of all the British chiefs, penetrated the real design of Napoleon; and on the 21st July, while yet the combined fleet had not been heard of on its return from the West Indies, wrote to Nelson that he was convinced they would raise the blockade of Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, and with the united force make for the British islands. His penetration was so remarkable, that his letter might almost pass for a transcript of the secret instructions of Napoleon, at that time in the possession of Villeneuve.<sup>1</sup>†

1805.  
77.  
Energetic  
measures  
the Admi-  
rality when  
the recei-  
vis des-  
hes.

<sup>1</sup> South.  
224, 225.  
Colling-  
wood, i.  
145.

Meanwhile Villeneuve returned to Europe as rapidly as adverse winds would permit, and on the 23d June he

\* On the day following, Nelson landed at Gibraltar, being the first time he had quitted the Victory for two years.

† His words are—"July 21, 1805.—We approached, my dear Lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen first. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object which they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, *make the round of the bay, and, taking the Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more.* This appears a probable plan; for unless it be to bring their powerful fleets and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to a chance of loss, which I do not believe Buonaparte would do without the hope of an adequate reward. The French government never aims at little things, while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies *was to take off the naval force*, which proved the great impediment to their undertaking."—COLLINGWOOD'S *Memoirs*, i. 145, 146.—The history of Europe does not contain a more striking instance of political and warlike penetration.

Extraordi-  
nary pene-  
tration of  
Collingwood  
as to the  
enemy's  
design.



CHAP.  
XXXIX.

1805.

78.

The combined fleet  
is outstripped by the  
British brig

July 9.

July 15.

m. xii.  
16, 19. Ann.  
Reg. 1805,  
229. James,  
iv. 1, 2.

79.

Sir Robert  
Calder's  
action.

had reached the latitude of the Azores. Napoleon, who by this time had returned to St Cloud from Italy, despatched orders to the fleet at Rochefort to put to sea and join Admiral Gantheaume off the Lizard Point; or, if he had not made his escape from Brest, to make for Ferrol and join the combined fleet there. He literally counted the days and hours till some intelligence should arrive of the great armament approaching from the West Indies—the signal for the completion of all his vast and profound combinations. But meanwhile, one of the brigs despatched by Nelson from Antigua on the 13th June had outstripped the combined fleet, and by the rapidity of its passage fixed the destinies of the world. The Curieux brig, sent on this important errand, arrived at London on the 9th July, having made the passage from Antigua in twenty-five days; and instantly the Admiralty despatched orders to Admiral Stirling, who commanded the squadrons before Rochefort, to raise the blockade of that harbour, join Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and cruise with the united force off Cape Finisterre, with a view to intercept the allied squadrons on their homeward passage towards Brest. These orders reached Admiral Stirling on the 13th July. On the 15th he effected his junction with the fleet before Ferrol, and Sir Robert Calder stood out to sea, with fifteen line-of-battle ships, to take his appointed station and wait for the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

The event soon showed of what vital importance it was that the Curieux had arrived so rapidly in England, and that the Admiralty had so instantaneously acted on the information communicated by Lord Nelson. Hardly had Sir Robert Calder, with his squadron united to that of Admiral Stirling, reached the place assigned for his cruise, about sixty leagues to the westward of Cape Finisterre, when the combined fleet of France and Spain hove in sight, on 22d July, consisting of twenty line-of-battle ships, a fifty-gun ship, and seven frigates.\* The weather was so

\* Yet, strange to say, our naval historians seem insensible to the vital impor-

hazy, that the two fleets had approached very closely before they were mutually aware of each other's vicinity. But as soon as the British admiral descried the enemy, he made the signal for action, and bore down on the hostile fleet in two columns. Some confusion, however, took place in consequence of the necessity under which the English squadron lay of tacking before they reached the enemy; and Villeneuve, perceiving the enemy's intention of cutting off his headmost vessels, and enveloping them by a superior force, skilfully met it by the counter-movement of tacking himself, luffing, and thus meeting the head of the British column by the head of his own. This brought the two fleets into collision in rather a disorderly manner; the *Hero*, which headed the English line, coming first in contact with the *Argonaute*, which bore the flag of Admiral Gravina; and when they got into close action, several vessels in both fleets were exposed to the attack of two or three opponents. The superiority of the British, however, was soon apparent, notwithstanding the preponderance of force on the part of the enemy. Before the action had continued four hours, two of the Spanish line-of-battle ships, the *St Raphael* and *Firme*, were compelled to strike their colours; while the *Windsor Castle*, in the English fleet, was also so much injured as to render it necessary to put her in tow of the *Dragon*. A thick fog, which came on just as the action began, rendered it impossible to

tance of this junction of the squadrons blockading Rochefort and Ferrol. Mr James observes, "Thus was the blockade of two ports raised, in which at the time were about as many ships ready for sea as the fleet which the blockading squadrons were to go in search of. The policy of this measure does not seem very clear. If the squadron did not, like the Rochefort one, take advantage of this circumstance and sail out, it was only because it had received no orders."<sup>1</sup> Is it not evident, that unless this junction of the blockading squadrons had taken place, the combined fleet would have successively raised the blockade of both harbours, and stood on with five-and-thirty sail of the line for Brest?

Napoleon, whose penetrating eye nothing escaped, viewed in a very different light the concentration of the English blockading squadrons at this critical period. On the 27th July 1805, he wrote in these terms to the minister of marine:—"The English squadron before Rochefort has disappeared on the 12th July. It was only on the 9th July that the brig *Curieux* arrived in England. The Admiralty could never have decided in twenty-four hours what movements

<sup>1</sup> James, iv 2.

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<sup>1</sup> James, iv.  
7, 9. Dum.  
xii. 51, 52.  
Thiers, v.  
430, 431.

see further than a cable's length from any object in either fleet, and rendered the battle a series of separate engagements between detached vessels, rather than a regular battle. At length darkness separated the combatants; and the British fleet, carrying with them their prizes, lay-to for the night to repair their injuries, and prepare for a renewal of the action on the following day.<sup>1</sup>

80.  
The two  
parties  
without  
decisive  
success.

The loss sustained by the British was very small, amounting only to thirty-nine killed, and one hundred and fifty-nine wounded; that of the French and Spaniards to four hundred and seventy-six; and no ship, except the Windsor Castle, was seriously damaged on the English side. Neither fleet showed any decided inclination to renew the action on the following day. At noon the combined fleet approached to within a league and a half of the British, who were drawn up in order of battle; but Villeneuve made signal to haul to the wind on the same tack as the British—that is, to decline the engagement for the present—as soon as he saw that the English fleet stood firm: and night again separated the hostile squadrons. On the day after, Sir Robert Calder stood away with his prizes towards the north, justly discerning, in the danger arising from the probable junction of Villeneuve with the Rochefort and Ferrol squadrons,<sup>2</sup> the first of which was known to have put to sea, a sufficient reason for falling back upon the support of the Channel fleet or

James, iv.  
17. Vict. et  
Conq. xvi.  
143. Dum.  
xii. 53.

to prescribe to its squadrons. Even if they had, it is not likely their orders could have reached the squadron before Rochefort in three days. I think the blockade must have been raised, therefore, by orders received before the arrival of the Curieux. On the 15th July that squadron effected its junction with that before Ferrol; and on the 16th or 17th they set out in virtue of anterior orders. I should not be surprised if they had sent another squadron to strengthen that of Nelson, and to effect the destruction of the combined fleet; and that it is these fourteen vessels before Ferrol which form that squadron. They have taken with them frigates, brigs, and corvettes, assuredly either to keep a look-out, or seek the combined fleet." It is interesting at the same moment to see the sagacity of Collingwood penetrating the long-hidden designs of the French Emperor, Napoleon's foresight divining the happy junction of the fleets from Rochefort and Ferrol under Sir Robert Calder, and the rapid decision of the Admiralty, so much beyond what he conceived possible, which proved the salvation of England.—See DUMAS, xii. 19, 20.

that of Lord Nelson; and Villeneuve, finding the passage clear, stood towards Spain, and, after leaving three sail of the line in bad order at Vigo, entered Ferrol on the 2d August.

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Of the importance of this, perhaps the most momentous action ever fought by the navy of England, no further proof is required than is furnished by the conduct of Napoleon, narrated by the unimpeachable authority of Count Daru, his private secretary, and the very eminent author of the History of Venice. On the day in which intelligence was received from the English papers of the arrival of Villeneuve at Ferrol, Daru was called by the Emperor into his cabinet. The scene which followed must be given in his own words:—"Daru found him transported with rage; walking up and down the room with hurried steps, and only breaking a stern silence by broken exclamations. 'What a navy!—what sacrifices for nothing!—what an admiral! All hope is gone. That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Ferrol! It is all over: he will be blockaded there.—Daru, sit down and write.' The fact was, that on that morning the Emperor had received intelligence of the arrival of Villeneuve in that Spanish harbour: he at once saw that the English expedition was blown up, the immense expenditure of the flotilla lost for a long time, perhaps for ever! Then, in the transports of a fury which would have entirely overturned the judgment of any other man, he adopted one of the boldest resolutions, and traced the plans of one of the most admirable achievements that any conqueror ever conceived. Without a moment's hesitation, or even stopping to consider, he dictated at once the plan of the campaign of Austerlitz; the simultaneous departure of all the corps from Hanover and Holland to the south and the west of France; their order of march, duration, their lines of conveyance, and points of rendezvous; the surprises and hostile attacks which they might experience, the divers

81.  
Vast importance of this action. Napoleon's conduct on receiving the intelligence of it. Aug 11.

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<sup>1</sup> Dupin,  
Force Na-  
vale de  
l'Angle-  
terre, i. 244.  
Dum. xii.  
119, 120.  
Bign. iv.  
296-7.

movements of the enemy. Everything was foreseen: victory was rendered secure on every supposition. Such was the justice and vast foresight of that plan, that over a base of departure two hundred leagues in extent, and a line of operations three hundred leagues in length, the stations assigned were reached according to this original plan, place by place, day by day, to Munich. Beyond that capital, the periods only underwent a slight alteration; but the places pointed out were all reached, and the plan as originally conceived carried into complete execution."<sup>1</sup>

82.  
It totally  
defeats his  
well-laid  
designs.

Nothing can portray the character of Napoleon and the importance of Sir Robert Calder's victory more strongly than this passage. He well knew how imminent affairs were in his rear; that Russia was advancing, Austria arming; and that, unless a stroke was speedily struck on the Thames, the weight of Europe must be encountered on the Danube. It was to anticipate this danger, to dissolve the confederacy by a stroke at its heart, and conquer, not only England, but Russia and Austria, on the British shores, that all his measures were calculated; and they were arranged so nicely, that there was barely time to carry the war into the enemy's vitals to anticipate his being assailed in his own. Finding this first project defeated by the result of Sir Robert Calder's action, he instantly took his line; adopted the secondary set of operations when he no longer could attempt the first; and prepared to carry the thunder of his arms to the banks of the Danube, when he was frustrated in his design of terminating the war in the British capital.

83.  
Cruel injus-  
tice to which  
Sir Robert  
Calder was  
meanwhile  
subjected.

While such immense consequences were resulting from the action of the 22d July, the gallant officer who, with a force so far inferior, had achieved so much success, was the victim of the most unmerited obloquy. The first intelligence of the defeat of the combined fleet by so inconsiderable an armament was received over all England with the utmost transports of joy; and the public expectation was wound up to the very highest pitch by an

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expression in the admiral's despatches, which pointed to an intention of renewing the battle on the following day, and the statement everywhere made by the officer who brought the intelligence, that a renewal would certainly take place.\* When, therefore, it was discovered that the hostile fleets had not again met, that the British admiral had stood to the northward, rather avoiding than seeking an encounter, and that Villeneuve had reached Ferrol in safety, where he lay unblockaded with thirty ships of the line, these transports were suddenly cooled, and succeeded by a murmur of discontent, which was worked up to a perfect paroxysm of rage upon finding that, in consequence of these circumstances, Napoleon, in the official accounts published in his admiral's name on the occasion, claimed the victory for the French arms.<sup>1†</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, iv.  
18. Ann.  
Reg. 1805,  
230, 231.

The consequence was, that, after having continued a short time longer in the command of the fleet, Sir Robert was compelled to retire and demand a court-martial, which, on the 26th December, severely reprimanded him

\* The public discontent, which terminated so cruelly for Sir Robert Calder, was in a great degree owing to the unfortunate suppression of part of his despatches in the accounts published by the Admiralty. The passage published was in these words:—"The enemy are now in sight to windward: and when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any further opportunity that may offer to give you a further account of these combined squadrons." The suppressed paragraph was this:—"At the same time, it will behove me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe that they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port; therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron."<sup>2</sup> Had this paragraph been published after the former, it would have revealed the real situation of the British admiral, lying with fourteen ships of the line fit for action, in presence of a combined squadron of eighteen, hourly expecting a junction with two others, one of fifteen, and the other of five line-of-battle ships. In these circumstances, no one can doubt that to retire towards the Channel fleet was the duty which the safety of England, with which he was charged, imperatively imposed on the British admiral. It is the most pleasing duty of the historian thus to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the memory of a gallant and meritorious officer; and it is the greatest consolation, next to the inward rewards of conscience, of suffering virtue, when borne down by the torrent of popular obloquy, to know that the time will come when its character will be reinstated in the eyes of posterity, and that deserved censure be cast upon the haste and severity of present opinion, which in the end seldom fails to attend deeds of injustice.

<sup>2</sup> James, iv.  
17.

† The accounts, published by Napoleon, in the name of Villeneuve, of the

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84.  
Sir Robert  
Calder is  
brought to  
a court-  
martial.

for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement on the 23d and 24th July; though the sentence admitted that his conduct had not been owing either to cowardice or disaffection. Thus, at the very time that a public outcry, excited by the vehemence of party ambition, was chasing from the helm of the Admiralty the statesman, whose admirable arrangements had prepared for the British navy the triumph of Trafalgar, the fury of ignorant zeal affixed a stigma on the admiral whose gallant victory had defeated the greatest and best arranged project ever conceived by Napoleon for our destruction, and finally rescued his country from the perils of Gallic invasion. Such, in its first and hasty fits, is public opinion! History would indeed be useless, if the justice of posterity did not often reverse its iniquitous decrees.\*

85.  
Nelson re-  
turns to  
England.

Aug. 15.

Meanwhile Nelson, having taken in water and other necessary supplies at Tetuan, stood for Ceuta on the 24th July: and having heard nothing of the combined fleet, proceeded to Cape St Vincent, rather cruising in quest of intelligence than following any fixed course. He then traversed the Bay of Biscay, and approached the north of Ireland; and finding the enemy had not been heard of there, joined Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant on the 15th August. No news had been obtained of the enemy; and on the same evening he received orders to proceed with

action, were entirely fabricated by the Emperor himself. In his despatch to the minister of marine of 11th August, after noticing the accounts in the English newspapers which claimed the victory, Napoleon said, "The arrival of Villeneuve at Corunna will overturn all their gasconades, and in the eyes of Europe will give us the victory; that is no small matter. Instantly write out a narrative of the action, and send it to M. Maret. *Here is my idea of what it should be;*" and then follows the fabricated account.—DUMAS, xii. 348; *Pièces Just.*

\* Let us hear what the French writers say of this proceeding:—"Admiral Calder," says Dupin, "with an inferior force, meets the Franco-Spanish fleet; in the chase of it he brings on a partial engagement, and captures two ships. He is tried and reprimanded, because it is believed that, had he renewed the action, he would have obtained a more decisive victory. What would they have done with Calder in England, if he had commanded the superior fleet, and had lost two ships in avoiding an engagement which presented so favourable a chance to skill and valour?"—DUPIN'S *Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 17.

the Victory and Superb to Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 17th, and at length heard of the action of 22d July, and entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol. He was hailed with unbounded demonstrations of gratitude and joy in England; the public having followed with intense anxiety his indefatigable and almost fabulous adventures in search of the enemy, and deservedly awarded that consideration to heroic efforts in discharge of duty which is so often the reward only of splendid or dazzling achievements.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> South. ii.  
225, 230.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 230.

Napoleon's hopes of accomplishing the objects of his ambition were somewhat revived upon finding that Nelson had not joined Sir Robert Calder's squadron, and that the fleet in Ferrol was still immensely superior to that of the enemy. Accordingly he resumed his designs of invasion; on the 12th August transmitted orders to Villeneuve, through the minister of marine, to sail without loss of time from Ferrol, and pursue his route towards Brest, where Gantheaume was prepared to join him at a moment's warning;\* and in two days afterwards he wrote a second letter, in still more pressing terms, absolutely enjoining the immediate sailing of the combined fleet.† Sir Robert Calder had by this time effected a junction with Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, so that the sea was open to his adventure. On the 17th August, however,

86.  
Napoleon orders the combined fleet again to put to sea, but it makes for Cadiz instead of Brest.

Aug. 14.

\* "Despatch instantly," wrote Napoleon, on the 12th August to M. Decrès, "a messenger to Ferrol. Make Villeneuve acquainted with the news received from London. Tell him I hope that he is continuing his mission, and that it would be too dishonourable for the imperial squadrons to permit a skirmish of a few hours and an engagement with fourteen vessels to render abortive such great projects—that the enemy's squadron has suffered much—and that, on his own admission, his losses have not been very serious." And on the 14th August:—"With thirty vessels my admirals should learn not to fear four-and-twenty English; if they are not equal to such an encounter, we may at once renounce all hopes of a marine. I have more confidence in my naval forces; had I not, it would ruin their courage. If Villeneuve remains the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th, at Ferrol, I will not complain; but if he remains an hour longer with a favourable wind, and only twenty-four line-of-battle ships before him—I require a man of superior character. The little energy of my admirals throws away all the chances of fortune, and ruins all the prospects of the campaign."—DUMAS, xii. 59, 67.

† "J'espère que Villeneuve ne se laissera pas bloquer par une escadre



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Aug. 11.

he was again detached, with twenty ships of the line, to cruise off Cape Finisterre. On the 11th, the combined fleet, amounting to twenty-nine sail of the line, having left several vessels behind them in a state not fit for service, stood out to sea, and at first took a north-westerly direction; but having received accounts at sea from a Danish vessel that a British fleet of twenty-five ships of the line (Sir Robert Calder's) was approaching, Villeneuve tacked about and made sail for Cadiz, where he arrived on the 21st, the very day on which he was expected at Brest. Admiral Collingwood, with four sail of the line, who lay before the former port, was obliged to retire on the approach of so overwhelming a force; but no sooner had the enemy entered than he resumed his station, and with his little squadron gallantly maintained the blockade of a harbour where five-and-thirty hostile line-of-battle ships were now assembled.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, iv.  
23, 27.  
Dum. xii.  
63, 71.  
Thiers, v.  
448.

87.  
Ganthé-  
aume in  
vain leaves  
Brest to  
meet them.  
Aug. 21.

Not anticipating such a departure on the part of the combined fleet from the prescribed operations, Napoleon, on the 22d August, wrote both to Villeneuve and Ganthéaume in the most pressing terms to stand out to sea, unite their forces, and make straight for Boulogne, where he was in readiness to receive them. His words are very remarkable, and singularly characteristic of the solemn feelings with which he was animated on the eve of this, the most important event of his life.\* In obedience to the orders he received, Ganthéaume, on the 21st of August, stood out of Brest harbour with one-and-twenty ships of the line, and drew up in order of battle in Bertheaume roads. Admiral Cornwallis, whose squadron,

inférieure à la sienne. Aidez et poussez l'amiral autant qu'il vous sera possible. Concertez-vous avec lui pour les troupes que vous avez à bord, et envoyez-m'en l'état de situation. Nous sommes prêts partout: une apparition de vingt-quatre heures suffirait. *Napoleon au Général Lauriston, aide-de-camp de Villeneuve, 14 Août 1805.*—THIERS, v. 448.

\* He wrote to Villeneuve on 22d August;—"Monsieur le vice-amiral, j'espère que vous êtes arrivé à Brest. Partez, ne perdez pas un moment, et avec mes escadres réunies entrez dans la Manche. *L'Angleterre est à nous!* Nous sommes tout prêts: tout est embarqué. Paraissez vingt-quatre heures, et tout est terminé.—NAPOLÉON." To Ganthéaume, he wrote on the same day, "Je

after the large detachment under Calder, amounted only to fourteen, immediately moved in to attack them, and a distant cannonade ensued between the two fleets. But the French, who had no intention to engage in a general affair before the arrival of the combined fleet, did not venture out of the protection of their batteries, and the day passed over without any general action. In vain every eye was turned to the south, in the hopes of descrying the long-wished-for reinforcement—in vain Gantheaume counted the hours for the arrival of Villeneuve with thirty ships of the line, chasing before him Calder with twenty. In that decisive moment the star of England prevailed—the remembrance of the late battle had paralysed the enemy. The action of the 22d July had saved his country, though it had proved fatal to its saviour. The combined fleet, weakened and discouraged, had sought refuge in Cadiz, not daring to encounter a second action; and the Brest squadron, after spending the day in anxious suspense, returned at night to their harbour.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xi  
69, 70.  
Thiers, v.  
452.

The intelligence of the arrival of the combined fleet at Cadiz put a final period to the designs of Napoleon against Great Britain, and all his energies were instantly turned to the prosecution of the war against Austria. His indignation against Villeneuve for not continuing his route for Brest, where all was in readiness for his reception, knew no bounds: "Your Villeneuve," said he to Decrès, "is a coward, a traitor;" and in the first transports of his fury, he made out orders for the combined fleet instantly to set sail from Cadiz for Brest, where

88.  
Napoleon's  
designs are  
in conse-  
en-  
11-

Pa

vous ai déjà fait connaître par le télégraphe que mon intention est que vous ne souffriez pas que Villeneuve perde un seul jour, afin que, profitant de la supériorité que me donnent cinquante vaisseaux de ligne, vous mettiez sur-le-champ en mer pour remplir votre destination, et pour vous porter dans la Manche avec toutes vos forces. Je compte sur vos talents, votre fermeté, votre caractère, dans une circonstance si importante. Partez, et venez ici. Nous aurons vengé six siècles d'insultes et de honte. Jamais, pour un plus grand objet, mes soldats de terre et de mer n'auront exposé leur vie!"—THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, v. 454.

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the whole armament was to be put under the command of Admiral Gantheaume. But a little reflection convinced him that, supposing this done, the time for the projected invasion of Britain would be past, and the empire of Europe might, during his absence, be lost in Germany. He determined, therefore, to abandon his enterprise against England, and direct all his forces to the centre of Germany. His indignation appeared in an act of accusation which he drew up against Villeneuve, dictated by himself, in which the leading charges were, incapacity in the action of 22d July, and positive disobedience of orders, in afterwards steering with the combined fleet for Cadiz, instead of pursuing the prescribed route for Brest. But as it was of the utmost moment that his designs against the Imperialists on the Danube should as long as possible be concealed, the preparations for embarkation were continued with redoubled activity down to the last moment, and at the very time when the Emperor was directing the contemplated movements across France and Germany to the shores of the Danube. Between the 23d August and 1st September, the troops were daily exercised at embarking and disembarking in the bay of Boulogne, and at length acquired the most extraordinary perfection in these difficult operations.\* The cavalry and artillery were all stored in the appointed vessels; the Emperor's household and baggage were embarked; and the soldiers, in the utmost impatience, awaited the signal to step on board;<sup>1</sup> when suddenly, on

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
101. Dum.  
xii. 84, 127.  
Ney, ii. 249,  
265. Thiers,  
v. 453.

\* The following passage from Marshal Ney's Memoirs contains some curious details on this subject:—"The instructions of the Emperor were so luminous, minute, and precise, as to give the inferior commanders nothing to do but follow them out specifically. To ascertain the time required for the embarkation, Marshal Ney distributed the gunpowder, caissons, artillery, projectiles, and stores on board the transports provided for that purpose, and he formed that portion of the flotilla assigned to him into subdivisions: every battalion, every company, received the boats destined for its use; every man, down to the lowest drummer, was apprised of the boat, and the place in the boat, where he was to set himself. At a signal given, infantry, cavalry, artillery, were at once put under arms, and ranged opposite to the vessels on board which they were respectively to embark. A cannon was discharged, and all the field-officers dismounted, and placed themselves at the head of their respective corps; a second

the 1st September, the Emperor set out at two o'clock for Paris, and orders were issued to the whole of this mighty armament to defile by different routes towards the Rhine.

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The circumstances which induced this sudden change of resolution, were not merely the destruction of all the projects for the naval campaign by the entry of Villeneuve into the harbour of Cadiz. Matters had also come to a crisis on the Continent of Europe; and the time had now arrived when, as the coalition could not be dissolved on the shores of Britain, it required to be anticipated on the banks of the Danube. From the moment that Napoleon put on his head the iron crown of Charlemagne, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, which had provided for the independence of the Cisalpine republic, and incorporated Genoa, Parma, and Placentia with his vast dominions, all hope of permanently preserving the peace of the Continent was at an end: and it was only a question of time and expedience when Austria should openly join her forces to those of the coalition. The assembly of all the armies of France on the shores of the Channel, the departure of the Emperor for Boulogne, and the embarkation of a considerable part of his forces, having impressed the Aulic Council with the belief that the military strength of the empire would soon be involved in that perilous undertaking, the moment appeared eminently favourable for the Imperialists to commence operations. General Chastellar, at the head of fifteen thousand men, entered

89.  
Austria had  
been making  
hostile pre-  
parations.

gun was the signal to make ready to embark; a third, and the word of command, 'Colonels, forward!' was heard with indescribable anxiety along the whole line; a fourth, which was instantly followed by the word 'March!' Universal acclamations immediately broke forth; the soldiers in perfect order hastened on board, each to his appointed place; in *ten minutes and a half* twenty-five thousand men embarked. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds: they thought the long-wished-for moment had arrived; but at the next signal the order to disembark was given, and they were made aware that the whole was only a feint to try the rapidity with which the movement could be performed. The relanding was completed nearly as rapidly as the embarkation; in *thirteen minutes* from the time the soldiers were on board, they were drawn up in battle array on shore."—NEY, ii. 260, 261.

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Aug. 12.

the Tyrol, and began to organise the brave and hardy population of that province. Considerable bodies of workmen were employed in strengthening the fortifications on the Venetian frontier, and armaments already began to be formed on the Inn and the principal roads leading into Bavaria. These hostile preparations were immediately made the subject of angry contention between the cabinet of the Tuileries and that of Vienna; and in several articles in the *Moniteur*, evidently flowing from the pen of Talleyrand, the question as to the balance of power in Europe, and the danger to be apprehended from the strength of France, was discussed with more openness than was possible amid the studied ambiguity of diplomatic correspondence.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
310. 319.  
Dum. xii.  
101, 111.

90.

Both parties  
warmly as-  
sail the  
court of  
Munich with  
proposals  
for alliance.

At length the mask was let fall on both sides. The concentration of the Austrian forces on the Adige and the Inn, and the general warlike activity which pervaded the Imperial dominions, left no doubt that a contest was approaching; while, on the other hand, the whole forces of Napoleon were, unknown to Austria, converging, over the whole line from the Elbe to the Pyrenees, towards the Danube. In these circumstances it was of the highest

\* The views of the opposite parties are well abridged in the following state papers which at this period passed between the two cabinets:—

“Let us come at once,” said Talleyrand, “to the bottom of the question. Austria wishes to take up arms in order to reduce the power of France. If such is her design, I ask you to consider, is it conformable to her real interests? Is she always to consider France as a rival, because she was so once; and is it not from a very different quarter that the liberties of Europe are now menaced? The time is perhaps not far removed when France and Austria, united, will be required to fight, not only for their own independence, but for the liberties of Europe and the principles of civilisation itself. In every war that may ensue between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and France on the other, Austria, whatever name she may assume, will speedily be found to be a principal in the strife; and she will be fortunate if, abandoned by an ally of whom she has experienced the inconstancy and caprice, she does not undergo the rudest strokes of fortune.

“What does France demand of Austria? Neither efforts nor sacrifices. The Emperor desires only the repose of the Continent. He is ever ready to make a maritime peace as soon as England will adhere to the treaty of Amiens. But as that is impossible, in the present temper of England, but by means of a maritime war, he desires to devote himself exclusively to it; and therefore he demands of Austria not to divert him from that great design,<sup>2</sup> and to enter

<sup>2</sup> Note, Aug.  
5. Talley-  
rand to Co-  
bentzel.

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importance to both sides to secure the co-operation of the lesser states of Germany, and especially of Bavaria, whose dominions lay directly between the hostile powers, and would in all probability be the first theatre of hostilities. The court of Munich, accordingly, was warmly urged, both by France and Austria, to side with them in the contest; and the Elector, long uncertain, hesitated between the two parties, and even entered into diplomatic connexions with both—the common resource of weak states when threatened with destruction by the collision of powerful neighbours, and hardly to be reproached as a fault when it is the result of necessity. On the one hand, it was represented by the French party that Austria was the old and hereditary enemy of Bavaria—that she had already solicited the cession of a portion of her territory; that there could be no doubt that she coveted her possessions as far as the Lech; and that the Elector had therefore everything to hope from an alliance with Napoleon, and as much to fear from exposure to the rapacity of the Emperor. On the other hand, it was strongly urged by the old aristocratic party,—at the head of which was the Princess of Baden, the Elector's daughter-in-law, who was

into no engagement which may disturb the harmony which now prevails between the two empires."

It was replied on the part of Austria on the 3d September—"That the cabinet of Vienna was both willing and anxious to put an end to the dangers which threatened Europe by a sincere and earnest mediation; but that, to do this with any prospect of success, it was indispensable that the faith of treaties should be religiously observed, and that he who violated them was the real aggressor. The treaty of Lunéville carefully stipulated the independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian republics. Every state should respect the independence of those which adjoin it, no matter whether they are strong or weak; and it is the violation of this duty by the French government, which imposes upon other states the necessity of coalescing to oppose a barrier to its aggressions. Austria is arming, but not with a hostile intention, and solely with the design of maintaining the existing peace with France, as well as the equilibrium and repose of Europe. Even should war become inevitable, she solemnly declares that the courts of Austria and Russia have bound themselves to interfere in no respect with the internal affairs of France; to make no change on the established possessions or relations in Germany; and to respect the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Great Britain has the same intentions, and is desirous to be regulated by the same moderate principles in re-establishing her pacific relations with the French empire."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Note by Austria, Sept. 3. Duri. xii 109, 110.

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. vi.  
320, 323.  
Dum. xii.  
210, 211.

a woman of uncommon talent and vigour of mind,—that all these advantages were merely apparent; that the alliance with France was a connexion with a revolutionary state which threatened the subversion of all the institutions of society, and that, when menaced by such a catastrophe, the only prudent course was to adhere to the head of the Germanic body, whose interests, it might be relied on, would always be opposed to such innovations.<sup>1</sup>

91.  
It finally  
joins  
France.

Aug. 24.

Sept. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Bign. iv.  
320, 323.  
Dum. xii.  
210, 211.

It was sufficiently difficult to determine which course to adopt between such opposing considerations; but, in addition to them, the Elector had other and more anxious causes for solicitude on this occasion. His eldest son was at Paris, in the power of Napoleon; the fate of the Duc d'Enghien was still recent; and his paternal fears were strongly excited by the perils which he might run if the French Emperor were irritated by decided hostilities. Vacillating between such opposite dangers, the Elector, on the 24th August, agreed to the substance of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, but delayed the signature of the treaty on various pretences, anxious to gain time in these critical circumstances, and it was not finally signed till the 23d September, at Würzburg. Meanwhile the Austrians, having some suspicion of such an understanding, summoned the Elector in a peremptory manner, on the 6th September, to unite his forces to their own. They were met by the most urgent entreaties to be allowed to remain neutral; and as this was refused, the Elector, on the 8th, despatched a letter to the Emperor, promising, if neutrality was impossible, to unite his forces to his own. In the night following, however, being overcome with terrors for his son, he secretly departed with his family to Würzburg; the Bavarians retired into Franconia to join the French forces; and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Inn.<sup>2</sup>

The preparations of Napoleon were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the contest in which he was engaged, and the immense forces which the Allies were

preparing to employ against him. Mr Pitt had conducted the negotiations for the formation of a coalition with the most consummate ability: every difficulty had been removed, every jealousy softened: Austria and Russia stood forth prominent in the fight; and hopes were even entertained, that if disaster did not attend the first efforts of the coalition, Prussia might be induced to unite her forces to those of the other allies in support of the freedom of Europe. In Italy and Germany, no less than three hundred and fifty thousand men were preparing to act against France, among whom were one hundred and sixteen thousand Russians, advancing by forced marches through Poland towards the Bavarian plains. Their arrival, however, could not be calculated upon for at least two months to come; and in the mean time, the Austrian army, which had just crossed the Inn, eighty thousand strong, stood exposed to the first strokes of Napoleon. Thirty thousand Imperialists, under the Archduke John, were assembled in the Tyrol; and the Archduke Charles, at the head of fifty-five thousand of the best troops of the empire, was preparing to exert his great talents on the Italian plains.\* Four attacks were projected by the Allies: one in the north of Germany by a united force of Russians, Swedes, and English; the second in the valley of the Danube, by the grand armies of Russia and Austria; a third in Lombardy, which was intrusted to the Austrians alone; the fourth in the south of Italy by a united force of Russians, English, and Neapolitans.

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1805.

92.

The Aus-  
trians cross  
the Inn.

\* The forces of the coalition were thus disposed when hostilities commenced by the passage of the Inn :—

In Bavaria and Upper Austria, under the Archduke Ferdinand,	90,000
Reserve under the Emperor Francis, forming at Vienna,	30,000
First Russian army crossing Poland,	56,000
Second Russian army, under the Emperor Alexander,	60,000
Austrians in the Tyrol,	30,000
Austrians in Italy, under the Archduke Charles,	55,000
Russians and Swedes in Pomerania,	30,000

351,000



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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xii.  
131, 138.  
Jom. ii. 97.  
Thiers, vi. 7.

It was evident that the forces of the coalition would ultimately become superior; and that France had much to dread from the prospect of having to combat with the single resources of the empire against Europe in arms on the Rhine. But in the outset, the armies of Napoleon had greatly the advantage both in the number, and composition of the troops. Everything, therefore, depended on secrecy of combination and celerity of movement; and in both these qualities Napoleon was unrivalled.<sup>1</sup>

93.  
The Army  
of Holland  
  
from Bou-  
logne to the  
Rhine.

To meet this immense force, and destroy part before the remainder could advance to its support, was the object of Napoleon, and in its prosecution he displayed even more than his wonted energy and ability. The Army of England on the shores of the Channel, the forces in Holland, the troops in Hanover, were forthwith formed into seven corps, under the command of as many marshals of the empire: their united numbers amounted to one hundred and ninety thousand men; a force amply sufficient to crush the Imperialists in Germany, if the whole could be brought simultaneously into action before the Russians advanced to the support of the former. The army of Italy was thirty-five thousand strong, besides fifteen thousand in the Neapolitan territories; and the troops of Bavaria and the lesser German states, whose aid might be relied on, amounted to twenty-four thousand; so that France could open the campaign with two hundred and seventy thousand men.<sup>2\*</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Dum. xii.  
136.

But these forces, considerable as they were, formed but

\* The French forces were thus disposed:—

Grand army, divided into seven corps, under Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, Augereau, with the cavalry under Murat, and the Guard under Mortier,	196,472
Army of Italy,	34,674
Army of Naples,	15,000
Electoral troops,	23,815

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269,960

a part of the preparations of the Emperor. On the 23d September, he repaired to the senate, and submitted two propositions to the legislature, which were forthwith adopted. The first was a levy of eighty thousand conscripts from the class who were to become liable to military service in 1806—a sufficient proof that France was already anticipating her military resources; the second, the re-organisation of the national guard, throughout the whole extent of the empire. But in thus reviving this republican institution, the Emperor was careful to organise it on a different footing from that on which it had been based during the days of democratic equality. “It is important,” said he, “that the officers of the national guard should be *named by the Emperor*; every species of force ought to emanate from the supreme authority: all our institutions should be in harmony; and a single uniform direction be given to whoever commands the force of the armed citizens.” Subsequent decrees arranged the details of this re-organisation. Every man in good health was required to serve, from the age of twenty-one to that of sixty; ten companies formed a cohort, and several cohorts, according to the locality, a legion. Those only in the departments of the frontier, from Geneva to Calais, were called into active service, and arranged into four corps, commanded by General Rampon, Marshal Lefebvre, Marshal Kellermann, and General d’Abbeville.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

94.

Immense  
preparations  
of Napoleon.

Sept. 23.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xii.  
237, 238.  
Bign. iv.  
330.

The Emperor adjourned the meeting of the senate by the following address, which sufficiently indicated the urgent state, in his estimation, of public affairs, and announced that he had no alternative but to conquer or die:—“The eternal objects of the enemies of the Continent are at length accomplished; the war is renewed in the heart of Germany; Austria and Russia have united themselves to England. A few days ago, I hoped that the peace of the Continent would not be disturbed; menaces and grounds of umbrage alike found me immovable; but the Austrian army has crossed the Inn;

95.

His address  
to the senate.

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Munich is invaded ; the Elector of Bavaria is chased from his capital ; all my hopes have vanished. Senators! when, in conformity with your wishes, I placed the imperial crown on my head, I undertook to you and to all the citizens of France the obligation to maintain it pure and inviolate. Magistrates, soldiers, citizens, all equally desire to preserve our country from the influence of England, which, if it once prevailed, would lead only to the burning of our fleets, the filling up of our ports, the ruin of our industry. I have kept all the promises which I have made to the French people : they have made no engagement with me which they have not more than fulfilled. Frenchmen ! your Emperor will do his duty ; the soldiers will do theirs ; you will do yours.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
330, 331.  
Dum. xii.  
237, 238.

96.

Entire  
breaking  
up of the  
armament  
at Boulogne.

Previous to setting out for Boulogne, Napoleon issued several decrees for the disarming of the flotilla, and the laying up in ordinary what was kept, for future and distant operations. The artillery was removed from the greater part of the armed vessels and all the transports ; such part of it as could be accommodated in the harbour of Boulogne was kept there, the remainder dispersed through the harbours of the Channel. The English, too well satisfied at this dislocation of so formidable a force, made no attempt to hinder its dispersion ; and soon, of all that vast assemblage of vessels, hardly enough remained at Boulogne to transport thirty thousand men. A reserve of twenty thousand men alone remained on the heights above the harbour, under the command of General Brune, designed at once to keep up alarm on the coasts of Britain, and form a reserve in case of disasters befalling the grand army. Thus terminated this extraordinary armament, the greatest assemblage of military and naval forces ever made in modern times, contrived with the utmost skill, conducted with the most profound dissimulation, which entirely deceived the vigilance of the mighty nation against which it was directed, and failed at last rather from a casual combination of circumstances,<sup>2</sup> and the

<sup>2</sup> Dum. xii.  
127, 129.  
142, 143.  
Jom. ii. 87,  
89. Thiers,  
vi. 133, 134.

intrepidity of an admiral whom England punished for his achievement, than from any inadequacy in the means employed to attain the vast object which her enemy had in view.

Determined, however, not entirely to lose the fruit of his naval armaments, Napoleon, before setting out for the grand army, issued directions for the fleet at Cadiz to put to sea and proceed to Toulon, in order to be ready to act as occasion might require on the shores of Italy. This instruction was accompanied by the appointment of Admiral Rosily to the command of the combined fleet in lieu of Villeneuve,\* who was directed to surrender the command to him on his arrival. Rosily, however, was in Paris at the time, and some time must elapse before he could reach Cadiz. M. Decrès intimated the appointment to Villeneuve, with information of the vehement indignation of the Emperor on account of his return to Cadiz. He did not direct him to set sail from Cadiz, but he hoped he would; and, in truth, left no alternative to a man of honour but to do so. Though of a desponding temperament, Villeneuve was a brave man; and as soon as he received the despatch of Decrès, he determined to hazard all on the issue of a battle. This led to events of the greatest importance, by rendering the disgraced admiral desperate, and prompting him to make the ill-omened sortie which terminated in the disaster of Trafalgar. But, after bringing the fleet round to Toulon, the successor of Villeneuve was to break it down into several detached cruising squadrons, the chief of which was one to take possession of and cruise near St Helena! Strange fatality, which appeared to attach him, on the eve of so many of the greatest events of his life, to the destined scene of his exile and death! Villeneuve, on

97.  
The combined  
is order  
never  
to sail  
Cadiz.

\* "Votre ami Villeneuve sera probablement trop lâche," said Napoleon to Decrès, "pour sortir de Cadiz. Expéditez l'Amiral Rosily, qui prendra le commandement de l'escadre, si elle n'est pas encore partie; et vous ordonnerez l'Amiral Villeneuve de venir à Paris de me rendre compte de sa conduite."

—THIERS, vi. 135.

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1805.

Dum. xii.  
145, 149.  
Thiers, vi.  
136.

receiving the crushing despatch of M. Decrès, replied to him, "The naval men of Paris and the departments are unworthy of their name if they cast the first stone at me. Let them come on board, and they will see with what elements they are exposed to fight. As to the rest, if, as is pretended, the French marine is only awaiting in boldness, as is pretended, the Emperor shall be speedily satisfied, and he may reckon on the most decisive success." <sup>1</sup>

98.  
Restoration  
of the  
gorian  
ndar.  
9.

An important change occurred at this period, highly characteristic of the decline of revolutionary fervour, and a return to the ordinary ideas of civilised life. This was the restoration of the Gregorian calendar, and abolition of the barbarous nomenclature of the Revolutionary era, which for twelve years had been in use in France—a change prescribed by the Emperor in a decree issued shortly before he set out for Strassburg.<sup>2</sup>

99.  
Increase of  
the British  
blockading  
force before  
Cadiz.

Sept. 14.

Meanwhile the British government directed all their efforts to form a powerful fleet to blockade the combined squadrons in the harbour of Cadiz. Independent of the twenty ships of the line which had been detached from the Channel fleet by Admiral Cornwallis, and the four which Admiral Collingwood had under his command off the Isle of Leon, seven more were got together in Portsmouth and Plymouth; and Nelson, who had retired to his house at Merton to recruit his exhausted strength, again volunteered his services to resume the command, repaired to Portsmouth, and hoisted his flag on board the Victory of ninety guns. Even during the few weeks of his retirement, his thoughts perpetually ran on the combined fleets, and he was constantly impressed with the idea, that they were destined to receive their death-blow from his hand.\* In these generous sentiments

\* When Captain Blackwood, on his way to London with despatches, called at Merton one morning early, Nelson, the moment he saw him, exclaimed, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets! I think I shall yet have to beat them. Depend upon it, Blackwood," he repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing." At length his anxiety

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he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, who, notwithstanding the ardour of her attachment, constantly urged him to sacrifice every private consideration at the call of public duty. He was vividly impressed, however, with the presentiment that he would fall in the battle which was approaching; and before he left London, he called at the upholsterer's where the coffin which Captain Hallowell had given him, made of the wreck of the *Orient*, was deposited, desiring that its history might be engraven on its lid, as it was highly probable he would want it on his return. On the night on which he left Merton, he wrote a few lines in his journal, highly descriptive of the elevated feeling and manly piety which formed the leading features of his character.\* With difficulty he tore himself, on the beach at Portsmouth on the following morning, from the crowd who knelt and blessed him as he passed; and the last sounds which reached his ears from that loved land which he was never again to see, were the enthusiastic cheers of his countrymen, who never ceased to strain their aching eyes towards his vessel till it vanished from their sight.<sup>1</sup>

Sept. 14.

<sup>1</sup> South. ii.  
234, 237.

Nelson's reception in the fleet off Cadiz was as gratifying as his departure from England. The yards were all crowded with hardy veterans, anxious to get a sight of their favourite hero, and peals of acclamation shook the ships when he was seen on the quarterdeck of the *Victory* shaking hands with his old captains, who in transports of

100.

tic reception  
of Nelson  
by the fleet.

became so excessive, that he resolved, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of his physicians, to volunteer his services to resume the command, which were, of course, gladly accepted by the Admiralty. In this resolution he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, with that feeling of generous ardour which has so often animated her sex in similar circumstances, when influenced by romantic attachment. "Nelson," said she, "however we may lament your absence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gain a quiet heart by it. You will gain a glorious victory, and then you may return here and be happy." He looked at her with tears in his eyes,—"Brave Emma! good Emma! If there were more Emmas there would be more Nelsons."—SOUTHEY, ii. 232.

\* "Friday night, Sept. 13, half-past ten.—I drove from dear, dear Merton,

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joy hastened on board to congratulate him on his arrival. No one from that moment entertained a doubt that the fate of the combined fleet was sealed, if they should venture from their harbour. So great was the terror of his name, that, notwithstanding the positive orders to sail for Toulon which he had received, Villeneuve hesitated to obey when he heard of his arrival; and in a council of war it was resolved not to venture out unless they were at least one-third superior to the enemy. Informed of this circumstance, Nelson carefully concealed his real strength from his opponents—stationing his fleet out of sight, about sixty miles to the westward of Cape St Mary's, with a chain of repeating frigates to inform him of the motions of the enemy; while, at the same time, the blockade of the port was rigorously enforced, so as to render it probable that ere long they would be compelled to sail, from the impossibility of finding supplies in the vicinity of Cadiz for so great a multitude. Forty sail of the line were now assembled in that harbour, of which thirty-three were ready for sea; and as Napoleon, never contemplating the return of the combined fleet to Cadiz, had formed no magazines of provisions in that quarter, though ample stores had been collected at Rochefort, Brest, and the harbours of the Channel, the want of provisions was soon severely felt.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> South, ii.  
237. Dum.  
xiii. 174,  
177.

101.  
His stratagem to induce the enemy to leave the harbour.  
Oct. 15.

Still, however, the council of war which Villeneuve had summoned to his assistance declined to undertake the responsibility of an engagement, and even came to a solemn resolution to avoid it, as attended with certain destruction to the fleet. Villeneuve sent this resolution to Paris, accompanied by his own opinion to the same effect, but with a declaration, that he was nevertheless

where I left all which I hold dear in this world, to go to serve my King and country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the expectations of my country; and if it is his good pleasure that I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to the throne of his mercy.<sup>2</sup> If it is his good Providence to cut short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission, relying that he will protect those so dear to me whom I leave behind. His will be done!"—SOUTHEY, ii. 235.

prepared to sail with the first wind, and devote himself for his country. Nelson, to overcome their irresolution,

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1805.

recourse to a stratagem, which was crowned with the most complete success. Having received, on the 15th October, information that he would soon be joined by six sail of the line from England, he ventured on the bold step of detaching Admiral Louis with a like force to Gibraltar for stores and water; thus maintaining the blockade with only twenty-two line-of-battle ships, in presence of thirty-three newly equipped and ready for action. In these critical circumstances, Nelson was not without some feelings of anxiety lest the Carthagena or Rochefort squadrons should join the enemy and increase their already formidable superiority; yet even then he had the generosity to allow Sir Robert Calder, who was obliged to go home to demand a court-martial, to proceed thither in his own ninety-gun ship, which could ill be spared at such a crisis. Fortunately the promised reinforcements arrived, and in single vessels, so as not to attract the notice of the enemy; and Nelson, whose anxiety for the approaching combat had now risen to the very highest pitch, again found himself at the head of seven-and-twenty ships of the line.<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 19.  
1 South. ii.  
237, 242.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 233,  
234. Dum.  
xiii. 174,  
177. Thiers,  
vi. 143.

Deceived by this stratagem as to the real strength of the enemy—aware that Napoleon was desirous of concentrating his principal naval resources in the Mediterranean, and apprehensive that, if he any longer delayed his departure, Admiral Rosily might assume the command, and deprive him of the fair opportunity which now presented itself of covering his former failures by the defeat of England's greatest hero, Villeneuve at length resolved upon putting to sea and risking a battle. Early on the 19th October, accordingly, the inshore frigates made signal that the enemy were coming out of the harbour; and at two o'clock in the afternoon, that they were fairly at sea, steering for the south-east. Overjoyed at this intelligence, Nelson instantly gave the signal to chase in

102.  
Which is  
completely  
successful.  
Oct. 19.



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1805.

the same direction ; and though they were not got sight of on the following day, yet so well were their motions watched by the frigates on the outlook, that the British admiral was made acquainted with every tack which they made, while he himself studiously kept out of view, lest, upon seeing the number of his vessels, they should return to Cadiz harbour. At length, at daybreak on the 21st, their whole fleet was descried, drawn up in a semi-circle, in close order of battle, about twelve miles ahead ; and Nelson, who had previously arranged the order of attack with his worthy second in command, Collingwood, and fully explained it to the officers of the fleet, made signal to bear down in two lines perpendicularly upon the enemy. He had twenty-seven sail of the line and four frigates—they thirty-three line-of-battle ships and seven frigates, four of the former being three-deckers ; and four thousand soldiers were dispersed through the fleet, who unhappily took too effectual aim in the battle which followed.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> James, iv.  
39. South.  
ii. 240, 246.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 234,  
235. Dum.  
xii. 175, 177.

103.  
Dispositions  
on both  
sides.

Nelson's plan of attack was, to bear down upon the enemy in two columns, and thus break the line in two places at once. In this way he thought it was most likely that each ship would be brought speedily into close action with its antagonist, and the greatest chance of decisive success be obtained. Villeneuve's instructions, as the British lay to windward, were to lie in close order and

\* In communicating his plan of attack to Collingwood, Nelson, who was altogether destitute of professional jealousy, wrote—"I send you my plan of attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in ; but it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into execution. We can, my dear Coll., have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies, and getting a glorious peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you, and no man will render your services more justice than your very old friend, Nelson and Bronte." Nelson said to his captains, "that knowing his precise object to be that of a close and decisive action would supply any deficiency of signals ; and in case they could not be seen or understood, no captain can do wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." So impressed were these noble veterans with the grandeur of the plan of attack proposed to them, that many of them shed tears in his presence.—SOUTHEY, ii. 243, 244.

await the attack. The fleet was drawn up in two lines, and so arranged on the whole, that at the interstices of each two vessels in the front line the broadside of one in the second presented itself—a combination as well imagined as can be conceived, to meet the anticipated British manœuvre of breaking the line. The front line, commanded by Villeneuve himself and Admirals Alava and Dumanoir, consisted of twenty-one line-of-battle ships: twelve under Admirals Gravina and Magon formed the second. Villeneuve's instructions to his captains were general, to obey the signals he might make during the action, and to use their utmost efforts to come to close action with their opponents. "EVERY CAPTAIN IS AT HIS POST IF HE IS IN FIRE." Such was his last order, and it was worthy of the brave nation whose armament he commanded. Collingwood, in the Royal Sovereign, led the first column of the British, followed closely by the Belleisle and Mars; Nelson himself, in the Victory, headed the second, immediately after whom came the Temeraire and the Neptune. When the lines were completely formed, and the ships bearing rapidly down on the enemy, so that it was evident an engagement was inevitable, Nelson retired to his cabin and wrote the following prayer:—"May the great God whom I worship grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory, and may no misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself individually, I commit my life to Him that made me, and may his blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To Him I resign myself and the just cause which is intrusted me to defend." Noble sentiments to be uttered by such a leader on such an occasion, and worthy to be engraven on the hearts of all who, like him, are called to the glorious duty of defending the cause of freedom and religion against the efforts of tyrannic power!<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Collingwood's Memoirs, i. 162. James, iv. 41, 49. South, ii. 246, 247. Dum. xiii. 183. Thiers, vi. 139.

Never did the ocean exhibit a grander spectacle than

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104.  
Magnificent  
aspect of the  
fleets as they  
approached  
each other.  
Oct. 21.

was presented by the British fleet bearing down on the combined squadrons, at noon on the 21st October, a few leagues to the north-west of CAPE TRAFALGAR. A long swell was setting into the Bay of Cadiz; our ships, crowding all their canvass, moved majestically before it, with light winds from the north-west. Right before them lay the mighty armament of France and Spain, the sun shining full on their close-set sails, and the vast three-deckers which it contained appearing of stupendous magnitude amidst the lesser line-of-battle ships by which they were surrounded. The British sailors, however, admired only the beauty and splendour of the spectacle, and, never doubting of success, observed to each other, "What a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spit-head!" Nelson, when he appeared on the quarterdeck, wore his admiral's frock-coat, bearing on his left breast four stars, the insignia of the different orders with which he was invested: the officers on board lamented such a display, which it was evident would expose him to certain death from the enemy's marksmen; but they knew it was in vain to remonstrate, as his resolution was taken, and he had before been heard to say, "In honour I gained them, and in honour I will die with them." He was in good spirits, but calm and sedate; not in that exhilaration with which he had entered into battle at the Nile and Copenhagen: it seemed as if he neither expected nor wished to survive the action. He asked Captain Blackwood what he should deem a victory? That officer answered he should consider it a glorious result if fourteen were taken; but Nelson replied, he should not be satisfied with less than twenty. He then made signal for the British fleet to prepare to anchor at the close of the day; and when it was given, asked the captain whether he did not think there was another wanting. After musing awhile, he fixed what it should be; and the signal appeared at the mast-head of the Victory, the last he ever made, which will be remembered as long as the British

name shall endure: "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY." It was received by a rapturous shout throughout the fleet, which already rung the knell of those of France and Spain, although their seamen were brave and experienced, and animated with the utmost enthusiasm for the combat which was approaching. "Now," said Nelson, "I can do no more; we must trust to the Great Disposer of all events, and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James iv.  
45, 47.  
South. ii.  
252, 253.  
Dum. xiii.  
185, 186.

Nelson led thirteen ships of the line in the Victory; Collingwood fourteen in the Royal Sovereign: but such was the superior sailing of the latter vessel, that she speedily distanced all her competitors, and was already near the enemy's line when the last vessels in the column were still six miles distant; and as Nelson steered two points more to the north than Collingwood, in order to cut off the enemy from retreat to Cadiz, the other column was first engaged.\* Considerably ahead of all the rest of the fleet was the Royal Sovereign, which, with all sails set, steered right into the centre of the enemy's line, and was already enveloped in fire, when the nearest vessels, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, were still nearly a mile in the rear. Collingwood's guns were all double-shotted, and by long previous practice he had brought the training of his men to such perfection, that they could fire three well-directed broadsides in three minutes and a half. On the morning of the battle he was in unusual spirits, conversing cheerfully with his officers. "Now, gentlemen," said he, "let us do something to-day which the world may talk of hereafter." "See," said Nelson, "how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action!" while Collingwood, well knowing what would be passing in the breast of his commander and friend, at the same time observed,

105.  
Order in  
which the  
English  
fleet bear  
down.

\* Nelson, in bearing down, made signal when the ships entered into action to cut away their canvass, in order that no hands might be lost in furling the sails. The loss to the fleet in a few minutes was nearly £200,000; but to this admirable piece of foresight much of the early success was owing.

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<sup>1</sup> Collingwood, i. 168, 169, 172, 173. South. ii. 257. Thiers, vi. 152. Nelson Desp. vii. 152.

106.

Battle of  
Trafalgar.  
Heroic con-  
duct of Col-  
lingwood.

"What would Nelson give to be here!"\* When Villeneuve beheld the manner in which the hostile fleet was bearing down upon his line, he remarked to those around him that all was lost. In passing the *Santa Anna*, the *Royal Sovereign* gave her a broadside and a half into her stern, tearing it down and killing and wounding four hundred of her men. Fourteen guns were disabled by that single discharge. Then wheeling rapidly round, she lay alongside of her so close, that the lower yards of the two vessels were locked together, and the muzzles of their guns literally touched each other.<sup>1</sup>

The Spanish admiral, Alava, seeing that it was the intention of the *Royal Sovereign* to engage him to leeward, had brought all his strength to the starboard side; and such was the weight of his metal that his first broadside made the *Royal Sovereign* heel two streaks out of the water. A furious combat now ensued between the two first-rates; but such was the rapidity and precision of the *Royal Sovereign's* fire, that the discharges of the Spaniard rapidly became weaker and weaker; and it was expected by the English that she would be compelled to strike before another British ship had got into close action. This disgrace, however, was prevented by the *San Justo*, *Indomptable*, *Fougueux*, and *San Leandro*, which grouped round the *Royal Sovereign* when they saw their admiral's danger, and assailed her on all sides by such a vehement cross-fire that their balls frequently struck each other above the deck of the English vessel. Regardless of his danger, Collingwood continued for twenty minutes pouring

\* The classical reader will recollect the last words of Hector in his combat with the heaven-defended Achilles:—

“Νῦν αὐτέ με μοῖρα κιχάνει.  
Μὴ μὲν ασπυδεῖ γε καὶ ἀκλειῶς ἀπολοίμην,  
Ἄλλὰ μεγα βέβας τι καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μυθέσθαι.”

*Iliad*, X, 505.

“’Tis true I perish, yet I perish great:  
Yet in a mighty deed I shall expire:  
Let future ages hear it, and admire!” POPE.

How identical is the heroic spirit in similar circumstances in all ages of the world!  
, *Ger. Lit.* xi. 118.

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his broadsides into his first-rate antagonist, and with such effect that she at length returned his fire only by a single gun, at long intervals from each other. Still, with a firmness worthy of the Spanish character, the admiral continued the contest, relying on the assistance of his friends, who now clustered round the English vessel so closely that she was entirely hid from the remainder of the fleet. The sailors in the other British vessels coming up, watched with intense anxiety the opening of the smoke, which at length showed the British flag waving unconquered in the midst of the numerous ensigns of France and Spain by which it was surrounded. Meanwhile the English vessels, as they successively came up, engaged the enemy with the utmost vigour. The Foudroyant, Pluton, and Algésiras—the last of which bore Admiral Magon's flag—and the Prince des Asturies, which bore that of the Spanish admiral Gravina, combated bravely the Belleisle, Polyphemus, Neptune, Mars, and Tonnant, which successively bore up, without any decided advantage being for long perceptible on either side.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, iv.  
49, 52. Col-  
lingw  
i. 172  
South  
257. Du  
xiii. 201,  
204. Thie  
ii. 153. N  
son Desp  
vii. 164,  
167.

Meanwhile Nelson, burning with anxiety, was crowding all sail to reach the scene of danger; and as he approached within a mile and a half's distance, single shots were fired from different vessels in the enemy's line, some of which fell short, and others went over, until at length one went through the Victory's main-topgallant-sail. A minute or two of awful silence ensued, during which the Victory continued to advance, when all at once the whole van of seven or eight ships opened a concentric fire upon her, of such severity as hardly ever before was directed at a single ship. At this perilous moment the wind, which had long been slight, died away to a mere breath, so that the Victory advanced still more slowly, ploughing majestically through the waves, unable from her position to return a single shot. Presently a ball knocked away the wheel—every man at the poop was soon killed or wounded—the spars and rigging were falling on all

107.  
Nelson next  
breaks th  
line.

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sides—while the crew, with their lighted matches in their hands, stood at their guns, long waiting, with the coolness which discipline alone can give, the signal to return the fire. At this moment, Nelson's secretary, Mr Scott, was killed by his side. "This is too warm work, Hardy," said he, "to last long," as he continued with his captain, amidst the scene of destruction, his accustomed slow walk in the centre of the vessel. He at first steered for the bows of the Santissima Trinidad, which he imagined bore the French admiral, though his flag was not yet hoisted; but as the Victory approached, the enemy closed up, and presented so compact a front that it was impossible to find an entrance, and Nelson directed Captain Hardy to steer for the opening between the Redoutable and Bucentaure.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, iv. 54, 59. Dum. xiii. 204, 206. South. ii. 259, 262. Thiers, vi. 154, 155.

108.  
And engages  
the enemy  
in close  
combat.

At one o'clock the Victory, as she passed slowly and deliberately through, poured her broadside, treble-shotted, into the Bucentaure, with such terrible effect, that above four hundred men were killed or wounded by the discharge. While listening with characteristic avidity to the deafening crash made by their shot in the French hull, the British crew were nearly suffocated by the clouds of black smoke which entered the Victory's port-holes, and Nelson and Hardy had their clothes covered by the volumes of dust which issued from the crumbling woodworks of the Bucentaure's stern. In advancing, the Victory received a dreadful broadside from the French Neptune; but, without returning a shot, passed on to the Redoutable, with which she grappled, and commenced a furious conflict, while with her other guns she engaged the Bucentaure and Santissima Trinidad. Captain Harvey, in the Temeraire, fell on board the Redoutable on the other side, so that these three ships formed as compact a tier as if they had been moored together, their heads all lying the same way. The lieutenants of the Victory upon this depressed their guns, and diminished the charge, lest the shot should pass through and injure the Temeraire;<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ann. Reg. 1805, 235, 236. James, iv. 54, 59. South. ii. 259, 262. Dum. xiii. 20, 406, 208. Thiers, vi. 155, 156. Lord Colingwood's Desp. Nelson Desp. vii. 213.

and as every shot from the Victory set the Redoutable on fire, the British sailors stood with buckets of water in their hands, and extinguished the flames in the enemy's decks as they arose, lest they should involve both ships in destruction.

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After the first discharge, the Redoutable closed her lower-deck ports, and fired from them no more, fearing that she would be boarded from the Victory. Seeing this, and thinking she had struck, Nelson twice ordered ~~the~~ firing into her to cease; but her crew still kept up a murderous warfare from the decks and tops: and to this he fell a victim. The sixty-eight pounders, indeed, on the Victory's forecastle, each loaded with five hundred musket-balls, soon cleared the Redoutable's gangways; but a destructive fire was kept up from her fore and main tops, and as Nelson was walking on the quarterdeck, he was pierced by a shot from one of the French marksmen, not more than fifteen yards distant. "They have done for me at last, Hardy," said he. "I hope not," said Hardy. "Yes," he replied; "my backbone is shot through." He was immediately carried below; but even then, such was his presence of mind, that he directed the tiller-rope, which had been cut away, to be replaced, and taking out his handkerchief, covered his face and stars, lest the crew should be discouraged by the sight. The cockpit was crowded with wounded and dying men; he insisted that the surgeon should leave him and attend to those to whom he might be useful, "For to me," said he, "you can do nothing." All that could be done was to fan him with paper, and give him lemonade to assuage his burning thirst. So great a calamity as the mortal wound of Nelson necessarily occasioned some confusion on board the Victory, and the French officers in the Redoutable, perceiving this, though without being aware of its cause, were preparing to board the Victory,<sup>1</sup> when a dreadful broadside from the Temeraire, which struck down two hundred men, at once destroyed

109.  
Nelson is  
mortally  
wounded

<sup>1</sup> South. ii.  
263, 264.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 237.  
James, iv.  
61, 63.  
Thiers, vi.  
158.



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110.

Details of  
the action  
in other  
quarters.

the boarders, and nearly disabled the *Redoutable* for the remainder of the action.

Meanwhile the battle continued with unabated fury in all directions. At a quarter past two the *Santa Anna* struck to the Royal Sovereign, after an uninterrupted combat of two hours' duration; but the loss on board of the English ship was also very severe, and she was reduced to nearly as unmanageable a state as her gigantic opponent. During the latter part of the action, Collingwood took his men off the poop, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed; but he long after remained there, fearless of death himself. At length, descending to the quarterdeck, he visited the sailors, enjoining them not to waste a shot; looking himself along the guns to see that they were properly pointed, commending particularly a negro gunner, who, while he stood beside him, fired ten times directly into the opposite port-hole of the *Santa Anna*. Captain Harvey of the *Temeraire*, when engaged in close combat with the *Redoutable*, perceived the *Fougueux* of seventy-four guns preparing to lay his ship aboard on the other side. He allowed the enemy to come within a hundred yards, and then poured in a broadside with such tremendous effect that she fell a perfect wreck aboard of the English vessel, and was soon after carried, with little resistance, by boarding. Out of seven hundred men of which her crew consisted at the commencement of the action, four hundred were killed or wounded. The other British vessels, as they successively came into action, engaged in close combat the nearest ships of the enemy; and when the arrival of the remote parts of the columns had reduced the great odds against which the leading line-of-battle ships had at first to contend, the wonted superiority of the English soon became apparent.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, iv.  
75, 80.  
South ii.  
270. Dum.  
xii. 208.  
Colling-  
wood, i. 174.  
Thiers, vi.  
166.

Before three o'clock ten ships of the line had struck. By degrees the musketeers in the tops of the *Redoutable* were picked off by the Victory's marines; and at length her whole masts and rigging fell across the *Temeraire's*

bows, which forming a bridge of communication between the two combatants, she was boarded and taken possession of by the crew of the English vessel, which thus had the glory of capturing an antagonist on the right and left. Seldom had a ship been more gallantly defended; out of six hundred and forty-three men who composed her crew, three hundred had been killed, and two hundred and twenty wounded, before she struck.\* Equally dreadful was the carnage on board the Bucentaure, which had received Nelson's first broadside. Its poop was demolished, its masts down, and its sides stove in by the English fire. "My part on board the Bucentaure is done," exclaimed Villeneuve; and he endeavoured to hail the Santissima Trinidad to be taken on board, but no voice could be heard in that awful cannonade. Shortly after, the Bucentaure struck her colours, with Villeneuve on board; and the masts of the Santissima Trinidad, which had been exposed to a tremendous raking fire from the Victory, Neptune, Leviathan, and Conqueror, fell with a fearful crash, and she was taken possession of, when wholly disabled, by a boat from the Prince.<sup>1</sup>

While victory was thus everywhere declaring for the British arms, Nelson was lying in the cockpit in the utmost anxiety to hear the details of the battle. As Captain Hardy could not for above an hour leave the deck, he repeatedly exclaimed, "Will no one bring Hardy to me? He must be killed: he is surely dead." At length he came down; they shook hands in silence. Hardy in vain strove to suppress his feelings at that painful moment. "Well, Hardy," said Nelson, "how goes the day with us?"—"Very well," replied Hardy; "ten ships have struck, but five of the van have tacked,

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111.

Victory  
everywhere  
declares  
for the  
British.

<sup>1</sup> James, iv.

75, 89.

South. ii.

270, 271.

Ann. Reg.

1805, 236,

237. Dum

xiii

170, 1

Collin

wood, i. 174.

Thiers, vi.

161, 162.

112.

Nelson's

last hours

and death

\* The marksman who had wounded Nelson did not escape. Shortly after the latter fell, the storm of balls was so severe that an old quartermaster, who had seen the man fire, and two midshipmen, alone were left on the Victory's poop. The two midshipmen kept firing, and he supplied them with cartridges. The old quartermaster pointed to the man who had fired the fatal shot, who wore a glazed hat and white frock. Both midshipmen then fired, and the man fell.—SOUTHEY, ii. 269, 270.

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and are coming down upon the Victory; but I have called two or three fresh ships round, and have no doubt we shall give them a drubbing.”—“I hope,” said Nelson, “none of our ships have struck?”—“There is no fear of that,” replied Hardy.—“I am a dead man,” then said Nelson; “I am going fast: it will be all over with me soon.” Meanwhile loud cheers from the crew of the Victory announced every successive ship of the enemy that struck, and at every renewal of the joyous sounds the countenance of the dying hero was illuminated by a passing light. Soon after Hardy went up to the deck, but returned in about fifty minutes, and taking Nelson by the hand, congratulated him, even in the arms of death, on his glorious victory; adding that fourteen or fifteen of the enemy were taken. “That’s well,” replied Nelson, “but I bargained for twenty;” and then, in a stronger voice, added, “Anchor, Hardy, anchor! Do *you* make the signal. Kiss me, Hardy,” said he. Hardy knelt down and kissed his cheek. “Now, I am satisfied!” said Nelson; “thank God, I have done my duty!” His articulation now became difficult; but he was repeatedly heard to say, “Thank God, I have done my duty!” He often prayed with the chaplain, Dr Scott, and frequently said, “Pray for me, Doctor.” He continued in great pain for three hours and a half, and expired at half-past four without a groan, leaving a name unrivalled even in the glorious annals of the English navy.<sup>1</sup>

e’s  
46,

49. South.  
ii. 267, 270.  
Thiers, vi.  
168, 189.  
Nelson  
Desp. vii.  
296.

113.

Vast mag-  
nitude of  
e vi

The combined fleet now presented the most melancholy spectacle. In every direction were to be seen only ing wrecks or dismantled hulks. The proud armament, late so splendid, was riddled, shattered, and torn by shot. Guns of distress were heard on all sides; and in every quarter the British boats were to be seen hastening to the vessels which had surrendered, to extricate their crews from their perilous situation. The *Algésiras*, with Admiral Magon on board, combated to the last with the utmost resolution; and the crew were preparing to board the

- Tonnant, when they were torn in pieces by a broadside from an English vessel on the other side. Though wounded both in the arm and thigh, and all but fainting from loss of blood, the heroic Magon still continued to animate his men, when he was struck by a grapeshot in the breast, and instantly expired. The Algésiras now surrendered: out of a crew of 640 men, 330 had been struck down.\* Ere long nineteen ships of the line had struck, with Ville-

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The comparative strength of the two fleets was as follows:—

BRITISH.		
	GUNS.	CAPTAINS.
1. Victory, . . .	100	Hardy; Admiral Nelson.
2. Royal Sovereign, . .	100	Rotheram; Admiral Collingwood.
3. Britannia, . . .	100	Bullen; Admiral, Earl of Northesk.
4. Temeraire, . . .	98	Harvey.
5. Prince, . . .	98	Grindall.
6. Neptune, . . .	98	Freemantle.
7. Dreadnought, . . .	98	Conn.
8. Tonnant, . . .	80	Tyler.
9. Belleisle, . . .	74	Hargood.
10. Revenge, . . .	74	Moorsom.
11. Mars, . . .	74	Duff.
12. Spartiate, . . .	74	Sir Francis Laforey.
13. Defiance, . . .	74	Durham.
14. Conqueror, . . .	74	Pellew.
15. Defence, . . .	74	Hope.
16. Colossus, . . .	74	Morris.
17. Leviathan, . . .	74	Bayntun.
18. Achilles, . . .	74	King.
19. Bellerophon, . . .	74	Cooke.
20. Minotaur, . . .	74	Mansfield.
21. Orion, . . .	74	Codrington.
22. Swiftsure, . . .	74	Rutherford.
23. Ajax, . . .	74	Pilford.
24. Thunderer, . . .	74	Stockham.
25. Polyphemus, . . .	64	Redmill.
26. Africa, . . .	64	Digby.
27. Agamemnon, . . .	64	Berry.
— . . . .	—	—
27 . . . .	2,148	
Frigates, 4		

FRENCH.		
	GUNS.	HOW DISPOSED OF.
1. Bucentaure, . . .	80	Taken and wrecked.
2. Formidable, . . .	80	Escaped, taken by Sir R. Strachan.
3. Neptune, . . .	80	Escaped, uninjured.
4. Indomptable, . . .	80	Taken and wrecked.
5. Algésiras, . . .	74	Taken, but got into Cadiz dismasted.
6. Pluton, . . .	74	Escaped in a sinking state.

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neuve, the commander-in-chief, and the Spanish admirals, Alava and Cisneros. One of them, the *Achille*, of seventy-four guns, had blown up after she surrendered; but eighteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the *Santissima Trinidad*, of a hundred and thirty guns, and *Santa Anna*, of a hundred and twelve, were in the hands of the British, and lay in mingled confusion alongside of their redoubtable conquerors. In this extremity Admiral

	GUNS.	HOW DISPOSED OF.
7. <i>Mont Blanc</i> , . . .	74	Escaped—taken by Sir R. Strachan.
8. <i>Intrépide</i> , . . .	74	Burnt.
9. <i>Swiftsure</i> , . . .	74	Taken, and sent to Gibraltar.
10. <i>Aigle</i> , . . .	74	Taken and wrecked.
11. <i>Scipion</i> , . . .	74	Escaped—taken by Sir R. Strachan.
12. <i>Duguay Trouin</i> , . .	74	Escaped—taken by Sir R. Strachan.
13. <i>Berwick</i> , . . .	74	Taken and wrecked.
14. <i>Argonaute</i> , . . .	74	Wrecked near Cadiz.
15. <i>Achille</i> , . . .	74	Burnt.
16. <i>Redoutable</i> , . . .	74	Taken and sunk.
17. <i>Fougueux</i> , . . .	74	Taken and wrecked.
18. <i>Héros</i> , . . .	74	Escaped to Cadiz.

## SPANISH.

19. <i>Santissima Trinidad</i> , . .	130	Taken and sunk.
20. <i>Prince des Asturies</i> , . .	112	Escaped dismasted.
21. <i>Santa Anna</i> , . . .	112	Taken, but escaped dismasted.
22. <i>Rayo</i> , . . .	100	Taken and wrecked.
23. <i>Neptuno</i> , . . .	84	Taken and wrecked.
24. <i>Argonauta</i> , . . .	84	Taken and sunk.
25. <i>Bahama</i> , . . .	74	Taken and sent to Gibraltar.
26. <i>Montañez</i> , . . .	74	Escaped to Cadiz.
27. <i>San Augustino</i> , . . .	74	Taken and burnt.
28. <i>San Ildefonso</i> , . . .	74	Taken and sent to Gibraltar.
29. <i>San Juan Nepomuceno</i> , . .	74	Taken and sent to Gibraltar.
30. <i>Monarca</i> , . . .	74	Taken and wrecked.
31. <i>San Francisco de Asis</i> , . .	74	Taken and wrecked.
32. <i>San Justo</i> , . . .	74	Escaped to Cadiz dismasted.
33. <i>San Leandro</i> , . . .	64	Escaped to Cadiz dismasted.

33 of line 2,634

Frigates 5

## ABSTRACT.

Taken at Trafalgar, . . .	19
Taken by Sir R. Strachan, . . .	4
Sunk, . . .	1
Escaped to Cadiz, wrecks, . . .	6
Escaped to Cadiz uninjured, . . .	3

Gravina, with nine ships of the line, forming the van of the combined fleet, stood away for Cadiz, after having combated with the most heroic courage the now greatly superior force of the British, directed against his surviving vessels of the wreck. He was mortally wounded, however, and soon after died. Less honourable was the conduct of Admiral Dumanoir, who, with four French ships, took to flight, pouring his broadsides, as he passed, not only into the British ships, but the Spanish prizes which had struck their colours; a circumstance which, although probably unavoidable, from the confused way in which friend and foe were intermingled, contributed not a little to augment the irritation between the two nations, which this terrible disaster could not fail to produce. The British ships were too much occupied in taking care of their numerous prizes to be able to give chase; and Dumanoir stood out to the northward and got clear off, only, however, to fall into the hands of another squadron, and ultimately reach a British harbour.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, iv. 99, 102.  
South, ii. 273, 274.  
Dum. xiii. 228, 229.  
Vict. et Conq. xvi. 188, 192.  
Thiers, vi. 168, 171.

It had been Nelson's dying instructions to Admiral Collingwood to bring the fleet to anchor; and it would have been well could this advice have been followed, as he would have probably brought his nineteen noble prizes in safety to Spithead.\* As it was, he deemed it an unnecessary precaution, or was not practicable, till nine at night, and the consequences proved eminently disastrous.† Early on the morning of the 22d a strong southerly wind arose, with squally weather, and a heavy swell set in from the Atlantic into the Bay of Cadiz. Not-

114.  
Violent tempest, and disasters to the prizes.

\* A practical proof of the benefit which might have been derived to the fleet and the prizes, from attending to Nelson's dying instructions, was afforded by the Defence. This vessel, with its prize, the San Ildefonso, anchored and rode out the gale in safety. The Swiftsure and Bahama prizes also anchored, and were saved.—JAMES, iv. 130.

† In justice to Collingwood, however, it must be stated, that many high naval authorities are of opinion that if he had anchored immediately after the battle, the consequences might have been fatal to many of the British squadron, not one of which was lost by pursuing the opposite course; and that, when the signal to anchor was given at nine at night, many vessels, including the Victory itself, were incapable of obeying.—COLLINGWOOD, i. 191, 192, *Note*.

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Oct. 23.

withstanding the utmost efforts of the British, it was found impossible to keep the prizes in tow, or make the necessary repairs on their pierced and ruined sides, to enable them to ride out the gale; and the consequence was, that most of them drifted their cables, and either foundered at sea or were wrecked on the coast. The crew of the *Algésiras* rose upon the slender British guard which had her in possession, and escaped with her into Cadiz, where the authorities had the generosity to allow the English prize crew to return on their parole to their own fleet. Encouraged by this circumstance, Captain Cosmao-Kirjulien, the senior French officer in the harbour, put to sea with five sail of the line and five frigates, the only part of the combined fleet which was in a condition for service, in the hope of recapturing some of the dismasted hulls which were drifting about the coast. The British instantly formed in line of battle, covering such of the prizes as they still had in tow, and the French did not approach within gunshot; but their frigates succeeded in getting hold of the *Santa Anna* and Spanish *Neptune*, which drifted into their hands, and brought them into Cadiz. Many melancholy catastrophes happened during the storm. Among the rest, the *Indomptable* was wrecked on the coast, having on board, besides her own, the survivors of the *Bucentaure's* crew, and above a thousand persons perished. Some of the prizes foundered in the gale; others were sunk by the British. Four only reached Gibraltar in safety. But the British took Admirals Villeneuve, Alava, and Cisneros, besides twenty thousand prisoners, including the land forces on board,\* and the

\* This number may appear large, and the *whole loss*, including prisoners, is stated by M. Thiers to have been only 7000 men.—THIERS, vii. 172. This number, however, is exclusive of those who fell into the hands of the victors, but escaped during the storm. The English took nineteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the *Santissima Trinidad* and *Santa Anna*. In three of the seventy-fours taken, the prisoners were 800 each.—*Nelson Desp.* vii. 226. Applying this to the whole nineteen ships taken, the crews of these ships would be 15,200, and as there were two first-rates taken, and 4000 troops on board, under General Contarmin—[COLLINGWOOD to MOLLARDEN, 24th Oct. 1805; *Nelson Desp.* vii.

combined fleet was almost totally annihilated, while their own loss was only sixteen hundred and ninety men killed and wounded. "Six-and-twenty ships of the line," says General Mathieu Dumas, "at Trafalgar or Cape Ortegal," were compelled to strike their colours. It may truly be said that there were left only a few remnants of the fleet which two months before had filled England with alarm."<sup>1</sup> †

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
230, 239.  
James, iv.  
123, 137.  
Coll. i. 183,  
184. Thier:  
vi. 180, 181

An interchange of courteous deeds took place between the British fleet and the Spaniards at Cadiz. The magnitude of the disaster had extinguished all feelings of irritation, and brought the people into that state of sad exaltation which is nearly allied to generous emotion. Admiral Collingwood made an offer to send all the wounded Spaniards ashore; a proposal which excited the deepest gratitude in that high-spirited people, and was at the same time a seasonable relief to the British squadron, already sufficiently occupied with its own wounded, and the numerous prizes in its hands. In return, the Marquis of Solano, governor of Cadiz, sent to offer the English the use of the hospitals for their wounded, pledging the Spanish honour that they should be carefully attended to. When the storm after the action drove some of the prizes upon the coast, they declared that the English who were thus thrown into their hands should not be considered as prisoners of war; and the Spanish soldiers gave up their own beds to their shipwrecked enemies.<sup>2</sup> Already was to be seen the commencement of that heartfelt alliance which was so soon destined to take place between these generous enemies;

115.  
Courteous  
intercourse  
with the  
Spaniards  
at Cadiz.

<sup>2</sup> Colling-  
wood, i.  
185, 190.  
South, ii.  
275, 276.

217]—the number of persons on board the prizes could not be less than 20,000. Lord Collingwood accordingly says, "In the captured ships we took 20,000 prisoners, including the troops."—LORD COLLINGWOOD to J. E. BLACKETT, Esq., 2d Nov. 1805; *Nelson Desp.* vii. 235.

\* The subsequent action with Sir R. Strachan.

† In the midst of this scene of ruin, Admiral Collingwood did not neglect the duty which he owed to the Supreme Disposer of all events. On the day after the battle, the following general order was issued to the fleet:—"The Almighty God, whose arm is strength, having of his great mercy been pleased



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and it was amidst the tempests of Trafalgar that the feelings were produced which brought them to stand side by side at Vitoria and Toulouse.

116.  
Mingled joy  
and grief in  
Britain on  
the occasion.

No words can describe the mingled feelings of joy and grief, of exultation and melancholy, which pervaded the British empire upon the news being received of the battle of Trafalgar. The greatest naval victory recorded in the annals of the world had been gained by their arms. The dangers of invasion, the menaces of Napoleon, were at an end. Secure in their sea-girt isle, they could now behold without alarm the marshalled forces of Europe arrayed in hostility against them. In a single moment, from the result of one engagement, they had passed from a state of anxious solicitude to one of independence and security. Inestimable as these blessings were, they yet seemed an inadequate compensation for the life of the hero by whom they had been gained. The feelings of grief were even more powerful than those of gratitude; and England, with the fleets of her antagonist sunk in the deep, seemed less secure than when, in presence of her yet unscathed enemies, she was protected by the hero whose flaming sword turned every way.

117.  
Honours  
granted to  
the family

Need it be added that all the honours which a grateful country could bestow were heaped upon the memory of Lord Nelson? His brother was made an earl, with a grant of £6000 a-year; £10,000 was voted to each of his sisters, and £100,000 for the purchase of an estate. A public funeral was decreed, and a monument by the nation in the place of his interment, St Paul's cathedral. The principal cities of the empire vied with each other

to crown the exertions of his majesty's fleet with success, in giving them a complete victory over their enemies on the 21st of this month, and that all praise and thanksgiving may be offered up to the throne of grace for the great benefit to our country and to mankind, I have thought proper that a day should be appointed for a general humiliation before God, and thanksgiving for his merciful goodness, imploring forgiveness of sins, a continuation of his divine mercy, and his constant aid to us in defence of our country, liberties, and laws, without which the utmost efforts of man are naught."—COLLINGWOOD, i. 179.

in erecting monuments and statues to his memory. Admiral Collingwood was made a baron, and received a pension of £2000 a-year; a grant which first raised that noble officer from the state of comparative dependence which is so often the lot of upright integrity. The remains of Nelson were consigned to the grave amidst all the pomp of funeral obsequies, in St Paul's, followed by a countless multitude of sorrowing spectators. The leaden coffin in which he was brought home was cut in pieces and distributed as relics through the fleet; and when at his interment his flag was about to be lowered into the grave, the sailors who assisted at the ceremony with one accord rent it in pieces, that each might preserve a fragment as long as he lived. Unbounded was the public grief at his untimely end. "Yet," in the words of his eloquent biographer, "he cannot be said to have fallen prematurely whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr; the most awful, that of the martyred patriot; the most splendid, that of the hero in the hour of victory; and if the chariot and horses of fire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory."<sup>1</sup>

Lord Nelson was the greatest naval officer of this or any other nation whose achievements have been recorded in history. The energies of an ardent and impetuous mind were in him wholly absorbed in patriotic feeling. Duty to his God, his King, and country, constituted the simple objects to which unrivalled powers and consummate genius were directed. Like all other great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make his officers thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his general plan of operations, but intrusted them with full discretionary powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the capacity for skilful combination which

<sup>1</sup> South. ii.  
276, 280.  
Coll. i. 214.

118.  
Character of  
that naval  
hero.

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1805.

brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action. Simple in his desires, enthusiastic in his character, he was alike superior to the love of wealth, the bane of inferior, and envy of others, the frailty of ambitious minds. Devotion to his country was in him blended with a constant sense of religious duty; and amidst all the license of arms he was distinguished from the first by an early and manly piety. In later years, when his achievements had marked him out as the great defender of Christianity, he considered himself as an instrument in the hand of Providence to combat the infidel spirit of the Revolution, and commenced his despatch on the battle of the Nile by ascribing the whole to Almighty God. Too great to be fettered by rules, too original to condescend to imitation, he consulted his own inspiration only in all his mighty deeds, and in every instance left the stamp of native genius on the duties, whether elevated or humble, which he performed. His whole career, from his first entrance into the navy to the battle of Trafalgar, exhibited a pattern of every manly virtue. Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most successful, because the most profound and intrepid, of leaders. If a veil could be drawn over the deeds perpetrated at Naples, his public character might be deemed without a fault: but no human being was ever yet perfect; and that alloy which has descended to all from our first parents, concealed in him by the intensity of patriotic devotion, was at length revealed by the fascination of female wickedness.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dupin's  
Voyages, iv  
66. Bretton,  
iii. 463.

The battle of Trafalgar was soon followed by another victory, which at any other period would have excited the most lively satisfaction, but was hardly noticed in the

\* The ultimate fate of the celebrated and bewitching Lady Hamilton, whose influence led Nelson into the cruel executions at Naples, which forms the only blot on his public character, was a remarkable instance of moral retribution. She died in France, many years afterwards, alone and unbefriended, in want of the common necessities of life.

CHAP.  
XXXIX.180.  
119.  
Victory  
of Sir R  
Strachan

transports consequent on that stupendous event. Admiral Dumanoir, who had escaped from the disaster at Cadiz, and crossed the Bay of Biscay in hopes of getting either into Rochefort or Brest harbours, fell in, on the 2d November, with the frigates of Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, who immediately made signal that a strange fleet was in sight. The British admiral instantly gave chase, which was continued two days and nights, during which the light of the moon rendered the enemy visible; until at length, at noon on the 4th November, the two squadrons were so near that Dumanoir was obliged to lie to, and receive battle. The English fleet at first consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; but during the chase one of the former was driven away by stress of weather, and in the action which followed four line-of-battle ships and four frigates alone were engaged. The French had four sail of the line only, and some of their guns were dismounted from the effects of the battle of Trafalgar. The battle began at noon, by each of the British line-of-battle ships engaging one of the enemy, and lasted with great vigour for four hours; when it terminated in the capture of every one of the French ships, but not till they were almost totally dismasted, and had sustained a loss of seven hundred and thirty killed and wounded. Crippled and dispirited as they were, it was not to be expected that the four French ships could have withstood the shock of four fresh English line-of-battle ships, supported by four frigates, who took an important part in the action; and the heavy loss which they sustained proves that they had not surrendered till the last extremity. Sir Richard Strachan brought his four prizes into harbour, which somewhat consoled the English for the absence of so many of those taken at Trafalgar; and their satisfaction was increased by the British loss being only twenty-four killed and a hundred and eleven wounded.<sup>1</sup>

Nov. 4.

It is observed by Mr Hume, that actions at sea are seldom, if ever, so decisive as those at land—a remark

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1805.  
120.  
Reflections  
on the deci-  
sive nature  
of these  
successes.

suggested by the repeated indecisive actions between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II., but which affords a striking proof of the danger of generalising from too limited a collection of facts. Had he extended his retrospect further, he would have observed that the most decisive and important of all actions recorded in history have been fought at sea. The battle of Salamis rolled back from Greece the tide of Persian invasion; that of Actium gave a master to the Roman world; that of Lepanto arrested for ever the dangers of Mahometan invasion in the south of Europe; and that of la Hogue checked for nearly a century the maritime efforts of the house of Bourbon. As important in its consequences as the greatest of these achievements, the battle of Trafalgar not only at once secured the independence of England, and destroyed all Napoleon's hopes of maritime greatness, but annihilated for half a century the navies of France and Spain. The losses of the Moscow campaign were repaired in six months; even the terrible overthrow of Leipsic was almost forgotten in the host which was marshaled round the imperial eagles at Waterloo. But from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered; and during the remainder of the war, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Napoleon, no considerable fleet, with the tricolor flag, was ever seen at sea. Error frequently attends hasty or partial induction; but from a sufficiently broad and extensive view of human affairs, conclusions of general and lasting certainty may be formed.

121.  
Comparison  
of victories  
at land and  
sea.  
1 Napoleon,  
ii. 124.

It is stated by Napoleon that a fleet of thirty ships of the line, with guns and complement of men complete, may be considered as corresponding at sea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men at land.<sup>1</sup> Judging by this standard, the battle of Trafalgar, which rendered useless fully twenty-five ships of the line and made prize of twenty, must be considered as equivalent to a victory where ninety thousand men out of one hundred

and twenty thousand were destroyed. The annals of war exhibit no instance of such a success with land forces; it is double what even the bulletins claimed for Napoleon at Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Even at Waterloo, where alone a blow approaching to that inflicted at Trafalgar was struck, the loss of the French has never been estimated at above forty thousand men. The loss by which that decisive victory was purchased,

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XXXIX.  
1805.

the side of the British alone, was nearly nine thousand; on that of the Allies, above twenty thousand: whereas the total loss of the English at Trafalgar was only sixteen hundred and ninety men; a smaller number than perished in many inconsiderable actions attended with little or no result in Spain.\* This affords a striking instance how comparatively bloodless, when viewed in relation to the importance of the successes achieved, are victories at sea: and although the losses of the defeated party are much more severe, yet even they bear no sort of proportion to the enormous effusion of blood in land fights. Lord Collingwood estimates the killed and wounded at Trafalgar, where the French navy was in a manner annihilated, "at several thousands:" while the Moscow campaign, where four hundred thousand men perished, was found insufficient to beat down the military power of Napoleon.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Coll. i.  
183, 184.

The battle of Trafalgar affords a decisive proof that it is owing to no peculiar manœuvre, ill-understood by others, of breaking the line, that the extraordinary successes of the English at sea are owing, but that the superior prowess and naval skill of their sailors are alone the cause of their triumphs. In truth, the operation of breaking the line, whether at sea or land, is an extremely critical and hazardous one, and never will be attempted,

122.  
Reflections  
on the man  
œuvre of  
breaking  
the line.

\* The loss at Talavera, out of 19,000 British, was 5000: that at Albuera, 4500 out of 7500; and out of 16,000 who formed the storming columns at Badajoz, nearly 4000 lay on the breaches and in the ditches of that terrible fortress.

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or if attempted, succeed, but by the party conscious of and possessing greater courage and resources in danger than its opponent. From its superior sailing, and the lightness of the wind, the Royal Sovereign was in action at Trafalgar when the rear of the column was still six miles distant, and fully a quarter of an hour before another British ship fired a shot: and the whole weight of the conflict, for the same reason, fell upon the twelve or fourteen British ships which first got into action, by whom six-sevenths of the loss was sustained.\* So far from the French and Spanish fleets being doubled upon and assailed by a superior force, the British fleet itself was thus situated; and the victory was in fact gained by half its force, before the remainder got into action. The arrival of this remainder, indeed, gave those first engaged a decisive advantage, and enabled the ships which hitherto had borne up against such desperate odds to overwhelm in their turn their dispirited, and now outnumbered, opponents; but had they not been, from the first, superior, and greatly superior, to their antagonists, they must have been taken prisoners in the outset of the fray, and lain useless logs alongside of their captors when the rear of the columns was getting into action. Would any but an enemy of superior courage have ventured to plunge, like Collingwood and Nelson, into the centre of their opponent's fleet, and, unsupported, single out the hostile admiral for attack, when surrounded by his own vessels? What would have been the fate of Alava and Villeneuve, of the Santa Anna and the Bucentaure, if they had thus engaged Collingwood and Nelson, the Royal Sovereign and the Victory, at the muzzle of their guns, in the middle of the English fleet, while three or four other hostile line-of-battle ships were pouring in their shot on all sides? Would they not have been compelled to strike their colours in ten minutes, before

\* "The total loss was 1690, of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of the twenty-seven vessels of the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns."—JAMES, iv. 111.

the tardy succeeding vessels could come up to their support?

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123.

Which is  
safe only to  
the superior

<sup>a</sup>  
p

In breaking the line, in short, whether at sea or land, the head of the column must necessarily be engaged with a vastly superior force before the rear and centre can get up to its support; and if, from accidental causes, their arrival, as at Trafalgar, is long delayed, it may happen that this contest against desperate odds may continue a very long time—quite long enough to prove fatal to an ordinary assailant. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that Nelson, Duncan, and Rodney did wrong, and ran unnecessary hazard, by breaking the line at Trafalgar, Camperdown, and Martinique—quite the reverse; they did perfectly right: but that it is the manœuvre suited only to the braver and more skilful party, and never can prove successful except in the hands of the power possessing the superiority in courage and prowess, though not in numbers. It will succeed when the head of the column can sustain itself against double or treble its own force until the centre and rear get up, but in no other circumstances. The case is precisely the same at land: the party breaking the line there runs the greatest risk of being overpowered, if not able to bear up against superior forces, before support arrive from the rear; and an antagonist who can trust his troops in line to resist the head of the column, will soon obtain a decisive advantage by assailing the attacking column on both flanks. This was what the Duke of Wellington felt he could do, and constantly did, with British troops; and, accordingly, Jomini tells us that the system of attacking in columns and breaking the line never succeeded against the close and murderous fire of the English infantry. It was the same with the Russians. Napoleon's system of bringing an overwhelming force against one point, and there breaking the line, answered perfectly, as long as he was engaged with the Austrians, who laid down their arms or retired the moment they saw an enemy on their flank; but when



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he applied it to the Russians, he soon found the attacking column fiercely assailed on all sides by the troops among whom it had penetrated; and the surrender of Vandamme, with seven thousand men, in the mountains of Bohemia, in 1813, taught him that it is a very different thing to get into the rear of an army drawn from the north and one from the south of Europe.

124.  
And on the  
introduction  
of steam in-

It is frequently said by the French writers, that at this period the fate of Europe depended upon chance, and that, if the parties to whom Napoleon remitted to report on Mr Fulton's proposal for the navigation of vessels by steam had given a different opinion from what they did, and that invention had been adopted at Boulogne, there can be no doubt that the invasion might have been successfully accomplished. There appears no solid ground for this opinion. Great discoveries, destined, like those of gunpowder, printing, and steam, in the end to change the face of the world, never come to maturity but by slow degrees. The sublimest genius, the most overwhelming power, is not able so far to outstrip the march of time, as to give to one generation the general use of a discovery destined by nature for another. Even if it were otherwise, and steam navigation could in a few years have been brought to perfection, or at least into common application, in the French navy, unquestionably the English would not have been idle; the mighty engine would have yielded its powers in a corresponding degree to both sides, and their relative situations would have remained the same as before. If steamers would have enabled the flotilla, under all winds, to issue from Boulogne harbour, and attempt the passage of the Channel, they would have enabled the English blockading squadrons at all seasons to maintain their station, and put it in their power to have sent in fire-ships, which would have carried conflagration and ruin into the crowded harbour. Propelled by this powerful force, one armed steam-ship, at dead of night, would have burst open the chains at the entrance of the

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1805.

basin, while succeeding ones, in rapid succession, carried flames and explosion into its forest of shipping. Gunpowder did not diminish the superiority of the English at sea. The victory of Nelson at Trafalgar was not less decisive than that of Edward III. at Sluys. In the altered species of warfare to which steam navigation would unquestionably have given rise, success in the end would have remained with the people of the greater resources and resolution. The land of coal and of iron had no reason to dread a contest carried on by the powers of fire. The last gun, the last guinea, the last steam engine, would carry the day. The countrymen of Collingwood, who ventured unsupported into the midst of the combined fleet, need never fear the mechanical force which augments the facility of getting into close action, and increases the rapidity with which the different vessels of the squadron can be brought together to the decisive point.

But it is impossible to form an equally clear opinion as to the consequences which would have followed if Napoleon, with a hundred and thirty thousand men, had succeeded in effecting a landing on the coast of Kent. He has told us that he would have advanced direct to London, of which he calculated upon getting possession in four days; and there he would instantly have proclaimed parliamentary reform, a low suffrage for the new voters, the downfall of the oligarchy, the confiscation of the property of the church, a vast reduction of taxation, an equitable adjustment of the national debt, and all the other objects which the revolutionary party in this country have ever had at heart, and the prospect of obtaining only one of which, five-and-twenty years afterwards, produced so extraordinary a change in the dominant multitude of the English people. It was Napoleon's constant affirmation, that the majority in number of the English nation was opposed to the war, which was maintained solely by the influence and for the purposes of the oligarchy; and that, if he could once have roused the multitude against their

125.  
What if Napoleon had succeeded in effecting a landing? His design if he had done so.

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rule, Great Britain would speedily have become so divided as to be no longer capable of resisting the power of France. "I would not," said he, "have attempted to subject England to France: I could not have united two nations so dissimilar. If I had succeeded in my project, I would have abolished the monarchy, and established a republic instead of the oligarchy by which you are governed. I would have separated Ireland from England, and *left them to themselves, after having sown the seeds of republicanism in their morale*. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would *have introduced a great reform*."<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> O'Meara,  
i. 350, 469.

126.  
p  
habilities of

That the French Emperor would have been worsted in his attempt, if England had remained true to herself, can be doubtful to no one who recollects that the British troops defeated the French in every encounter, without exception, from Vimeira to Waterloo, and that Napoleon himself said to Lord Whitworth there were a hundred chances to one against his success. But would she have remained true to herself under the temptation to swerve produced by such means? This is a point upon which there is no Briton who would have entertained a doubt

\* "I would have hurried over my flotilla," said Napoleon, "with two hundred thousand men," [it was only one hundred and thirty-eight thousand,] "landed as near Chatham as possible, and proceeded direct to London, where I calculated upon arriving in four days from the time of my landing. I would have proclaimed a republic, the abolition of the nobility and House of Peers, the distribution among my partisans of the property of such of the latter as opposed me; liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, *but would have introduced a great reform*. I would have published a proclamation, declaring that we came, as friends to the English, and to free the nation from a corrupt and flagitious aristocracy, and restore a popular form of government, a democracy; all which would have been confirmed by the conduct of my army, as I would not have allowed the slightest outrage to be committed by my troops. I think that, between my promises and what I would actually have effected, I should have had the support of a great many. In a large city like London, where there are so many canaille and so many disaffected, I should have been joined by a formidable body; and I would at the same time have excited an insurrection in Ireland. You would never have burned your capital; you are too rich and fond of money. How often have the Parisians sworn to bury themselves under the ruins of their capital rather than suffer it to fall into the hands of the enemies of France, and yet it has twice been taken! The hope of a

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till within these few years. But the manner in which the public mind has reeled from the application of inferior stimulants since 1830, and the strong partiality to French alliance which grew up when popular passion was powerfully excited by that change, has now suggested the painful doubt whether Napoleon did not know us better than we knew ourselves, and whether we could have resisted those methods of seduction which had proved fatal to the patriotism of so many other people. The spirit of the nation, indeed, then ran high against Gallic invasion; unanimity unprecedented existed among the British people: but strong as that feeling was, it is now doubtful whether it would not have been supplanted, in a large portion of the nation at least, by a still stronger, and whether the sudden offer of all the glittering objects of democratic ambition would not have shaken the patriotism of a considerable portion of the British, as it unquestionably would of the great bulk of the Irish people.

No man can say how he would keep his senses under the application of some extraordinary and hitherto unknown stimulant, as if he were at once elevated to a throne, or saw the mountains fall around him, or the earth

127.  
Their prob-  
able result.

change for the better, and a division of property, would have operated wonderfully amongst the canaille, especially that of London. The canaille of all nations are nearly alike. I would have made such promises as would have had a great effect. I would have abolished flogging in the army, and promised your seamen everything, which would have made a great impression on their minds. The proclamation that we came as friends to relieve the English from an obnoxious and despotic aristocracy, whose object was to keep the nation eternally at war, in order to enrich themselves and their families through the blood of the people; together with the proclaiming of a republic, the abolition of the monarchical form of government and the nobility, the declaration of the forfeiture of such of the latter as should resist, and the division of their possessions amongst the partisans of the revolution, with a general equalisation of property, would have gained me the support of the canaille, and of all the idle, profligate, and disaffected, in the kingdom." Thus far the Emperor Napoleon; to which it may be added, that amidst the divisions and democratic transports consequent on these prodigious innovations, he would quietly have laid his grasp on Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and smiled at his revolutionary allies on this side of the Channel when they called on him to redeem his pledges, further than spoliating some of the higher orders; and if they proved refractory, have marched a file of grenadiers into the chapel of St Stephen.—See O'MEARA, i. 349, 352.

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suddenly open beneath his feet. Even the warmest friend to his country will probably hesitate before he pronounces upon the stability of the English mind, under the influence of the prodigious excitement likely to have arisen from the promulgation of the political innovations which Napoleon had prepared for her seduction. If he is wise, he will rejoice that, in the providence of God, his country was saved the trial, and acknowledge with gratitude the inestimable obligations which she owes to the illustrious men whose valour averted a danger under which her courage indeed would never have sunk, but to which her wisdom might possibly have proved unequal. The true crisis of the war occurred at this period. It was the arm of Nelson which delivered his country from her real danger. Thenceforth the citadel of her strength was beyond the reach of attack. At Waterloo she fought for victory ; at Trafalgar for existence.

## CHAPTER XL.

## CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE, which had long taken an active part in the European confederacy, and was now destined to stand in the front rank of the fight of nations, is a power which has slowly risen to greatness, without the aid of any extraordinary ability either in its sovereigns or its cabinet, by a succession of fortunate alliances on the part of its princes, and a constant adherence to prudent counsels on that of its government. The dukes of the house of Hapsburg, in former times, possessed merely the inconsiderable provinces of Upper and Lower Austria ; they were surrounded by the more powerful kingdoms of Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia ; and so far from it being probable that they would ever rise to the rank of a first-rate power, nothing presaged that they would be able to maintain their independence amidst those formidable potentates by whom they were environed. Austria has seldom been distinguished by extraordinary talent, either in her statesmen or generals, until the glorious eras of Maria Theresa and the French Revolution. She was remarkable chiefly for the prudence of her counsels and the good fortune of her enterprises ; and her institutions were not such as to call forth talent in the middle or lower classes of the state. Nevertheless she has steadily advanced in population, wealth, and political importance, and now stood forth as a first-rate power, alike formidable to the independence of the adjoining states, and valuable

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1805.

1.  
Steady progress of the  
Austrian  
empire.

CHAP. as a bulwark against the encroachments of French usur-  
 XL. pation or Russian ambition.

1805.

if-  
 ferent races  
 and nations  
 which com-  
 pose the  
 monarchy.

Unlike France or England, the Austrian monarchy has owed nothing to the homogeneous descent of its inhabitants. No one dominant race has in its provinces acquired a decided preponderance over the others, or communicated to the whole the impress of its character and the lustre of its name. Though the appellation of Austria has, from Vienna being the residence of its sovereigns, been generally applied to the whole empire, yet the inhabitants of the inconsiderable provinces which properly bear that name have neither conquered by force of arms, like the Romans, nor swayed by intellectual superiority, like the Greeks, the more distant, but larger and more powerful provinces of the empire. The state has grown up to greatness, as the monarchy has added provinces to its crown, by the voluntary marriage of their sovereigns,\* not the forced submission or gradual amalgamation of their inhabitants. Styria was acquired by legacy from Othokar VI. to Leopold I., hereditary archduke of Austria in 1192; Carniola by purchase, by Leopold II. in 1199. The crown of Bohemia was won for the dukes of Austria by marriage in 1527; that of Hungary, which became the brightest jewel in their diadem, by the same means at the same period; the duchy of the Tyrol, which was the inheritance of the heiress of the Tyrol, who married an archduke of the same fortunate house; the Flemish provinces, with Lorraine and Alsace, which became united to the Austrian crown by the marriage of Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold, to Maximilian, archduke of Austria, grandfather of Charles V.—formed fully three-fourths of the magnificent Austrian dominions at this time. Gallicia, acquired by the iniquitous partition of Poland in 1772 and 1794, and Lombardy and Venice, which fell to their lot in the division of the spoils of conquest in 1797 and 1815, are the only considerable provinces of the

\* "*Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube.*"

monarchy which have been won by force of arms. They do not constitute a fourth part of its extent or population; and contribute a still less proportion to its warlike or financial resources. The strength of the monarchy has been the result of marriage, and of marriage alone.

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1805.

When the extraordinary embarrassment is considered which has been experienced by Great Britain in all periods of its history, from the alien blood and hostile passions of Ireland—one only foreign portion of an otherwise compact and homogeneous empire—it becomes an interesting subject of inquiry, how the Austrian government has succeeded, through so many ages, in holding together the various provinces and multifarious races which compose its wide-spread empire. The fact of its being a military monarchy, maintained by the sword, and the Emperor's ruling, ostensibly at least, by his own will, will not explain the difficulty: for the sword itself is held by men of many races, provinces, and former separate dominions; many of whom were animated, at one period at least, by the fiercest religious passions; who have more than once revolted against the central government; and all of whom retain to this hour the strongest attachment to their national traditions. In reality, also, the government of Austria is not a despotism but an aristocracy, in which the practical direction of affairs is vested in a body of nobles, hardly three hundred in number, drawn from all the provinces of its vast dominions. How, then, has it happened, that while England, with its free government and representative institutions, has experienced such difficulty in restraining the national and religious passions of a single neighbouring island, Austria, with none of these advantages, has succeeded in stilling the rivalry of so many independent states, and attaching such ancient, powerful, and various nations in willing subjection to a foreign central government?

3.  
Remarkable  
manner in  
which the  
Austrians  
have held to-  
gether their  
empire.

This circumstance will appear still more extraordinary when the striking vicissitudes of fortune which the Im-



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1805.

4.

Great  
national  
reverses  
which this  
united spirit  
has enabled  
Austria to  
withstand.

perial dominions have undergone at various times are considered, and the numerous opportunities which successful external hostility or internal revolt have afforded to dismember and overturn the empire. No state in modern times has sustained such terrible reverses : none has been so frequently pierced to the heart by wounds apparently mortal : none has been so frequently driven to rest, as a last resource, on the patriotic spirit of its distant provinces. The dreadful insurrection of the Hungarian peasants in the sixteenth century, combined the horrors of the Jacquerie in France with the brutal atrocities of the insurrection of the boors in Germany. In the very infancy of its fortunes, the revolt of the Hussites in Bohemia brought into the vitals of the state the terrible scourge of religious warfare ; nor was it soon appeased, for so strong was the party of the Protestants shortly after the Reformation, that nearly a half of the inhabitants of the Hereditary States were at one period numbered among the followers of Luther.<sup>1</sup> In the close of the seventeenth century, Vienna was besieged by three hundred thousand Turks, and owed its salvation only to the heroism of John Sobieski and the lances of the Poles. Fifty years afterwards, the same capital fell into the hands of the victorious French and Bavarians, and the unconquerable Maria Theresa sought refuge and found support only in the fidelity of the Hungarian nobility. In 1757, the steeples of Vienna were descried by the outposts of the Great Frederick from the plain of the March-field ; in 1797, they were seen by the videttes of Napoleon from the heights of the Simmering. Twice during the revolutionary war the Austrian capital was taken by the French forces ; the defeats the Imperial arms sustained during that terrible contest were so frequent as almost to defy enumeration. Yet from all these reverses the state in the end has emerged, not only unscathed, but victorious ; and in the fidelity of her subjects, and the persevering character of her government, Austria, during four

<sup>1</sup> Ranke's  
History of  
the Popes,  
ii. 137.

centuries, has found the means of rising superior to all the storms of fortune, and steadily advancing, until she has attained the very first rank among the powers of Europe.

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What is, in an especial manner, worthy of notice—the secret of this strong principle of vitality and unbroken progress is to be found in the patriotic spirit of the Austrian people, and the strength of the bonds which unite the inhabitants of so many different, and once independent, provinces and kingdoms, to the Imperial government. It was in the attachment of the Hungarians that Maria Theresa found the means of defeating the formidable inroad of the French and Bavarians; the steadiness of the Bohemians enabled Marshal Daun to repel the invasion of the Prussians, when the standards of the Great Frederick were seen from the steeples of Vienna. But for the gallant spirit of the Hungarians, Austria would have sunk in 1805 under the shock of Austerlitz; the devoted loyalty of the Tyrolese partly rescued it from destruction after the disaster of Wagram in 1809. No country contains so great a variety of races, nations, and religions; none has found in them all such steady support in such terrible reverses.

5.  
Which were  
all overcome  
by the steady  
attachment  
of the pro-  
vinces.

This observation affords ample subject for serious reflection to the inhabitants of the British empire. Though vexed with incomparably less diversity of race or national rivalry, and enjoying a constitution which boasts, in a peculiar manner, the advantage of communicating to government the wishes of distant dependencies, and the impress of public opinion, England could hardly hope, if London and Portsmouth were taken by the victorious arms of the French or Russians, to find the means of reinstating its affairs, and regaining the empire of the waves, in the loyalty of the Irish Catholics, the fidelity of the Canadian *habitans*, the attachment of the West Indian planters, or the steadiness of the East Indian rajahs. It is in vain to shut our eyes to these considerations: they are founded on facts of such long continu-

6.  
Reflections  
on the oppo-  
site sta-

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ance, and so momentous in their consequences, as to point evidently to some general law of nature, which will ere long force itself upon the observation of mankind. If they are at variance with our preconceived ideas, the candid inquirer after truth will rather suspect that these ideas are in part erroneous, than that results so opposite to the inferences from them should so long have taken place on so great a scale. And the conclusion which posterity will probably deduce from them is, that the inherent corruption of human nature is felt even more severely in popular than in aristocratic communities; that the government of the many by the many is often more selfish than that of the many by the few; that the tenacity to interest when one people rules another, is generally greater than when one sovereign governs both; and that the effect of free institutions is rather to communicate a mighty impulse to human exertion, than to eradicate the seeds of evil in the multitude who constitute the ruling power.

7.  
Superficial  
extent, po-  
pulation,  
and revenue  
of the Aus-  
trian em-  
pire.

Austria contains a surface of 33,802 square marine leagues, or above 300,000 square miles, being twice and a half the superficies of the British islands, which embrace 122,000. It is thinly peopled as a whole, as appears from the census of 1834, by 35,047,533 inhabitants, and at the period of the French invasion in 1805, it could only boast of 27,500,000. Its revenue now amounts to 150,000,000 florins, or 315,000,000 francs, (£12,600,000,) a sum, however, at least equivalent, if the difference in the value of money and in habit of living is considered, to eighteen millions sterling of British money. Before the commencement of the Revolutionary war, the revenues of Austria, which in 1770 amounted to 90,000,000 florins, (£7,500,000,) had risen, by the acquisitions made in Poland and elsewhere, to 106,000,000, or .

Tchobor-  
ski, Finan-  
ces d'Autri-  
che, i. 7, 13.  
Bign. ii.  
270, 273.

During the war, its revenue was increased by the imposition of several new taxes;<sup>1</sup> and it sustained no diminution by the peace of Campo Formio, the Venetian

States proving more than a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries.\*

At the peace of Lunéville, the income of government amounted to 115,000,000 florins, or £9,500,000 sterling — a sum equal, at that time, to at least fifteen millions sterling in England; and with this revenue, which was the clear receipt of the treasury, independent of the expense of collection and several provincial charges, they were able to maintain an army of 300,000 men, including 50,000 magnificent cavalry. Like most of the other European states, Austria had been compelled, during the difficulties of former years, to have recourse to a paper currency; and the bank of Vienna, established by Maria Theresa in 1762, was the organ by which this was effected. It was not, however, a paper circulation convertible at pleasure into gold, but a system of assignats, possessing a forced legal currency; and government, in 1797, passed a regulation prohibiting any person from demanding exchange in coin for more than twenty-five florins, or two

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8.

Situation  
of Austria.  
Statistical  
s r  
garding  
monarchy.

\* The population and superficial area of the several provinces of the Austrian empire stood thus, according to the census of 1834:—

	Superficial Area. sq. geog. leagues.	Population.	Population per square league.
Hungary, .	11,620	11,404,330	878
Gallicia, .	4,304	4,395,339	1,087
Bohemia, .	2,649	4,001,852	1,532
Lombardy, .	1,017	2,495,929	2,478
Moravia and Silesia,	1,339	2,110,141	1,582
Venetian provinces,	2,132	2,079,588	979
Transylvania,	3,086	1,963,435	681
Austria Lower,	1,970	1,343,652	1,150
Austria Upper,		846,982	
Styria, .	1,114	923,882	793
Tyrol, .	1,435	827,635	
Carinthia, Carniola,	1,445	1,553,527	
Dalmatia, and Littoral,			
Military Frontier, .	1,695	1,101,281	552
	33,802	35,047,573	

Of this population the military, on full or half pay, amount to 518,950—leaving a civil population of 34,528,583; the annual increase is 311,612, or somewhat more than in the British Islands.—See *Census of 1834 for Austria*; MALTE BRUN, v. 726, 737; and vii. 282, 283; and vi. 592, 752; and TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 7.

CHAP. pounds sterling. During the course of the war, silver  
 XL. and gold almost entirely disappeared from circulation,  
 1805. and paper billets for two or three shillings assumed their  
 place. A considerable portion of the smaller currency  
 was in brass, which was issued at double its intrinsic value;  
 and besides this, there were obligations of various sorts  
 of the government to foreign provinces, bankers, and states.  
 The debt in all was 200,000,000 florins (£16,600,000)  
 in 1789; but at the conclusion of the war, in 1801, it  
 amounted to triple that sum. The treasury had been  
 reduced to the necessity of paying the interest in paper  
 currency, and even compelling forced loans from its own  
 subjects.<sup>1</sup>

Raymond  
 d Roth,  
 l'Autriche,  
 ii. 274, 285.  
 Bign. ii.  
 276, 273.

9.  
 Diversity of  
 surface and  
 natural pro-

The diversity of surface and natural features in this,  
 as in all other countries through which the great stony  
 girdle of the globe passes, proves an inexhaustible source  
 at once of natural beauty, agricultural riches, and variety  
 of productions. The Alps of the Tyrol and Styria, gra-  
 dually branching off to those of Carinthia and Dalmatia  
 on the one hand, and to the Carpathian range on the  
 other, traverse nearly its whole extent, separated only  
 by the valley of the Danube, which cuts, as it were,  
 through this vast natural barrier, and rolls its volume  
 of waters, swelled on either hand by the numerous  
 torrents which descend from the mountain sides, to the  
 Hungarian plains. This noble river is thirteen hundred  
 miles in length, and receives the waters of sixty navi-  
 gable streams. The clefts and hollows of this immense  
 mountain range exhibit on either side scenes of exqui-  
 site beauty, combining often the grandeur of Swiss or  
 Tyrolese scenery with the close-cut pastures, rich vine-  
 yards, and golden harvests of Upper and Lower Austria.  
 Immense woods of pine on all the elevated mountains  
 at once adorn the landscape, and furnish inexhaustible  
 supplies of fuel for the inhabitants; vast and fertile mea-  
 dows on the banks of the Danube nourish innumerable  
 herds of cattle, and maintain admirable horses for the

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great establishments by which the Imperial cavalry are mounted. The sunny slopes are covered by vines of uncommon luxuriance and their fruit of the richest flavour; while the spacious plains which stretch from the neighbourhood of the river to the foot of the mountains on either hand, bring to maturity noble crops of grain, rye, and potatoes, which maintain in rustic plenty the numerous and happy inhabitants.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Malte Brun, v. 599, 724. Personal observation.

These are the imposing and captivating features of Upper and Lower Austria, forming the strength and heart of the empire, and comprising by far the richest, best cultivated, and most prosperous part of the Imperial dominions in Germany. But besides the valley of the Danube, and its range of adjacent mountains, the Austrian sway stretches into Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and Italy, and, surmounting the crest of the mountains, has extended far on either side of their reverse slopes the domination of the Ostrogoths. Bohemia† is a vast natural basin encircled by mountains, which at a remote period appears to have enclosed a great lake, before the Elbe burst through the barriers of the Erzgebirge, and opened

10. General aspect of Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, and Hungary.

\* Upper and Lower Austria contain—

	ARPENTS.	POPULATION BY RACES.
Arable land,	2,120,000	Germans, 2,109,180
Gardens,	81,000	Slavonians, 7,050
Vineyards,	79,000	Greeks, 366
Meadows,	753,000	Armenians, 210
Mountain pastures,	1,064,000	Jews, 1,575
Forests,	1,830,000	
Waste lands,	883,500	2,118,381
	6,750,000	

The Austrian arpent or joch is about two English acres.—See MALTE BRUN, v. 731, 732.

† Bohemia contains—

	ARPENTS.	POPULATION BY RACES.
Arable land,	3,828,500	Slavonians, 2,477,000
Gardens,	86,000	Germans, 1,358,000
Vineyards,	44,000	Jews, 60,000
Meadows,	799,000	
Pastures,	610,000	3,895,000
Forests,	2,810,000	
Fish-ponds,	132,700	

7,810,200.—MALTE BRUN, v. 728.

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through the precipices of the Saxon Switzerland a passage for the cooped-up waters to the German ocean. Its plains, peopled now by four millions of inhabitants, are entirely agricultural; but though the produce is great, the system of cultivation is rude, and human skill has done little to aid the beneficence of nature. The plains of Galicia, containing four million three hundred and ninety-five thousand inhabitants, to the north of the Carpathian mountains, exhibit the rude agriculture, boundless forests, and general misery, which in every age have formed the characteristic of the Polish provinces. Silesia and Moravia, three-fourths of the inhabitants of which are of Slavonic origin, exhibit the same features of the Slavonic race, modified in some degree, in many places, especially Silesia, by the industry and perseverance of the Germans.\* Hungary, containing upwards of ten millions of inhabitants, presents an immense level surface interspersed with vast morasses, but abounding with natural agricultural riches, and capable of nourishing, in ease and affluence, at least four times its present population.† Transylvania, Illyria, and Dal-

\* Silesia and Moravia contain—

	ARPENTS.		POPULATION BY RACES.
Arable land, . . .	2,200,400	Slavonians,	1,566,500
Gardens, . . .	58,000	Germans,	477,000
Vineyards, . . .	51,000	Jews,	34,000
Meadows, . . .	325,000	Gipsies,	1,084
Pastures, . . .	429,000		
Forests, . . .	1,120,000		2,078,584
Fish-ponds, . . .	41,800		
Waste lands, . . .	596,300		

4,821,500.—MALTE BRUN, v. 729.

† Hungary contains—

	ARPENTS.		POPULATION BY RACES IN 1829.
Arable land, . . .	4,897,218	Magyars,	3,800,000
Gardens, . . .	688,767	Slavonians,	4,760,300
Vineyards, . . .	911,176	Germans, Jews, &c.,	2,023,701
Meadows and pastures, . . .	7,715,225		
Forests and marshes, . . .	8,942,740		10,584,001
Fish-ponds, . . .	860,000		

23,965,126

—MALTE BRUN, vi. 761.

matia, separated from Austria and Hungary by great ranges of wooded mountains, belong to a different region of the globe; they have borrowed the character of the Turkish provinces which they adjoin; while the Tyrol, Styria, and Carniola, bedded in the valley of the Alps, recall to the enchanted traveller the sublimest features of Swiss scenery; and the plain of Lombardy transports him to the delicious sun, watered meadows, and golden harvests of Italy.<sup>1</sup>

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Malte  
Brun, v.  
593, 605.  
Personal  
observation.  
Turnbull's  
Austria, i.  
61, 234.

An empire of such extent, embracing so great a variety of climates and geographical features, could hardly be expected to possess any uniform and well-defined national character, like the comparatively compact and homogeneous empires of France and England. But this diversity is rendered still more striking by the extraordinary difference in the character and disposition of the races who, at successive periods, have settled in these various provinces. The Ostrogoths, who have given their name, like the Anglo-Saxons in Britain, to the whole empire, settled in Upper and Lower Austria, and spread themselves on either bank of the Danube to the crest of the mountains; and in their blue-eyed, fair-haired, slow but honest and persevering inhabitants, are to be seen at this day the genuine characteristics of the Gothic race. The Bohemians, Moravians, and Galicians are of a totally different character. In their swarthy visages, dark hair, fiery temperament, and comparatively volatile disposition, are to be traced the indelible features of the Slavonic family of mankind. Daring in war, ardent in disposition, impatient of control, attached to freedom, but averse to labour, and with little industry, the Hungarians have in every age betrayed the fierce disposition and warlike passions which made the Huns in former days the scourge of Europe. They have ever been the bulwark of the empire, and have been found combating with equal heroism, in different ages, their ancient enemies the Turks, seeking to subvert their religion, and their modern foes the French, striving to

11.  
Variety of  
races in  
Austria.



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overturn the independence of their country. In the fiery spirit, admirable horsemanship, roving disposition, and predatory inclination of the Croatians, Illyrians, and Transylvanians, it is easy to recognise the influence of Asiatic blood, and the prevalence of those habits which the children of Ishmael have communicated, in an apparently indelible manner, to all their descendants. The handsome countenances, dark hair, and piercing eyes of the Lombards, bespeak their Italian descent and the predominance of ancient blood; but in their unwarlike habits, pacific enjoyments, and ready submission to conquest, we seek in vain for the traces of the fierce settlers in Cisalpine Gaul, or the indomitable spirit of Roman virtue.

12.  
Military re-  
sources of  
the empire.

Drawn from so vast and varied a population, the Austrian army possesses within itself, if properly directed, the elements of almost every species of military virtue. In the steady valour and unconquerable energy of the Hungarians, the monarchy has in every age found the precious reserve to be brought forth, like the Old Guard of Napoleon, at the decisive crisis, and which has often, in circumstances apparently desperate, recalled victory to its standards. The Croatians, Pandours, and other warriors, from the military colonies on the Turkish frontier, furnish an inexhaustible supply of admirable light horse, scarcely inferior to the Cossacks in activity and enterprise. The Tyrolese are unrivalled for their skill as marksmen, and their constant habit of shooting at targets, and in the mountains, qualifies them in a peculiar manner for the duty of tirailleurs. The native Austrian foot is respectable, and when well led, will fight bravely, though they have not the fire or heroism of the Hungarian grenadiers. But their heavy cavalry, magnificently mounted, and having its officers drawn almost entirely from the nobility, contains some of the most brilliant corps in Europe. Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia furnish their proportion of hardy and zealous foot-soldiers for the ordinary regi-

ments of the line. Thus the national character of the various provinces of the empire is adapted, in a remarkable manner, for the different services of the army ; and, beyond all question, Austria has the means of raising within its own dominions an array of combatants second to none in Europe in martial vigour and efficiency. Yet the Imperial armies, down to the year 1813, were almost uniformly unfortunate ; and although, on many occasions, they displayed devoted gallantry in the field, and on all evinced extraordinary patriotic spirit in preparation, yet this appeared rather in the perseverance with which reverses were surmounted, than in the ardour with which success was sought or followed up. No nation ever sustained so many and such dreadful defeats ; none has in the end emerged so often victorious from their shock. In the perseverance of the aristocratic body which directs the national councils, joined to the steady patriotic spirit of the people, is to be found the explanation of this remarkable circumstance.

The Austrian army consists of sixty-three regiments of the line : twenty battalions of grenadiers, the corps of jagers of thirteen battalions, and the marine battalion on the Danube, numbering in all two hundred and ninety thousand combatants. The cavalry consists of eight regiments of cuirassiers, six of dragoons, seven of light horse, twelve of hussars, and four of hulans ; in all, thirty-eight thousand men. The artillery, divided into five regiments of field-artillery, one corps of bombardiers, and the garrison-artillery, embraces twenty thousand more. In addition to this, the engineers, sappers, miners, &c., and waggon-train, amount to thirty-two thousand five hundred :—in all, three hundred and eighty thousand combatants, nearly the whole of whom are in an excellent state of discipline and equipment. But this is by no means the whole military strength of the nation. The landwehr, established in all the provinces except Hungary, and the “Hungarian Insurrection of Nobles,” which

CHAP. XL. 1805. corresponds to it in that extensive kingdom, constitute an armed force of equal amount, which, when called out, gives the state a mass in all of seven hundred and forty thousand combatants. In the year 1814, when the patriotic spirit of the nation was drawn forth to the highest pitch, and its resources strained to the uttermost, nine hundred and seventy thousand men received pay in the armed force, regular and landwehr, of the nation—an astonishing number for an empire not at that period containing six-and-twenty millions of inhabitants, though not so great, in proportion, as in the same year was raised by the British islands, with a population only of eighteen millions.<sup>1\*</sup>

alte Brun,  
v. 724.  
Tchorboraki,  
Finances  
d'Autriche,  
ii. 341, 346.

14.  
The military  
colonies.

The military force which Hungary is required to furnish to the general support of the empire, is sixty-four thousand men, including seventeen thousand horse—a force very inconsiderable for a kingdom containing eleven millions of inhabitants, and which demonstrates that, in this respect at least, it has been very leniently dealt with. But on the frontiers of the whole monarchy towards Turkey, the military colonies are placed, the organisation of which is entirely warlike, for the purpose of defence against the perpetual hostility of the Osmanlis, and which give rise to one of the most singular and interesting spectacles in Europe. The whole surface of this strip of land is divided into seventeen districts, each of which is termed a regiment, and in which the whole land is held by military tenure. The inhabitants of each holding are generally related by blood or marriage, and form what is called a “House communion,” which is subject to the rural and domestic control of one chief, usually the oldest of the family. Every male is trained to military service, and liable, from the age of eighteen to sixty, to be at any time called out for the public defence. When doing duty

\* Great Britain, in that year, had 1,053,000 men in arms; of whom 813,000 were drawn from the population of the British isles, not numbering then above 18,000,000 inhabitants.

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within the confines of their own regiment or district, they receive no pay, and feed themselves; the moment they pass that limit, their whole expenses fall on the crown. About fifty thousand of these hardy borderers are constantly embodied and in arms; but the total number liable to serve, and who may be called out on an emergency, exceeds two hundred thousand. Night and day, five thousand of them are constantly patrolling on guard along the Turkish frontier; and so closely do these videttes approach each other, and so perfect is the system of signals established by firing guns during the day, or lighting beacons at night, that upon the smallest incursion on any point of this immense frontier, above a thousand miles in length, the whole fifty thousand can be almost instantly assembled at their respective points of rendezvous, and in twenty-four hours two hundred thousand warriors are in arms! These military colonies embrace, at this time, above a million of souls, and their numbers are increasing so rapidly as to double in forty years; while in Upper Austria, the duplication is once in a hundred and four years; and, on an average of the whole empire, once in fifty-one. The inhabitants on the military frontier, like the Gauchos of the Pampas in South America, are for the most part indolent and unruly in peace, negligent in their persons, and addicted to intemperance; but in war they are active and enterprising, and being accustomed to a rigid discipline, they make excellent soldiers when removed from home.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Marmont's  
Voyages, i.  
79, 81. Turn-  
bull's Aus-  
tria, i. 8, and  
277, 280.

The mode of obtaining men for the army varies in different parts of the empire. In the Italian provinces all persons, noble or common, at the age of eighteen, are registered for military service, with a very few professional exemptions; and the quotum is selected from that list by the ballot. Substitutes, however, are allowed: the period of service is only for eight years; and there is no landwehr or army of reserve. In the Tyrol the same system prevails. In the German provinces, all males,

15.  
Mode of ob-  
taining men  
for the army,  
and officers.

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1805.

not noble or clerical, from eighteen to forty-five, are liable to be called on to serve either in the line or landwehr. Those in the first class, which embraces the young men from eighteen to twenty-eight, are liable to be balloted for the first service; those in the second, from twenty-eight to forty-five, for the landwehr. It is very rarely, however, that the ballot is resorted to for supplying vacancies in the line: in general, they are obtained with ease by voluntary enlistment, or selection of candidates by the local authorities or feudal lords—care being taken, as much as possible, to choose single men and younger sons, to whom it is usually an object of ambition to get into the service.\* The period of service is fourteen years, after which the soldier is inscribed on the list of the landwehr, which is never called out except on urgent occasions; and if balloted for there, he is entitled to his discharge at the age of forty years. The articles of war and military code have remained the same since the days of Maria Theresa, when they were framed in the most enlightened spirit; but practical abuses frequently creep in from the aristocratic influence pervading the service, which, as is generally the case in such governments, all the efforts of those at the head of affairs are unable to eradicate. Every regiment has its “inhaber” or colonel proprietor, distinct from the colonel commandant, with whom the granting of all commissions of the first rank rests; but all subsequent promotions are made by the crown. Nobility is not a requisite to obtaining commissions, any more than in the English army; but, as the spirit of the nation is essentially aristocratic, the

\* So patriotic is the spirit of the people, that when danger threatens the monarchy, no difficulty is ever experienced, even on the shortest notice, in obtaining, by voluntary enrolment, the requisite number of recruits for the public service. In the year 1805, on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz, orders were sent to Prague for the immediate levy of fifty thousand men in Bohemia. Before the evening of the day on which the order was received, summonses for the requisite numbers were despatched to each district and lordship; the levy was forthwith made; and, in seventeen days from the receipt of the orders, the whole fifty thousand were ready armed, clothed, and equipped, at the depots in Bohemia and Moravia.—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 301, 302.

officers are generally taken from that class ; and the sons of the burghers and middle rank seek, in preference, situations in the innumerable civil offices under government, where they find themselves more comfortable, in contact only with persons in their own station of life, and often rise by good conduct to the highest eminence.<sup>1</sup>

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Turnbull's  
Austria, i.  
80, 293.

The great breeding establishments kept up by the Emperor for providing horses for the cavalry are peculiar to Austria, and highly characteristic of the provident system of its administration. One of the most remarkable is that of Mezohegyes in Transylvania. An immense plain, fifteen leagues in circumference, containing eighty thousand acres of the finest grass, is there surrounded by a broad belt of wood, fenced in on the outside by a deep ditch. Two thousand acres in the interior are covered with thriving plantations, for shelter and warmth to the horses, and the whole remainder of the surface is devoted to the nourishment of the studs or their attendants. Three hundred and sixty ploughs are employed in the interior in raising grain and cultivating the land for the use of the horses. Formerly twenty thousand horses were assembled in this great establishment, which was one of the principal depots for mounting the cavalry ; but contagious diseases were found to be prevalent in such an assemblage of animals, and it is now kept up only to furnish stallions and mares of the finest breeds for the use of the government and the country. One hundred and fifty of these noble animals are annually sent forth by this establishment, and serve to keep up the government stallions at the number of two thousand, which is deemed necessary to the public service. The arrangement is all military, and the attention paid to every department is so extreme, that the whole expense of the establishment is defrayed by the price obtained for the young horses, which are sold by auction after those for government and the public service have been selected. The military exchequer pays a hundred and twenty

16.  
The great  
breeding  
stations for  
the

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Marm  
Voyages  
68, 73.

florins (£10) for the dragoon horses, and a hundred and forty florins for those of the cuirassiers ; and much of the vigour and efficiency of the Imperial cavalry is to be ascribed to these noble establishments, in which the greatest care has been taken to combine the celerity and hardihood of Arab blood with the strength and bone of the Norman breed.<sup>1</sup>

17.  
Taxation  
and finances  
of the em-  
pire.

Taxation in Austria is far from being oppressive ; although the revenue of the state, if the value of money is taken into account, is very considerable. The total revenue at this time is 129,746,000 florins, equivalent to 322,000,000 francs, or £12,900,000 sterling. The expenditure, exclusive of the war department, is 87,000,000 florins, or £8,700,000 ; but the army is understood to cost 60,000,000 florins—making the total expenditure nearly 20,000,000 florins (£2,000,000) above the income.\* The exchequer has always been a matter of great difficulty with the Austrian government, as it is with all powers maintaining a costly military establishment, without the aid of any

\* In 1834 the income and expenditure of the empire were as follows :—

Interest of public debt,	40,000,000 florins, or	£4,000,000
Finance department,	14,619,220	1,462,000
Chancery and diplomacy,	1,801,168	180,168
Police, . . . . .	1,643,504	164,350
Civil cost of the army,	2,586,306	258,000
Public audit, . . . . .	2,703,723	270,372
Justice, . . . . .	7,708,734	470,874
The courts, . . . . .	1,461,139	146,113
Public works in Germany,	8,774,066	877,406
— Lombardy,	2,987,935	
— Venice,	2,580,169	258,000
Lesser charges, . . . . .	351,626	35,000
War, . . . . .	60,000,000	6,000,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	144,217,590	14,421,076

The receipts of the Imperial treasury, in 1834, were as follows :—

Land tax, . . . . .	38,987,954 florins, or	£3,898,700
House tax, . . . . .	3,859,178	385,900
Income tax on trades,	2,498,234	249,800
Personal tax, . . . . .	1,307,451	130,700
Legacy tax, . . . . .	879,160	87,900
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total direct, . . . . .	47,531,977	£4,753,000

extensive commerce to enlarge its credit or increase its receipts. In 1808 the revenues were only £9,000,000 ; and they were in such a state of confusion at the close of the war, that, but for the subsidies of England, which, from the difference in the value of money in the two countries, told with twofold efficacy, its armies never could have been brought into the field to combat for European independence.

Foreign commerce has been little cultivated in Austria till of late years, owing to its inland situation, and the restrictions, long almost amounting to a prohibition, which the jealousy of Russia and Turkey imposed on the navigation of the Danube. Yet is there no country which, from its vast internal resources, and the possession of so noble a natural estuary for exportation, is calculated to furnish materials for a greater foreign traffic, or with which a more extensive and lucrative trade is destined one day to be carried on between the owners of the rude produce of the soil and the manufacturing industry of other states. The silks, oils, and dairy produce of Lombardy and Venice ; the fleeces of Hungary and Bohemia ; the mineral riches of Austria and Hungary ; the inexhaustible agricultural wealth of the whole empire, must

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13.  
Foreign and  
internal  
commerce.

Indirect :—

Excise, . . .	17,841,347 florins, or £1,784,000	
Stamps, . . .	3,232,048	... 323,000
Customs, . . .	12,037,692	... 1,203,000
Law tax, . . .	1,882,700	... 188,000
Lottery, . . .	3,363,682	... 336,000
Post Office, . . .	1,417,362	... 141,000
Post-horses, . . .	376,952	... 37,000

Monopolies, viz. :

Salt, . . .	19,404,807	... 1,940,000
Tobacco, . . .	3,784,376	... 378,000
Gunpowder, . . .	9,329	... 900
Domains, . . .	3,460,656	... 346,000
Mines, . . .	1,952,410	... 195,000
Hungarian revenue, . . .	5,330,000	... 533,000

126,223,598 ... £12,623,000

—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 325, 327, 328. TCHORBORSKI'S *Finances de l'Autriche*, ii. 374, 410.



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1805. ere long find a vent in an immense foreign commerce. The exports in 1834, according to the official value, were 111,092,941 florins, or £11,109,000, and the imports 107,781,409 florins, or £10,778,000; but these numbers are taken from the official entries, which are much below the real value.\* If the wise and judicious measures now in the course of adoption by the Austrian government, to facilitate their foreign exports by the great arteries of the Po and the Danube, and the noble harbour of Trieste, are fully carried into execution, there can be no doubt that their commerce is destined at no distant period to exhibit an amount double or triple what is now presented. And nothing can be more certain than that Austria is a country with which, perhaps beyond any other, it is for the interest of Great Britain to cultivate commercial relations, and with which treaties on the footing of *real* reciprocity might be concluded; for her productions are those which Britain wants, and can never emulate, and the manufactures of Britain are what Austria wants, and can never rival.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lichtenstein, Stat. 194. Raymond and Roth, i. 124. Turnbull's Austria, ii. 360, 361.

19. General prosperity of the Austrian people.

One remarkable feature which strikes the most superficial traveller in every part of Austria Proper, the Tyrol, and Styria, is the extraordinary and general wellbeing of the peasantry. Without many of the luxuries which habit and a long command of the commerce of the world have rendered necessities to the English labourer; clothed in comparatively coarse garments, often without either tea

\* The proportions of the several parts of the empire were, in 1834—

IMPORTS.			
German Provinces,	61,981,390 florins, or	£6,198,139	
Italian Provinces,	34,288,855	...	3,428,885
Hungary and Transylvania,	11,511,164	...	1,151,164
	107,781,409		£10,778,188
EXPORTS.			
German Provinces,	68,533,685	...	£6,853,368
Italian Provinces,	34,960,722	...	3,496,072
Hungary and Transylvania,	7,598,534	...	759,853
	111,092,941	...	£11,109,294

—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 361.

or coffee, the Austrian peasant enjoys a much greater and more permanent share of the necessities and comforts of life than the great bulk of the working classes, at least in the manufacturing districts, of Great Britain. Contentment and happiness reign in all their dwellings. Their furniture and clothing, their carts and horses, their stables and offices, their well-fed flocks and teams, their trim hedges and ditches, indicate the influence of long-established wellbeing. In the beautiful valleys of Upper Austria, the eye of the traveller is gladdened, as in Switzerland and England, by that sure mark of general prosperity—the extension of separate dwellings and well-defined properties over the whole surface of the country. Small green enclosures, neat fences, hedgerows of lofty timber, clean and cheerful white cottages, with their little gardens and trellises of roses, are to be seen on all sides peeping out of the dark band of the circumjacent forest. Though universally educated, they have no pretensions to an intellectual character, and are far inferior to the peasants of Saxony or Scotland in general information; but, on the other hand, they have escaped the vices which elsewhere have followed the unrestrained tasting of the tree of knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal observation.  
Turnbull's  
Austria, ii.  
66, 69.

Passionately fond of enjoyment, easy in their circumstances, joyous and good-humoured, not disquieted about the future, having no desires beyond their condition, they lead in general a prosperous and happy life, which many nations might envy, who, by straining after ideal and unattainable objects, lose, like the dog in the fable, the real blessings which heaven has placed within their reach. Their pleasures, of which they are so fond, are chiefly of the physical kind. They do not feel the ardent desire for elevation which in free communities elevates a few to greatness, and consigns many to disappointment; and they must be changed indeed before a Burns, a Watt, or a Telford arises among them. Yet are these physical enjoyments in a great degree divested of the revolting excesses

20.  
Their habits  
and character.

CHAP. so common in northern latitudes. They drink amply of  
 XL. their own beer or provincial wine;\* but intoxication is  
 1805. rare, quarrelling almost unknown amongst them: rural  
 games, dancing, and social festivity constitute their great  
 delight; and the kindliness of their disposition renders  
 these rustic assemblages a scene of equal enjoyment to  
 the spectator as to the persons engaged in them. The  
 vast number of cattle in the monarchy—fully double,  
 in proportion to the population, of those which exist in  
 France—demonstrates in a decisive manner the general  
 wellbeing of the rural population; for a wretched people  
 can never keep animals of comfort.† Nor are more  
 spiritual and ennobling feelings wanting among them:  
 hardly any people in Europe are more generally and  
 passionately fond of music; the graves of the dead are  
 the object of universal and touching attachment; and  
 in no part of the world is patriotic spirit more strongly  
 felt, or have more strenuous and persevering efforts been  
 made in the hour of danger in behalf of their country.<sup>1‡</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal  
 observation.  
 Macdon-  
 ald's Aus-  
 tria. Edin.  
 Encyclopæ-  
 dia, iii. 147,  
 149. Turn-  
 bull's Aus-  
 tria, ii. 66.  
 70.

21.  
 Causes of  
 this remark-  
 able well-  
 being of the  
 Austrian  
 peasantry.

The secret of this remarkable wellbeing of the peasantry of Austria, is to be found in the tenure by which land is held, joined to the just and equitable principles on which government has long been administered. Though the holding of landed property is exceedingly various, yet generally the Austrian cultivator is not a tenant in the English sense of the word—that is, a farmer holding at will, or in virtue of a lease; he is a *feuar* in the sense of Scotch law—that is, he has his land for ever on paying

\* The wine raised in Upper and Lower Austria is worth 10,000,000 florins, or £1,000,000 yearly. About a sixth of the whole surface of Lower Austria is devoted to the cultivation of the vine.—RAYMOND and ROTH, *Statistique de toute la Monarchie Autrichienne*, i. 234.

† The horned cattle in the Austrian empire are 13,400,000 to a population of 35,000,000: in France they are 6,000,000 among 32,000,000, or just one-half.—See HUMBOLDT, *Amérique Méridionale*, vi. 96, 97; and LICHTENSTEIN, *Statistique de l'Autriche*, 160, 161.

‡ These observations apply to Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, the Tyrol, and Carniola. In Bohemia, Hungary, and Galicia, feudal institutions prevail; the power of the nobles is more considerable, and the condition of the people much less prosperous.

the fixed duties to the feudal superior. The lord of the manor retains several considerable privileges, particularly those of hunting, fishing, and holding certain manorial courts, and he receives also certain fines on succession or transmission; but the real right of property remains with the *coloni* as long as they discharge their feudal duties, which are generally commuted on favourable terms into payments in money. Where lands are held by tenants proper, who also are very numerous, the leases are generally for six, eight, or twelve years; and the rules of law in relation to these tenants, or their subtenants, are extremely just towards the cultivator. Though the whole goods brought on the farm are liable to the over-lord or principal tenant, the person of the subtenant is only liable to his immediate superior, and the goods can only be attached by execution after judgment obtained, not by previous sequestration or mesne process, as in the British islands.<sup>1</sup>

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1305.

<sup>1</sup> Personal knowledge.

Humane and ample provision is made for the relief of the destitute; in nothing have the benevolence and justice of the German character been more strikingly evinced than in this particular. No part of Europe, perhaps, abounds so much in charitable endowments as the southern and richer provinces of the Austrian empire; and since the reduction of the monasteries under Joseph II., between 1782 and 1786, rendered unavoidable a system of poor-laws, as was the case in Great Britain from a similar cause in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the attention of government has been strongly and beneficially directed to that object. In every rural community or parish, and in every district of the towns, an institution for the poor, or "*Armen Institut*," is established under the direction of the clergyman of the parish, and an officer termed the "*Armen Vater*," or "Father of the Poor." The funds for the distributions made by these functionaries, which are very liberal, are derived from duties on articles of import in burghs, and voluntary contributions in kind or money;

22.  
Provision  
for the poor  
in Austria

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and the latter source, as in other agricultural communities, is generally sufficient without any direct assessment on property. Let not philosophy despise, in these humble details, the "short and simple annals of the poor;" in them, more than in the spread of popular power and passions, is the true secret of general prosperity and national attachment to be found. If we desire a proof, contrast the uniform and steadfast loyalty amidst every disaster of the Austrian people, with the turbulent passions and furious hostility of the Irish democracy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Turnbull,  
ii. 48, 61.  
Personal ob-  
servation.

23.  
Austrian  
system of  
education.

Education, as is now well known, is not merely generally, but almost universally, diffused in the German provinces of Austria. Her government has organised a system, in this important particular, different from that which obtains in any other country. Aiming at the gradual and peaceful amelioration of the internal condition of the people, the equalisation of rights in the eye of the law, and the general wellbeing, combined with the tranquillity of the inhabitants, the Austrian statesmen have viewed education as a mighty engine to mould the public mind, and on the due regulation of which the national safety is dependent. In conformity with this view, two fundamental principles have been adopted, which are at the root of their whole system of instruction. The first is, that all education, in whatever rank or grade, whether public or private, from that of the prince in the university to that of the peasant at the parish school, is to be placed under the guidance of the state, and liable to the direction and control of its functionaries; the second, that all education should be blended with, and mainly founded on, religion. Under this condition, however, the most ample latitude is permitted in regard to the religious creed which is taught. It is only provided that every child shall be registered as belonging to *some* religious persuasion, and that, in his education, the principles of *that religion* are to form a material part of his instruction: but it is immaterial what that religion is; it may be the

faith of the Jew or the Protestant, the Greek or the Romanist. The charge of supervision is committed to the clergy of the different persuasions; but they are rigidly compelled to teach those doctrines only which have been put forth by their ruling consistories, and sanctioned by the supreme authority of the state. Thus the difficulty so sorely felt in England, and other free countries, as to what creed is to be taught at schools, is entirely avoided: and, like the Roman Pantheon, the Austrian institutions for education admit within their ample portals all known modifications of religious belief. Education is sedulously recommended by government and its subordinate officers, and a complete system maintained at the public expense, or by extensive funds set apart for that purpose, from the humble grammar-school, through the various lyceums and gymnasiums, to the eight universities which form the highest branch of the establishment.\* But it is not compulsory as in Prussia; and hence, though the number of scholars in every part of the country is great, and rapidly increasing, yet it does not, as it does in some of the provinces of Prussia, embrace all the children capable of receiving tuition.† On the whole, the system of education in Austria is extensive and judicious, and founded on liberal principles; but it is easy to be wise and liberal in the administration of a despotic state.<sup>1</sup> How long would such a system coexist with a free

<sup>1</sup> Turnbull,  
ii. 124, 145.

\* These universities are those of Vienna, Prague, Pavia, Lemberg, Gratz, Olmutz, Innspruck, and Pesth.

† In the whole empire, exclusive of Hungary, Transylvania, and the military frontiers, there are—

Capable of going to school—Males,	1,307,777
Females,	1,221,394
	2,529,171
Actually at school—Males,	874,840
Females,	661,264
	1,536,104

That is, about two-thirds of the children capable of being at school are actually at it.—TURNBULL, ii. 143.—In Transylvania the proportion is still greater: there are 52,698 children at school, out of 64,227 capable of going to it—a proportion greater than in any equal part of the British empire.

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press, democratic legislation, and popular institutions? It is there, and there only, that the real tendency, for good and for evil, of the fruit of the tree of knowledge is to be perceived.

24.  
Religious  
institutions  
of the em-  
pire.

The religion of Austria is the Roman Catholic, and the great majority of the people are of that persuasion : \* but persons of every variety of religious creed are alike eligible to all offices, in the army, law, or civil service ; and practically there is no distinction made between them, either in government appointments or the Imperial alliances. The Archdukes Charles and Joseph have both married out of the pale of the Romish church : the former having espoused a Lutheran princess ; the latter, first a lady of the Greek church, then one of the Lutheran persuasion. Nine-tenths of the ample estates belonging, in former days, to the Romish church, were confiscated by the Emperor Joseph between 1784 and 1789 ; and the monastic orders now embrace only nine thousand members instead of eighty thousand, who formerly were maintained by their possessions. But there was this vital distinction between the proceedings of this philosophic reformer and those of our Henry VIII.—he did not bestow the confiscated lands on rapacious courtiers or reforming barons, but, with a few trifling exceptions, they were all accumulated into a religious fund (*religionscasse*) in the different provinces, from which provision was thereafter to be made for the spiritual wants and education of the people. So ample were the resources thus acquired, that no difficulty has since been experienced in providing funds for the

\* In the Austrian empire there are, exclusive of the military class,

Greek Church, United,	.	.	.	3,375,840
Greek, not United,	.	.	.	2,722,083
Lutherans,	.	.	.	1,189,817
Calvinists,	.	.	.	2,150,721
Unitarians,	.	.	.	45,899
Jews,	.	.	.	613,283

34,528,583

—Census of 1834 ; and TURNBULL, ii. 11 ; and MALTE BRUN, v. 727, 738.

religious and secular instruction of the rapidly increasing population. The same emperor introduced the equally important change of causing, in defiance of all the remonstrances of the Pope, the prayers and litanies in the churches to be performed in the German tongue, though mass is still celebrated in Latin. Alarmed at so portentous an innovation, the holy father hastened in person to Vienna, to protest against it. He was received with every possible demonstration of respect: but the new system continued, and all classes now enjoy the inexpressible comfort of joining in the tribute of prayer and praise in a language which they can understand. Gentleness and toleration pervade every department of the Austrian church. Though the spiritual authority of the Supreme Pontiff is respectfully admitted, the least attempt at interference with temporal power is steadily resisted; the patronage of livings, as in England, is vested in the crown, the bishops, clerical and lay incorporations, and private individuals; and in no part of Europe is the authority of the crown more perseveringly exerted to correct clerical abuses, or extend spiritual instruction, by ordinances altogether independent of the court of Rome.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Turnbull,  
ii. 73, 100.  
Malte Brun,  
v. 727, 738.

The Austrian system of government, which has succeeded in so surprising a manner in stilling the jealousies and lulling to sleep the rivalries of so many different nations, is founded on the same principles as the British government in India, and in both countries it has been brought about by the same necessity. It was the weakness of the central power, when compared with the strength of the subject provinces, which compelled the governments of both, in despair at effecting the subjugation of such extensive possessions by force, or their amalgamation by settlement, to govern them all by an attention to their interests, and a respect for their feelings. The extraordinary spectacle of the Hindoo, the Mussulman, the Parsee, and the followers of Bhudda, all uniting in

25.  
General  
principle of  
the Austrian  
government.



CHAP. willing civil and military obedience to the sway of the  
 XL. Christian stranger, has its exact counterpart in the Impe-  
 1805. rial dominions, where the Austrian Catholics, the Bohe-  
 mian Lutherans, the Polish Jews, and the Hungarian or  
 Transylvanian Greeks, rival each other in devotion and  
 attachment to the Imperial government. One cause alone  
 can explain in either instance such a prodigy, and that  
 is—attention to remote interests on the part of the central  
 authority. Unhappily, such is the selfishness of human  
 nature, that such attention is hardly ever to be looked for  
 except in the weak, with whom it is a matter of necessity.  
 Had Hungary been the ruling power and the seat of  
 government, the Bohemians, the Tyrolese, the Austrians,  
 might have been subdued by force, but they would never  
 have united in willing and cheerful obedience to its sway.  
 The rule of the dominant Hungarians in Hungary, in  
 Bohemia, and Austria, would not have been that of the  
 English in India, but of the English in the West Indies,  
 or, till recent times, in Ireland.

26.  
 ast natural  
 pabilities  
 Austria.

Under the influence of this paternal system of govern-  
 ment, industry and cultivation have made very consider-  
 able progress in the Imperial dominions; but nothing to  
 that of which they are susceptible, and which, to all appear-  
 ance, they will one day attain. Fully a fourth part of  
 the whole superficial extent of the state is still waste, a  
 large portion of which is susceptible of cultivation; and  
 even that which is under the plough, does not, if Lombardy  
 be excepted, yield on an average a fourth of what the soil  
 could produce.\* Supposing that two hundred million

\* Total superficies of the Austrian dominions—

12,167 square German miles, or 126,878,241 jochs, or 252,000,000 acres.	
Of which arable, . . .	33,366,680 . . . 66,733,360
Vineyards, . . .	3,854,760 . . . 7,709,520
Meadows, orchards, and gardens, . . .	13,811,708 . . . 27,623,416
Pastures, . . .	11,014,707 . . . 22,029,414
Forests, . . .	33,385,015 . . . 66,770,030

Total productive surface, . . . 95,432,870 jochs, or 190,865,740 acres.

—SPRINGER'S *Stat. de l'Autriche*; and TCHORBORSKI, *Sur les Finances de l'Autriche*,  
 i. 114.

acres of the Austrian territory, out of the two hundred and fifty-two million of which it consists, are capable of profitable cultivation, this would, at the rate of an inhabitant to every two acres, maintain a hundred millions of inhabitants, or above three times its present population. Great as this number is, it is less than is to be found in some parts of Switzerland, where large parts of the territory are sterile and rocky, and there are nevertheless one inhabitant to every acre and a quarter, all living in a degree of ease and affluence almost unparalleled elsewhere in the world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tchorborski, i. 114, 117. Prof. Springer's Stat. Tables.

Austria is now not a uniform homogeneous empire, subject to one law, descended of one race, inspired by one national feeling; it is a *confederation of monarchies*, united by accident or consent under one common head, but each governed by its own constitution, laws, and customs. The sovereign is emperor of Austria, but he is king of Hungary and Bohemia; and it is in the latter character, and in it only, that he gives his commands to these mighty dependencies. No attempt to alter the constitution, or force changes on the subjects of any of its provinces, is ever made, at least in modern times, by the government of Vienna. Satisfied if they remain peaceable, and contribute their fixed quota to the general defence of the empire, they willingly allow them to enjoy their national institutions, and sedulously attend to every circumstance, even in form, which tends to maintain their national feelings, or diffuse the illusion of real independence. The Emperor can issue orders which are obeyed both in Hungary and Bohemia, but he does so as king of these monarchies; his orders are addressed to their respective chanceries, into which none but natives are admitted, and they are always in strict conformity with their existing constitutions and laws. Improvements in local legislation or institutions are only introduced when recommended by their established parliaments or legislature, and enforced when sanctioned by their authority.

Austria's, in fact, a confederation of monarchies.

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The great secret of government consists in ascertaining, from correct sources, the wants of the various subjects of the empire, and anticipating their complaints by being beforehand with the requisite reforms. "Everything for the people, nothing by them," which Napoleon described as the real secret of good government, has long been the ruling principle of the Austrian administration: their maxim is to prevent the growth of political passion by carefully conserving political and individual interests. Whether such a system is equally advantageous as the popular institutions which make such changes emanate from the direct will of the people, this is not the place to discuss; but it may safely be affirmed that it is the only system of government adapted for a people in the circumstances of the great bulk of the subjects of Austria, or by which its various provinces could be retained in willing obedience to the central government.

28.  
Civil gov-  
ernment in  
the Imperial  
dominions.

Although the popular principle enters very little into the general system of the Austrian administration in any of its provinces, yet it is a mistake to suppose, as is frequently done in Great Britain, that the power of the crown is entirely uncontrolled, and that the government is a pure despotism. In every part of the empire there is a provincial State or "Stande," composed of the principal inhabitants. Their composition varies in different provinces; but, generally speaking, they are the notables or chief men of the district, not the representatives of any large body in the community. They consist in all cases of four classes: the clergy, the higher nobility, the ordinary landholders, and the burghers. The latter are deputies of cities, but elected by a limited class. They have no legislative power, but they have important powers of administration within their own bounds, and nearly the entire direction of the collection of the revenue, and levying of men within those limits. They make representations also, or remonstrances, on all matters of local concern; and in a government founded on the principle of

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1805.

preventing discontent by anticipating all the reasonable wants of their subjects, these representations are often as effectual as actual legislation, emanating from themselves, would have been. In Hungary a more thorough representative system prevails, if that system can be called representative which, framed mainly for the interests of the aristocratic body, is entirely rested on their suffrage. In Lombardy, the provincial estates are elected in a still more popular manner—the deputies being proper representatives of the whole inhabitants who pay taxes to a certain amount, and the suffrage being conducted through a double, and sometimes a triple election. But in all the provinces, the duties and powers of these assemblies are the same, and very nearly resemble those which, in ancient times, belonged to the English parliament; viz. the raising and collecting the revenue and levies of men, and representing their wants to the government. The power of taxation and legislation belongs to the crown, to be exercised, however, by and through these local assemblies.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Turnbull,  
ii. 215, 223.  
Malte Brun,  
v. 396, 402.

The public debt of Austria is very considerable, and will hereafter weigh heavily, like that of England, on the energy and resources of the empire. Great pains have been taken by the Imperial authorities to conceal the magnitude of this burden, and mystify the details published regarding it; but enough exists to show that it is a very serious burden. Part of it is of old standing, but by far, the greater proportion was contracted during the disastrous wars of the French Revolution. The addition made during that long and dreadful contest was so considerable, that in 1841 it amounted to little short of 1,000,000,000 florins, (£100,000,000,) and the total interest which required to be provided for was no less than 42,817,000 florins, or £4,281,700 sterling. This, it must be admitted, is a heavy burden upon a nation little abounding in commercial wealth, and the revenue of which has not yet reached £14,000,000 a-year. Yet it is inconsiderable, both in point of absolute and relative amount, to

29.  
Public debt  
of Austria.

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1805.

that of Great Britain, which, of a revenue which does not not now exceed, from ordinary sources, £50,000,000 sterling, absorbs annually £28,000,000.\* And if the resources which ultimately may be rendered available to the two countries be taken into consideration, the balance will incline still more decisively in favour of the Austrian empire. Certainly, to a country possessing a fine climate, thirty-five millions of inhabitants, and more than double the whole area of the British islands, a public debt of a hundred millions sterling cannot be considered as a very crushing burden, when Great Britain, with half these natural resources, exists and flourishes under eight hundred millions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tchoborbski, Finances d'Autriche, i. 39, 40.

This national debt of Austria was, as we have said, for the most part contracted during the Revolutionary war: two-thirds of its amount grew up during or since that terrible convulsion. Great part of it was contracted in paper

\* Public debt of Austria in 1841—

		INTEREST.
Paper money, . . . (florins)	4,343,735	...
Old debt from 1792, . . .	245,815,000	2,458,150
Old debt not covered, . . .	2,660,000	30,000
Debt to bankers, . . .	42,000,000	1,850,000
Debt of the Tyrol, Voralberg, &c., . . .	16,295,000	575,350
Debt of Lombardy, . . .	74,000,000	2,980,000
New debt since 1792, . . .	444,327,596	18,641,514
Debts on lottery, . . .	51,273,000	...
Due to the bank, . . .	89,250,000	2,030,000
Floating debt, . . .	30,000,000	900,000
	<hr/> 999,964,331	<hr/> 29,465,014

To the interest must be added annually—

For Sinking-fund, . . . (florins)	8,170,320
Do. in Lombardy, . . .	730,000
Do. for lottery do., . . .	2,873,340
Annual rents applied to Sinking-fund, . . .	1,888,150

Total Sinking-fund, . . .	13,661,810
Repayment of old debt drawn by lot, . . .	4,000,000

Total in discharge of debt, . . .	17,661,810
Add interest of debt, . . .	29,465,014

Total annual charges of debt, . . .	47,126,824
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30.

i

tion of the  
Austrian  
paper dur-  
ing the war,  
and present  
sinking-  
fund.

money, bearing a forced circulation—the most easy method for the moment, and the most burdensome in the end, which a state can possibly adopt. The difficulty of comprehending the complicated details of Austrian finance arises, in a great degree, from this circumstance, as a considerable part of the debt is due to the holders of this paper money, which government is obliged to recognise as at par to the holders. Its depreciation was often very great during the war; but the regular and stable administration of the Imperial government has uniformly made it resume its proper value on the return of peace. And, notwithstanding the difficulty which the public exchequer has experienced in discharging the interest of their public debt since the peace, they have had the fortitude to keep up a sinking-fund of 10,000,000 florins, (£1,000,000,) nearly equal to a third of the interest of the debt; a fact which, contrasted with the ruinous abandonment of the same admirable institution during the same period by Great Britain, illustrates the vital distinction between the foresight of an aristocratic, and the recklessness of a popular government.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tchorborski, i. 39, 41.

The foreign policy of Austria, like that of all other countries which are governed by a landed aristocracy, is steady, consistent, and ambitious. It never loses sight of its objects: yields when it cannot resist, but prepares in silence the means of future elevation. In no other monarchy of equal extent is the personal cost of the court so inconsiderable; a great expenditure is not required either to uphold the influence of the crown, or to overshadow the lustre of the nobility. The disposal of all the situations in the army, and those in the civil administration, which are at least as numerous, renders the influence of government irresistible, and enables the archdukes and Imperial family, without injury to their authority, to live rather with the simplicity of private citizens than the extravagance of princes of the blood in other countries. In no part of Europe is the practical administration of government more gentle and paternal than in the Heredi-

31.

Her govern-  
ment and  
policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
270, 274.

tary States; but in the recently acquired provinces the weight of authority is more severely felt, and many subjects of local complaint, arising from the exorbitant power of the nobles, and the feudal restrictions on the people, have long existed in the Hungarian and Bohemian dominions. The population of the empire, at the peace of Lunéville in 1801, was 27,600,000; and they have given ample proof, in the glorious efforts of subsequent times, both of the courageous and patriotic spirit by which they are animated, and the heroic sacrifices of which they are capable.<sup>1</sup>

32.  
Her jealousy  
of Prussia,  
and reliance  
on England.

Jealousy of Prussia was, during the years which followed the treaty of Lunéville, the leading principle of the Austrian cabinet; a feeling which originated in the aggression and conquests of the Great Frederick, and had been much increased by the impolitic and ungenerous advantage which the court of Berlin took of the distresses and dangers of the Austrian monarchy, to extend, by an alliance with France, their possessions and influence in the north of Germany. Europe had too much cause to lament this unhappy division, the result of a selfish and short-sighted policy on the part of the Prussian government, which, in their rivalry of the Emperor, made them shut their eyes to the enormous danger of French ambition, till incalculable calamities had been inflicted on both monarchies, and they themselves were brought to the verge of destruction by the overthrow at Jena. Though compelled frequently to withdraw from the alliance with England, the Austrian government never ceased to look to it as the main pillar of the confederacy for the independence of Europe, and reverted to the cabinet of London on every occasion when they took up arms, in the perfect confidence that they would not apply for aid in vain. The natural inclination of the Imperial government was to lean for Continental support on the Russian power; and although this tendency was considerably weakened by the part which the cabinet of St Petersburg took with Prussia

in arranging the matter of German indemnities, yet this temporary estrangement soon ceased upon the arrival of more pressing dangers, and the two nations were to be seen contending side by side, with heroic constancy, on the field of Austerlitz.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
275, 276.

The leading persons in the administration of Vienna at this period were the Count Cobentzel, vice-chancellor of state, and Count Colloredo, a cabinet minister, and intimate friend of the Emperor. The Archduke Charles, whose great military abilities had procured for him a European reputation, was at the head of the war department; but the powers of government were really in the hands of Cobentzel and Colloredo, and an unworthy jealousy prevailed of the hero who had more than once proved the saviour of Germany. A young man, afterwards celebrated in the most important transactions of Europe, M. DE METTERNICH, had already made himself distinguished by his eminent talents in political affairs, but he had not yet risen to any of the great offices. The general policy of the Austrian cabinet at this period was reserve and caution; the empire had bled profusely from the wounds of former wars, and required years of repose to regain its strength and recruit its finances; but the principles which governed its secret resolutions were unchangeable, and it was well known to all the statesmen of Europe, that in any coalition which might be formed to restrain the ambition of France, Austria, if success appeared feasible, would bear a prominent part.<sup>1</sup>

53.

Leading  
persons of  
its cabinet  
at this pe-  
riod.

<sup>2</sup> Bign. ii.  
263, 267.  
Dum. xi.  
23, 27.

Russia, under the benignant rule of Alexander, was daily advancing in wealth, power, and prosperity. That illustrious prince, whose disposition was naturally inclined to exalted feeling, had been bred in the exercise of benevolent affections by his tutor, Colonel La Harpe, a Swiss by birth, and a philanthropist by character, under whose instructions he had learned to appreciate the glorious career which lay before him, in the improvement, instruction, and elevation of his people. From the very com-

34.

Russia, its  
rapid growth  
and steady  
policy.



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mencement of his reign, his acts had breathed this benevolent spirit: the punishment of the knout, the use of torture, had been abolished; valuable rights given to several classes of citizens; improvements introduced into the civil and criminal code; slavery banished from the royal domains; and the first germ of representative institutions introduced, by permitting to the senate, the conservators of the laws, the right of remonstrance against their introduction. But these wise and philanthropic improvements, which daily made the Czar more the object of adoration to his subjects, only rendered Russia more formidable to the powers of Western Europe. The policy of the cabinet of St Petersburg was unchanged and unchangeable. Domineering ascendancy over Turkey and Persia, predominant influence in the European monarchies, formed the continued object of its ambition; and in the contests and divisions of other powers, too many opportunities occurred of carrying its designs into execution. For above a century past, Russia has continually advanced, and never once receded; victorious or vanquished, its opponents are ever glad to purchase a respite from its hostility by the cession of territory. Unlike the ephemeral empires of Alexander or Napoleon, its frontiers have slowly and steadily enlarged. Civilisation marches in the rear of conquest, and consolidates the acquisitions which power has made; its population, doubling every sixty years, is daily rendering it more formidable to the adjoining states; and its extension, to all human appearance, is not destined to be arrested till it has subjected all Central Asia to its rule, and established the Cross in undisturbed sovereignty on the dome of St Sophia and the minarets of Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tooke's  
Russia, ii.  
124, 147.  
Bign. ii.  
278, 280.

35.  
Statistics of  
the empire.  
June 18,  
1834.

At the conclusion of the reign of Peter the Great, in 1725, the population of the empire was about 20,000,000, and its revenue 13,000,000 silver rubles, or £3,200,000 sterling: in 1787, its numbers had swelled to 28,000,000, and its revenue risen to 40,000,000 rubles, or £9,000,000:

in 1804, its inhabitants were no less than 36,000,000, and its revenue about 50,000,000 silver rubles, or £12,000,000; a sum equivalent to at least double that sum in France, and triple its amount, at that period, in Great Britain.\*

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The greater part of the revenue was derived from the capitation tax—a species of impost common to all nations in a certain stage of civilisation, where slavery is general, and the wealth of each proprietor is nearly in proportion to the number of agricultural labourers on his estate. It amounted to five rubles for each freeman, and two for each serf, and was paid by every subject of the empire, whether free or enslaved. Customs and excise, especially on spirituous liquors—the object of universal desire in cold climates—produced a large sum: the duties on these articles alone brought in annually 30,000,000 paper rubles, or £3,000,000, into the public treasury. But notwithstanding this considerable revenue, and the high value of money in that comparatively infant state, the expenses of government, which necessarily embraced a considerable naval as well as military establishment, were so great that its finances were barely equal to the protection of its vast territory; and experience has demonstrated that, without large foreign subsidies, Russia is unable to bring any great force into the central parts of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign.  
282, 283.  
Malte Brun,  
vi. 635.  
Bremmer,  
i. 19.

The army, raised by conscription at the rate of so many in each hundred of the male population, amounted nominally to above three hundred thousand men. But, from the vast extent of territory which they had to defend, it was a matter of great difficulty to assemble any considerable force at one point, especially at a distance from the frontiers of the empire; and in the wars of 1805 and 1807, Russia never could bring above seventy thousand men into any one field of battle. In no state of Europe

36.  
And state of  
the army.

\* The revenue actually paid was 120,000,000 rubles; but from the great emission of paper money bearing a legal currency subsequent to 1787, the value of the ruble had fallen to half of what it was in its original silver standard, and it was worth no more than half-a-crown English money.—BIGNON, ii. 282.

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is the difference so great between the amount of an army as it appears on paper, and the actual force which it can bring into the field ; and a commander in general can assemble round his standard little more than half of what the gazettes announce as being at his disposal. Drawn, however, from the agricultural population, its soldiers were extremely formidable, both from the native strength and the enduring courage which they possessed. The slightest physical defect was sufficient to cause the proffered serf to be rejected ; and though they embraced the military life with reluctance, and left their homes amidst loud lamentations, they soon attached themselves to their colours, and undertook with undaunted resolution any service, how perilous soever, on which they might be sent. The commissariat was wretched ; the hospital service still miserably defective : but the artillery, though cumbrous, was numerous and admirably served, and the quality of the troops almost unrivalled. Accustomed to hardships from their infancy, they bivouacked without tents on the snow in the coldest weather, and subsisted without murmuring on a fare so scanty that the English soldiers would have thought themselves starved on it. Fed, clothed, and lodged by government, the pay of the infantry only amounted to half-a-guinea, that of the Cossacks to eight-and-sixpence, a-year ; but such was the patriotic ardour and national enthusiasm of the people, that even on this inconsiderable pittance they were animated with the highest spirit, and hardly ever were known to desert to the enemy. The meanest soldier was impressed with the belief that Russia was ultimately to conquer the world, and that the commands of the Czar in the prosecution of that great work must invariably be obeyed. When Benningsen retired towards Königsberg, in the campaign of 1807, and sought to elude the enemy by forced marches during the long nights of a Polish winter, the murmur at retreat was so imposingly audacious, although ninety thousand men thundered in close pursuit,

that the general was compelled to soothe the dissatisfaction by announcing that he was marching towards a chosen field of battle. The disorder consequent on six days of continued famine and suffering instantly ceased; and joyous acclamations rent the sky when they received the command to halt, and the lines were formed, with parade precision, amidst the icy lakes and drifted snow of Eylau.<sup>1\*</sup>

CHAP.  
XL.  
1807.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson's  
Polish Cam-  
paign, i. 31.  
Bign. ii.  
202, 203.

Enthusiastically beloved by his subjects, Alexander had, immediately on his accession to the throne, abolished the custom of alighting from the carriage when the royal equipages were met, which had excited so much discontent under his tyrannical predecessor; but the respect of his subjects induced them to continue the practice, and, to avoid such a mark of Oriental servitude, he was in the habit of driving about, without guards, in a private chariot. Married early in life to the beautiful Princess Elizabeth of Baden, he soon became an indifferent husband, but constantly kept up the external appearances of decorum, and remained throughout an attached friend to that princess. More tender cords united him to the Countess Narishkin, a Polish lady of extraordinary fascination, gifted with all the grace and powers of conversation for which the women of rank in that country are, beyond any other in Europe, distinguished; and to her influence, joined to that of Prince Czartorinski, his early friend and adviser, a distinguished noble of the same nation, his marked regard for the Sarmatian race through life is, in a great degree, to be ascribed. Immediately upon his accession to the throne, he was compelled to select his ministers from the party which placed him there; and Pahlen, Pain, and Woronzoff were his first advisers. But though attached from the outset to England, to whose

37.  
Character  
and manners  
of the Em-  
peror Ale

\* "Comrades, go not forward into the trenches; you will be lost!" cried a retiring party to an advancing detachment: "the enemy are already in possession."—"Prince Potemkin must look to that, for he gave us the order: come on, Russians!" was the reply, and the whole marched forward and perished, the victims of their heroic sense of duty.—SIR ROBERT WILSON'S *Polish War*, p. 2.

CHAP. influence he owed his elevation, he was sincere in his  
 XL. admiration for the First Consul ; and, still influenced by  
 1805. the angry feelings of 1799, entered warmly into the  
 French project of elevating Prussia at the expense of  
 Austria, in the division of the German indemnities. A  
 species of prophetic sympathy united him to Frederick-  
 William, who had ascended the throne about the same  
 age, and only shortly before himself ; and this was soon  
 ripened into a sincere attachment, from their interview at  
 Memel in the summer of 1803, and contributed not a  
 little to determine the subsequent course of events on the  
 great theatre of Europe.

38.  
 Austria, de- In proportion as the time approached when his great  
 ceived by projects against Austria were to be carried into execution,  
 Napoleon's redoubled his ostensible efforts for the invasion  
 measures, of Great Britain. These preparations, which never had  
 crosses the been more than a feint from the moment that intelligence  
 Inn. of the stoppage of Villeneuve's fleet by Sir Robert  
 Calder's action, and the subsequent retreat of that admiral  
 to Ferrol, had been received, completely produced the  
 desired effect. Austria, deceived by the accounts which  
 were daily transmitted of the immense accumulation of  
 forces on the coasts of the Channel, the embarkation of  
 the Emperor's staff and heavy artillery, and the continual  
 exercising of the troops in the difficult and complicated  
 operation of getting on shipboard, deemed the moment  
 come when she could safely commence hostilities, even  
 before the arrival of the Russian auxiliaries. She broke  
 ground, accordingly, by crossing the Inn and invading the  
 Bavarian territories, fondly imagining that the French  
 troops were still on the shores of the Channel, and that  
 she would be able, by a rapid advance, to rouse Bavaria  
 and the lesser powers of Germany to join her standard,  
 and appear before the arrival of Napoleon, with the whole  
 forces of the empire, on the banks of the Rhine.<sup>1</sup> But  
 she grievously miscalculated, in so doing, the activity and  
 resources of the French Emperor, and soon found to her

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
 1, 11. Jom.  
 ii. 99, 100.

Sept. 9.

cost that she had been the dupe of his artifices, and had unwittingly played his game as effectually as if she had intentionally prostrated her resources before his ambition.

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The forces with which the Aulic Council engaged in this enterprise were eighty thousand men ; and the Russians were still so far removed as to render it impossible to reckon upon their co-operation in the first movements of the campaign. Precipitance in forcing on hostilities before their troops were all arrived, was the ruin of this campaign. They had, with reason, calculated upon being joined by the whole forces of Bavaria ; but, as already noticed, the paternal anxiety of the Elector rendered these hopes abortive, and threw the whole weight of that electorate into the opposite scale. Public spirit in the Imperial dominions was strongly roused, and the people were prepared to make any sacrifices in defence of their country ; but they had little of the self-confidence or hope which, even more than physical power, constitutes the strength of an army. The soldiers went into the field resolute and devoted, but rather with the resignation of martyrs than the step of conquerors. Their repeated defeats had rendered them nearly desperate of success. The army was numerous, gallant, and well appointed, but hardly equal to the task of meeting unaided the united French and Bavarian forces, even if led by commanders of equal talent and experience. What, then, was to be expected from them when advancing under the guidance of Mack to meet the grand army grouped round the standards of Napoleon ?\* In vain the British govern-

30.  
Her troops  
advance  
through  
Bavaria to  
the Black  
Forest.

\* Though totally deficient in the decision, promptitude, and foresight requisite for a commander in the field, Mack was by no means without a considerable degree of talent, and still greater plausibility, in arranging on paper the plan of a campaign : and so far did this species of ability impose on Mr Pitt, that he wrote to the cabinet of Vienna, recommending that officer to the command of the German army. The just and decisive opinion expressed of him by Nelson at Naples, in 1798, has already been noticed. With all his great qualities as a civil statesman, Mr Pitt had but little capacity for military combinations ; and this is the judgment, in this particular impartial, pronounced upon him by Napoleon.—See NAPOLEON *in* MONTHOLON, ii. 432.

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ment transmitted to the cabinet of Vienna a detailed statement, obtained from the imperial staff at Boulogne, of the amount and composition of the French army, showing above a hundred and thirty thousand men, of all descriptions, ready to march; and asked, whether it was against England or Austria that this force was really intended to act? With infatuated self-confidence, their host continued to advance; soon it overran the Bavarian plains, entered the defiles of the Black Forest, and occupied with its outposts the openings from that rocky ridge into the valley of the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
12.

40.  
Efforts of  
Napoleon to  
gain Prus-

From the moment that it was evident that hostilities were unavoidable, Napoleon had been indefatigable in his endeavours to engage Prussia on his side. The instructions to Duroc, his envoy at Berlin, were, to represent to the Prussian government, "that there was not a moment to lose; that it was indispensable an alliance should forthwith be concluded between the two states; that the confederacy of Russia, Austria, and England was equally menacing to both; that, during the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty, it was necessary that Prussia should make an open declaration against Austria, or at least a formidable demonstration on the Bohemian frontier; that the Emperor was about to make an autumnal campaign; that having dispersed the armament of Austria before the month of January, France and Prussia might turn their united forces against Russia, for which purpose the Emperor offered the aid of eighty thousand men, amply provided with everything necessary for a campaign."\* The answer of the Prussian cabinet to these propositions was in the main favourable.<sup>2</sup> They admitted "that the union of France and Prussia could alone provide against the rest of the Continent such a

<sup>2</sup> Bign. iv.  
334.

\* Instructions to Duroc, 24th August 1805.—BIGNON, iv. 334. These instructions, written the very day on which Napoleon received accounts of the retreat of Villeneuve to Cadiz, and when he dictated to Daru the march of the grand army from Boulogne across Germany, (*ante*, Chap. xxxix. § 80,) are a singular monument of his vigour and rapidity of determination.

barrier as would insure the maintenance of general tranquillity."

The French plenipotentiary, taking these words in a more favourable sense than they were perhaps intended, immediately commenced the drawing out of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two powers; but when it was communicated to the Prussian government, their temporising policy reappeared; they were willing to unite with France in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities, but hesitated at taking any step which might involve them in the contest; and evinced, amidst all their anxiety for the acquisition of Hanover, an extreme apprehension of the consequences of a Russian war. To overcome their scruples, Napoleon did not hesitate to engage that "he would retain none of his conquests on his own account, and that the empire of France and kingdom of Italy should receive no addition." But the terrors of the Prussian cabinet were not to be overcome by these obviously hypocritical professions, and they persisted in their resolution to enter into no engagement which might involve them in hostilities. Matters were in this doubtful state, when the Russian minister at Berlin presented a letter from the Emperor Alexander, in which he proposed an interview with his Prussian Majesty on the frontiers of their respective dominions, and requested permission for the Russian troops to pass through his territories on their route for Bavaria. The pride of Frederick-William instantly took fire; and he replied by a decided negative against the passage of the Muscovites through any part of his dominions; but expressed his willingness to meet his august neighbour at any place which he might select. Prussia, at the same time, renewed its negotiations with France for the acquisition of Hanover as a deposit, until the conclusion of the war; a proposition to which Napoleon testified no unwillingness to accede, provided "France lost none of its rights of conquest by the deposit."<sup>1</sup>

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41.

Negotiations between the two powers. The Russians are denied a passage through the Prussian territories.

Sept. 21.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv. 338, 340, 346. Th vi. 204.



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XL.

1805.

42.

march of the  
French  
troops  
towards  
Bavaria.

While these unworthy negotiations were tarnishing the reputation of the Prussian monarchy, the French troops were in full march from the shores of the Channel to banks of the Rhine. The instructions given by Napoleon to all the chiefs of the grand army for the tracing of their route, and the regulation of their movements, were as perfect a model of the combinations of a general, as the fidelity and accuracy with which they were followed were of the discipline and efficiency of his followers. The stages, the places of rest, the daily marches of every regiment, were pointed out with undeviating accuracy over the immense circumference from Cherbourg to Hamburg; relays of horses were provided to convey by post those who were more remote, twenty thousand carriages collected for their rapid conveyance, and the immense host caused to converge, by different routes, through France, Flanders, and the north of Germany, to Ulm, the centre where it was anticipated the decisive blows against the Austrian monarchy were to be struck.\* The troops simultaneously commenced their march from the coast of the Channel in the beginning of September, and performing, with the celerity of the Roman legions, the journeys allotted to them, arrived on the Rhine from the 17th to the 23d of the same month. They were all in the highest spirits, buoyant with health, radiant with hope: the exercise and discipline to which they had been habituated during the two preceding years, in their camps on the shores of the ocean, having enabled them to overcome, with ease, fatigues which would have been deemed insurmountable at that period by any other soldiers of Europe.† Such was the vigour with which the soldiers were animated, that out of fifteen thousand native French who were in Marmont's corps, only *nine* men were

\* See the orders, addressed by Napoleon to the seven marshals commanding the corps of the army, in Dumas, xiii. 300, 302. *Pièces Just.*—Many of them are dated at nine, ten, eleven, at night, at midnight: but in all is to be seen the same extraordinary union of minuteness and accuracy of detail, with grandeur and extent of general combination.

† The celerity with which the march of Marshal Ney's corps was performed is particularly remarkable.

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1 Dum. xiii.

13, 14.

Bign. iv.

360. Jom.

ii. 103, 104.

Bour. vii. 10.

Thiers, vi.

68, 69.

left behind, in a march of twenty days from Holland to Würzburg; a fact unparalleled, perhaps, in modern war. The troops of the other corps arrived at the places assigned them in the heart of Germany, after twenty-five or thirty days' journey from the coasts of the Channel, a distance of 150 leagues, without the rest of a day, and with scarcely any sick or stragglers falling off from their array.<sup>1</sup>

The army which Napoleon thus directed against the Imperialists was the most formidable, in respect of numbers, equipment, and discipline, which modern Europe had ever witnessed. It was divided into eight corps under the command of the most distinguished marshals of the empire. Then for the first time Napoleon gave it the name of the GRAND ARMY; a name like that of the Old Guard, which will be immortal in history. It consisted of 212,000 men, of whom 187,000 were French, and included 38,000 cavalry and 340 guns; and far exceeded, in discipline, efficiency, and equipment, any armament ever seen in modern times.\* The plan of Napoleon was to direct the corps of Ney, Soult, and Lannes, with the Imperial Guard and the cavalry under Murat, to Donauwörth and Dillingen: Davoust and Marmont were to march upon Neuburg; and Bernadotte, joined to the Bavarians, upon Ingolstadt; while Augereau, whose corps was conveyed by post from the distant harbour of Brest,

43.  
Composition  
and direc-  
tion of these  
forces.

\* The composition of this army was as follows:—

			MEN.
1st Corps, commanded by Bernadotte,	.	.	17,000
2d — — — Marmont,	.	.	20,000
3d — — — Davoust,	.	.	26,000
4th — — — Soult,	.	.	40,000
5th — — — Lannes,	.	.	18,000
6th — — — Ney,	.	.	24,000
7th — — — Augereau,	.	.	14,000
8th — — — Murat (cavalry),	.	.	22,000
9th, Guards, — Mortier and Bessières,	.	.	7,000
10th, Bavarians, — Wrede,	.	.	25,000

212,000

Besides 50,000 in Italy under Massena, and 20,000 in reserve under St-Cyr.—  
See JOMINI, ii. 104; DUMAS, xiii. 17, 18; THIERS, vi. 70, 71.

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received orders to cover the right flank of the invading army, and extend itself over the broken country which stretches from the Black Forest to the Alps of the Tyrol and the Grisons. This far-famed forest consists of a ridge of rocky hills and plateaus with precipitous sides, which lie between the valley of the Rhine and the sources of the Danube. They are for the most part covered with firs, the sombre hue of which has given its name to the region ; and the roads which traverse it lie in the bottom of deep ravines, shut in generally between precipices of considerable elevation. The Black Forest, as it lies directly between France and Austria, has, in all wars between the two countries, occupied a conspicuous place in military operations : but on this occasion its importance was in a great measure superseded by more extended operations. A single glance at the map will be sufficient to show that Napoleon's movements were calculated to envelop altogether the Austrian army, if they remained in heedless security in their advanced position in front of Ulm. For while the bulk of the French, under Napoleon in person, descended upon their right flank by Donauwörth, Bernadotte, with the corps from Hanover, got directly into their rear, and cut off the line of retreat to Vienna, while Augereau blocked up the entrance to the defiles of the Tyrol. It was of the utmost moment to the success of these great operations that the movements of the troops should, as long as possible, be concealed : and the despotic power of the French Emperor gave him every facility for the attainment of this object. A rigorous embargo was immediately imposed in all parts of the empire ; the post was everywhere stopped ; the troops were kept ignorant of the place of their destination ; and such were the effects of these measures, that they were far advanced on their way to the Rhine before it was known either to the cabinets of London or Vienna that they had broken up from the heights of Boulogne.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
105, 106.  
Dum. xiii.  
13, 15.  
Thiers, vi.  
77, 78.

The other corps of the army, traversing their own or a

friendly territory, experienced no obstacle on their march; but that of Bernadotte, in its route across Germany, from Hanover to Bavaria, came upon the Prussian state of Anspach. Napoleon was not a man to be restrained by such an obstacle; he had foreseen it, and given positive orders to Bernadotte to disregard the neutrality of that power. "You will traverse its territories," said he; "avoid resting there, make abundance of protestations in favour of Prussia, testify the greatest possible regard for its interests, and meanwhile pursue your march with rapidity, alleging as an excuse the impossibility of doing otherwise, which really is the fact." These instructions were punctually obeyed; and Bernadotte, at the head of sixty thousand men, including the Bavarians and corps of Marmont placed under his orders, disregarding the remonstrances of the local authorities, traversed the Prussian territory, and assembled around Eichstadt, with his advanced-guard on the Danube, between Neuburg and Ingolstadt, at the end of the first week of October. The master-stroke was delivered; the left wing of the French in great force was interposed between the Austrians and their own dominions, while they were reposing in fancied security around the ramparts of Ulm.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

44.

Violation of  
the PrussianOct. 8.  
1 Dum. xiii.  
27, 28.  
Bism. iv.  
345, 346.

Great was the astonishment and indignation at Berlin when the unexpected intelligence of this outrage upon their independence was received. It at once revealed the humiliating truth, long obvious to the rest of Europe, but which vanity and partiality to their own policy had hitherto concealed from the Prussian cabinet, that the alliance with France was based neither on a footing of equality, nor on any sense of mutual advantage; that it had been contracted by Napoleon only for purposes of ambition; that he neither respected nor feared their power; and that, after having made them the instruments of effecting the subjugation of other states, he would probably terminate by overturning their own independence. The weight of these considerations was

45.  
Great indignation excited by this at Berlin.  
Oct. 14.

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XL.  
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much increased by the recollection that this outrage had been inflicted by a nation whom, for ten years, it had been the policy of Prussia to conciliate by all the means in her power; while, on the other hand, the simple refusal to grant a passage through their territories had been sufficient to avert the march of the Russian troops, although the cabinet of Berlin had, during that time, been far from evincing the same compliance with the wishes of the Czar. These indignant feelings falling in with a secret sense of shame at the unworthy part they were about to take in the great contest for European independence which was approaching, produced a total alteration in the views of the Prussian cabinet; while the more generous and warlike party of the capital, at the head of which were the Queen, Prince Louis, and Baron Hardenberg, loudly gave vent to their indignation, and openly expressed their joy at the occurrence of a circumstance, which had at length opened the eyes of government to the ruinous consequences of the temporising policy which they had so long pursued.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
346, 347.  
Dum. xiii.  
28, 31.  
Hard. viii.  
476, 480.  
Thiers, vi.  
204.

46.  
Hostile  
measures  
adopted by  
the cabinet  
of Berlin.

All intercourse with the French embassy was immediately prohibited; an energetic note, demanding satisfaction, was forthwith presented to the minister of that power at Berlin; and permission was given to the Russian troops to traverse in their march the Prussian territories. The projected interview between the Czar and the Prussian monarch to adjust that matter was adjourned, as the difficulty had been solved by the measure of Napoleon; the troops which had been directed towards the Russian frontiers were countermanded; and three powerful armies of observation were formed,—one of sixty thousand men in Franconia, under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe; one in Lower Saxony of fifty thousand, under the Duke of Brunswick; and one in Westphalia of twenty thousand, under the command of the Prince of Hesse. This impolitic step of Napoleon is linked with many important consequences. It produced that burst of angry

feeling which at length brought Prussia into the lists with France in 1806. It is thus connected with the overthrow and long oppression of that power, and may be considered as one of the many causes, at this time entering into operation, which, in their ultimate results, produced the resurrection of European freedom, and the fall of the French empire.<sup>1</sup>

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XL.

130

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
346, 347.  
Dum. xiii.  
20, 31.  
Hard. viii.  
476, 480.

While the precipitance of Napoleon was thus producing a storm in the north of Germany, a treaty was concluded between Russia, England, and Sweden, by which the latter power engaged to furnish an auxiliary corps of twelve thousand men to act in Pomerania, in concert with a Russian force of double that amount, under the orders of Count Osterman Tolstoy. This army was to be further reinforced by the German Legion in the service of England; an addition which would raise it to nearly forty thousand men; an army, it was hoped, adequate not only to the task of reconquering the electorate of Hanover, for which it was immediately destined, but to determine at last the wavering conduct of Prussia, and give an impulse to the northern states of Germany, which might precipitate them in a united mass on the now almost defenceless frontiers of Holland and Flanders. Had Prussia boldly taken such a line, what a multitude of calamities might have been spared to itself and to Europe! More fortunate in the south than the north of Europe, Napoleon at this period concluded a convention with the court of Naples for the neutrality of that kingdom during the approaching contest. A negotiation was at the same time set on foot with the Holy See for the admission of a French garrison into Ancona; but the Pope had suffered too severely from the conquests and exactions of the Republicans to admit of such a concession; and both parties protracted the discussions with a view to gain time for the issue of military operations. These negotiations at either extremity of the line of operations might have been attended with important effects

47.

Measures  
concerted  
between  
Russia,  
Sweden,  
and E-  
land, i.e.  
the north  
of Ger-  
many, and  
neutrality  
of Naples

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
31, 33. Bign.  
iv. 356, 357.  
Bot. iv. 287.

upon the final issue of the war, if the crisis had been delayed for any considerable time. But Napoleon was meanwhile preparing those redoubtable strokes in the heart of Germany, which were calculated at once to prostrate the strength of Austria, intimidate or overawe the lesser powers, and frustrate the great combination formed by the English and Russian cabinets for the deliverance of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

48.  
Napoleon's  
proclamation  
to his  
troops.  
Sept. 27.

The Emperor arrived at Strassburg on the 27th September, and immediately addressed to his soldiers one of those heart-stirring proclamations which contributed almost as much as his military genius to the success of his arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the campaign of the third coalition has commenced: Austria has passed the Inn, violated its engagements, attacked and chased our ally from his capital. We will not again make peace without sufficient guarantees: our generosity shall not again make us forget what we owe to ourselves. You are but the advanced-guard of the great people. You may have forced marches to undergo, fatigues and privations to endure; but whatever obstacles we may encounter, we shall overcome them, and never taste of repose till we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies." To the Bavarian troops he thus addressed himself:—"Bavarian soldiers! I come to put myself at your head, to deliver your country from the most unjust aggression. The house of Austria wishes to destroy your independence, and incorporate you with its vast possessions. You will remain faithful to the memory of your ancestors, who, sometimes oppressed, were never subdued. I know your valour; and feel assured that after the first battle I shall be able to say with truth to your prince and my people—You are worthy to combat in the ranks of the Grand Army."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Bign. iv.  
362. Norv.  
ii. 386.

The movements of the opposite armies in Germany were now rapidly bringing matters to a crisis. Mack, at the first intelligence of the approach of the French

troops, had concentrated his forces at Ulm, Memmingen, and Stockach, with advanced posts in the defiles of the Black Forest, contemplating only an attack, as in former wars, in front, and expecting to be able to stem the torrent of such an invasion as effectually, in a defensive position, around the ramparts of Ulm, as Kray had done the incursion of Moreau in a previous campaign. He was in total ignorance of the great manœuvre of Napoleon in turning his flank with the French left wing, and interposing between his whole army and the Austrian frontier. This decisive movement, the knowledge of which had been carefully kept from the enemy, by means of a whole French corps diffused as light troops along the ridge behind which it was going forward, was now rapidly approaching its consummation. The united corps of Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, and Soult, with the Bavarians, a hundred thousand strong, had arrived at the same moment on the Danube in the rear of Mack, and without a moment's hesitation passed the river at Donauwörth, Neuburg, and Ingolstadt. Pursuing their course without interruption, they speedily arrived on the Austrian line of communication with Vienna; and by the middle of October, Marmont and Soult were established in great strength at Augsburg, directly on the road from the Imperial headquarters to the Hereditary States; while Napoleon himself, at the head of the remainder of his army, led by Murat and Ney, was pressing upon their right flank.<sup>1</sup>

Struck as by a thunderbolt by this formidable apparition in his rear, Mack had but one resource left, which was to have fallen back with all his forces to the Tyrol, the road to which was still open, and sought only to defend the approach to Vienna by accumulating a formidable mass in that vast fortress on the flank of the invading army. But the Austrian general had not resolution enough to adopt so daring a design, and probably the instructions of the Aulic Council fettered him to a more

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49.

Movements  
of the  
French  
troops to  
surround  
the Aus-  
trians.

Oct. 6 and 7.

Oct. 12.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii  
35, 38. Jom.  
ii. 108, 109.  
Norv. ii.  
388.

50.

Mack's  
defensive ar-  
1



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limited plan of operations. He confined himself, therefore, to concentrating his forces on the line of the Iller, between Ulm and Memmingen, hastily threw up intrenchments to defend the latter town, and, grouping his masses round the ramparts of the former, fronted to the eastward, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus unexpectedly appeared in his rear. At the same time he despatched orders to General Auffenberg, who commanded twelve battalions of grenadiers and four squadrons of cuirassiers at Innspruck, to join him by forced marches, and, as soon as he arrived, despatched him to support the corps of Keimayer, who was at the head of the vanguard near Donauwörth.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
41, 43. Jom.  
ii. 108, 109.

51.  
Four thousand Imperialists are cut to pieces by Murat.

The brave Imperialist, while pursuing, in unsuspecting security, his march to the place of his destination, suddenly found himself enveloped at Wertingen, four leagues from Donauwörth, by an immense body of French cavalry. It was the corps of Murat, eight thousand strong, which, rapidly sweeping round the Austrian infantry, menaced them on every side. In this extremity, Auffenberg formed his whole division into one great square, with the cuirassiers at the angles, and in that order boldly waited the attack of the enemy. Down came the French dragoons like a tempest, rending the air with their cries, and speedily swept away the Imperial horse stationed outside the infantry, while courageously resisting the immensely superior forces of the enemy. Still the square remained, and from its sides, fronting every way, there issued a redoubtable rolling fire, which reminded the French veterans of their own unceasing discharges at Mount Thabor and the Pyramids. The combat was long and obstinate: in vain Nansouty with the heavy dragoons charged them repeatedly on every side; the Imperialists stood firm; their sustained running fire brought down rank after rank of their assailants, and the issue of the combat seemed extremely doubtful, when the arrival of

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1805.

Oudinot with a brigade of French grenadiers changed the fortune of the day. These fresh troops, supported by cannon, opened a tremendous fire upon one angle of the square; the Austrians, worn out with fatigue, were staggered by the violence of the discharge, and Nansouty, seizing the moment of disorder, rushed in at the wavering part of the line, and in an instant an aperture was made which admitted several thousand of the enemy into the centre of the Austrian square. Collecting with heroic resolution the yet unbroken part of his troops, Auffenberg succeeded in forming a smaller square, which effected its retreat into some marshes in the neighbourhood of the Danube, which arrested the pursuit of the French horse: but three thousand prisoners, many standards, and all their artillery, remained in the hands of the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xlii.  
43, 45. Jom.  
in. 109. Bign.  
iv. 264.

Although the courage with which the Austrians fought on this occasion, appeared to the reflecting in every part of Europe a favourable augury for the final issue of the contest, yet to the inconsiderate multitude, who judge only from the result, the effect was very different, and the brilliant termination of the first action in the campaign was an event as animating to the French, as it was depressing to the Imperial soldiers. Napoleon, with his usual skill, availed himself of the opportunity to exhibit a spectacle which might electrify the minds of his troops. Two days after the action, he repaired in person to Zusmarshausen, where he passed in review all the corps who had been engaged in it; with his own hand distributed crosses, orders, and other recompenses to the most deserving; and pronounced a flattering eulogium on General Exelmans, when he presented the standards taken from the enemy. Another officer, who, attended by only two dragoons, had so imposed on the terrors of the broken Imperialists, the night after the action, as to make a hundred of them lay down their arms, received a place in the Imperial Guard. Never did

52.  
Recom-  
penses be-  
stowed by  
Napole  
the sold  
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Oct. 9.

CHAP. sovereign in modern times understand so completely the  
 XL. art of exciting enthusiasm in the minds of his followers,  
 1805. by the distinction conferred on individual merit, in what-  
 ever rank of the army; and it was as much owing to this  
 circumstance, as to the greatness of his military genius,  
 that the superior successes of the grand army, which he  
 commanded in person, compared with those at a distance  
 under the orders of his lieutenants, were owing.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
 365, 366.  
 Dum. xiii.  
 45, 46.

53.  
 The French  
 sweep en-  
 tirely round  
 h  
 10

While the powerful advanced-guards of the grand  
 army, viz., the corps of Ney on the left bank of the  
 Danube, and that of Murat on the right, were thus en-  
 gaging the whole attention of the enemy, the remainder  
 of that immense host, on the right and left, was rapidly  
 sweeping round the flanks and rear of the Austrian  
 troops. Soult soon joined Marmont at Augsburg; the  
 Imperial Guards were shortly after established at the  
 same place; Davoust, with his numerous and well-ap-  
 pointed corps, arrived at Aicha, all directly in the rear of  
 the Imperialists: while the corps of Keimayer, almost  
 enveloped in such immense masses, deemed itself for-  
 tunate in being able to effect its retreat, by the bridge  
 of Neuburg, into Bavaria and the city of Munich.  
 Thither it was immediately followed by the corps of  
 Bernadotte, who established himself in that capital,  
 while the troops of Marmont and Davoust were moved  
 in the same direction, with the view of forming a power-  
 ful army of observation, which might repel any attempt  
 on the part of the Russians, or the Austrian reservès  
 from the Hereditary States, to disengage the army of  
 Mack, now entirely surrounded by the French forces.  
 But information soon arrived that the Russians were at

8th and 9th  
 October.

\* Generosity, as well as excellence of military conduct, attracted the notice of the Emperor. At the passage of the Lech, a corporal who had been cashiered by his superior officer on account of some irregularity of discipline, beheld that officer on the point of perishing in the waves of the river. Forgetting what he had suffered at his hand, the brave man plunged in and saved him. The Emperor caused him to be brought into his presence, and after publicly eulogising his conduct, appointed him to a situation round his own person, and gave him the star of the Legion of Honour.—BIGNON, iv. 365, 366.

such a distance as to be unable to take any part in the decisive operations which were approaching; and therefore Bernadotte alone was left in observation in Bavaria, and the other corps were drawn in a circle round the north and east of the Austrians at Ulm. Ney, in particular, was directed to occupy all the bridges over the Danube, and push forward his advanced-guards on the left bank of the river, to give instantaneous warning of any attempt which the enemy might make to break through the net which surrounded him, and regain Bohemia by passing the rear and communications of the grand army.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
49, 52. Jour.  
ii. 110, 111.

Mack, instead of falling back to the Tyrol, which was the only way of retreat that now really remained to him, and where he might have formed a junction with the troops in that province, and in the north of Italy, and formed a mass fully 180,000 strong in all, persisted in the idea that, by directing the mass of his forces to the north-east, he might yet regain the Bohemian frontier, and thus preserve the communication with the Russians, which was of such importance to ulterior operations. He therefore moved forward all his troops, as they successively arrived from the Black Forest and the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, in that direction, and on the 8th October established his own headquarters at Burgau, midway between Ulm and Augsburg. Meanwhile the defence of Ulm was intrusted to General Jellachich, who laboured assiduously, night and day, not only with the garrison, but with the whole inhabitants of the town and five thousand peasants from the vicinity, in strengthening the works on the heights adjoining the place. Between the 5th and 8th of October, the movement of the Austrian army was completed: it now faced towards Bavaria and the Lech, having its left resting on the Danube, over which it still held the bridges of Ulm and Günzburg. The latter post being of great importance to the Austrians, was occupied by eight thousand of their best troops. They were there

54.  
Measures of  
Mack to ex-  
tricate him-  
self.

CHAP. attacked by Marshal Ney, at the head of superior forces,  
 XL. and after a bloody conflict the bridge was carried at the  
 1805. point of the bayonet, and the Imperialists driven out of  
 the town with the loss of above two thousand men.  
 Disconcerted by this check, and despairing, from the vast  
 accumulation of forces on the banks of the Danube and  
 Lech, of success in any attempt to break through in that  
 direction, Mack withdrew his headquarters to Ulm; and  
 Ney, rapidly following his footsteps, narrowed the circle  
 on the north and east, within which the Austrians in that  
 city were enveloped.<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 10.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.

53, 56. Norv.

ii. 389, 390.

55.

Bloody com-

bat at Hass-

lach.

Oct. 11.

At this time Murat, under whose orders the corps of  
 Ney had been placed, expecting an attack upon his posi-  
 tion on the right bank of the Danube, directed Ney to  
 cross over by Günzburg and Elchingen to his support.  
 That marshal did so, leaving, however, on the left bank  
 his advanced-guard, consisting of Dupont's division at  
 Albeck, and that of Barraguay d'Hilliers at Langenau.  
 In their advance towards Ulm, Dupont's division encoun-  
 tered a body of Austrians, twenty thousand strong, posted  
 in an admirable situation at Hasslach, and supported by  
 a powerful artillery in position on the rugged heights  
 which adjoin that hamlet. The French were so far ad-  
 vanced before they perceived the strength of the enemy,  
 which was more than double their own, that retreat was  
 impossible, while attack seemed hopeless. In these cir-  
 cumstances, Dupont took the most audacious, often in  
 such situations the most prudent course. He vigorously  
 assailed the enemy, and, in the evening, the arrival of  
 successive reinforcements in some degree restored the  
 equality of the combat. The weight of the contest took  
 place at the village of Jungingen, which was taken and  
 retaken six times during the course of the day. But  
 although they maintained a heroic struggle with inferior  
 forces at that point, the French were unsuccessful at  
 others; their cavalry having been overthrown by the  
 Imperialist horse, who assailed them in rear, and their

cannon and baggage swept off by their redoubtable cuirassiers, and brought in triumph to the walls of Ulm. At night Dupont retired to Albeck, leaving, indeed, a third of his troops on the field of battle, but justly proud of having, with forces so inferior, maintained so honourable a combat, and bringing with him, as a set-off against the loss of his artillery, nearly two thousand prisoners, taken, during the terrible strife in the village, from the Imperial infantry. This glorious combat was of the most vital importance to Napoleon's operations, and, in fact, was the immediate cause of their extraordinary success; for, by barring the road to Bohemia, it threw the Austrians back on the beleaguered position of Ulm, round which the French forces were now drawing in every direction.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
114. Dum.  
xiii. 57, 62.  
Bism. iv.  
376. Thiers,  
vi. 104, 106.

The honour of the Austrian arms was in some degree maintained by the divided trophies of this bloody conflict; but it was shortly after severely tarnished by a less creditable transaction at Memmingen. The following day, Mack ordered Werneck to follow up Dupont with his division, while Laudon, to cover Werneck's right flank, was pushed on to Elchingen. At the same time he directed Jellachich to march with his division in all haste to Memmingen, to reinforce the garrison of that place, and keep open his communications with the Tyrol. That general, however, arrived too late, and, finding the town already in the hands of the enemy, and fearing that, if he retreated towards Ulm, he would be cut off, he threw himself into the mountains of the Tyrol. On the 11th October, Soult was detached by Napoleon, with his whole corps, from Augsburg, against this town, and after cutting to pieces a regiment of Austrian cuirassiers, whom he encountered on his road, he completed the investment of the place on the 13th. The garrison, four thousand strong, destitute of provisions, intimidated by the great display of force which appeared round their walls, and discouraged by the disastrous issue of the combats which had hitherto taken place, capitulated on the first summons; and then began

56,  
Capitulation of four thousand Austrians in Memmingen, and complete investment of Ulm.

Oct. 13.

CHAP. that ruinous system of laying down their arms in large  
 XL. bodies which, during this campaign, more even than their  
 1805. numerous disasters, tarnished the honour of the Imperial  
 armies. Rapidly pursuing his success, Soult, on the day  
 following, crossed the Iller, and with three of his divisions  
 marched to Biberach, so as to bar the road to Upper  
 Suabia, which hitherto had lain open to the enemy, while  
 the fourth took post on the south-east, before the ramparts  
 of Ulm, where they were shortly after joined by the corps  
 of Marmont and Lannes. On the same day, Napoleon,  
 with the Imperial Guard, advanced from the neighbour-  
 hood of Augsburg to Burgau, and established his head-  
 quarters there for the night; while Ney, on the north,  
 completed the circle of enemies drawn round the unhappy  
 Imperialists. The fate of Mack was already sealed: a  
 hundred thousand French were grouped round the ram-  
 parts of Ulm, where fifty thousand Austrians, in deep  
 dejection, were accumulated together.<sup>1</sup>

m. ii.  
 , 116.  
 Dum. xiii.  
 67, 68. Bign.  
 iv. 368.  
 Thiers, vi.  
 107, 108.

57.  
 Napoleon's  
 address to  
 his soldiers  
 at the bridge  
 of the Lech.

In advancing to Burgau, at the head of his Guards, Napoleon came, at the bridge of the Lech, upon the corps of Marmont, which had been established there on the preceding day. The weather was dreadful; the snow already fell in heavy flakes; the cold was intense; and the soldiers, burdened not only with their arms, but with provisions for several days in every man's knapsack, were slowly toiling over a road rendered almost impassable by the multitude of carriages which had already furred its surface. Insensible to the severity of the weather, Napoleon instantly halted, dismissed his own suite to a distance, formed the private soldiers into a dense circle around him, and there harangued them for half an hour, in a loud voice, on the situation and prospects of the campaign. He thanked them for the constancy with which they had encountered difficulties and endured privations the severest to which they could be exposed in war; demonstrated to them the situation of the enemy, cut off from his own country, surrounded by superior forces, and obliged to fight,

as at Marengo, in order to open the only avenue which remained for his escape. In the great battle which was approaching, he confidently promised them victory, if they continued to act with the resolution and constancy which they had hitherto evinced. This speech, the circumstances of which as much resemble the harangues of the Roman generals to their legions, as they are characteristic of the French army at that period, and the peculiar turn of mind in their chief, was listened to with profound attention. No sooner was it concluded than shouts and warlike exclamations broke out on all sides, and the joyful visages of the soldiers demonstrated that they fully appreciated the immense advantages which their own exertions and the skill of their chief had already secured for them.<sup>1</sup>

While the formidable legions of Napoleon were thus closing round the Imperial array, the most stormy debates were taking place at the headquarters at Ulm as to the course which should be pursued. Fully alive, as all were, to the extent and imminence of the danger, opinions were yet painfully divided as to the means of salvation which remained to the army. On the one hand, it was urged that the only chance of safety which was left, was to form the troops into one solid mass, and attempt to force a passage towards either Bohemia or the Tyrol; on the other, that the most advisable course was to detach the Archduke Ferdinand with the cavalry and light troops towards the former of these provinces, while Mack himself held Ulm, from whence he might hope either to be delivered by the Russians, or effect his retreat into the latter. A more fatal resolution than that of dividing their forces, in presence of such an enemy, could not possibly have been adopted. But the urgent necessity of providing, at all hazards, for the escape of a member of the Imperial house, overpowered every other consideration: and it was ultimately determined that Mack, with the bulk of the army, should run the hazard of remaining at Ulm, to engage the attention of the enemy, while the

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xliii.  
66, 68. B'gn.  
iv. 369, 370.

58.  
Mack resolves to detach the Archduke Ferdinand to Bohemia, and himself remain at Ulm.  
Oct. 13.



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archduke endeavoured, at the head of the cavalry and light troops, to gain the Bohemian mountains. In a military point of view, there could be no doubt that the only plan left was to have retired to the Tyrol, where, by drawing together all his forces, Mack might still have assembled 170,000 combatants ; but such a measure would have been an entire departure from the orders of the Aulic Council, which contemplated nothing of the kind, and would have required for its adoption a general wielding the despotic powers of Frederick or Napoleon.<sup>1</sup>

112. Norv.  
ii. 392, 393.  
Thiers, vi.  
108.

59.  
Description  
of the Aus-  
trian posi-  
tion at El-  
chingen.

At the same moment that this desperate resolution was formed by the Austrian generals, Napoleon was preparing for a general attack, on the following day, on the position which they occupied. He ordered Ney to proceed to Elchingen, and there cross the Danube, so as to regain his original position on the left bank, and advance along it towards Ulm ; and he was to be supported, if necessary, by Lannes and Murat. His army would thus form a vast circle round Ulm, at the distance of about two leagues from the ramparts. The advanced posts of the two armies were everywhere in presence of each other. Early on the following morning, Napoleon himself ascended to the chateau of Adelhausen, from the elevated terrace of which he was surveying, by the advancing line of fire, the progress of his tirailleurs in driving in the outposts of the enemy, when his attention was arrested by a violent cannonade on the right. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney, who, at the head of sixteen thousand men, was commencing an attack on the bridge and abbey of ELCHINGEN. The Austrians, fifteen thousand strong, with forty pieces of cannon, under Laudon, had there established themselves in one of the strongest positions which could be imagined. The village of the same name, composed of successive piles of stone houses intersected at right angles by streets, rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the banks of the Danube to a large convent which crowns the summit of the ascent. All the exposed points on these

heights were lined with artillery, all the windows filled with musketeers. The bridge over the Danube had been only imperfectly destroyed by the Austrians on the preceding day; but the tottering arches were commanded by the cannon and infantry with which all the opposite heights were covered; and they still had a strong advanced-guard on the southern bank of the river.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Personal  
observation  
Dum. xliii.  
72. Jom.:  
118. Thier:  
vi. 109.

Undeterred by such formidable obstacles, Ney approached with his usual intrepidity to the attack. He had, on several late occasions, had warm altercations with Murat, whose temper, naturally warm, had been rendered doubly arrogant by his recent elevation. On one of these occasions, when Ney had been explaining to him his plan of attack, he had replied that he could not be troubled with such long designs, and that for his part he never formed his plan but in presence of the enemy. Stung by the undeserved reproach, Ney resolved to outdo even that fearless cavalier in personal daring. Dressed in full uniform, he was everywhere to be seen at the head of the columns, leading the soldiers to the conflict, or rallying such as were staggering under the close and murderous fire of the Austrians. Nothing could at first resist the impetuosity of the French: the Imperial outposts on the south bank of the river were attacked with such vigour that the assailants passed the bridge pell-mell with the fugitives, and, hotly pursuing them up the streets, arrived at the foot of the vast walls of the convent at the summit. There they were arrested by a severe plunging fire from the top of the battlements; while the Imperialists, who had been forced from the streets, took a strong position on their right, from whence they enfiladed the front of the abbey, and threatened to retake the town. Thither they were speedily followed by the French. The same division which had forced the passage of the bridge advanced in the van of the attacking column; and a desperate conflict ensued in front of the wood, which the Austrians held with invincible resolution. In vain the

CO.  
Combat of  
Schlingen.  
(ct. 14.)

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French brought up fresh columns to the fight. The regiments of the Archduke Charles and of Erlach, with heroic bravery, made good their ground, and, though reduced to a fourth of their numbers, still maintained, at the close of the day, their glorious defence. But towards evening, Laudon, though still in possession of the wood and abbey, found that his position was no longer tenable. The French, now in full possession of the bridge, had caused large bodies both of horse and foot to defile over. Already their cavalry were sweeping round the Austrian rear, and menacing their communications; and at length he retired, having sustained a loss in that desperate strife of fifteen hundred killed and wounded, and two thousand prisoners.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
72, 74. Jom.  
ii. 118, 119.

393, 394.  
Ney, ii. 218.  
Thiers, vi.  
110, 113.

61.  
Retreat of  
the Arch-  
duke Ferdi-  
nand with  
great loss.  
Oct. 15.

The resistance of these gallant troops, though fatal to too many of themselves, proved the salvation of the Archduke Ferdinand, and preserved the house of Hapsburg from the disgrace of having one of its princes fall a prisoner into the hands of the enemy. During the desperate strife at Elchingen, the Archduke disposed the troops with which his sortie was to be effected into two divisions, with the one of which, consisting of five thousand cavalry, he set out on the road to Geislingen and Aalen, while Werneck, at the head of the other, moved upon Albeck and Herdenheim: the two were to unite at Nördlingen. The latter corps fell, with forces greatly superior, upon the division of Dupont, stationed between Albeck and Langenau, already severely weakened by the combat at Hasslach; and those brave troops were on the point of being overwhelmed by superior numbers, when Murat, with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, came up to their support. The arrival of these reinforcements gave the French as great

\* It is from this glorious action that Marshal Ney's title of Duke of Elchingen was taken. He exposed his person without hesitation throughout the day, and seemed even to court death; but fate reserved him for greater destinies, and a more melancholy death.—JOMINI, ii. 118.

a superiority of numbers as their adversaries had previously possessed, and the Austrians were compelled to retire before nightfall in the direction of Herdenheim. On the day following they were again assailed in their march by Murat, who made eighteen hundred prisoners from their weary columns; but having been joined by the Archduke, at the head of the cavalry, the remainder resolutely continued their endeavours to force their way through the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

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Oct. 16.  
1 Jom. ii.  
124. Rapp.  
39, 41. Dum.  
xiii. 92, 95.

With characteristic adherence to old custom, even in circumstances where it is least advisable to follow it, the Imperialists had encumbered this light corps, whose safety depended on the celerity of its movements, with five hundred waggons, heavily laden. These were speedily charged by the French horse, and captured, with all the drivers and escort by which they were accompanied. Despairing, after these disasters, of bringing his infantry in safety through the hourly increasing masses of his pursuers, the Archduke in the night continued his retreat with the light horse, and by great exertions reached Donauwörth. The vigour and celerity of the French pursuit were unexampled. Some of the divisions, in dreadful weather, and through roads almost impassable for carriages, marched twelve leagues a-day. The cavalry were continually on horseback; and, animated by the prospect of gaining so brilliant a prize, the troops of all arms made the utmost efforts in the pursuit. But the perseverance and skill of the Austrian cavalry triumphed over every obstacle; and after surmounting a thousand dangers, the Archduke succeeded in crossing the Altmuhl, and, by Riedenburg and Ratisbon, gaining the Bohemian frontier, where he was at length enabled to give some days' repose to his wearied followers. But it was with a few hundred horse alone that he escaped from the pursuit. The remainder of the corps, exhausted with fatigue, and despairing of safety, were surrounded in the neighbourhood of Nördlingen, at Trochtelfingen,<sup>2</sup> by the cavalry of

62.  
Surrender  
of Werneck  
with 9000  
men.

Oct. 18.  
2 Thiers, vi.  
116, 117.  
Dum. xiii.  
92, 97. Jom  
ii. 124, 1.  
Norv. ii.  
397, 398.  
Rapp 39  
44.

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1805.

63.  
The heights  
round Ulm  
are carried  
by Napo-  
leon.

Murat, and to the number of eight thousand men laid down their arms.

While these astonishing successes were rewarding the activity of Murat's corps, Napoleon in person was daily contracting the circle which confined the main body of the Imperialists around the ramparts of Ulm. This city, which has since become so celebrated from the disasters which the Austrians there experienced, is surrounded by a wall flanked with bastions and a deep ditch ; but it lies in the bottom of a valley, overhung on the north by the heights of Michelsberg and La Tuileries, which command it in every part. These heights, during the campaign of 1800, had been covered by a vast intrenched camp, constructed by the provident wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and it was by their aid that Kray was enabled to arrest the victorious army of Moreau for six weeks before its walls. Totally destroyed by the French after the evacuation of that city, these works had been hastily attempted to be reconstructed by Mack, after he saw his retreat cut off in the present campaign : but the ramparts were incomplete ; the redoubts, unarmed, were little better than a heap of rubbish ; and the garrison had not a sufficient force at their disposal to man the extensive lines which were in preparation. The consequence was that these important heights, the real defence of Ulm, fell an easy prey to the enemy. Animated by the presence of the Emperor, who had established his headquarters at Elchingen, and in person directed the operations, the French troops cheerfully advanced amidst torrents of rain, and almost up to the knees in mud, to the attack. Ney speedily carried the Michelsberg, while Suchet made himself master of La Tuileries ; and before nightfall the French bombs established on the heights were carrying terror and death into every part of the city.<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 18.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
80, 84. Jom.  
ii. 120, 122.  
Personal ob-  
servation.

Arrived on the heights of the Michelsberg, Napoleon beheld Ulm, crowded with troops, stretched out within

half cannon-shot at his feet, while the positions occupied by his legions precluded all chance of escape to the Austrian army, now reduced by its repeated losses to little

than thirty thousand combatants. Satisfied that they could not escape him, and encouraged by the surrender of Werneck, of which he had just received accounts, he summoned Mack to capitulate, and returning himself to his headquarters at Elchingen, despatched an officer of his staff, Philippe de Ségur, to conduct the negotiation. Mack at first was persuaded, or attempted to make the French believe he was persuaded, that his situation was by no means desperate, and that he would in a short time be succoured by his allies. He accordingly expressed the greatest indignation at the mention of a capitulation; insisted that the Russians were within five days' march; and ultimately only agreed to surrender if in eight days he was not relieved. "You behold," said he, "men resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity, if you do not grant them eight days. I can maintain myself longer. There are in Ulm three thousand horses, which we shall consume before surrendering, with as much pleasure as you would do in our place."—"Three thousand horses!" replied Ségur; "Ah! Marshal, the want which you experience must already be severe indeed, when you think of so sad a resource!" Mack, however, continued firm, and Ségur returned to Napoleon's headquarters to give an account of his unsuccessful mission.<sup>1</sup>

Certain that the Austrians could not be relieved within the time specified by their general, Napoleon sent back Ségur, with a written ultimatum, granting the eight days, counting from the 17th, the first day when the blockade was held to have been established, which in effect reduced the eight days to six. "Eight days, or death!" replied the Austrian general, and at the same time he published a proclamation,\* in which he denounced the punishment of death against any one who

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1805.

64.

tions for the  
surrender of  
Mack.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vii.  
25, 27. Dum.  
xiii. 84, 86.  
Rapp, Mé-  
moires, 28,  
31.

65.  
They capitulate at first  
conditionally.

\* The proclamation was in these terms:—"In the name of his Majesty, I

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1805.

should mention the word "surrender!" Shortly after, Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the French headquarters. His astonishment and confusion were extreme, when the bandage was removed from his eyes, and he found himself in presence of the Emperor and his brilliant staff. The Emperor began the conversation, by painting in the gloomiest colours the situation of the Austrian army. He cited the example of Jaffa, where he had been obliged to put the garrison, four thousand strong, to the sword, and declared that similar obstinacy would involve the Imperial army in the same lamentable fate. He pointed out the hopelessness of all ideas of rescue from the Russians, who had not reached the Bohemian frontier, and the increase which his blockading force would soon receive from the troops who had been victorious over Werneck, and captured the garrison of Memmingen.\* The prince returned to Ulm with these untoward tidings; and Mack, fallen suddenly from the height of confidence to the depth of despair, agreed to surrender. On the 19th the capitulation was signed, by which the fortress of Ulm was to be given up, and the whole army to lay down its arms, on the 25th, if not before that time relieved by the Russian or Austrian armies.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rapp, 35, 36. Jom. ii. 424. Dum. xiii. 87, 88. Bour. vii. 35. See the capitulation in Dum. xiii. 396.

These terms were sufficiently disgraceful to the Austrian arms; but Mack had not yet exhausted the cup of humiliation. Napoleon, to whom every hour was precious,

render responsible, on their honour, and their duty, all the generals and superior officers who should mention the word 'surrender,' or who should think of anything but the most obstinate defence—a defence which cannot require to be prolonged for any considerable time, as in a very few days the advanced-guards of an Imperial and a Russian army will appear before Ulm to deliver us. The enemy's army is in the most deplorable situation, as well from the want of provisions as the severity of the weather: it is impossible that he can maintain the blockade beyond a few days; and as to trying an assault, it could only be done by little detachments: our ditches are deep, our bastions strong; nothing is more easy than to destroy the assailants. Should provisions fail, we have more than three thousand horses, which will maintain us for a considerable time."—DUM. xiii. 87.

\* "You expect the Russians?" said Napoleon: "Do you really, then, not know that they have not yet reached Bohemia? Do you suppose I am not

and who already began to experience the inconvenience of so great an accumulation of men without magazines at a single point, perceiving the weakness of the adversary with whom he had to deal, sent for Mack to his headquarters at Elchingen, and there so completely bewildered him by a recital of the disasters which had attended the army, and the impossibility of their either being relieved by the Russians or escaping to the defiles of the Tyrol, that the unhappy man, who had now entirely lost his senses, agreed to evacuate the place and surrender on the following day, on condition that the corps of Ney should not quit Ulm till the 25th. In this way, without any reason whatever, the whole other troops in the blockade, amounting to nearly seventy thousand men, were rendered instantly disposable for ulterior operations.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

66.

And ther  
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1. Jom.

127. 1

xiii. 34. 36.

Rapp, 36.

In consequence of this new article in the capitulation, a spectacle took place on the 20th unparalleled in modern warfare, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that memorable morning, the garrison of Ulm, thirty thousand strong, with sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay down its arms. Napoleon, surrounded by a numerous and magnificent staff, took his station before the fire of a bivouac on a rocky eminence, forming part of the heights on the north of the city. For five hours the immense array defiled before him—the men in the deepest dejection, the officers in sullen despair, at the unparalleled disgrace  
67.  
The army of  
Mack defiles  
before Napo-  
leon.  
Oct. 20.

fully informed as to your situation? If I let you return on your parole, who will assure me that the soldiers at least will not immediately, in defiance of the capitulation, be employed against me? I have too often already been the dupe of such artifices on the part of your generals. This is not an ordinary war: after the conduct of your government, I have no measures to keep with it. It is you who have attacked me; I have no faith in your promises. Mack might engage for himself, but he could not do so for his soldiers. If the Archduke Ferdinand were here, I could trust him; but I know he is not. He has crossed the Danube; but I will get hold of him yet. Do you suppose I am to be made a fool of? Here is the capitulation of Memmingen; show it to your general; I will grant him no other: the officers alone can be allowed to return into Austria: the soldiers must be prisoners of war. The longer he delays, the worse will be his ultimate fate.”—BOUR. vii. 31, 33.



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1805.

which had befallen their arms. Klenau, Giulay, Lichtenstein, were there — names celebrated in the achievements of former wars, and destined to acquire still greater distinction in those more glorious ones, which followed. Napoleon addressed himself to these brave men in delicate and touching terms: “Gentlemen,” said he, “war has its chances. Often victorious, you must expect sometimes to be vanquished. Your master wages against me an unjust war. I say it candidly, I know not for what I am fighting; I know not what he desires of me. He has wished to remind me that I was once a soldier; I trust he will find that I have not forgot my original avocation. I will, however, give one piece of advice to my brother the Emperor of Germany,— Let him hasten to make peace; this is the moment to remember *that there are limits to all empires, however powerful*. The idea that the House of Lorraine may come to an end, should inspire him with distrust of fortune. I want nothing on the Continent: it is *ships, colonies, and commerce which I desire*; and their acquisition would be as advantageous to you as to me.” Thus spoke Napoleon on the 20th October 1805: on the day following, the empire of the seas was for ever wrested from his arms by the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar, and on that day eight years he himself was flying from a greater disaster to the arms of France, sustained on the field of Leipsic.<sup>1</sup>\*

Little anticipating these calamities, the Emperor

\* As the procession of captives continued to defile before him, Napoleon said to the Austrian generals,—“It is truly deplorable that such honourable men as yourselves, whose names are spoken of with honour wherever you have combated, should be made the victims of an insane cabinet, intent on the most chimerical projects. It was already a sufficient crime to have attacked me in the midst of peace, without any declaration of war: but this offence is trivial to that of bringing into the heart of Europe a horde of barbarians, and allowing an Asiatic power to mix itself up with our disputes. Instead of attacking me without a cause, the Aulic Council should rather have united their forces to mine, in order to repel the Russian force. Their present alliance is monstrous; it is the alliance of the dogs and wolves against the sheep. Had France fallen in the strife, you would not have been long of perceiving the error you had committed.” At this moment, a general officer recounted

On 20th Oct.  
1813.  
1 Bign. iv.  
374, 375.  
Thom. xiii.  
).

enjoyed the splendid spectacle which was going forward. Under the appearance of perfect calmness, he concealed a mind intoxicated with the glory which surrounded him.

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XL.

The Imperial soldiers, amidst all their misfortunes, were filled with admiration at the conqueror by whom they had been overcome : as they defiled before him, the march of the columns insensibly became slower, and every eye was turned to the hero who filled the world with his renown. But when they had passed, the recollection of their situation fell at once upon them, and without waiting till they arrived at the place where their arms were to be deposited, and in defiance of the commands of their officers, they threw them violently on the ground, and from the vast and now disorderly array a confused murmur of grief and indignation arose. In the French army, on the other hand, nothing but joy and exultation were to be seen : never had the enthusiasm of the soldiers been so great, never their devotion to the Emperor so unbounded ; and reviewing the movements of the campaign by which these astonishing successes had been gained, the veterans said to each other, "The little corporal has discovered a new method of carrying on war—he makes more use of our legs than our bayonets."<sup>1</sup>\*

68.  
Feelings of  
the two  
armies on  
the occasion.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
101. Rapp,  
37.

Ever anxious to make his greatest successes the means of exciting additional feelings of exultation in the inhabitants of his capital, Napoleon sent to the conservative senate of Paris the forty standards taken from the army at Ulm, accompanied by a flattering message, in which he

69.  
Napoleon's  
message to  
the senate.

aloud an insulting expression which he had heard from the common soldiers in regard to the Austrian captives. "You must have little respect for yourselves," said Napoleon to his troops, with an air of marked displeasure, "to insult men bowed down by such a misfortune."—SAVARY, i. 101, 102.

\* During the rapid and complicated movements which led to the capture of Ulm, the Emperor was indefatigable in his exertions. For three days and nights he hardly ever undressed, and was almost incessantly on horseback ; in the rudest weather he shared the fare and hardships of the meanest of his soldiers. In vain was he expected by the authorities at Augsburg, and magnificent preparations made for his reception ; he slept in the villages, surrounded by his staff, in the humble cottages of the peasants.—BIGNON, iv. 376.

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said:—"Senators, behold in this present which the sons of the Grand Army make to their fathers, a proof of the satisfaction which I experience at the manner in which you have seconded my efforts. And you, Frenchmen, make your brothers march; let them hasten to combat at our sides, in order that we may be able, without further effusion of blood or additional efforts, to repel far from our frontiers all the armies which the gold of England has assembled for our destruction. A month has not elapsed since I predicted to you that the Emperor and the army would do their duty; I am impatient for the moment when I may be able to say, 'The people have done theirs.'" Careful, at the same time, to secure the attachment of his allies, he sent six pieces of cannon to the Duke of Würtemberg, and twenty-five thousand muskets to the Elector of Bavaria. Shortly after, he addressed to his soldiers one of those proclamations which so often electrified Europe, by the stupendous successes which they commemorated, and the nervous eloquence in which they were couched. On this occasion it was hardly possible to exaggerate the triumphs of the army: with a loss not exceeding eight thousand men, they had taken or destroyed nearly eighty thousand of their enemies.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
130. Dum.  
xiii. 103,  
104.

The blame of these disasters was wholly laid, by the Austrian government, on General Mack; he was in consequence subjected to a court of inquiry, and condemned to imprisonment for twenty years. Upon the conclusion of the war, Napoleon interceded for him, but in vain.

His proclamation to his soldiers.

\* "Soldiers of the Grand Army! in fifteen days we have concluded a campaign! We have kept our promise; we have chased the troops of Austria from the Bavarian territories, and re-established our ally in the possession of his states. The army which, with so much ostentation and presumption, had advanced to our frontiers, is annihilated. But what signifies that to England? We are no longer at Boulogne, and her subsidies will be neither greater nor less. Of a hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they will replace our conscripts in the labours of the fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, their whole park of ammunition, and ninety standards, are in our power; of that whole army not fifteen thousand have escaped. Soldiers! I announced to you a great battle; but, thanks to the faulty combinations of the enemy, I have obtained these great advantages without incurring any risk; and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, this great result

Historic justice, however, requires that it should be stated, that although this unfortunate general was obviously inadequate to the difficult task imposed upon him of commanding a great army which was to combat Napoleon; and although he evidently lost his judgment, and unnecessarily agreed to a disgraceful abridgment of the period of the capitulation at the close of the negotiations, yet the whole disasters of the campaign are not to be visited on his head. The improvidence of the Imperial government, the faults of the Aulic Council, have also much to answer for. Mack's authority was not firmly established in the army; the great name of the Archduke Ferdinand overshadowed his influence; the necessity of providing for the safety of a prince of the Imperial house overbalanced every other consideration, and compelled, against his judgment, that division of the troops to which the unexampled disasters which followed may immediately be ascribed.<sup>1</sup> In the memoir in his own vindication, which he laid before the council of war by which he was tried, he ascribed all the misfortunes which followed to this sad necessity, and positively asserted that the division of his forces, from which such disastrous results followed, was imposed on him by the council of war at Ulm against his will.\* It is reasonable to impute to this unfortunate general extreme improvidence in remaining so long at Ulm, when Napoleon's legions were closing around him, and great weakness of judgment, to give it no severer name, in

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XL.

1805.

70.

The blame  
of these dis-  
asters really  
divided be-  
tween Mack  
and the  
Aulic Coun-  
cil.

<sup>1</sup> Rapp, 36.  
Jom. ii. 130.

has not weakened us by the loss of fifteen hundred men. Soldiers, this astonishing success is owing to your boundless confidence in your Emperor—to your patience in undergoing fatigues—to your rare intrepidity! But we will not rest here. Already I see you are burning to commence a second campaign. The gold of England has brought against us the Russian army from the extremities of the universe; we will make it undergo the same fate. To that combat is, in an especial manner, attached the honour of the French infantry. It is there that is to be decided for the second time that question, already resolved in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the first or second in Europe. There are no generals there whom it would add to my glory to vanquish. All my care shall be to obtain the victory with as little effusion of blood as possible. My soldiers are my children." Amidst his customary exaggeration, there was much truth in this proclamation.—RAPP, 47, 48.

\* See THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vi. 118.

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1805.

afterwards capitulating without trying some great effort, with concentrated forces, to effect his escape. But there appears no reason to suppose, as the Austrian government did, that he wilfully betrayed their interests to Napoleon; and it is to be recollected, in extenuation of his faults, that his authority, controlled by the Aulic Council, was in some degree shared with an assembly of officers, which, it is proverbially known, never adopts a bold resolution; and that he was at the head of troops habituated to the discreditable custom of laying down their arms, on the first reverse, in large bodies.

71.  
Errors of  
cabinet  
enna

real plan of  
the cam-  
paign.

While these stupendous events were paralysing the Imperial strength in the centre of Germany, the campaign had been opened, and was already fiercely contested on Italian plains. The Aulic Council, from whose errors the European nations have suffered so often and so deeply, had, in the general plan of the campaign, committed three capital faults. The first was that of commencing a menacing offensive war in Germany with the weaker of their two principal armies. The second, that of remaining on the defensive in Italy, in presence of inferior forces, with the greatest array which the monarchy had on foot. The third, that of retaining in useless inactivity a considerable body of men, with no enemy whatever to combat, in the Tyrol, which might on several occasions have cast the balance in the desperate struggles which took place to the north and south of its mountains. While Mačk, with eighty thousand men, was pushed forward to bear the weight of the Grand Army, of double that strength, in the valley of the Danube, the Archduke Charles, with above ninety thousand, was retained in a state of inactivity on the Adige, in presence of Massena, who had only fifty thousand; and twenty thousand more were scattered over the Tyrol, where they had no more formidable enemy in their front than the peaceful shepherds of Helvetia.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
130. Dum.  
xiii. 108,  
109.

No sooner was the cabinet of Vienna made aware, from the rapid march of Napoleon's troops across Germany,

and the distance at which the Russians still were from the scene of action, of the imminent danger to which their army in Suabia was exposed, than they despatched orders to the Archduke Charles to remain on the defensive, and to detach all the disposable troops at his command to the succour of Mack at Ulm. That gallant prince, accordingly, restrained the impetuosity of his numerous and disciplined battalions on the Adige; retained his forces on the left bank of that stream, and detached thirty regiments across the Tyrol towards Germany. By this means he lost the initiative, often of incalculable importance, at least with able commanders and superior forces, in war; was compelled to forego the opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the troops of Massena in his front—to depress the spirits of his soldiers, by keeping them in inactivity till the disasters in Germany had extinguished their hopes; and all this for no good purpose, as, before his reinforcements could emerge from the gorges of the Tyrol, the die was cast, and the troops in Ulm had defiled as captives before the French Emperor.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

Oct. 15.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
139. Dum.  
ii. 109.  
Bign. iv.  
380, 381.

The forces in Italy were divided by the Adige, not only along the course of that river from the Alps to the Po, but in the city of Verona itself—the town properly so called, and the castles on the right bank, being in the hands of the French, while the suburbs on the left bank were in those of the Austrians. Strong barricades were drawn across the bridges which united the opposite sides of the river; and the Archduke, reduced by the orders of the Aulic Council and the catastrophe in Suabia to a melancholy defensive, was strengthening with field-works the celebrated position of Caldiero, the importance of which had been so strongly felt in former campaigns, when Massena, stimulated by the orders of the Emperor, and the accounts he was daily receiving of the advance of the grand army to the north of the Alps, resolved to commence operations.<sup>2</sup> He accordingly denounced the armistice which had been agreed on till the 18th October, and

73.  
Position of  
the French  
at Verona.

<sup>2</sup> Bign. iv.  
382, 383.  
Dum. ii.  
112, 113.

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1805.

74.  
Forcing of  
the bridge  
of Verona.  
Oct. 18.

in the night preceding arrived alone in Verona, where preparations had for some time past been secretly making for forcing the bridges and gaining the entire command of the river at that point.

At midnight, on the night of the 18th, after removing, with as little noise as possible, their own barricades on the bridge, the French attached a petard to the strong barrier of separation, and at daybreak, while a violent cannonade at other points distracted the attention of the enemy, the explosion took place, and the obstacle was thrown down. It displayed, however, a yawning gulf behind it, where the bridge had been cut by the Imperialists. But this proved only a momentary obstacle to the French soldiers. Some cast themselves into boats, and rowed across the stream; others brought planks, and hastily threw them over the opening; the barricades at the opposite end were speedily forced; and, under cover of a thick fog, which signally favoured their operations, the intrenchments on the opposite side were stormed, and the combat continued, from street to street and from house to house, till night. A violent storm then separated the combatants, when, although the Austrians still held their forts in the town, the passage was secured to the French, a *tête-de-pont* established, and three battalions left intrenched on the left bank of the stream. This operation was a masterpiece of skill, secrecy, and resolution, on the part of the French general: it cost the Austrians two thousand men, and, what was of still greater importance, gave their antagonists the command of the passage with the loss of little more than half that number.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
382, 383.  
Dum. ii.  
112, 119.  
Jom. ii. 140.

75.  
Bloody but  
indecisive  
actions at  
Caldiero.

Conceiving himself threatened with a speedy attack in consequence of this audacious and fortunate enterprise, the Archduke lost no time in making preparations to repel it. The position of Caldiero, already strong, was rendered almost impregnable. Its line of rocky heights, extending from the foot of the Alps to the shores of the Adige, strengthened in every accessible point by redoubts,

intrenchments, and palisades, seemed to defy attack; while the natural advantages of the ground, broken by cliffs, woods, and vineyards, from which even the arms of Napoleon had recoiled, appeared to oppose an invincible barrier to the further advance of the French troops. Massena remained inactive from the 18th to the 29th October; but, having then received intelligence of the astonishing successes of Napoleon in the plains of Suabia, he resolved to resume the offensive. But how to assail seventy thousand men, strongly intrenched, with a force not amounting to fifty thousand, was a problem which even the genius of the conqueror of Zurich might find it difficult to solve. Nevertheless he resolved upon making the attempt. The triumph at Ulm was announced to the soldiers by a loud discharge of artillery in the evening of the 28th, and on the following morning, before their exultation had subsided, he made his dispositions for attack. To assail such a position, guarded by an army superior to his own, in front, was a desperate enterprise; but the French general conceived that, by bringing the bulk of his forces to his own left, he might turn the Imperialists by the mountains, and compel them to lose all the labour they had employed in strengthening it. Massena himself, with two divisions, was to engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack and loud cannonade in front of the position; while Verdier, at the head of the right wing, was to cross the Adige below Verona, and endeavour to turn the Austrian left, and Molitor, with the left, was to gain the mountains and threaten their right. Molitor made great progress on the first day, and Massena, with the centre, advanced almost to the foot of the enemy's intrenchments; but after the most gallant efforts, they were driven back before night to their own ground in front of Verona, while Verdier, on the right, confined himself to a heavy firing along the line of the Adige.<sup>1</sup>

On the following day, however, the French dispositions were more completely carried into effect. Their centre,



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XL.

1805.

76.

Desperate  
conflict in  
the centre.

issuing in great strength from Verona, carried all the villages occupied by the Imperial light troops, and arrived at the foot of the formidable redoubts of Caldiero; while Molitor gallantly advanced against the almost impregnable heights on their right, and Verdier made the utmost efforts to effect his passage on the lower part of the river. But all the endeavours of the latter were unsuccessful; and though his movements and threatening aspect detained a considerable portion of the Imperialists on the Lower Adige, the contest was almost confined to the centre and left wing. Confident in the strength of their extreme right, and indignant at the idea of being assailed by inferior forces in their intrenchments, the Austrians deployed in great masses from their centre and left, and gallantly engaged their antagonists in the plain. A terrible combat ensued. The heads of the Imperial columns were repeatedly swept away by the close and well-directed discharge of the French artillery; while the French, when they impetuously followed up their successes, were, in their turn, as rudely handled by the heavy fire of the Austrian redoubts. The heat of the battle took place round the village of Caldiero, which was speedily encumbered with dead. Massena and the Archduke themselves charged at the head of their respective reserves, and exposed their persons like the meanest soldiers; but all the efforts of the French were unable to overcome the steady valour of the Germans. Several of Molitor's divisions on the French left penetrated to the foot of the redoubts, and more than one battalion actually reached their summit; but they were there instantly cut to pieces by the point-blank discharge of the Imperial cannon, rapidly turned against them from the adjoining intrenchments. At length night closed on this scene of slaughter, but not before four thousand brave men were lost to both parties, without either being able to boast of a decided advantage;<sup>1</sup> for if the French had broken several columns of Imperial infantry, and made twelve hundred prisoners,

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
119, 143.  
Jom. ii. 141,  
142.

they had suffered at least as much, and the redoubtable intrenchments were still in the hands of their antagonists.

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1805.

77.  
The F.  
are in the  
end re-  
pulsed.

On the following morning, Massena renewed the combat with greater prospect of success. On the preceding evening, Verdier had at length succeeded in throwing across two battalions, which were arrested by the Austrian columns in the marshes adjoining the river; but at day-break they were reinforced by a whole division, and advanced, combating all the way, on the dikes which ran up from the Adige to the Austrian position. Soon a bridge was completed, and the whole right wing crossed over, which, following up the retiring columns of the Imperialists, was at length stopped by the redoubt of Chiavecto del Christo, which in this quarter formed the key of their position, and, if taken, would have drawn after it the loss of the battle. Sensible of its importance, Verdier made the utmost efforts to carry this intrenchment, but the gallantry of the defence was equal to that of the attack. General Nordmann, who commanded the Austrians, saw all the cannoneers killed by his side, and was himself struck down; but his place was instantly taken by COUNT COLLOREDO, afterwards one of the most distinguished of the Imperial generals, who continued the stubborn defence till the Archduke, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in disengaging this band of heroes. Verdier was now assailed, in his turn, at once in front and both flanks; his corps was at length forced back, he himself severely wounded; and such were the losses of the French in this quarter, that it was with difficulty that they maintained themselves on the left bank of the Adige.<sup>1\*</sup>

† Dum. xiii.  
143, 149.  
Jom. ii. 144,  
145, Aus-  
trian Official  
Report.

But, notwithstanding this success, the Archduke was already preparing a retreat. The Archduke John had

\* We have the best possible evidence, that of Napoleon himself, that these murderous actions terminated upon the whole to the advantage of the Austrians. "The Archduke Charles," says he, "had gained considerable advantages over Massena at Caldiero; in effect, the Prince of Essling was beaten." The Archduke spoke of the action with his accustomed modesty and truth in his official despatches.—See *NAPOLEON in MONTH.* ii. 108 and 116; and *HARD.* viii. 499.

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78.

The Arch-  
duke re-  
solves to  
retreat to  
cover Vi-  
enna.

Nov. 2.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
150, 156.

Jom. ii. 143.

arrived at his headquarters, and brought with him a complete confirmation of the intelligence regarding the disasters in Germany which had already circulated in obscure rumours through his army. It was no longer possible to think of preserving Italy; the heart of the empire was laid open, and it was necessary to hasten to the protection of the menaced capital. The better to disguise his movement, he made preparations as if for resuming the offensive, and several strong corps were pushed forward into the mountains toward the French left, and some detachments already appeared in the rocky ridges between the Adige and the lake of Garda. Alarmed at this movement, Massena stood on the defensive, and concentrated his forces in front of Verona; but while he was in hourly expectation of an attack, the Archduke had caused all his heavy cannon and baggage to defile towards the rear, and when the French videttes approached the intrenchments which had been so obstinately contested, they found them, stripped of artillery, guarded only by a few of the enemy's rearguard.<sup>1</sup>

79.

Gallant conduct of the  
Austrian  
rearguard.

Massena's whole army instantly broke up and advanced in pursuit, but the Imperialists had gained a full march upon them. The whole artillery and baggage had already defiled by one road in admirable order; dense columns of infantry, interspersed between them, covered their movements, and a strong rearguard, under General Frimont, presented a menacing front to the pursuers. The excessive fatigue of the troops, however, rendered some repose necessary; and for this purpose, as well as to gain time for his immense array of carriages to defile in his rear, the Archduke resolved to hold firm in the neighbourhood of Vicenza, which is surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and by its position on the Bachiglione, the stream of which was rendered impassable by floods, commanded the only line either for the retreat of the Germans or the pursuit of the French. There he continued, accordingly, with a powerful rearguard, in battle array, the

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whole of the 3d November, and, on the following night, leaving Vogelsang with four battalions in the town, he continued his retreat in the most leisurely manner. That intrepid rearguard, with heroic firmness, continued to make good the post, despite equally the menaces and assaults of Massena, till daybreak on the 4th, and then withdrew in perfect safety to the left bank of the river, having afforded, by their admirable steadiness, time for the park of artillery to gain a march on the other troops, and for the two wings under Rosenberg and Davidowich to unite themselves to the centre of the army. It was no ordinary skill on the part of the general, and steadiness on that of the soldiers, which could, in the presence of a pursuing enemy, commanded by such an officer as Massena, secure the safe retreat of seventy thousand men by a single defile and bridge, who had been a few hours before scattered over a line of fifteen leagues in breadth, immediately after a bloody battle of three days' duration.<sup>1</sup>

D  
153, 1.  
Jom 143

From Vicenza the Archduke retired, by forced marches, through the rich and watered plains of the Brenta and Piave, towards the mountains of Friuli, separating himself altogether from Venice, into which he threw a strong garrison of eighteen battalions. When he arrived on the Tagliamento he halted for a day, and sustained a severe combat with the French advanced guard, in order to gain time to receive the information which was to decide him whether to march by Tarvis and Villach, to unite his forces with those of the Archduke John in the neighbourhood of Salzbouurg, or to proceed by the direct route through Laybach toward Vienna. The disastrous intelligence, however, which he there received of the total wreck of General Mack's army, rendered it necessary to continue his retreat as rapidly as possible by the latter of these routes to Vienna. Skilfully availing himself of every obstacle which the swollen waters of that stream, as well as the Piave and the Isonzo, could afford, he conducted his march with such ability,<sup>2</sup> that though it lay through

80.  
The Arch-  
duke conti-  
nues his

143,  
Dum.  
165,  
Thie  
235.

CHAP. narrow defiles and over mountains charged with the snows  
XL. of winter, no serious loss was sustained, nor were the spirits  
1805. of the soldiers weakened, before they descended, in unbroken  
strength, into the valley of the Drave and the streams  
which make their way to the great artery of the Danube.

81. Meanwhile Napoleon, whose genius never appeared  
Advance more strongly than in the vigour with which, by separate  
of Napo- columns, he followed up a beaten army, was pursuing with  
-n's army indefatigable activity the broken columns of the Austrian  
Oct. 24. troops, without neglecting any of the precautions which  
he never failed to adopt to insure his communications and  
provide for his supplies. Great magazines were formed at  
Ulm, Augsburg, and on the Lech, and troops stationed  
in positions so fortified as to be beyond the reach of a  
*coup-de-main*. On the 24th of October he arrived at  
Munich, where he was received with every imaginable de-  
monstration of joy, and a general illumination attested  
the universal transports. Augsburg was made the grand  
depot of the army; while the leading corps, under Ber-  
nadotte, Davoust, Murat, and Marmont, pressed on in  
ceaseless march towards the Hereditary States. Speedily  
the Iser was passed: the French eagles were borne in  
exultation through the forest of Hohenlinden, and nothing  
arrested their march till they reached the rocky banks of  
the Inn, and appeared before the fortress of Braunau.  
At the same time, Marshal Ney, who had remained at  
Ulm, in terms of the capitulation, till the 25th October,  
received orders to move with his whole corps upon the  
Tyrol, in order to clear the vast natural fortress which  
that district composes of the enemy's forces; while  
Augereau's corps, which, having broken up from Brest,  
had latest come to the scene of action, and had recently  
crossed the Rhine at Huningen, was pushed forward by  
forced marches to menace the western frontier of that  
romantic province.<sup>1</sup>

While disasters were thus accumulating on all sides  
upon the Austrian monarchy, the cabinet of Vienna did

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
241, 248,  
Savary, i.  
103. 2d Part.  
Jom. ii. 144.

their utmost to repair the fatal blow which had so nearly prostrated the whole strength of the state. How to arrest the terrible enemy who was pouring in irresistible force and with such rapidity down the valley of the Danube, was the great difficulty. Courier after courier was despatched to the Archduke Charles, to hasten the march of his army to the scene of danger; the Archduke John was directed to evacuate the Tyrol, and endeavour to unite his forces to those of his brother to cover the capital; the levies in Hungary and Lower Austria were pressed forward with all possible rapidity; and the Emperor himself, after issuing an animating proclamation to the inhabitants of Vienna,\* set out in person to hold a conference with the Russian general, Kutusoff, who was advancing with the utmost rapidity, concerning the best means of arresting the march of the enemy. But when he arrived at the headquarters of the latter, the extent of the danger became apparent. The remnant of the Austrian army, under Meerfeld and Keinmayer, which had joined him, hardly amounted to twenty thousand men; his own troops hitherto come up were not thirty thousand; and how was it possible, with such inconsiderable forces, to withstand Napoleon at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand combatants? It was therefore resolved to

\* "The Emperor of France has compelled me to take up arms. To his ardent desire of military achievements, his passion to be recorded in history under the title of a conqueror, the limits of France, already so much enlarged and defined by sacred treaties, still appear too narrow. He wishes to concentrate in his own hands all the interests upon which depends the balance of Europe. Far from attacking the throne of the Emperor of France, and keeping steadily in view the preservation of peace, which we so publicly and sincerely stated to be our only wish, we declared, in the presence of all Europe, 'That we would in no event interfere in the internal concerns of France, nor make any alteration in the new constitution which Germany received after the peace of Lunéville.' Peace and independence were the only objects which we wished to attain; no ambitious views, no intention such as that since ascribed to me, of subjugating Bavaria, had any share in our counsels. But the sovereign of France, totally regardless of the general tranquillity, listened not to these overtures. Wholly absorbed in himself, and occupied only with the display of his own greatness and omnipotence, he collected all his force, compelled Holland and the Elector of Baden to join him, whilst his secret ally, the Elector Palatine, false to his sacred promise, voluntarily delivered himself up to him; violated in the most insulting manner the neutrality of the King of Prussia at the very moment that he had

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
248, 250.  
Jom. ii. 144.

abandon the line of the Inn and retire towards Vienna, after breaking down all the bridges over the numerous streams which fell into the Danube, and lay across the line of march, so as to impede the enemy's advance, and effect a junction with the Russian reserves which were approaching under Benningsen and the Grand-duke Constantine, or the gallant army which was hastening to the scene of danger under the Archduke Charles.<sup>1</sup>

83.  
Increasing

But while everything seemed thus to smile upon Napoleon in the south of Germany, a storm was arising in the north which menaced him with destruction. The cabinet of Berlin had taken umbrage to an extent which could hardly have been anticipated, and which was greatly beyond the amount of the injury inflicted, at the violation of the territory of Anspach. It was not the mere march of a French corps through a detached portion of their dominions which occasioned this feeling of irritation; it was the secret consciousness that the insult was deserved, which had envenomed the wound. For ten years Prussia had flattered herself that, by keeping aloof, she would avoid the storm; that she would succeed in turning the desperate strife between France and Austria to her own benefit, by enlarging her territory and augmenting her consideration in the north of Ger-

given the most solemn promises to respect it: and by these violent proceedings he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a part of the troops which I had ordered to take a position on the Danube and the Iller. I am tranquil and at ease in the midst of twenty-five millions of my subjects, equally dear to my heart and house. With fortitude the Austrian monarchy has arisen from every storm which menaced it during the preceding centuries. Its intrinsic vigour is still undecayed. There still exists in the breasts of those good and loyal men, for whose prosperity and tranquillity I combat, that ancient patriotic spirit which is ready to make every sacrifice, and to dare everything to save what must be saved,—their throne and their independence, the national honour and the national prosperity. From the spirit of patriotism on the part of my subjects, I expect, with a proud and tranquil confidence, everything that is great and good; but above all things unanimity, and a quick, firm, and courageous co-operation in every measure that shall be ordered, to keep the rapid strides of the enemy off from our frontier until those numerous and powerful auxiliaries can act, which my exalted ally, the Emperor of Russia, and other powers, have destined to combat for the liberties of Europe, and the security of thrones and of nations.”—*Ann. Reg.* 1805, 713.

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many; and hitherto success had, in a surprising manner, attended her steps. At once all her prospects vanished, and it became apparent, even to her own ministers, that this vacillating policy was ultimately to be as dangerous as it had already been discreditable. So far from having increased the respect with which she was regarded, it was now plain that she had entirely lost it; and a power which, under the guidance of the Great Frederick, had stepped forth as the arbiter of the north of Germany, was now treated with the indifference and neglect which is the bitterest ingredient in the cup of the vanquished. The veil suddenly dropped from the eyes of her ministers: they now distinctly perceived that, instead of security, they had reaped only danger from former submissions; and that, as a reward for so long a period of forbearance, they could look only, like Ulysses, for the melancholy satisfaction of being last devoured. Under the influence of these feelings, the resolution of the cabinet was violently shaken. The King openly inclined to hostile measures, while the indignation of the nation knew no bounds. Prince Louis, whose rash and inconsiderate, though vehement and generous, character could ill brook the long inactivity of the Prussian arms, publicly and on all occasions gave vent to his desire for war; the popularity of the Queen rose almost to idolatry; the consideration of Haugwitz, the great maintainer of the temporising system, rapidly sank, and all eyes were turned to Baron Hardenberg, whose resolute counsels to adopt a more manly policy had been long known, as the only minister fit, at such a crisis, to be intrusted with the direction of affairs.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hard. vii.  
479, 481.  
Dum. xiii.  
250, 251.  
Nap. in Las  
Cas. iv. 220.

Matters were in this inflammable state when the Emperor Alexander arrived at Berlin, and employed the whole weight of his great authority, and all the charms of his captivating manners, to induce the King to embrace a more manly and courageous policy. Under the action of so many concurring causes, the French influence

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CHAP. rapidly declined; Duroc left the capital on the 2d No-  
XL. vember, without having been able to obtain an audience

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84.

Arrival of  
Alexander  
at Berlin,  
and conclu-  
sion of a

for some days previously, either from the King or Em-  
peror; and on the day following, a secret convention was  
signed between the two monarchs for the regulation of  
the affairs of Europe, and the erection of a barrier  
against the ambition of the French Emperor. By this  
convention it was stipulated, that the treaty of Lunéville  
was to be taken as the basis of the arrangement, and all  
the acquisitions which France had since made were to be  
wrested from it; Switzerland and Holland were to be  
restored to their independence, and, without overturning  
the kingdom of Italy, it was to be merely agreed that  
its throne and that of France were never to be occupied  
by the same individual. Haugwitz was to be intrusted  
with the notification of this convention to Napoleon, with  
authority, in case of its acceptance, to offer a renewal of  
the former friendship and alliance of the Prussian nation,  
but in case of refusal, to declare war, with an intima-  
tion that hostilities would be commenced on the 15th  
December.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hard. viii.  
481, 482.  
Martens, vii.  
Dum. xiii.  
253, 254.  
Thiers, vi.  
212.

85.

Nocturnal  
visit to the  
tomb of the  
Great Fre-  
derick.

The conclusion of this convention was followed by a  
scene as remarkable as it was romantic, and which was  
ultimately attended by consequences of the highest impor-  
tance to the destinies of Europe. When they signed it,  
both the potentates were fully aware of the perilous nature  
of the enterprise on which they were adventuring; as the  
Archduke Anthony had arrived two days before with  
detailed accounts of the disastrous result of the combats  
around Ulm. Inspired with a full sense of the dangers  
of the war, the ardent and chivalrous mind of the Queen  
conceived the idea of uniting the two sovereigns by a  
bond more likely to be durable than the mere alliances  
of cabinets with each other. This was to bring them  
together at the tomb of the Great Frederick, where it  
was hoped the solemnity and recollections of the scene  
would powerfully contribute to cement their union. The

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Emperor, who was desirous of visiting the mausoleum of that illustrious hero, accordingly repaired to the church of the garrison of Potsdam, where his remains are deposited, and at midnight the two monarchs proceeded together by torchlight to the hallowed grave. Uncovering when he approached the spot, the Emperor kissed the pall, and taking the hand of the King of Prussia as it lay on the tomb, they swore an eternal friendship to each other, and bound themselves, by the most solemn oaths, to maintain their engagements inviolate in the great contest for European independence in which they were embarked. A few hours after, Alexander departed for Galicia, to assume in person the command of the army of reserve, which was advancing through that province to the support of Kutusoff. Such was the origin of that great alliance, which, though often interrupted by misfortune, and deeply checkered by disaster, was yet destined to be brought to so triumphant an issue, and ultimately wrought such wonders for the deliverance of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hard. viii.

It would have been well for the common cause, if, when Prussia had thus taken her part, her cabinet had possessed resolution enough to have interfered at once and decidedly in the war: the disaster of Austerlitz, the catastrophe of Jena, would thereby, in all probability, have been prevented. But after the departure of the Emperor, the old habit of temporising returned, and the precious moments, big with the fate of the world, were permitted to elapse without any operations being attempted. Haugwitz did not set out from Potsdam till the 14th November; the Prussian armies made no forward movement towards the Danube, and Napoleon was permitted to continue, without interruption, his advance to Vienna; while eighty thousand disciplined veterans remained inactive in Silesia on his left flank—a force amply sufficient to have thrown him back with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine. Even the arrival of Lord Harrowby at Berlin, a few days after the departure of

86.  
Prussia subsequently relapses into her temporising system.

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Haugwitz, with full powers and the offer of ample subsidies from Mr Pitt, could not prevail on the government to accelerate the commencement of active operations. Apparently the cabinet of Berlin were desirous of seeing what turn affairs were likely to take before they openly commenced hostilities, forgetting that the irrevocable step had already been taken—that Duroc, upon leaving their capital, had proceeded straight to the Emperor's headquarters on the Danube; that the convention which had been concluded could not be kept a secret; that Napoleon, in consequence, was made their determined foe, and that every hour now lost was adding to his means of selecting his own time for their future destruction.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
255, 256.  
Hard. viii.  
438, 439.  
Savary, i.  
104.

87.

Opinions on  
the subject  
in a council  
of war at  
Potsdam.

There were not wanting, however, numbers who openly counselled a bolder policy, and prophesied all the disasters which would ensue from continuing longer their adherence to the procrastinating system. In a council of war, held at Potsdam soon after intelligence of the disasters at Ulm was received, the Duke of Brunswick ordered Colonel Massenbach, a young pupil of the celebrated Tempelhoff, to deliver his opinion on the present state of affairs. "The armies are in presence of each other," said he; "a decisive battle must soon be fought. If Napoleon is beaten, his retreat through the Tyrol is secured by Marshal Ney's recent occupation of that province, and he will be beyond the reach of the Prussian forces. It is indispensable, therefore, that the Prussian army in Silesia should instantly march to the support of the Allies, and that a strong body should threaten Napoleon's communications with the Rhine, in order to compel him to divide his forces. If both these measures are not adopted, and the Russians are beat, all is lost." General Ruchel, however, an older officer, ridiculed the apprehensions of such a catastrophe; and the Duke of Brunswick, with his wonted irresolution, broke up the council without having come to any determination.<sup>2</sup>

iii.

But though Prussia was thus inactive, Napoleon was not without very serious cause for anxiety in the north of Germany. A combined force of British, Russians, and Swêdes, thirty thousand strong, had recently disembarked in Hanover, and the Prussian troops who occupied that electorate had offered no resistance—a sure proof of a secret understanding between the cabinet of Berlin and that of London, in virtue of which it was to be restored to its rightful owners. The danger of an enemy in that quarter was very great, for the whole French army of occupation had been withdrawn, with the exception of the garrison of Hameln; and not only were its inhabitants warlike, and ardently attached to the British government, but there was every reason to apprehend that the flame, once lighted, might spread to Holland, where the partisans of the house of Orange had received an immense accession of strength from the calamities in which their country had been involved from the French alliance. Hardly any regular troops remained to make head against these dangers; but Napoleon contrived to paralyse the disaffected, by pompous announcements in the *Moniteur* of the formation of a powerful army of the north, of which his brother Louis, in the first instance, was to take the command, but which might soon expect to be graced by the presence of the Emperor himself.<sup>1</sup>

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88.

Landing of  
the Allies in  
Hanover.<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
145. Dum.  
xiii. 249.

On his right flank, Marshal Ney was more successful in achieving the conquest of the Tyrol, and relieving him from all anxiety in regard to that important bulwark of the Austrian monarchy. This romantic region, so interesting from its natural beauties, the noble character of its inhabitants, and the memorable contest of which it was afterwards the theatre, will form the subject of a separate description hereafter, when the campaign of 1809 is considered.\* The imperious necessity to which the Austrian government was subjected, of withdrawing their forces from the Tyrol for the protection of the capital,

89.

Operations  
in the Tyrol.\* See *infra*, Chap. LVIII.

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prevented it from becoming the theatre of any considerable struggle at this time. Resolved to clear these mountain fastnesses of the Imperial troops, Napoleon ordered Ney to advance from Ulm over the mountains which form the northern barrier of the valley of the Inn right upon Innspruck; while a powerful Bavarian division, which had already occupied Salzbouurg, advanced by the great road from that town by Reichenthal, by the same capital, and menaced Kufstein, the principal stronghold on the eastern frontier of the province. Both invasions were successful. General Derooy, commanding the Bavarian troops, wound in silence along the margin of the beautiful lakes which lie at the foot of the rocky barrier which separates the province of Salzbouurg from that of the Tyrol, and suddenly pushing up the steep ascent, amidst a shower of balls from the overhanging cliffs and woods, which were filled with Tyrolese marksmen, carried the intrenchments and forts at their summit with matchless valour, and drove back the Imperialists, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, to the ramparts of Kufstein. The whole eastern defences of Tyrol were laid open by this bold irruption: the Imperial regulars retired over the mountains towards Leoben, while the Tyrolese levies were shut up under the cannon of Kufstein, which was soon blockaded.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
390. Jom.  
ii. 167.  
Dum. xiii.  
280, 285.

90.  
Desperate  
conflict in  
storming the  
heights.

Contemporaneous with this attack on the eastern frontier of the province, Augereau moved forward from the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, so as to threaten Feldkirch and its western extremity; while at the same time Marshal Ney advanced, at the head of ten thousand men, against the barrier of Scharnitz, the ancient *Porta Claudia*, a celebrated mountain intrenchment which commands the direct mountain road from Bavaria to Innspruck, and was known to be almost impregnable on the only side from which it could to all appearance be assailed. An attack in front, though supported by all the fire and impetuosity of the bravest of the French troops, was

repulsed with very heavy loss. Success seemed utterly hopeless. But the genius of Marshal Ney at length overcame every obstacle. Dividing his corps into three divisions, he succeeded, with one commanded by Loison, in making himself master of the fort of Leitasch, in the rear of the intrenchments; from whence his victorious troops pressed on in two columns to scale the precipices which overhung them on the southern side, to the summit of which the peasants, as a place of undoubted security, had removed their wives and children. The combat was long and doubtful: securely posted in the cliffs and thickets above, the Tyrolese marksmen kept up a deadly fire on the French troops, who, breathless and panting, were clambering up by the aid of the brushwood which nestled in the crevices, and of their bayonets thrust into the fissures of the rock. Fruitless, however, was all the valour of the defenders: in vain rocks and trunks of trees, thundering down the steep, swept off whole companies at once; as fast as they were destroyed others equally daring succeeded them, and pressed with ceaseless vigour up the entangled precipice. The summit was at length carried, and the French eagles, displayed from the edge of the perpendicular cliff in their rear, was the signal for the renewal of the attack on the intrenchments by the division stationed in their front. They were no longer tenable: a shower of balls from the heights behind, against which the Tyrolese had no defence, rendered it impossible either to man the works or stand to the guns. A panic seized the garrison; they fled in confusion, and the victorious assailants, besides that of a mountain barrier hitherto deemed impregnable, had to boast of the capture of fifteen hundred prisoners.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
390, 391.  
Jom. ii. 167,  
168. Dum.  
xiii. 280,  
288.

The immediate trophy of this victory was the capture of Innspruck, with sixteen thousand stand of arms.\* The

\* An interesting incident occurred at Innspruck. The 76th French regiment had, in the campaign of 1799, lost two of its standards. When walking in the arsenal of that town, one of its officers beheld them among the other warlike trophies of the Tyrolese. Instantly the intelligence spread that their

CHAP. whole northern barrier of the Inn was abandoned ; General  
XL. Jellachich, who commanded in the western part of the

1805. Tyrol, retired to the intrenched camp of Feldkirch ; while

91. the Archduke John withdrew all his forces from the  
Surrender of Jellachich.

ey

Nov. 15.

hope of rallying to his standard the corps in the eastern and western districts of the province before he commenced his final retreat into the Hereditary States. It was too late, however. Surrounded and cut off from all hope of succour, Jellachich, with five thousand men, was obliged to capitulate at Feldkirch, upon condition of not serving for a year against France, and leaving all his artillery to grace the triumph of the victors. The Archduke John, upon hearing of this catastrophe, abandoned the crest of the Brenner during the night, and retired by Klagenfurth to Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother and the gallant army of Italy. But the Prince de Rohan was not equally fortunate. That gallant officer, who was stationed with six thousand men near Nauders and Fins-termünz, on the western frontier of the province, found himself by these disasters cut off from any support, and isolated among the enemy's columns in the midst of the mountains of the Tyrol. Disdaining to capitulate, he formed the bold resolution of cutting his way through all the corps by which he was surrounded, and joining the garrison left in Venice.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
280, 290.  
Jom. ii.  
168, 170.

92.  
Bold enter-  
prise and  
final failure  
of the Prince  
de Rohan.

Considerable success at first attended his efforts. Descending the course of the Adige, he surprised and defeated Loison's division at Bolzano, and thus opened a way for himself by Trent and the defiles of the Brenta to the Italian plains. Already the mountains were cleared ; Bassano was passed ; and the wearied troops were joyfully wending their way across the level fields to the shores of the Lagunæ, when they were met by St-Cyr, who

lost ensigns were recovered, and the veterans, hastening in, kissed the tattered remnants, and wept for joy at again beholding the former companions of their lot.—BIGNON, iv. 391.

commanded the forces stationed to observe Venice, and completely defeated at Castel Franco. Dispirited by this disaster, and seeing no remaining means of escape, this gallant band, still five thousand strong, was obliged to lay down its arms. At the same time the fortress of Kufstein capitulated, on condition of the garrison being allowed to march back to the Hereditary States, which was readily agreed to. Thus, in little more than three weeks, not only were the Imperialists entirely driven from the Tyrol, long considered as the impregnable bulwark of the Austrian monarchy, garrisoned by twenty-five thousand regular troops, and at least an equal amount of well-trained militia, but more than half of the soldiers were made prisoners, and all the strongholds had passed into the hands of the enemy. Finding the reduction complete, Ney, before the end of November, marched with his whole forces to Salzburg to co-operate with Massena, who was approaching the same quarter, against the Archduke Charles; while Augereau withdrew to Ulm, to observe the motions of Prussia, and the occupation of the Tyrol was committed to the Bavarian troops.<sup>1</sup>

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Nov. 24.

Nov. 18.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
289, 293.  
Jom. ii.  
168, 170.

It was not inability to defend its passes which led to this rapid abandonment of that important province. Notwithstanding the disasters at Scharnitz and Feldkirch, the Archduke John could still have maintained his ground among its rugged defiles, aided by the numerous warlike inhabitants, whose attachment to the House of Austria had long been conspicuous. It was the pressing danger of the heart of the empire, and the paramount necessity of providing a covering force for the capital, which rendered it absolutely imperative to withdraw the regular forces. Napoleon's progress down the valley of the Danube became every day more alarming. The formidable barrier of the Inn was abandoned almost as soon as it was taken up: forty-five thousand men could not pretend to defend so long a line against a hundred and fifty thousand. The intrenchments of Mühldorf, the

93.  
Napoleon  
advances  
into Upper  
Austria.



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XL.805.  
31.

ramparts of Braunau, armed as they were with artillery, were precipitately evacuated, and the Inn was crossed by the French battalions at all points. The advantages of the latter fortress appeared so considerable, that the French Emperor gave immediate orders for its conversion into the grand depot of the army. Meanwhile Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the advanced-guard, continued to press the retiring columns of the enemy: a skirmish in front of Mersbach, a more stubborn resistance near Lambach, at the passage of the Traun, while they evinced the obstinate valour of the enemy with whom they had now to contend, hardly retarded the march of the invaders an hour: the determined opposition of the Austrians near the foot of the mountains, at the bridge of Steyer over the Enns, only delayed Marshal the right wing of the army a day; and at length the French headquarters were established on the shores of the blue waters of the Traun at Lintz, the capital of Upper Austria.<sup>1</sup> ✓

3.  
4.  
6.  
Sav.ii.  
103. Dum.  
xiii. 264,  
277. Jom.  
ii. 133, 144.

94.  
His mea-  
sures at  
Lintz to  
envelope  
Kutusoff.

The Emperor profited by the two days' delay at Lintz, which the destruction of the bridge at that place, and the necessity of giving some repose to the troops, occasioned, to give a new organisation to his army, with a view to the surrounding and destroying of Kutusoff's corps. Four divisions of the army, amounting in all to twenty thousand men, were passed over to the left bank of the Danube, and placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who received instructions to advance cautiously, with numerous videttes out in every direction, and always somewhat behind the corps of Lannes, which moved in advance of him on the right of the river. A flotilla was prepared to follow the army with provisions and stores down the sinuous course of the Danube; and such directions were given to the numerous corps on its right bank, as were best calculated to insure the separation of the Russians from the Archduke Charles, and the ultimate destruction of both. Nor was it only in warlike preparations that

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the Emperor was engaged during his sojourn at Lintz. Duroc joined him there from Berlin, with accounts of the accession of Prussia to the confederacy of Russia and England; upon which he instantly directed the formation of an army of the north, under the command of his brother Louis, composed of six divisions: a force, as already mentioned, which, although existing on paper only, was likely to overawe the discontented powers in the north of Germany. At the same time a Spanish auxiliary corps, twelve thousand strong, under a leader destined to renown in future times, the Marquis LA — which was already on its march through France, was ordered to hasten its advance, and follow toward the same direction.<sup>1</sup>

Nov. 8.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xliii.  
294, 298.  
Jom. ii. 145.  
Sav. ii. 103.

At Lintz the Emperor received also the Elector of Bavaria, who hastened to that city to render him the homage due to the deliverer of his dominions; and on the same day Count Giulay arrived with proposals for an armistice with a view to a general peace. The ruined condition of the army which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, the general consternation which prevailed, the distance at which the principal Russian forces still were placed, and the imminent danger that the capital, with its magnificent arsenals, would immediately fall into the hands of the invaders, had prevailed in the Austrian cabinet over their long-continued jealousy of France. Napoleon received the envoy courteously; but, after observing that it was not to a conqueror at the head of two hundred thousand men that proposals should be addressed from a beaten army unable to defend a single position, sent him back with a letter to the Emperor containing the conditions on which he was willing to treat. These were, that the Russians should forthwith evacuate the Austrian territory, and retire into Poland, that the levies in Hungary should be instantly disbanded, and the Tyrol and Venice ceded to the French dominions.<sup>2</sup> If these terms were not agreed to,

95.  
Austrian  
proposals of  
peace, which  
come to  
nothing.

<sup>2</sup> Sav. ii. 104.  
Dum. xliii.  
298, 300.  
Jom. ii. 146.

CHAP. he declared he would continue, without an hour's inter-  
XL. mission, his march towards Vienna.

1805.

96.  
Itusoff  
withdraws  
to the left  
bank of the  
Danube.

These rigorous terms were sufficient to convince the Allies that they had no chance of salvation but in a vigorous prosecution of the contest. The most pressing entreaties, therefore, were despatched to the Russian headquarters to hasten the advance of their reserves; while a strong rearguard took post at Amstetten, to give time for the main body and artillery to complete their march without confusion through the narrow defile of the Danube. A bloody conflict ensued there between that heroic rearguard and the French advanced column, under Oudinot, and the cavalry of Murat; in which, although the Allies were ultimately forced to retreat before the increasing multitude of the enemy,\* they long stood their ground with the utmost resolution, and gained time for the army in their rear to arrive at the important rocky ridge behind St Polten, the last defensible position in front of Vienna, and which covered the junction of the lateral road running from Italy through Leoben with the great route down the valley of the Danube to the capital. To wrest this important position from the enemy, the right wing of the army, sixty thousand strong, under Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte, was directed through the mountains on the right, to turn their left flank; Murat, Lannes, and Oudinot, with the French left, of above fifty thousand combatants, manœuvred on their right; while the Emperor in person, at the head of the corps of Soult and the Imperial Guard, was destined to strike the decisive blows in the centre. But the Allies, until the arrival either of the Russian main body, or of the Archduke Charles, were in no condition to with-

\* A remarkable instance of courage occurred here on the part of a French cannoneer. The Russian cuirassiers, by a gallant charge along the high-road, had seized a battery of horse-artillery which was firing grape at them within half musket-shot, and sabred most of the gunners. One of them, however, though wounded, contrived to crawl to his piece, and putting the match to the touch-hole, discharged it right among the enemy's horsemen, with such decisive effect that the whole squadron turned and fled.—DUMAS, xiii. 303, 304.

stand such formidable forces; either of the enemy's wings greatly outnumbered their whole army. Kutusoff, therefore, decided with reason that it had become indispensable to abandon the capital; and that by withdrawing his forces to the left bank of the river, he would both relieve them from a pursuit which could not fail in the end to be attended with disaster, and draw nearer to the reinforcements advancing under Buxhowden, which might enable them to renew the conflict on a footing of equality.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiii.  
307, 308.  
Jom. ii. 140.  
149.

Skilfully concealing, therefore, his intention from the enemy, he rapidly moved his whole army across the Danube at Mautern, over the only bridge which traverses that river between Lintz and Vienna, and having burned its eight-and-twenty arches of wood behind him, succeeded for some days at least in throwing an impassable barrier between his wearied troops and their indefatigable pursuers. Arrived at St Polten, the French found it occupied only by light Austrian troops, who retired as they advanced. No force capable of arresting them any longer remained on the road to Vienna; and their light infantry, eagerly pushing forward, on the following day reached Burkersdorf, within four leagues of the capital.\* About the same time Davoust, while toiling with infinite difficulty among the rocky and wooded Alpine ridges which form the romantic southern valley of the Danube, came unexpectedly on the rearguard of Meerfelt, which, unsuspecting of evil, was pursuing its course in a southerly direction, by a cross road, to avoid the pursuit of Marmont. Suddenly assailed, it was pierced through the centre, and thrown into such confusion, that the fugitives escaped only by dispersing in the neighbouring woods and mountains,<sup>2</sup> leaving three thousand prisoners and sixteen pieces

97.  
Continued  
advance  
the French  
towards  
Vienna.  
Nov. 9.

Nov. 10.

Nov. 8.  
<sup>2</sup> Dum.  
307, 30  
Jom. ii.  
149. Th  
vi. 248.

\* When travelling on the road to Vienna, in the uniform of a colonel of chasseurs, which he commonly wore, Napoleon met a carriage containing a priest and an Austrian lady in great distress. He stopped, and inquired into the cause of her lamentations. "Sir," said she, "I am on my way to demand protection from the Emperor, who is well acquainted with my family, and has received from it many obligations. My house has been pillaged, and my

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of cannon in the hands of the enemy. Napoleon himself took up his headquarters at the magnificent abbey of M<sup>o</sup>lk; the romantic domes of which, overhanging the river, form so striking a feature in the landscape, and where he found great supplies of provisions and resources for the wounded.

98.  
Destruction  
of part of  
Mortier's  
corps by  
Kutusoff.

But while these great advantages were attending the standards of Napoleon on the right bank of the Danube, an unwonted disaster, nearly attended with fatal consequences, befell his forces on the left. Murat, at the head of the advanced-guard of the grand army, had pressed on with his wonted ardour to the neighbourhood of Vienna, in so precipitate a manner as drew forth a severe reproof from the French Emperor; who was well aware that, divided as his troops were by so great a stream, the most imminent danger attended those on the left bank from any unguarded movement, now that the Russians had wholly passed over to that side. The catastrophe which he apprehended was not long of arriving. Mortier, following the orders which he had received, which were to keep nearly abreast of, though a little behind, the columns on the right bank, was intent only upon inflicting loss upon the Russian troops, which he knew had passed the river, and conceived to be flying across his line of march from the Danube towards Moravia. As he was eagerly emerging from the defiles of D<sup>u</sup>rrenstein, between the Danube and the rocky hills which there approach the river, beneath the towers of the castle where Richard Cœur-de-Lion was once immured, he came upon the Russian rearguard under Milaradovitch, posted in front of Stein, on heights commanding the only road by which he could advance, and supported by a powerful artillery. The French general instantly commenced the attack at

Nov. 11.

gardener killed, by his soldiers."—"Your name?" replied he.—"De Bunny, daughter of M. de Marbœuff, formerly governor of Corsica."—"I am charmed," rejoined Napoleon, "to have the means of serving you. I am the Emperor." The astonishment of the fair suppliant may easily be conceived. She was sent to headquarters, attended by a detachment of chasseurs of the Guard, treated with the greatest distinction, and sent back highly gratified by the reception she had met with.—RAPF, 54, 55.

break of day, though little more than the division of Gazan had emerged from the formidable defile in his rear. The combat soon became extremely warm: fresh troops arrived on both sides: the grenadiers fought man to man with undaunted resolution, and it was still doubtful which party would prevail in the murderous strife, when towards noon intelligence arrived that the division of Doctoroff was approaching. This force, ably conducted by the Austrian general Smith, who was perfectly acquainted with the country, had, by a circuitous march through the hills, reached Mortier's rear, and already occupied Dürrenstein and the sole line of his communications. Thus, while the French marshal was fully engaged in front, his retreat was cut off, and with a single division of his corps he found himself enveloped by the whole Russian army.<sup>1</sup>

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Sav.  
Dum.  
13. Jom.  
150, 151.

Mortier instantly perceived that nothing but an immediate attack on Doctoroff's division, so as to clear the road in his rear, and permit the remainder of his corps to advance to his assistance, could save him from destruction. He had an hour before gone back in person to the division of Dupont, which was the next that was coming up, in order to hasten its march; and it was with great difficulty that, pursuing a devious path through the overhanging slopes, he succeeded in regaining the division Gazan, now hard pressed both in front and rear. Forming his troops in close column, he advanced against Doctoroff, with the determination to force his way through at the point of the bayonet, or perish in the attempt. In silence, but with undaunted resolution, they advanced to the mouth of the terrible defile they had passed in the morning, little anticipating such a disaster; but they found the bottom of the ravine filled with dense masses of the enemy, while the river on one side, and the walls of rock on the other, precluded all hope of turning them on either side. Compelled to combat both in front and rear, they made but little progress. Incessant discharges mowed

99.  
Desperate  
action at  
Dürren-  
stein.

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1805.

down their ranks, and destruction seemed inevitable, when the sound of a distant cannonade from the further extremity of the pass revived the hope that succour was approaching. It proved to be the division of Dupont; which, fully aware of the imminent danger of the general, was advancing with all imaginable haste to his succour, and was already engaged with the rear of Doctoroff's division, which gallantly faced about to repel them.<sup>1</sup>

151, 152.  
v. ii. 105.

100.  
The French  
--- at length  
successful.

This extraordinary conflict continued till nightfall with unparalleled resolution on both sides. The combatants, in the dark or by the light of the moon, continued the strife; the whole defile resounded with the incessant roar of fire-arms; while the ancient Gothic towers which once held in chains the hero of the crusades, were illuminated by the frequent discharges of artillery which flashed through the gloom at their feet. Gradually, however, Gazan's division was broken; upwards of two-thirds of their number had fallen; three eagles were taken; and Mortier himself, whose lofty stature made him conspicuous, being repeatedly intermingled with the Russian grenadiers, owed his safety to the vigour and dexterity with which he wielded his sabre. His officers, desirous of preventing so brilliant a prize from falling into the hands of the enemy, besought him to get on board a bark on the river, and make his way to the other side, but the brave marshal refused to leave his comrades.\* This heroic constancy at length received its reward. The distant fire was heard to be sensibly approaching; it was Dupont, who, forcing his way with dauntless courage through the defile, was gradually compelling Doctoroff to give ground before him, while the latter now in his turn found himself between two fires. The brave Smith, at the head of the

\* "No," said he, "reserve that resource for the wounded. One who has the honour to command such brave soldiers should esteem himself too happy to share their lot and perish with them. We have still two guns and some boxes of grape-shot; we are almost at Dürrenstein; let us close our ranks and make a last effort."—DUMAS, xiv. 14.

Russian column, was killed by a discharge of grape-shot, at the moment when he was making a decisive charge on the remains of Gazan's division. The French, who had exhausted all their ammunition, were roused by the cheers of their deliverers, which were now distinctly heard, to try a last effort with the bayonet. Assailed both in front and rear, Doctoroff's division was driven up a lateral valley, which afforded them the means of escape; and, amidst the cries of "France! France! you have saved us!" the exhausted grenadiers of Gazan threw themselves into the arms of their comrades.<sup>1</sup>

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XL.  
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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
402, 403.  
Dum. xiv.  
9, 15. Jom.  
ii. 151, 152  
Sav. ii. 105.

This untoward affair gave singular vexation to Napoleon. It was not the mere loss of three thousand men, which in so mighty a host was of little consequence; that of the Allies had amounted to two-thirds of that number; and his could easily be repaired. It was the blot on his arms, the derangement of the plans of the campaign, which was the source of his annoyance. Mortier on the day after the battle esteemed himself fortunate in being able, by the aid of the French flotilla on the Danube, to make his way across the river with his whole corps, leaving the left bank entirely in the hands of the enemy. The object of his movements was frustrated. All hopes of surrounding and destroying Kutusoff before the arrival of the second Russian army were at an end. What was still more mortifying to his military feelings, both the courage and capacity of the enemy had been demonstrated. His troops had not only been defeated, but out-generaled; and the Muscovites, in their first serious engagement during the campaign, had gained greater trophies than the Austrians could boast of since the battle of Magnano. He paused, therefore, a day at St Polten, and wrote a very indignant letter\* to Murat, to whose inconsiderate advance on Vienna, on the right bank,

101.  
Mortier re-  
crosses the  
Danube.  
Nov. 11.

\* "Mon cousin, je ne puis approuver votre manière de marcher. Vous allez comme un étourdi, et vous ne pesez pas les ordres que je vous fais donner. Les Russes, au lieu de couvrir Vienne, ont repassé le Danube à Krems. Cette circonstance extraordinaire aurait dû vous faire comprendre que vous ne



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1805.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
153. Dum.  
xiv. 17, 18.  
Sav. ii. 105.  
Thiers, vi.  
258.

ahead of Mortier, he ascribed the whole misfortunes which had been incurred. Abandoning, for the present, all thoughts of harassing any further the retreat of Kutusoff, he turned all his attention to the capture of Vienna and the acquisition of the bridge there, which, besides its other immense advantages, would prevent the junction of the Archduke Charles with the Russian forces.<sup>1</sup>

102.  
Napoleon  
advances  
rapidly on  
Vienna.

Orders, therefore, were immediately given to Lannes and Murat to advance with all possible expedition on Vienna, and by every means in their power endeavour to gain possession of the bridges over the Danube, whether an armistice was agreed on or not.\* Meanwhile the Emperor Francis retired from the capital, after confiding the charge of it at this eventful crisis to Count Wurbna, the grand-chamberlain, who executed with fidelity the difficult duty committed to his charge. The citizens were overwhelmed with consternation when they found themselves deserted by the government, and assembled in tumultuous crowds to demand arms to defend their hearths and ramparts. But it was too late. The means of resistance no longer remained; and Vienna, which never yet had yielded to an enemy, was compelled to send a deputation to Napoleon's headquarters to treat for a capitulation. An active negotiation was kept up as to the terms on which an armistice could be granted; but the French Emperor would abate nothing of his rigorous demands, that the Hungarian insurrection should instantly be disbanded, and the Tyrol, with the duchy of Venice, be immediately ceded to France.<sup>2</sup>

\* Jom. ii.  
153, 154.  
Dum. xiv.  
17, 25.  
Sav. ii.  
105.

pouviez agir sans de nouvelles instructions. Vous n'avez consulté que la gloriole d'entrer à Vienne. Il n'y a de gloire que là où il y a du danger. I n'y en a pas à entrer dans une capitale sans défense. *Mölk*, 11 Novembre 1805."—Thiers's *Consulat et l'Empire*, vi. 258.

\* "As soon as ten o'clock on the 12th has arrived, you may enter Vienna. Endeavour to surprise the bridge of the Danube, and if it is broken down, make it your study to find the readiest means of passing the river; that is the great affair. Should M. Giulay, before ten o'clock, present himself with proposals for a negotiation, you may suspend your march on Vienna; but notwithstanding use all your efforts to secure the passage of the river."—*Orders to Murat*, 12th November 1805, in DUMAS, xiv. 20.

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1805.

108.

Description  
of that city.

Built in the superb basin bounded on the south by the Alps of Styria, on the east by the Carpathian mountains, on the west by the range of the Bisamberg and the hills of Bohemia and Upper Austria, Vienna, the subject of this anxious negotiation, yields to no capital of Europe, Constantinople and Naples excepted, in the beauty and salubrity of its situation. Anciently the frontier station of the Roman empire upon the Sarmatian wilds, its situation on the outskirts of civilisation has in every age rendered it a military post of the highest importance. The Hungarians alone had forced its gates in the thirteenth century ; but the inhabitants hardly regarded as a conquest the success achieved by those who were now their own subjects. Its heroic resistance to a vast army of Turks in 1688, gave time for Sobieski to approach with the flower of the Polish chivalry ; and the subsequent defeat of three hundred thousand Mussulmans beneath its walls delivered Eastern, as the victory of Tours had saved Western Europe, from a barbarian yoke. The old city was surrounded by a wall, flanked by strong bastions ; but it contains only a hundred thousand souls, hardly a third of the present inhabitants of the capital. The remainder dwell in the immense suburbs which surround it on every side, separated from the ancient rampart only by a broad glacis, conducive alike to the health and beauty of the metropolis. They are girded around by intrenchments, but such as are not defensible against a more skilful enemy than the Turks, from whose incursions they were intended to protect the inhabitants. Vienna cannot vie with Paris, Rome, or London, in the splendour or riches of its architectural decorations, though it is not without objects of deep historic interest. The church of St Stephens, surmounted by one of the highest steeples in Europe, from the summit of which the Polish lances were first discovered gleaming in the setting sun on the ridges of the Bisamberg, surmounts in lone magnificence every other edifice in the capital, and commands a noble

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view of the whole mountain-bound valley in which it stands. The Emperor's palace in Vienna is not worthy of the residence of so great a monarch; but the neighbouring one of Schönbrunn, and that of the Archduke Charles, are splendid structures, and the Imperial library presents a room three hundred feet in length, of surpassing grandeur. In a military point of view, the capture of this city was an object of the very highest importance, commanding as it did the only remaining bridge below Lintz over the Danube, and containing the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, stored with two thousand cannon, and above a hundred thousand stand of arms.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal observation.  
Jom. ii. 155,  
156. Dum.  
xiv. 23, 25.

104.  
Seizure of  
the bridge of  
Vienna.

The Emperor Francis had withdrawn from Vienna to Presburg, where he urged on the organising of the Hungarian insurrection, and thence he repaired to the fortified town of Brunn in Moravia, in order to concert measures with Alexander, who was hourly expected there from Berlin, for the further prosecution of the war. Meanwhile the French forces in great strength approached the capital; and Napoleon renewed his orders to Lannes and Murat, to endeavour, by all possible means, to gain possession of the bridge, which led across the river to the northern provinces of the empire. The interchange of couriers, which was frequent between the outposts of the two armies, on account of the negotiation which was going forward, gave an enemy, little scrupulous as to the means he employed, too fair an opportunity for accomplishing this object. Meerfelt, in retiring from Vienna, had intrusted the important post of the bridge over the Danube to Count Auersberg, who, with a strong rear-guard, was stationed at that, the sole avenue to the northern part of the Imperial dominions. At daybreak on the 13th November, General Sebastiani entered Vienna at the head of a brigade of dragoons, closely followed by Murat and Lannes, with a powerful body of grenadiers. Without halting an instant, they passed through the town, crossed the suburb of Leopold on its opposite side,

Nov. 13.

and marched straight to the great wooden bridge of Thabor, the head of which, on the right bank, was still held by an advanced-guard of the Austrians. Everything was ready for the destruction of the arches; the matches were set, the combustibles laid, the train ready; a powerful battery was stationed at the opposite extremity: Auersberg had but to give the word, and in a few minutes the bridge would be wrapt in flames, and all communication with the left bank cut off.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. vii.  
49. Rapp,  
56, 58.  
Sav. ii.  
105.

The better to conceal their designs, Lannes and Murat advanced on foot at the head of their troops. Everything bore a friendly appearance: the soldiers in column had their arms slung over their shoulders; they were surrounded by a host of stragglers as in time of profound peace: so frequent had been the interchange of couriers between the respective headquarters, that for three days there had been a kind of armistice between the two armies. The unsuspecting simplicity of the Germans was deceived by these appearances. Murat advanced with Lannes, with his hands behind his back, as if strolling out for a morning saunter: they called out to the Imperial officers not to fire, as the armistice was concluded; and the Austrians, trusting to their good faith, joined them, and began to converse about the approaching peace. As the conversation grew warmer, the French generals, followed by the grenadiers, insensibly advanced upon the bridge: for some time the Austrian officer did not take the alarm, but at length, seeing that it was more than half passed, and that the French troops were quickening their pace, he lost patience, and ordered the artillery to fire. The moment was terrible: the gunners stood to their pieces, the matches were raised; in an instant the bridge would have been swept with grapeshot, when Lannes walked straight up to him, saying with a loud voice,—“What are you about? do you not see?” At this instant the grenadiers rushed forward: the Austrian officer was seized, and continued assurances held out that the armistice was

105.  
Discredit-  
able strata-  
gem by  
which it  
seized.

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1805.

signed : while the column advanced with a rapid step along the bridge, covering by its mass a train of sappers and miners, who followed immediately behind, and threw all the combustibles placed along its length into the river. The artillerymen on the opposite side, seeing their own officers intermingled with the French, fell into the snare, and forbore to fire ; the critical moment passed ; the French grenadiers crossed the bridge, and, suddenly assailing the battery on the other side, seized the guns before the cannoneers could recover from their consternation. Instantly the grenadiers of Oudinot and Suchet succeeded them ; and the French found themselves masters of both banks of the Danube, by a stratagem conducted with a skill and intrepidity which would have been worthy of the highest admiration, were it not tarnished by a breach of faith, which neither ability nor success can palliate or excuse.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. vii.  
49, 50.  
Rapp, 56,  
60. Sav. ii.  
105, 106.  
Dum. xiv.  
27, 31. Jom.  
ii. 157, 159.  
Thiers, vi.  
261, 262.

106.  
Napoleon  
passes  
through  
Vienna, and  
establishes  
headquar-  
ters at  
Schön-  
brun.

This surprise of the bridge of Vienna, which he would have condemned as a disgraceful breach of faith if achieved by his enemies, gave the highest satisfaction to Napoleon, and it was in truth one of the most important events of the campaign. He was now enabled, from the central position of the capital, with his army *à cheval* on the river, to direct an overwhelming force against either the Russians or the Archduke Charles, as he pleased : the junction of these two powerful converging armies, or even their engaging together in common operations, was thenceforth impossible. He had now realised what, he often said to his lieutenants, contained in a few words the great secret of war—" *The art of dividing to live, and concentrating to combat.*" Impatient to profit by such extraordinary good fortune, the Emperor, at daybreak the following morning, established his headquarters at Schönbrun, from which the young Archduchess, Marie Louise, his future empress, had just before fled. The important effects of the capture of the bridge soon appeared. The Archduke Charles, whose columns were rapidly approaching the capital, was obliged

to incline to the right, with a view, by a long circuit towards Hungary, to endeavour to regain his communications with the Allied army. On the north of the river, convoys of all sorts rapidly arrived at Vienna; the hospital train was established there; the immense stores found in the arsenal enabled the French to countermand all their warlike apparatus which had been ordered up from Metz and Strassburg; while one half of the army, passed over to the north bank, threw back Kutusoff's advanced posts towards Moravia, and the other half, spread out from Kufstein in the Tyrol towards the frontiers of Hungary, interposed between the Danube and the hitherto unconquered battalions of the Archduke Charles.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sav. ii. 107,  
108. Dum.  
xiv. 31, 33.  
Bour. vii. 50,  
51. Thiers,  
vi. 271.

On the other hand, the surprise of this important bridge contributed not a little to aggravate the danger and embarrass the situation of Kutusoff. All the advantages which he had derived from his masterly movement in the valley of the Danube were now lost. The river no longer protected his rear from disaster; and alone, in presence of a force four times greater than his own, he had to continue a painful retreat to the second Russian army. He instantly fell back, and Brunn was assigned as the point of junction with the Austrian forces who had evacuated the capital. Napoleon, without a moment's delay, continued the pursuit by different columns, with a view to prevent the union. So strongly were the Austrians impressed with the idea that an armistice had been concluded, that General Nostitz, on the 15th November, when reached by the French dragoons, allowed them to pass without opposition through his squadrons, which gave them the means of falling unexpectedly on the heavy convoy which was struggling through the desperate roads in his rear. The rearguard of the Russians was soon overtaken, and one hundred loaded waggons fell almost without a combat into the hands of the enemy. Leaving this easy prey to be secured by the corps which followed, Murat pushed forward, at the head of the whole cavalry,

107.  
Subsequent  
movements  
of the  
armies.

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XL.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
159, 160.  
Dum. xiv.  
33, 36, 45.  
Sav. ii. 108.

and a corps of infantry about fifty thousand strong, to endeavour to reach Znaym before the enemy, which, if done, would have prevented the junction of the Russian and Austrian forces. At the same time Milhaud, with a brigade of chasseurs, pursued the Austrians on the chaussée of Moravia, came up with their rearguard, and at Wolersdorf captured a hundred and ninety pieces of cannon, with their caissons, which had been drawn from the arsenal of Vienna. Meanwhile Mortier and Bernadotte, who had both crossed the Danube, and were following fast on the traces of the Russian general, thundered without intermission in his rear. His destruction seemed inevitable.<sup>1</sup>

108.  
Finesse of  
Kutusoff in  
parrying the  
attempts of  
the French  
to circum-  
vent him.

Burning with anxiety to anticipate the enemy in his arrival at Znaym, and encouraged by the success of his stratagem with Auersberg, Murat resolved to try a similar device with Kutusoff, and for this purpose despatched a flag of truce, announcing the conclusion of an armistice, in the hope of thereby stopping the march of the Russian columns. But he had now a very different antagonist to deal with in such an attempt from the honest unsuspecting Austrians. Sprung from another race, and endowed with very different mental qualities, the Russians are as well skilled as the Germans are deficient in the arts of dissimulation; and they have repeatedly shown themselves superior in address to all the diplomatists of Europe. Kutusoff, whose acuteness was of the highest order, and who was inferior to none of his countrymen in the finesse of negotiation, instantly saw in this attempt the means of extricating the greater part of his army from its embarrassment. He received the French envoy in the most friendly manner, and pretended not only to enter cordially into the negotiation, but, in his anxiety to put an immediate end to hostilities, sent the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Winzingerode, to propose the terms, which were, that the Russians should retire into Poland, the French withdraw from Moravia; while, in

the mean time, both armies should remain in the situation which they at present occupied.\* Murat fell into the snare: Bagrathion, indeed, who was in presence of the French videttes with eight thousand men, remained stationary; but meanwhile the remainder of the army defiled rapidly in his rear, and gained the important post of Znaym, which opened up their communications with the retiring Austrians and their own reserves, which were approaching. The Emperor Napoleon was highly indignant when he heard that an armistice had been concluded, and despatched immediate orders for an attack; but before his answer could be received twenty hours had been gained, Znaym was passed, and the main body of the Russians were in full march to join their allies, leaving only Bagrathion and his division in presence of the enemy. His indignation exhaled in a letter of extraordinary asperity to Murat, in which he did not scruple to say that his folly had made him lose the whole fruit of the campaign.<sup>1†</sup>

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1805.

<sup>1</sup>  
Dum. xiv.  
44, 51. Bign.  
iv. 432, 434.  
Thiers, vi.  
273.

At noon on the 16th despatches arrived from Napoleon disavowing the armistice, and directing an immediate attack on the enemy. Kutusoff had directed Bagrathion to keep his ground to the last extremity, in order to gain time for the retreat of the army. Nothing more was requisite to induce that heroic general, with his brave followers, to sacrifice themselves to the last man on behalf

109.  
Heroic  
action of  
Bagrathion  
who at  
length  
makes good  
his retreat.

\* "In agreeing to this proposal for an armistice," says Kutusoff, in his official account of the transaction, "I had in view nothing but to gain time, and thereby obtain the means of removing to a greater distance from the enemy, and saving my army. The Adjutant-general, Winzingerode, sent me a duplicate of the proposed convention for my ratification; without affixing my signature, I delayed my answer for twenty hours, waiting for that of the French Emperor, and meanwhile caused the main body of the army to continue its retreat, which thereby gained two marches on the enemy. In so doing I was well aware that I was exposing the corps of Prince Bagrathion to almost certain ruin; but I esteemed myself fortunate in being able to save the army by the destruction of that corps."—DUMAS, xiv. 48.

† "Il m'est impossible de trouver des termes pour vous exprimer mon mécontentement. Vous ne commandez que mon avant-garde et n'avez pas le droit de faire d'armistice sans mon ordre.—Rompez l'armistice sur-le-champ, et marchez sur l'ennemi.—Marchez, détruisez l'armée Russe. NAPOLEON au PRINCE MURAT, NOV. 16, 1805."—THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vi. 273.



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1805.

of their country. He was soon assailed at once in front and both flanks by Lannes, Oudinot, and Murat, to whose aid Soult, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived soon after the action commenced. The village of Grund was the key of the Russian position, and incredible efforts were made on both sides to gain or retain possession of that important point. For long the Muscovites made good their ground: in vain column after column advanced bravely to the attack; the resistance they experienced was as obstinate as the attack was impetuous; and after several hours' murderous fighting, this band of heroes remained unbroken in the midst of their numerous enemies. Towards nightfall, however, the immense and constantly increasing masses of the enemy prevailed; the thinned ranks could no longer be preserved; the French grenadiers broke into the village, and almost all the wounded Russians fell into their hands. Still the survivors maintained the desperate struggle: man to man, company to company, they fought in the houses, in the streets, in the gardens, with unconquerable resolution. The constant discharges of firearms and artillery spread a broad light in the midst of the gloom of a November night; and midnight found them still engaged in mortal combat. In the strife three thousand Russians fell or were made prisoners; but Bagrathion effected his retreat with the remainder, hardly five thousand, unbroken, from amidst forty thousand enemies—a glorious achievement, which gave an earnest of the future celebrity of a hero whose career was closed with immortal renown on the field of Borodino.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
50, 55. Sav.  
ii. 108, 109.  
Jom. ii. 160,  
161. Bign.  
ix. 434, 435.

110.  
Junction of  
the Russian  
armies, and  
critical posi-  
tion of Na-

Nothing could now prevent the junction of the Allied forces, and it took place on the 19th at Wischau, in Moravia, without further molestation. This great event produced an immediate change in the measures of Napoleon.

It was no longer a dispirited band of forty thousand men, which was retiring before forces quadruple their own,

but a vast army, seventy-five thousand strong, animated by the presence of the Russian Emperor in person, which was prepared to resist his efforts. The situation of Napoleon was in consequence daily becoming more critical. The necessity of guarding so many points, and keeping up a communication from Vienna to the Rhine, had greatly reduced his army: the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand tried veterans, was rapidly approaching from the south: the Hungarian insurrection was organising in the east: seventy-five thousand Russians and Austrians were in his front: while Prussia, no longer concealing her intentions, was preparing to descend from Silesia with eighty thousand men on his communications with the Rhine.

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The measures of Napoleon to ward off so many concurring dangers were conceived with his wonted ability. Calculating that at least ten days must elapse before the Russian armies, after the fatiguing marches which they had undergone, could be ready for active operations, he resolved to make the most of that precious interval to impose upon the different enemies by whom he was surrounded. Knowing well that the great secret of war is to expand forces, when a variety of enemies are to be restrained, and a moral impression produced, and to concentrate them when a decisive blow is to be struck, he resolved to take advantage of this breathing-time to disseminate his troops in every direction. Heavy contributions were imposed upon the conquered territories of Austria: Marmont was pushed forward on the road to Styria, to observe the Archduke Charles: Davoust received orders to advance upon Presburg to overawe the Hungarians: Bernadotte, with his corps and the Bavarians, were moved towards Iglau and the frontiers of Bohemia, to observe the motions of the Archduke Ferdinand, who, with ten thousand men, whom he had collected in Bohemia after the disaster of Ulm, and the levies of that province, was assuming a menacing attitude on the Upper

111.  
Able measures of Napoleon to avert this danger.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
55, 58. Jom.  
ii. 162, 163.  
Bign. iv. 435.

Danube; while Mortier, with his corps, which had suffered so much in the preceding combats, formed the garrison of Vienna. The troops of Soult and Lannes, with the Imperial Guard and the cavalry under Murat, advanced on the road to Brünn to make head against the now united Russian armies.<sup>1</sup>

112.  
Conduct of  
the French  
at Vienna.

Meanwhile the French armies maintained the most exemplary discipline at Vienna, and the inhabitants, somewhat recovered from their consternation, were enabled to gaze without alarm on the warriors whose deeds had proved so fatal to the fortunes of their country. Commerce revived, the barriers were opened, provisions flowed in from all quarters, and, excepting from the French sentinels at the gates and uniforms in the streets, it could hardly have been discovered that an enemy was in possession of the capital. General Clarke was appointed governor of the city, and a provisional government organised throughout all the conquered provinces, whose first care was to preserve discipline among the soldiers, and the next to enforce the collection of the enormous contributions which the conqueror had imposed on the inhabitants. The greatest courtesy was evinced towards the academies and scientific institutions, and considerable payments were even made from the military chest for the support of these useful establishments—admirable measures, demonstrating the ascendant of discipline and European courtesy over the savage passions of war, and which would have been deserving of unqualified admiration, if they had not been accompanied by withering exactions, levied under the authority of Napoleon himself, and if the coercion of private plunder\* had not been all

\* The contribution levied on Vienna and the conquered part of Upper and Lower Austria was 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000 sterling, a sum fully equivalent to £8,000,000 in this country. The public stores, the legitimate objects of conquest, at Vienna were immense: 2000 pieces of artillery, of which 500 were ready for siege use; 100,000 muskets; 600,000 quintals of powder; 600,000 balls; and 160,000 bombs. 15,000 muskets were sent as a present to the Bavarians, besides the colours taken from them in 1740, when their government made common cause with France.—See BIGNON, iv. 412.

turned to the account of the great imperial robber. At the same time, in the bulletins which he published, the whole calamities of the war were, as usual, ascribed to the English and the corrupting influence of their gold; while, with a rudeness unworthy of so great a man, and especially unbecoming in the moment of triumph, he insulted his fallen enemies in his official publications, and did not even spare the Emperor of Austria in the point where chivalrous feelings would have been most anxious to have forborne—the character and influence of the Empress herself.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
412, 417.  
Jom. ii. 157.  
Dum. xiv.  
37, 40.

Meanwhile the Allied armies had effected their junction in the neighbourhood of Wischau; one hundred and four battalions, including twenty Austrian, and one hundred and fifty-nine squadrons, of which fifty were of the same nation, presented a total of seventy-five thousand effective men. A division of the Imperial Guard, under the Grand-duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor of Russia, and a corps under Benningsen, which were hourly expected, would raise it to nearly ninety thousand. The forces which the French Emperor had at his immediate disposal to resist this great array were much less considerable, and hardly amounted at that moment to seventy thousand combatants; but such was the exhaustion of the Russian troops, after incessant marching and fighting for two months, that it was resolved to put them into cantonments for ten days round Olmütz, before resuming active operations. The troops were animated by the best spirit, and enthusiastically devoted to their sovereign, whose presence amongst them never fails to rouse to the highest pitch the loyal feelings of the Russian soldiers. But in equipment and skill in the art of war it had already become evident that they were decidedly inferior to their redoubtable adversaries, and that nothing but the indomitable firmness of northern valour had hitherto enabled them to maintain their ground in the combats which had taken place between them.<sup>2</sup>

113.  
Forces on  
the  
side

<sup>2</sup> Dum. xiv.  
61, 63. Jom.  
ii. 165, 166.  
Bign. iv. 435.

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114.

Napoleon  
reconnoitres  
the field of  
Austerlitz.  
Nov. 20.  
Nov. 25.

The hostile chiefs gradually drew near to each other. Napoleon advanced his headquarters to Brünn, a fortified place, containing considerable magazines recently abandoned by the Allies, and which afforded him the immense advantage of a secure depot for his stores, sick, and wounded, in the vicinity of the theatre of action. A few days after, when out on horseback reconnoitring the ground in the neighbourhood with his staff, he was much struck with the importance, both as a field of battle and a strategetical point, of the position of AUSTERLITZ. About two miles to the north-east, the road towards Hungary by Holitsch branches off from the main road from Vienna by Brünn to Olmütz, and passes through that town, which renders it a military position of the highest value. "Gentlemen," said he to the generals and officers, "observe well the ground here : within a few days it will be your field of battle." The importance attached by both parties to the possession of this position led to a severe combat of cavalry between the advanced-guard of the French, in presence of Napoleon himself, and the rearguard of the enemy, in which neither party could boast of decisive success, although the increasing force of the French compelled the Allies at nightfall to retire. Advices at the same time arrived that the advanced-guard of Massena had entered into communication with Marmont's corps, which formed the southern extremity of the Grand Army; so that Napoleon could now calculate for the decisive shock upon the united strength of the armies of Italy and Germany.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal  
observation.  
Bign. iv.  
436. Dum.  
xiv. 104,  
105, 118.

gers of  
his situa-

But notwithstanding all this, the French Emperor was fully aware of the dangers of his situation. If Massena and the Italian army had entered into communication with his extreme right, the united forces of the Archduke Charles and John, nearly ninety thousand strong, were rapidly approaching to the assistance of the Allies; and it had already become evident that Mortier would be unable to retain Vienna for any length of time from their

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arms.<sup>3</sup> The danger of losing his line of communication in rear was the more alarming that the forces in his front were rapidly increasing; and the arrival of the Grand-duke Constantine at the enemies' headquarters had already raised their efficient force to eighty thousand men, assembled in a strong position under the cannon of Olmütz. Prussia, he was well aware, was arming for the fight; and he might shortly expect to have his communications on the Upper Danube menaced by sixty thousand of the soldiers of the Great Frederick. Everything depended upon striking a decisive blow before these formidable enemies accumulated around him; and he was not without hopes that the inexperience or undue confidence of his opponents would give him the means of accomplishing this object, and terminating the war by a stroke which would at once extricate him from all his difficulties. In this expectation he was seconded to a wish by the presumptuous confidence of the circle of young officers, headed by Weyrother, by whom the Emperor of Russia was surrounded. They represented that the army had exhausted its supplies at Olmütz, and could no longer exist; that its spirit, from fatal inactivity, was daily declining; that Napoleon evidently felt himself overmatched, and, contrary to his usual practice, had<sup>B</sup> halted at Brünn; but that nothing could be so absurd as<sup>400, 400.</sup> to allow him to remain there unassailed, in quiet possession of the resources of three-fourths of the monarchy.<sup>Jom. ii. 171  
172. Thiers,  
vi. 285, 286.</sup>

The more to inspire the Allies with the false confidence which might lead to such a result, Napoleon despatched Savary with a letter to the Emperor Alexander, to offer his congratulations to that monarch on his having joined the Allied army, and propose terms of accommodation.\*<sup>116.</sup>

Simulate  
negotiations  
on both  
si  
ti  
Nov.

\* "Sire," said Napoleon, "I send my aide-de-camp, General Savary, to your Majesty, to offer you my compliments on your arrival at the headquarters of your army. I have charged him to express the esteem which I entertain for your Majesty, and the anxious desire which I feel to cultivate your friendship. I indulge the hope that your Majesty will receive him with that condescension for which you are so eminently distinguished, and that you will regard me as one of the men who are most desirous to be agreeable to you. I pray God to

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About the same time Counts Giulay and Stadion arrived at the headquarters of the French Emperor. After two days spent in fruitless negotiations, Napoleon demanded a personal interview with the Emperor Alexander. Instead of coming in person, the Czar sent his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgorucki, whom Napoleon met at the advanced posts. "Why are we fighting?" said Napoleon, when the aide-de-camp was admitted into his presence. "Let the Emperor Alexander, if he complains of my irruptions, make corresponding invasions on his own side, and all discussion will cease betwixt us." The Russian represented that such a conduct would be repugnant to the principles of his cabinet; that the

keep your imperial Majesty in his holy keeping." The Emperor Alexander replied from Olmütz, on the 27th, in these terms:—"I have received, sire, with the gratitude of which it was deserving, the letter which General Savary brought, and hasten to return my best acknowledgments. I have no other desire but to see the peace of Europe established on safe and honourable conditions. I desire, at the same time, to seize every occasion of being personally agreeable to you: receive the assurance of it, as well as of my high consideration."

"When I arrived at the Russian headquarters," says Savary, "I found the officers and staff declaiming against the ambition of the French government, and full of confidence in the success of their arms. The Emperor received me in the most gracious manner, and made a sign for his attendants to retire. I could not avoid a feeling of timidity and awe when I found myself alone with that monarch. Nature had done much for him: it would be difficult to find a model so perfect and gracious; he was then twenty-six years of age. He spoke French in its native purity, without the slightest tinge of foreign accent, and made use on all occasions of our most classical expressions. As there was not the least affectation in his manner, it was easy to see that this was the result of a finished education. The Emperor said, when I put the letter into his hand, 'I am grateful for this step on your master's side; it is with regret that I have taken up arms against him, and I seize with pleasure the first opportunity of testifying that feeling towards him. He has long been the object of my admiration; I have no wish to be his enemy, any more than that of France. He should recollect that, in the time of the late Emperor Paul, though then only Grand-duke, when France was overwhelmed by disasters, and met with nothing but obloquy from the other cabinets, I contributed much, by directing the Russian cabinet to take the lead, to induce the other powers of Europe to recognise the new order of things in your country. If now I entertain different sentiments, it is because France has adopted different principles, which have given the European powers just cause of disquietude for their independence. I have been called on by them to concur with them in establishing an order of things which may tranquillise all parties; and it is to accomplish that purpose that I have come hither. You have been admirably served by fortune, it must be admitted; but I will never desert an ally in distress, or separate my cause

Emperor had only taken up arms to succour Austria, and obtain for the Continent a solid peace, without either personal interest in the matter, or animosity against France; that he desired to see it powerful and happy, as well as all the other European states; that his empire was already so vast, that its extension was no object of ambition, and that his sole desire was the prosperity of his subjects.

Napoleon replied, that the Allies wished to deprive him of his crown, and reinstate the Bourbons. This Dolgorucki contested; and he denied also that they desired to restore his Italian possessions to the King of Sardinia; but admitted that they insisted on the independence of

from that of the Emperor of Germany. He is in a critical situation, but one not beyond the reach of remedy. I lead brave soldiers, and if your master drives me to it, I will command them to do their duty. You are already a great and powerful nation, and by your uniformity of language, feelings, and laws, as well as physical situation, must always be formidable to your neighbours. What need have you of continual aggrandisement? Since the peace of Lunéville, you have acquired first Genoa, and then Italy, which you have subjected to a government which places it entirely at your disposal."

"Genoa has been acquired by us," answered Savary, "in spite of ourselves. Its political power was annihilated, its harbour blockaded by the English, its commerce destroyed, its means of defence against the Barbary powers at an end. Necessity, therefore, not less than inclination, compelled them to throw themselves into the arms of a foreign power. France was subjected to the whole charges of its defence before the formal act of annexation took place. As to Italy, it is altogether our conquest. We have watered its fields with our blood; twice it has regained its political existence by our efforts. If it began with republican institutions, it was in order to be in harmony with its protecting power. The changes which have since taken place in its government were intended to make it still follow the phases of our constitution. It has the same laws, usages, and internal regulations as France. It must lean on some foreign power, and has only France and Austria to choose between. We have fought for ten years to wrest it bit by bit from that power: could we permit its inhabitants to choose an alliance which would at once deprive us of the whole fruit of our labours? If Austria has not abandoned all thoughts of Italy, we are still ready to combat her for it; if she has, it is of very little moment what its form of government is. The Emperor, in sending me to your Majesty, was far from supposing that the war took its origin in these questions; if it does so, I not only see no possibility of peace, but anticipate a universal hostility." It was easy to see that an accommodation was impossible between powers actuated by such opposite sentiments. Savary returned, after three days spent in parleying, without having accomplished the professed object of his mission; but having effectually gained its real design in making the French Emperor acquainted with the self-confidence and vehemence which prevailed at the Allied headquarters.—SAVARY, ii. 112, 128.



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117.

inversa-

d Alex-  
ander's aide-  
de-camp.

Nov. 28.

Holland, and an indemnity for the loss of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. "Let the Emperor of Russia imitate my conduct," said Napoleon, "and we shall soon come to terms of accommodation."—"He will never desert his allies," replied Dolgorucki.—"Then we must fight," rejoined Napoleon: "I wash my hands of the consequences;" and with that abruptly broke off the conference. But though it had only lasted half an hour, much had been done in that time to blind the Allies as to the real state of affairs. The Emperor met the prince at the advanced posts, as if solicitous to conceal what was passing in the interior of the army. Preparations for a retreat were ostentatiously put forward; field-works were hastily thrown up in front of the ground occupied by the army; and Dolgorucki withdrew with the firm conviction, which he did not fail to communicate to his sovereign, that the French Emperor had lost all his former confidence, and that his great object now was to extricate himself from the perilous situation in which he was placed.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Sav. ii. 115,  
128. Bign.  
iv. 437, 442.

118.  
witz  
s from

On the same day Count Haugwitz arrived at the French headquarters with the ultimatum of Prussia, as agreed on in the treaty of 3d November. Since that time the measures of the cabinet of Berlin had been decidedly hostile. A combined force of Russians and Swedes had occupied the electorate of Hanover; a strong body of English troops had landed at Stade; and a proclamation from the King of England announced that the electorate was now placed under the protection of Prussia; and that all the former authorities were reinstated in their functions as before the French invasion. The Swedes were in full march towards the Elbe, and the Prussians towards Franconia; while a powerful force of the same nation was collecting in Silesia to bring immediate succour to the

\* When Dolgorucki had retired, Napoleon said to the officers around him, "The Allies should wait till they are on the heights of Montmartre before they make such proposals."—BOUR. vii. 67.

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1865.

Allied<sup>2</sup> army. Even the garrison of Berlin had received orders to march to support the military movements which were in preparation. The eloquent declamations of the celebrated historian, Muller, had wrought up the public mind to a perfect frenzy; warlike enthusiasm filled every breast; and the most exaggerated reports of the disasters of the French were received with insatiable avidity. Napoleon was well aware of all this, and of the object of Haugwitz's mission. He therefore resolved to temporise, and if possible dissipate the clouds which were collecting by a decisive stroke, before they burst upon his head. Accordingly he refused to enter into discussion with the Prussian minister, and recommended him, after a short interview, to open conferences at Vienna with Talleyrand, instead of remaining amidst the tumult of his bivouacs; and the wily diplomatist, not sorry of an opportunity of waiting the issue of events before finally committing his country in a contest which he had so long laboured to prevent, readily acted on his suggestion.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hard. vii.  
497, 498.  
Bign. iv.  
437, 438.  
Jom. ii. 17

When forces so vast were preparing to aid them, both in the north and south, it was the obvious policy of the Allies to remain on the defensive, and rest secure in their strong position under the cannon of Olmütz, until the Archduke Charles had brought up his veteran battalions, and Prussia had descended in force into Silesia and Franconia. But although the expedience of doing so was fully appreciated at headquarters, it was resolved, in a council of war held on the 27th, to advance forthwith against the enemy. The advice of Count Langeron, who earnestly counselled delay, was overruled by that of Weyrother, who had recently acquired great influence over the Emperor—an officer of extensive views and skill in combination, but with little practical acquaintance with war, and little fitted to anticipate the rapid movements, and ward off the terrible strokes of Napoleon. The Russian troops, miserably provided at that period with commissaries, and totally destitute of magazines in that

119.  
The Allies  
advance to  
Wischan.

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1805.

Nov. 27.

Nov. 28.

Dum. xiv.  
150, 152.

Hard. viii.  
505, 506.

Jom. ii. 172.  
Thiers, vi.

285, 294.

120.

Preparatory  
movements  
in both  
ides.

part of the country, which it had never been expected would form the theatre of war, were suffering extremely from want of provisions; while the French, having the rich provinces of Lower Austria and Hungary in their rear, were amply provided with supplies of all sorts. The Allied generals, too, were aware of the inferiority in number of the French troops assembled round Brünn, and were ignorant of the admirable disposition of the other corps in echelon in their rear, by which the two armies could in a few days be restored to an equality. Influenced by these sentiments, a forward movement was resolved on, with a view to pass the right flank of the French army, cut them off from their communications with Vienna and the reserve under Massena, and at the same time establish their own connexion with the powerful succour approaching under the Archduke Charles. If the movement proved successful, and the road to Vienna was cut off, Napoleon had no other resource but to retire on Bohemia, where he would meet the forces of Prussia. The movement commenced on the 27th at daybreak, when the whole army advanced in five columns, moving parallel to each other, against the enemy. The French were not in sufficient force at the advanced posts to resist so formidable an assault; a detachment was made prisoners, and after a sharp combat the little village of Rausnitz was abandoned by Murat to Bagration. Encouraged by this success of its advanced-guard, the Russian main body followed joyfully and rapidly in its footsteps. Headquarters were moved on to Wischau, and the outposts were pushed forward to within two leagues of Austerlitz.<sup>1</sup>

This sudden irruption led to an immediate concentration of the French army. Murat, Lannes, and Soult received orders instantly to raise their cantonments and fall back behind Brünn, keeping only detachments in front of that place. Bernadotte was directed to leave the Bavarians at Iglau, and advance with his other troops by forced

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1805.

marches to the field of action; Davoust to come up with all imaginable haste to Nikolsburg, on the right of the French position; Mortier to abandon Vienna to a division of Marmont's army, and hasten with his whole corps to the environs of Brünn; and Marmont to draw near to the capital with all his forces. With such promptitude were these orders obeyed, and to such a degree of vigour had long discipline brought the French troops, that part of Davoust's corps, which was farthest off, marched *thirty-six leagues in forty-eight hours*, from Vienna to Gross Raigern, and bivouacked at the place a league and a half from the field of battle, on the night of December 1. In this way Napoleon's army, which, before the concentration commenced, was little more than fifty thousand strong, was raised by the evening of the 1st to ninety thousand. But before these distant succours could arrive, great successes might have been obtained, and the Emperor was in no small disquietude how to arrest the enemy before his forces were assembled. Fortunately for him, their subsequent movements were as slow and vacillating as their first had been decided and audacious. On the 29th they marched forward only two leagues, directing their chief force to the heights of Kutscherau, towards the French extreme right; but on the day following they retraced their steps, and advancing with the left in front, bivouacked at Hodiegitz, and their light troops were seen from the French outposts marching across their position towards their own right.<sup>1</sup>

\*. Napoleon spent the whole of both days on horseback, at the advanced posts, watching their movements. After surveying the heights of Pratzen, the highest ground in the neighbourhood, and obviously of the first importance if the battle was fought in its environs, he said to his generals, "If I wished to prevent the enemy from passing, it is here that I should station myself; but that would only lead to an ordinary battle, and I desire decisive success. If, on the other hand, I draw back my right

Nov. 29.  
Nov. 30.  
1 Nov. ii.  
407, 408.  
Jom. ii. 174,  
175. Dum.  
xiv. 133, 134.  
Bign. iv.  
439, 440.  
Thiers, vi.  
296.

121.  
Napoleon's  
measures to  
draw the  
enemy on.

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towards Brünn, and the Russians pass these heights, they are irretrievably ruined." In pursuance of this design the heights were abandoned; the right was drawn back, as if it was fearful of encountering the enemy; and the French army concentratéd round Brünn, ready to take advantage of the first imprudent step which might be made by their adversaries. At length, on the morning of the 1st December, the intentions of the enemy were clearly manifest. Napoleon beheld, as he himself says, "with inexpressible delight," their whole columns, dark and massy, moving across his position, at so short a distance as rendered it apparent that a general action was at hand. Carefully avoiding the slightest interruption to their movement, he merely watched with intense anxiety their march; and when it had become evident, from the direction they were following, and the number of troops who had already passed, that the resolution to turn the right flank of the French army had been decidedly taken, he said, with the prophetic anticipation of military genius, "To-morrow, before nightfall, that army is my own." In truth, the Allies, under the direction of Weyrother, whose repeated defeats at Rivoli and Hohenlinden, where he had been chief of the staff, had not yet taught him the quality of the antagonists with whom he had to deal, were venturing upon one of the most hazardous movements in war—a flank march in column in front of a concentrated enemy, and that, too, when that enemy was Napoleon at the head of eighty thousand men. At midnight on the 1st, a council of war was held at the Allied headquarters, at which Weyrother brought forward his plan of attack for the succeeding day, and soon took the lead in the discussion. Kutusoff took share in the discussion, and soon fell asleep. Lan-geron, when Weyrother had concluded, asked what they should do if Napoleon took the initiative and attacked them at Pratzen, before their movement was completed. "You need not trouble yourself about that," replied he,

<sup>1</sup> Hard. viii.  
506, 507.

D

1:

Norv.ii.408.

Jom. ii. 175,

176. Sav. ii.

130. Thiers,

vi. 101, 107.

“you know the boldness of Buonaparte : if he had been of sufficient strength to attack us, he would have done it yesterday. He has not forty thousand men.” “I trust it is so,” replied Langeron, “but I have my own misgivings. He has extinguished his fires ; I hear a loud murmur in his camp.”

Meanwhile the Allies, in great strength, animated by the presence of their respective sovereigns, and in the highest spirits, were marching in five massy columns within two cannon-shots of the French outposts. Their design was to turn the right flank of the enemy, so as, in case of disaster, to cut him off from Vienna, and throw him back on the mountains of Bohemia; and with that view they proposed to commence the action by a vigorous attack on that wing, which it was hoped would be speedily defeated and thrown back in confusion on the centre. On the evening of the 1st December, they occupied the following position. Their first column, under Doctoroff, had advanced beyond the right flank of the French as far as Aujezd; the second, commanded by Langeron, occupied the important heights of Prätzen, directly before the French right wing; the third, under Prybyszwecki, crowned the eminences immediately to the right of that elevated point: these three columns formed the left wing, commanded by Buxhowden; the fourth, under Kollowrath, consisting of fifteen Austrian and Milaradovitch's twelve Russian battalions, followed in order on the heights in rear of the third column; the cavalry under Lichtenstein, consisting of eighty-two squadrons, was destined to occupy the low ground from Blasowitz to Kruh, thus uniting the centre with the right wing, consisting of the fifth column under Bagration, which was established on each side of the Olmutz road opposite to the Rosenitzberg: while the reserve, under the Grand-duke Constantine, occupied the heights in front of Austerlitz.<sup>1</sup> In all, their forces embraced a hundred and fourteen battalions and a hundred and

122.  
Allied order  
of battle.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
134, 135.  
Nap. ii. 176.

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123.  
Description  
of the field  
of battle.

seventy-two squadrons, amounting to fully eighty thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were cavalry in the finest condition.

The French army, in concentrated masses, occupied a position in advance of the fortress of Brünn, midway between that town and Austerlitz. The Emperor's tent was placed on an elevated slope on the right of the great road leading across his line from Brünn to Austerlitz, at the distance of two leagues from the former place, a little in front of Bellowitz, between two streamlets, which, descending towards the south, unite their waters at Puntowitz and form the Goldbach.\* From this elevated point the whole extent of the line was visible, though many parts of it were obscured by rising grounds, copsewoods, and villages, which, intersected by numerous small fishponds, formed a sort of intrenched camp, within which the French army was placed. Their right rested on the lakes Menitz and Satschan, formed by the river Littawa; their left on the Rosenitzberg—an elevated hill, the first of the wooded chain which separates the basin of the Schwarza from that of the Marche, and which was intrenched and crowned with artillery. The front of the whole position was covered by broad marshes, which fringed on either side the stream of the Goldbach, intersected at right angles by the great road from Brünn to Olmütz, and by various country roads from village to village, which, from the morasses and little lakes by which they were bordered, appeared easily susceptible of defence. Right in front of the position, on the opposite side of the rivulet, lay the line of waving heights, gradually rising to the elevated point of the Pratzen, which were already covered with the enemy's troops, who, congregated in formidable masses on that imposing ridge,<sup>1</sup> sought to conceal the

<sup>1</sup> Personal43  
om. ii.  
175, 176.

\* These names will convey no ideas to readers in this country; but they will be of value to the traveller who explores, in that distant region, the theatre of this memorable conflict.

general movement of the troops in their rear, to turn the right flank of Napoleon.

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124

Disposi

By great exertions, the French Emperor had succeeded in assembling an immense force for the decisive battle which was approaching. The left wing, under Lannes, was stationed at the foot of the hills, having a powerful advanced guard of cavalry in front of the fortified position of the Rosenitzberg. Behind these was placed the corps of Bernadotte, who by forced marches had arrived in line from Iglau on the Bohemian frontier. To their right, on the right of the high road, also in reserve, were stationed the grenadiers of Oudinot, with the cavalry under Murat; and the Imperial Guard, under Bessières, in a third line behind them. The centre was composed of the corps of Marshal Soult, which was uncommonly strong, and occupied the villages from Girzikowitz to Kobelnitz, opposite the heights of Pratzen, which had been abandoned to the enemy. The right wing, under Davoust, was thrown back in a semicircle, with its reserves at the abbey of Raigern in the rear, and its front line stretching to the lake Menitz. Before the night of the 1st December, above ninety thousand men were here assembled within the space of two leagues; all veterans inured to war, and burning with impatience to signalise themselves in the decisive battle which was to take place on the morrow.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv  
142, 147.  
Sav. ii. 131  
134, Jom.  
ii. 177.

Napoleon spent the whole of that day on horseback, riding along the ranks, visiting the outposts, addressing the soldiers, and studying the ground. When a standard of the Italian army appeared, he spoke to the men in those words of brief but nervous eloquence by which he knew so well how to win their hearts; many of the veterans he even distinguished by name, and reminded of the dangers and glories they had shared together. "Soldiers!" said he, "we must finish this war by a decisive blow;" and loud cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" proved that he had not miscalculated the ardour of his

125.  
Nocturnal  
illumination  
of the French  
lines.



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followers. He continued riding through the bivouacs, animating the men, till long after nightfall, and then retired to his tent, where he dictated one of those magical proclamations which so often, on the eve of great events, contributed to the astonishing victories which he won.\* Suddenly, as he rode along, surrounded by his generals, fires were seen kindling on all sides; a brilliant illumination arose in all the bivouacs; the heavens were filled with the ruddy glow; and loud shouts in every direction announced some extraordinary transport among the soldiers. It was the enthusiasm of the common men, which, wrought up to the highest pitch by the interest of the moment and the presence of their beloved Emperor, celebrated thus, by the voluntary conflagration of the wood of their huts, and straw of their bivouacs, the first anniversary of his coronation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
146, 149.  
Sav. ii. 132,  
133. Jom.  
ii. 176, 177.

126.  
Movements  
on both sides  
n-  
ing.

The night was cold but clear, though a thick fog, as is not unusual in that country, covered all the lower grounds, and hardly permitted the sentinels to discern each other at ten yards' distance. At four in the morning the Emperor mounted on horseback. All was still among the immense multitude who were concentrated in the French lines; buried in sleep, the soldiers forgot alike their triumphs and the dangers they were about to undergo. Gradually, however, a confused murmur arose from the Russian host; the lights multiplied towards Aujezd and the south-eastern parts of the horizon; and all the

\* "Soldiers! The Russian army has presented itself before you to revenge the disaster of the Austrians at Ulm. They are the same men whom you conquered at Hollabrunn, and on whose flying traces you have followed. The positions which we occupy are formidable, and while they are marching to turn my right, they must present their flank to your blows. Soldiers! I will myself direct all your battalions. I will keep myself at a distance from the fire, if, with your accustomed valour, you carry disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks; but should victory appear for a moment uncertain, you shall see your Emperor expose himself to the first strokes; for victory must not be doubtful on this occasion, especially when the reputation of the French infantry is at stake, which is so dear an interest to the honour of the whole nation." This is perhaps the first instance recorded in history where a general openly announced to his soldiers the manœuvre by which he expected they would prove

reports from the outposts announced that the advance from right to left had already commenced along their whole line. In effect, the orders had been despatched at midnight; all their columns were in full march, within two hours after, to turn the French right. At three o'clock, a detachment of Austrian horse presented themselves before Telnitz, the outermost village in the possession of the French on that side, and shortly after an attack with infantry and artillery was made on that important post. No sooner did Napoleon hear the sound of the distant cannonade in that direction, than he ordered Soult to bring his columns up to the very entrance of the defiles formed by the villages and woods in the low grounds on either side of the rivulet, in order that, the instant the enemy appeared sufficiently engaged in their perilous cross-march, his numerous battalions might be at once thrown on their flank. The soldiers accordingly advanced: every heart throbbing with anxiety, every eye turned to the east, where still, in that wintry season, no glimmering of light appeared.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
160. Jom  
ii. 179. Sav  
ii. 133.

Gradually the stars, which throughout the night had shone clear and bright in the firmament, began to disappear; the ruddy glow of the east announced the approach of day; and the tops of the hills, illuminated by the level rays, appeared clear and sharp above the ocean of fog that rolled in the valleys. At last the sun rose in unclouded brilliancy—that “Sun of Austerlitz” which he so often afterwards apostrophised as illuminating the most splendid periods of his life.\* As the mist sank, and the

127.  
Napoleon  
at length  
orders the  
attack.

victorious; while the promise that he was not, except in the last extremity, to put himself at their head, affords the clearest indication of the mutual confidence which long service together had established between them.—See DUMAS, xiv. 148, 149.

\* Non fu mai l' aria sì serena e bella,  
Come all' uscir del memorabil giorno.  
L' alba lieta rideva, e pareva ch' ella  
Tutti i raggi del sole avesse intorno;  
E 'l lume usato accrebbe, e senza velo  
Volle mirar l' opere grandi il cielo.

TASSO, *Ger. Lib.* xx. 5.

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upper eminences in the lower grounds became visible<sup>1</sup>, the magnitude of the fault which the enemy had committed became apparent : the heights of Pratzen, the key to their position, which the evening before had been crowned with artillery and glittering with armed men, were now deserted. It was evident that the left wing, advancing towards Telnitz, had descended to the low grounds, and that the Allies, intent on outflanking their opponents, had entirely abandoned the thought of retaining their position. The marshals who surrounded Napoleon, saw the advantage, and eagerly besought him to give the signal for action ; but he restrained their ardour, and turning to Soult, said, "How long would it take you from hence to reach the heights of Pratzen?"—"Less than twenty minutes," replied the marshal ; "for my troops are in the bottom of the valley, covered with mist and the smoke of their bivouacs ; the enemy cannot see them."—"In that case," said Napoleon, "let us wait twenty minutes : when the enemy is making a false movement, we must take good care not to interrupt him." Burning with impatience, the marshals stood around awaiting the signal ; but before that time was fully elapsed, a violent fire was heard on the right towards Telnitz, and an aide-de-camp, arriving in haste, announced that the enemy had commenced the attack in great force in that quarter. "Now, then, is the moment," said Napoleon ; and the marshals set off at the gallop in all directions for their respective corps. At the same time the Emperor mounted his horse, and riding through the foremost ranks, "Soldiers!" said he, "the enemy has imprudently exposed himself to your blows ; we shall finish the war with a clap of thunder."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
160, 161.  
Jom. ii. 179,  
180. Sav.  
ii. 133, 134.  
Bign. iv.  
444.

128.  
Battle of  
Austerlitz.

The French army occupied an interior position, from whence their columns started like rays from a centre, while the Allies were toiling in a wide semicircle round their outer extremity. Marshal Soult, in the centre, first got into action ; but long before he could pass the hollow ground which separated the two armies, the Russian left

wing, under Buxhowden, had gained considerable successes. So violent was their onset, so great their superiority of force at the first encounter, that the French were driven from the village of Telnitz, and Buxhowden was advancing beyond the extreme right of their position. Alarmed at the progress of the enemy on the right, Napoleon ordered Davoust, who, with his reserve, lay near the abbey of Raigern, to advance to check them; but before he could come up, Sokolnitz also was carried, amid loud shouts, and the French right wing appeared completely turned. But it was in such moments that the cool judgment and invincible tenacity of Marshal Davoust appeared most conspicuous. Arranging his forces in battle array beyond the village of Sokolnitz, he received the Russians, when issuing from it disordered by success, with such resolution, that they were not only arrested in their advance, but driven out of that village with the loss of six pieces of caanon. Buxhowden, however, returned in greater force; the French were again expelled, blood flowed in torrents, and both parties maintained the conflict with invincible resolution.<sup>1</sup>

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Affairs were in this state on the right, when Soult, with his powerful corps, was suddenly thrown on the Russian centre. The fourth Allied column, under Kollowrath, composed of Austrians and Milaradovitch's corps of Russians, consisting of twenty-seven battalions, was just beginning to ascend the slopes of the Pratzen, which had been entirely evacuated by the third corps, under Buxhowden, immediately preceding it, when its outposts perceived the immense dark mass of French infantry emerging out of the mist in the low grounds on their right. Kutusoff instantly saw his danger; the enemy's centre, in order of battle, was ready to assail the combined army while in open columns of march. But if a fault in generalship had been committed, nothing that resolution could do to repair it was wanting. The Emperor Alexander was with the centre column, and his

<sup>1</sup> *Jom. ii.*  
*183. Dum.*  
*xiv. 160,*  
*165. Norv.*  
*ii. 410.*

<sup>129.</sup>  
The French  
cut through  
the Russian  
centre.

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was not a character to sink tamely before misfortune. By his directions, Kutusoff gave immediate orders for the corps which had descended from the heights of Prätzen to reoccupy that important position. The infantry of Milaradovitch and Kollowrath, forming the fourth column, rapidly wheeling into order of battle from open column, was formed in two lines, and every disposition made in the utmost haste to receive the enemy. Before they could be completed, however, the first line of Soult, composed of the divisions of St Hilaire and Vandamme, had ascended the heights. Its attack was so impetuous that the Russian front line was broken and driven back upon the second with the loss of several pieces of cannon; the heights of Prätzen, after a desperate conflict of two hours' duration, were carried, and six battalions, which occupied a hill forming the highest part of the ridge, cut to pieces. The danger was extreme; the Allied army, surprised in its cross march, was pierced through the centre, and the left wing in advance entirely separated from the remainder of the army.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
170, 172.  
Jom. ii. 185,  
186. Bign.  
iv. 445.  
Thiers, vi.  
311, 313.

130.  
Progress of  
the action on  
the French  
left.

While this important success was gained in the centre, the French left, under Bernadotte, Murat, and Lannes, was also warmly engaged with the enemy. Lannes advanced direct upon Rausnitz; Murat, with his numerous squadrons in the low grounds, on the right of Lannes, between Girzikowitz and Kruh; Bernadotte debouched from Girzikowitz upon the village and heights of Blasowitz. They, too, surprised the combined forces in their line of march; and Napoleon sent repeated orders to these generals to attack the enemy promptly and vigorously, in order to prevent them from sending forward any succours to the centre, where the decisive blow was to be struck. The French marshals advanced to the attack in the order prescribed for the whole army, with the front line in order of battle, the second in column, with the artillery in front, and the heavy cavalry in reserve behind the second line—a disposition

everywhere attended with the happiest effects. The Russian right wing, while moving along without any conception that the enemy was at hand, were thunderstruck at finding themselves suddenly assailed by French columns emerging in battle array out of the mist; and so complete was the surprise, that the reserve under the Grand-duke Constantine was one of the first divisions to find itself engaged. Their dispositions, nevertheless, were speedily made: the artillery was rapidly brought forward to the front, and under cover of its fire the marching columns, with all imaginable haste, wheeled into line. Gradually, however, the French infantry gained ground; and, taking advantage of their success, the cavalry under Kellermann were assailing even the Russian Imperial Guard, when Prince Lichtenstein, at the head of the splendid Russian hulans of the Guard, charged them with such vigour that they were instantly broken, and the Allied horse, following up their success, broke through the first French line, swept through the openings between the second, and interposed in the interval between the corps of Bernadotte and Lannes. Here, however, they were in their turn charged by Murat at the head of a large body of Napoleon's cavalry, and driven back through both French lines, who threw in a flanking fire on their disordered squadrons with such effect that nearly half their numbers were stretched on the plain.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv.  
176, 181.  
Jom. ii. 186.  
Bign. iv.  
445, 446.

This murderous strife on the left was attended with no decisive success to either party; but it had the desired effect of preventing any succours being sent from that quarter to the centre, now severely pressed by Soult.

\* The combat of Lannes, Bernadotte, and Murat, on the left, was remarkable for the perfect success with which the troops, arranged in the order prescribed by Napoleon, baffled all the efforts of the Allies, whose numerous and magnificent cavalry had there a full opportunity of acting. The first line was uniformly drawn up in battle array; the second in squares of battalions—the artillery and light horse in front, with the heavy cavalry arranged in several lines in the rear of the whole. Thus, if a charge of horse, which was frequently the case, broke the first array, it passed, while disordered by success, through the intervals between the squares behind the first line, from whose front and

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181.

Vehement  
of  
sianperial  
Guards.

At length Kutusoff, seriously alarmed at the progress of that sturdy assailant, recalled a large part of Lichtenstein's cavalry to make a fresh effort against the enemy on the heights of Pratzen: the remainder of the horse of Ouvaroff formed a mass of thirty squadrons, which it was hoped would suffice to keep up the communication between the centre and right wing of the Allies. But though these dispositions were judicious, they bore no sort of comparison to the measures of Napoleon, who, seeing clearly that Pratzen was the decisive point, ordered up to the support of Soult, already victorious, the whole corps of Bernadotte, the Guard, and grenadiers of Oudinot—in all, fully twenty-five thousand men. But before they could arrive, a desperate shock had taken place in the centre. The Grand-duke Constantine, perceiving the danger of Kollowrath's troops, and alarmed at the progress which Lannes and Bernadotte were making on his own side, brought forward the Russian Imperial Guard, and, descending from the heights, advanced, midway between Pratzen and Blasowitz, to meet the enemy. They were received by the division of Vandamme of Soult's corps; and while a furious combat was going on between these rival bodies of infantry, the French were suddenly assailed in flank by the Russian cuirassiers of the Guard, two thousand strong, in the finest order, led by Constantine in person. The shock was irresistible: in an instant the French column was broken, three battalions were trampled under foot, and the 4th regiment lost its eagle.<sup>1</sup>

pp. 61.  
Dum. xiv.  
61. Sav. ii.  
13. Thiers,  
vi. 321, 322.

Napoleon saw there was not a moment to be lost in repairing the disorder; and he immediately ordered Mar-

flanks it sustained a heavy fire. If they escaped that, the horsemen were suddenly assailed, when blown and dispersed, by a solid mass of heavy cavalry in the rear, which never failed to hurl them back in confusion through the squares, who by this time had reloaded their pieces, and whose flanking fire completed the destruction of their gallant assailants. The British heavy brigade of horse at Waterloo suffered extremely from a similar disposition made by Napoleon, which enabled him ultimately to baffle the most intrepid charges of the finest cavalry in the world after they had achieved important success.—See DUMAS, xiv. 183.

shal Bessières, with the cavalry of the Guard, to arrest that terrible body of horse. Rapp put himself at the head of their advanced guard, and set off at the gallop down the hill, to restore the combat. "Soldiers!" said he, "you see what has happened below there: they are sabring our comrades; let us fly to their succour." Instantly spurring their chargers, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy. The Russians had scarcely time to reform their squadrons after their glorious success, when this fierce enemy was upon them. They were broken, driven back over the dead bodies of the square they had destroyed, and lost their artillery. Rallying, however, in a few minutes with admirable discipline, upon being reinforced by the superb regiment of Chevalier Guards,\* they returned to the charge. Both Imperial Guards met in full career: the shock was terrible; and the most desperate cavalry action that had taken place during the war ensued, and lasted for above five minutes. Colonel Morland, who commanded the French chasseurs of the Guard, was killed in the mêlée, and the French horse were driven back. But as the Russian Chevalier Guards were pursuing with loud shouts, and in some disorder, they were in their turn assailed in flank by the grenadiers-à-cheval under Bessières in person. This powerful reserve, composed of the very flower of the Guards mounted on superb horses, immediately engaged in a desperate contest with Constantine's Chevalier Guards. The Russian infantry, though close at hand, merely looked on: so closely were the squadrons intermingled that they did not venture to fire, for fear of destroying their comrades. The resolution and vigour of the combatants were equal; squadron to squadron, man to man, they fought with invincible firmness, and soon the ground was strewed with the dead and the dying.<sup>1</sup> At length, however, the stern obstinacy of the Russians yielded to the enthusiastic valour of the French: the cavalry and infantry of their Guard gave way, and, after

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182.

Decisive  
charge of  
Rapp with  
the French  
cavalry of  
the Guard.<sup>1</sup> Rapp.195. Join.  
ii. 187, 188.  
Sav. ii. 135,  
136. Thiers,  
vi. 323, 324.

\* A corps in which all the privates were gentlemen.



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133.  
Decisive  
successes of  
French.

losing their artillery and standards, were driven back in confusion almost to the walls of Austerlitz; while, from a neighbouring eminence, the Emperors of Russia and Germany beheld the irretrievable rout of the flower of their army.\*

This desperate encounter was decisive of the fate of the day. Pierced through the middle, with the bravest of their troops destroyed, the Russians no longer fought for victory, but for existence. In effect, the defeat of the centre, which was now borne back above a mile from the field of battle, exposed the left wing, between Aujezd and Sokolnitz, to the most imminent danger. Rapidly following up his success, Napoleon caused his reserves, consisting of the grenadiers of Oudinot and the Imperial Guard, to wheel to the right to aid Soult in attacking the rear of that wing, while Davoust, near Sokolnitz, pressed its front. They first came up with a division of six thousand men, who were retracing their steps, too late, to support the centre. Assailed at once in front and both flanks by immense masses of infantry and cavalry flushed with victory, this body was speedily defeated, and half of its number made prisoners. Rapidly advancing from left to right, the victorious French next came upon Langeron, who shared the same fate: and the survivors from his division, flying for refuge to Buxhowden, first communicated to that general the melancholy intelligence of the disasters which had befallen the central divisions of the army. He immediately formed his troops into close column, and began to debouche from Aujezd with a view to regain, by a road between the marshes of the Littawa and the high grounds which adjoin them to the north, the remains of the army at Austerlitz. But before they had proceeded half a mile, the marching column was furiously attacked in flank at different points by the victorious French, who succeeded in piercing it through the middle,

\* It is the moment when Rapp returned with his charger all bloody, to announce this decisive success, that Gerard has selected for his admirable and well-known picture of the battle of Austerlitz.—RAPP, 62.

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and separating Buxhowden with a few battalions in advance from the remainder of the array. The unhappy body which was cut off, consisting of eight-and-twenty battalions, under Doctoroff and Langeron, was soon assailed in front, flank, and rear, by the Imperial Guard, Soult, and Davoust. After a brave resistance, they were at length overwhelmed: seven thousand were taken or destroyed on the spot, and great numbers sought to save themselves by crossing, with their artillery and cavalry, the frozen lake of Satschan which adjoined their line of march. The ice was already beginning to yield under the enormous weight, when the shot from the French batteries on the heights above broke it in all directions: a frightful yell arose from the perishing multitude, and above two thousand brave men were swallowed up in the waves. Though great part of Doctoroff's corps, however, was destroyed, that general conducted himself with the most heroic resolution. Taking advantage of a rising ground which in some degree covered his rear, he drew up the remains of his corps in three lines—the cavalry in the front line, the artillery in the second, the infantry in rear. They there preserved a firm countenance, while some squadrons of horse explored a line of retreat between the lake of Satschan and that of Menitz. Part succeeded in making their way through; but the larger portion were cut down by Murat's dragoons. "I had seen," said Langeron, an eye-witness, "many battles lost; but I could not have formed an idea of such a defeat."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. xiv. 195, 203.  
Jom. ii. 189, 190. Sav. ii. 137.

While these decisive successes were gained in the centre and right, the French left had also entirely prevailed over its opponents. Encouraged by the cries of victory which they heard to their right, and the sight of their battalions on the heights which in the morning had been crowded with the enemy, the French troops in that quarter redoubled their efforts, and Lannes and Murat exerted all their energies to complete the discomfiture of their gallant opponents. For five hours the combat con-

134.  
Victory also declares for the French on their left.

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tinued without any decisive advantage, the sharp rattle of the musketry interrupted at intervals by thundering charges of horse: but at noon the Allies sensibly gave way. The heights of Blasowitz, the plateau of Krüh, the village of Hollubitz, were successively carried; and at length the Russians, entirely dislodged from the ridge of eminences they had occupied in the morning, were assembled in one close column by Bagrathion, and commenced their retreat in the direction of Austerlitz. Suchet and Murat, at the head of their respective divisions of infantry and cavalry, succeeded in breaking part of that mass, and dislodging it from the road to Olmütz, where almost the whole of the baggage of the Allies fell into the hands of the victors. By great exertions and heroic resolution, Bagrathion succeeded, before nightfall, in effecting his retreat with the remainder to Austerlitz, already filled with the wounded, the fugitives, and the stragglers from every part of the army.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
190, 191.  
Dum. xiv.  
182, 189.  
Sav. ii. 136.  
Bign. iv.  
449.

135.  
Results of  
the battle.

Thus terminated the battle of Austerlitz, the most glorious of all the victories of Napoleon—that in which his military genius shone forth with the brightest lustre; for the stroke, which at once re-established his affairs and prostrated Europe, was most clearly owing to the manifest superiority of his manœuvres. The loss of the Allies was immense. Thirty thousand men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners;\* a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, four hundred caissons, and forty-five standards, remained the trophies of the victor's triumph; and the disorganisation of the combined forces was complete. It is true, these advantages had been dearly purchased; twelve thousand French had been killed or wounded in the struggle; but the Allies were cut off from the road to Olmütz, and their line of retreat towards Hungary exposed them to be harassed by Davoust in flank,<sup>2</sup> while Napoleon's victorious legions thundered in

<sup>2</sup> Jom. ii.  
190, 193.  
Dum. xiv.  
207, 209.  
Sav. ii. 137.  
Bign. iv.  
450, 451.

\* The prisoners were 19,000 Russians and 600 Austrians; but a considerable proportion of them were wounded.

their fear. Such was the consternation produced by this disaster, that, in a council held at midnight at the Emperor Francis' headquarters, it was resolved, by a great majority, that the further prolongation of hostilities was hopeless; and at four in the morning Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the headquarters of Napoleon to propose an armistice.

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There was no difficulty in coming to an understanding. Napoleon was too well aware of the magnitude of the danger from which he had escaped, and the serious nature of the perils with which he was still environed, to hesitate about accepting any offers which might detach the Emperor of Germany from the alliance. He had gained, it is true, one of the most brilliant victories on record in the annals of war, and the Russian army was threatened with a disastrous retreat, which would in all probability double its losses: but it was the very immensity of the success which he had achieved which was the source of his embarrassment. Was he prepared, in the depth of winter, to follow the Muscovite standards into the recesses of Poland or the Ukraine, and incur the hazard of rousing a national war by approaching the frontiers of Old Russia? Supposing he were, what were the enemies which he would leave on his flanks and rear? The Archduke Charles, at the head of eighty thousand men in the finest condition, was approaching Vienna, and had already summoned the French garrison in that capital to surrender, while his opponent, Massena, was still far on the other side of the Julian Alps. Hungary, with its ancient spirit, was rising *en masse* at his approach. The Archduke Ferdinand, with the aid of the Bohemian levies, had just chased the Bavarians from Iglau. The Russian reserves were approaching Olmütz; while Prussia, with one hundred thousand men, was preparing from Saxony to pour into Franconia, and entirely cut off all communication with the Rhine. How was it possible, with such forces accumulating in his rear, to

136.  
Dangers of  
Napoleon's  
situation

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1805.

1 Jom. ii.

191. Dum.

xiv. 208.

210. Hard.

ix. 2, 4.

Sav. ii. 133.

advance further into the wilds of Sarmatia in pursuit of his Scythian foe? Yet how could he remain where he was, to permit them to encircle him with their arms? Or how retreat, without the commencement of a series of disasters which would certainly dissipate the magical influence of his success, and might lead to the total overthrow of his power?<sup>1</sup>

137.  
The Aus-  
trians sue  
for an ar-  
mistice.

Impressed with these ideas, it was with the most lively satisfaction that Napoleon heard of the arrival of the Austrian envoy at his headquarters, and foresaw the means of extricating himself from his present embarrassments, not only without further danger, but with the utmost possible eclat. As on the Carinthian mountains in 1797, and at Marengo in 1801, he found an audacious and perilous advance followed by the highest triumph and success. Profoundly skilled in dissimulation, however, he carefully concealed these sentiments in the recesses of his bosom, and to the Prince Lichtenstein spoke only of the magnitude of the sacrifices which he made in consenting to any accommodation, and the immense advantages which, by the continuance of hostilities, were within his grasp. The better to increase the terror of his arms, he refused to suspend the march of his victorious legions, and, appointing the following day for the interview with the Emperor of Germany, gave orders in the mean time for following up the enemy with the utmost possible vigour.<sup>2</sup>

452. Jom.  
ii. 191, 192.  
Dum. xiv.  
209, 210.

133.  
Interview of  
the Emperor  
Francis with  
Napoleon.  
Dec. 4.

Meanwhile the Allied army, extremely weakened and in deep dejection, continued its retreat, not without sustaining a considerable loss from the attacks made on its rearguard. They crossed the Marche, and the Emperor of Russia established his headquarters at the chateau of Holitsch; but the Emperor Francis remained nearer the French outposts at Czeitch, in order to be ready for the conference which Napoleon had fixed for the day following. The latter moved on to the advanced-posts, and received the Emperor of Germany at a windmill on the

roadside near Særutichitz, still shown to travellers, where the fire of a bivouac protected them from the inclemency of the weather. "I receive you," said Napoleon, "in the only palace which I have inhabited for the last two months."—"You have made such good use," replied Francis, "of that habitation, that it should be agreeable to you." The officers of their respective suites then retired, and the two emperors conversed for above two hours, in the course of which the terms of accommodation were verbally agreed on. Napoleon took advantage of that opportunity to display all his talent in the colouring which he gave to his own conduct, and the dark shades in which he represented that of the Allies. Everything, as usual, was laid on England. It was the incessant ambition, corrupting gold, and Machiavelian policy of those islanders, which had so long divided the Continent; the blood and misery of the European powers were the means by which they elevated themselves to greatness, and, amidst universal suffering, engrossed the commerce of the world; the reproaches which they lavished on his ambition were in reality applicable to themselves; the cause of France was the cause of Austria, was the cause of Russia, was the cause of the civilised world; and the real enemy of them all was that perfidious power, which, having nothing in common with European nations but its situation, continually sowed the seeds of dissension on the Continent, and, secure from attack itself, found the principal source of its grandeur in the misfortunes of the states by which it was surrounded. The Emperor Francis was in no condition to enter the lists of controversy with the conqueror of Austerlitz; but he did not forget his own dignity in misfortune, and sullied his character by none of those sallies against his former allies, which Napoleon, with his usual disregard of truth, put into his mouth in the bulletins.<sup>1</sup>

The conference lasted two hours, after which the two emperors embraced and separated with all the marks of

<sup>1</sup> See this admitted Dum. xiv 214, 216. Bign. iv. 453.

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190

mutual esteem. The conditions had been verbally agreed on, and it was arranged that Pressburg should be the seat of the negotiations, and that an armistice should immediately take place at all points. The Emperor of Russia was no party to the conference; but the Emperor of Austria engaged his word of honour for his ally, that he would accept the conditions which were offered, namely, that hostilities should cease between the two armies, and that his troops should retire by slow marches, without further molestation, to their own country.\* Savary was sent next day to the Emperor Alexander to invite him to accede to these terms, which were immediately agreed to; and without requiring any other guarantee than his word, Napoleon immediately stopped the advance of his columns.† In truth, after the secession of Austria, the war, at least in that quarter, had no longer an object, and the Emperor of Russia justly deemed himself fortunate in being able to extricate his army, without further loss, from its perilous situation.<sup>1</sup> Anxious to conciliate the goodwill of so powerful an adversary, Napoleon returned several of the Russian officers who had been made prisoners, with-

<sup>1</sup> Sav. ii. 140,  
141. Dum.  
xiv. 216,  
218. Bign.  
iv. 454.

\* Though not a party to this conference, the Emperor Alexander derived great benefit from it, in securing the retreat of the troops under his command. Their only means of retreat over the Marche (or Morava) was by the bridge of Goding, which was defended by an Austrian division under General Meerfeldt. Davoust had already commenced his march against that point, and had arrived within little more than a mile of it, at the entrance of a defile where the Austrians had placed their artillery, when Alexander suspended the operations by a note written with his own hand, in which he announced the conference which was going forward between the Emperors of France and Germany. Whether Davoust could have gained possession of the bridge at Goding is very doubtful; as, independent of the Austrians, twenty-six thousand Russians were at hand, who would have come up before evening, and fought with the courage of despair.—See SAVARY, ii. 144, 145.

† Savary reached the Emperor of Russia's headquarters at four in the morning of the 5th. He found that monarch already dressed; and he immediately received an audience. "I am very happy to see you again," said Alexander, "on an occasion so glorious for you; that day will take nothing from the reputation which your master has earned in so many battles. It was my first engagement, and I confess that the rapidity of his manœuvres never gave me time to succour the menaced points; everywhere you were at least double the number of our forces."—"Sire," replied Savary, "your Majesty has been misinformed. Our force, upon the whole, was twenty-five thousand less than yours; and even of that, the whole was not very warmly engaged; but we

out exchange; and Alexander set out two days after, by post, for St Petersburg.

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140.

Armistice of  
Austerlitz.

On the 6th December an armistice was formally concluded at Austerlitz, by which it was stipulated, that until the conclusion of a general peace, the French should continue to occupy all those portions of Upper and Lower Austria, the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Moravia, at present in their possession; that the Russians should evacuate Moravia and Hungary in fifteen days, and Galicia in a month; that all insurrectionary movements in Hungary and Bohemia should be stopped, and no armed force of any other power be permitted to enter the Austrian territories. This latter clause was levelled at the Prussian armaments, and it afforded the cabinet of Berlin a decent pretext for withdrawing from a coalition into which they had entered at so untoward a time. Napoleon issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he spoke with just pride of their great achievements, and awarded a liberal recompense to the wounded, and the widows of those who had fallen in the battle.<sup>1</sup>\* At the same time he paraded the Russian prisoners who could

<sup>1</sup> Bign. iv.  
460. Dum.  
xiv. 214,  
222. Sav.  
ii. 148.

manœuvred much, and the same division combated at many different points in different directions; it was that which apparently multiplied our numbers. Therein lies the art of war; the Emperor, who has seen forty pitched battles, is never wanting in that particular. He is still ready to march against the Archduke Charles, if your Majesty does not, by accepting the armistice, dispose it otherwise."—"What guarantee does your master require?" replied Alexander; "and what security can I have that your troops will not prosecute their movements against me?"—"He asks only your word of honour, and has instructed me, the moment it is given, to suspend the march of Marshal Davoust."—"I give it with pleasure," rejoined the Emperor; "and should it ever be your fortune to come to St Petersburg, I hope I may be able to render my capital agreeable to you."—SAVARY, ii. 142, 143.

\* In the bulletin he said, with his usual condensed energy—"Soldiers! I am content with you; you have decorated your eagles with immortal glory; peace cannot now be far removed. When everything necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country is obtained, I will lead you back to France. My people will again behold you with joy: and it will be enough for one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for all your fellow-citizens to exclaim, 'There is a brave man!'" Liberal donations at the same time were made to all the wounded; the generals received 3000 francs each, and the common soldiers a napoleon each: the pensions to the widows of the generals were 6000 francs, or £240; of the colonels, 2400, or £96; of the common men, 200, or £8 sterling yearly.—See SAVARY, ii. 148; and BIGNON, iv. 560.



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be moved from the hospitals, above sixteen thousand in number, in the most ostentatious manner through the streets of Vienna on their road to France, and returned himself to Schönbrunn to superintend the negotiations about to commence at the town of Pressburg.\*

141.  
 dissimula-  
 tion of Prus-  
 sia, and ac-  
 commodat-  
 ion with  
 that power.

Faithful to the principles which he had sworn to adhere to at the tomb of the Great Frederick, Alexander no sooner found himself delivered from the grasp of his redoubtable adversary, than he sent to Berlin the Grand-duke Constantine and Prince Dolgorucki, offering to place all his forces at the disposal of the Prussian cabinet, if they would vigorously prosecute the war. But the veteran diplomatist to whom the fortunes of Prussia were now committed had very different objects in view, and he was prepared, by an act of matchless perfidy, to put the finishing-stroke to that system of tergiversation and deceit by which, for ten years, the conduct of the cabinet of Berlin had been disgraced. Häugwitz, as already mentioned, had come to Vienna to declare war against Napoleon, and the 15th December was the day fixed for the commencement of hostilities; but the battle of Austerlitz totally deranged their plans, and the very day before he was admitted to a second audience of the French Emperor, the armistice had completely detached Austria from the coalition. Nothing was more natural than that so calamitous an event should make a total change in his view of the policy of the war, and the severest morality could not condemn a statesman who sought to withdraw his country from a contest which now appeared hopeless, and in which, from being an accessory, it was likely to be called, without any adequate preparation, to sustain the principal part.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. v. 14,  
 17. Hard.  
 ix. 14, 28.  
 Sav. ii. 148,  
 149.

\* On his road thither, Napoleon met a large convoy of wounded Austrians on their route for the hospitals of the capital; he immediately descended from his carriage, and uncovering as the waggons passed, while his suite did the same, he said, in a loud voice, "Honour to the brave in misfortune!" So well did this great man know how to win the affections, and command the admiration, of the very soldiers who had lavished their best blood in combating his power.

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142.

Matchless  
effrontery  
and perfidy  
of Prussia.  
Dec. 7.

But not content with this, Haugwitz resolved to go a further. On the breaking up of the confederacy into which he had just entered, he determined to secure a part of the spoil of his former allies; and, if he could not chase the French standards beyond the Rhine, at least endeavour to wrest from England those Continental possessions which she now appeared in no condition to defend. With matchless effrontery he changed the whole object of his mission; and when admitted into the presence of Napoleon after the victory, congratulated him upon his success, and proposed a treaty, the basis of which should be the old project of annexing *Hanover to the Prussian dominions* until the conclusion of a peace between France and England. Although Napoleon had not received full accounts of the treaty of 3d November, yet he was aware of its substance, and well acquainted with all the military movements which Prussia had been making in conjunction with the Russian reserve, thirty thousand strong, which had advanced from Warsaw to Breslau. Upon receiving Haugwitz, therefore, he broke out into vehement declamation against the perfidy of the Prussian cabinet; informed him that he was acquainted with all their machinations; and that it now lay with him alone, after concluding peace with Austria, to turn his whole force against them; wrest from them Silesia, whose fortresses, unarmed and unprovisioned, were in no condition to make any defence; excite an insurrection in Prussian Poland, and punish them in the most signal manner for their infamous perfidy. Reasons of state, however, he added, sometimes compelled sovereigns to bury in oblivion the best founded causes of animosity: on this occasion he was willing to overlook their past misconduct, and ascribe it entirely to the efforts of England; but this could be only on one condition — that Prussia should at length abandon its doubtful policy, and enter heart and hand into the French alliance.<sup>1</sup> On these terms

17. Hard.  
ix. 14, 28.  
Sav. ii. 148.

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he was still willing to incorporate Hanover with its dominions, in exchange for some of its detached southern possessions, which were to be ceded to France and Bavaria.

143.  
Treaty of  
alliance  
with Prus-  
sia, which  
gains Han-  
over.

Overjoyed at the prospect thus afforded of extricating his country, not only without loss, but with a great accession of territory, from its perilous situation, Haugwitz at once accepted the stipulations. It was agreed that Prussia should enter into an alliance with France, and receive, besides the margravate of Baireuth, the whole electorate of Hanover in full sovereignty, as well as all the other Continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty; and, on the other hand, cede to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, and the principalities of Neufchâtel and Clèves to France; and accede to all the conditions of the general peace of Pressburg. A formal treaty to this effect was signed by Haugwitz on 15th December, the very day when hostilities were to have commenced. And this treaty the King of Prussia, with disgraceful cupidity, ratified under only a slight modification. But the ultimate effects of this treacherous conduct were in the highest degree disastrous. It excited a just indignation in the government of Great Britain,\* without really propitiating that of France;<sup>1</sup> and, by inducing a false security in the cabinet of Berlin,

Dec. 15.

<sup>1</sup> Hard. ix.  
47, 49. Bign.  
v. 17, 19.  
Sav. ii. 149,  
150.

\* As this treaty is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of Prussia, it is due to the many high-minded and honourable men which the cabinet of Berlin contained, and especially to that able statesman and intrepid counsellor, Baron Hardenberg, to say, that it was signed by Haugwitz of his own authority, at Vienna, without the knowledge or concurrence of the government at home: and that so far were they from contemplating the extraordinary turn to the prejudice of England which affairs had taken at Vienna, that, four days after the treaty was signed, a long official note was despatched by Hardenberg to Lord Harrowby, English ambassador at Berlin, in which it was declared that Prussia would regard the entry of French troops into Hanover as a declaration of war; and various arrangements were proposed for the further continuance of the Russian, Swedish, and English troops in the north of Germany. So overwhelmed was Hardenberg with confusion at discovering, six days afterwards, by despatches from Haugwitz, what that minister had agreed to in regard to Hanover at Vienna, that he was led into an angry debate with the French ministers, which, in April following, on the requisition of Napoleon, led to his dismissal from office. Napoleon, with his

Dec. 19.

rendered the fall of that power, when it was driven into hostilities in the following year, as irretrievable as, in the estimation of a large part of Europe, it was deserved.\*

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Great was the general indignation at Berlin when the particulars of this extraordinary treaty were made known. The war-party, in particular, with the Queen and Prince Louis at its head, whose patriotic feelings had been roused to the highest pitch by the anticipated accession of Prussia to the European league, were unmeasured in their vituperation at this disgraceful spoliation of Great Britain, at that very moment a friendly power, and with whom a close alliance, offensive and defensive, had just been concluded. The question as to the ratification of the treaty was long and anxiously debated in the cabinet, national ambition and cupidity contending with the principles of public faith and a more enlarged view of ultimate expedience. At length Hardenberg and the opposition so far prevailed, that the King, who had hitherto weakly yielded to Haugwitz, and agreed to the spoliation of his ally, was shaken, and the treaty was

144.  
Indignation  
this treaty  
excited at  
Berlin.

habitual disregard of truth, some months afterwards published in the *Moniteur* an article, in which he declared that Hardenberg, whom he cordially hated, had written this letter to Lord Harrowby without the authority of the cabinet; and that he had for "base bribes prostituted himself to the eternal enemies of the Continent."<sup>1</sup> This insinuation M. Bignon, albeit the chosen panegyrist of Napoleon, much to his credit, indignantly repelled: "A party man," says he, "and of an impassioned temperament, M. de Hardenberg was at the same time upright and honourable. That ever since the treaty of 3d November, Napoleon should regard him as the chief of the party hostile to France, and attack him as such, was all fair; but he had no right to accuse of venality a man far above such a reproach."—See BIGNON, v. 240; and HARDENBERG, ix. 30, 42.

<sup>1</sup> See 34th  
Bulletin, and  
*Moniteur*,  
No. 106, for  
1806.

\* "You have come," said Napoleon to Haugwitz, on his first interview with him after the battle of Austerlitz, "to present your master's compliments on a victory; but fortune has changed the address of the letter." From that moment, in Napoleon's mind, the ruin of Prussia was resolved on; but he prudently determined in the mean time to dissemble his resentment, and in the first instance suggest to that power an acquisition of territory, which, by embroiling it irretrievably with England, would sow the seeds of ruin in what still remained of the coalition, and expose it, single and unaided, to the deadly strokes which he already meditated against its existence.—See BIGNON, v. 14.

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ratified only under the following reservations:—That Napoleon was to obtain at a general peace a formal cession of Hanover to Prussia, and that till that was done the occupation was to be provisional only—a thin device, totally inadequate to blind the world to the real nature of the transaction. “The conduct of Prussia,” said Mr Fox, then minister for foreign affairs, in his place in parliament, “was a union of everything that was contemptible in servility, with everything that was odious in rapacity. Other nations have been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many of their provinces; but none except Prussia has been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation—that of being compelled to become the ministers of the rapacity and injustice of a master.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hard. ix.  
50, 59. Bign.  
v. 241, 242.  
Parl. Deb.  
vi. 891.

145.  
Affairs of  
Naples.

To complete the picture of the operations of this memorable year, and render intelligible some important clauses in the treaty of Pressburg by which it was concluded, it is only necessary to give a summary of the operations in the south of Italy and the north of Germany which were contemporaneous with these decisive strokes on the Danube and in the heart of Austria. The court of Naples had entered, somewhat late indeed, but cordially, into the alliance against France. Notwithstanding the treaty of 21st September, already mentioned, by which the neutrality of that power had been stipulated a combined fleet, having on board ten thousand Russian and three thousand English troops, cast anchor in the bay of Naples, in pursuance of the general plan of operations concerted by the Allies, and soon after landed without experiencing any opposition. It was anticipated by the Allies, what in effect happened, that this act would have the effect of embroiling the Neapolitan court with the French Emperor. Ferdinand, indeed, upon the arrival of this force, published a manifesto, in which he declared his resolution to abide by the treaty of neutrality, and his inability to resist the Allied forces; and he publicly engaged in no measure of hostility against France.

but his army was put on the war establishment, and placed under the direction of a Russian general. The Queen did everything in her power to engage the cabinet in the war: the French ambassador, disbelieving, or affecting to disbelieve, the court's professions of neutrality, immediately left Naples in great indignation; and the government, seeing war inevitable, was taking measures for organising a force in the south of Italy, when the battle of Austerlitz came, and delivered them up unprotected to the wrath of the victor.<sup>1</sup>

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1805.

<sup>1</sup> Dot. iv.  
198, 199.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 193.  
Jom. ii. 158,  
199. Bign.  
v. 35, 37.

It is probable that the common cause did not suffer materially from the absence of the pusillanimous troops of Naples from the theatre of war; but the case was very different with the forces which had been assembled in the north of Germany. Anxious to strike an important blow in that quarter, but not deeming their strength sufficient to venture on the Continent till the intentions of Prussia were declared, the British government had fitted out a considerable expedition, composed of the King's German Legion and a strong body of English troops, amounting altogether to eighteen thousand men, which arrived, in October, in Swedish Pomerania, under the command of General Don and Lord Cathcart. To these were soon after joined a Swedish corps of twelve thousand men, and a Russian force, under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, of ten thousand; and it was the intention of the Allies that the united force, of which the King of Sweden was to receive the command, having liberated Hanover, and raised the military force of that electorate, should advance towards Holland, and, after freeing the United Provinces from their chains, threaten the north of France. Many causes conspired to produce the miscarriage of this well-conceived expedition. The vehemence of the King of Sweden could not brook the vacillating conduct of the cabinet of Berlin, and he threatened that power in so unbecoming a manner, that the Allies, who at that moment were negotiating to effect

146.  
And of the  
north of  
Germany.

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1805.

the accession of Prussia to the confederacy, were obliged to interfere in order to accommodate matters, upon which he resigned the command and retired to Stralsund. Three weeks were consumed in negotiations to repair the breach; and when at length he was prevailed on to resume the direction, the period of successful action had passed. It was already in the middle of November, and all that this powerful force could effect was to commence the siege of Hameln, when the battle of Austerlitz changed the face of Europe. The immediate effect of that blow, followed as it soon after was by the accession of Prussia to the French league, was to dissolve this heterogeneous armament: the Russians retired to Mecklenburg, the English re-embarked their forces, and the Swedes took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. ii.  
196, 197.  
Ann. Reg.  
1805, 187,  
188.

7.  
Peace of  
Pressburg.  
27th Dec.

The negotiations with Austria, dictated by the irresistible power of Napoleon, were not long of being brought to a close. By the peace of Pressburg she was in a manner isolated from France, and to appearance rendered incapable of interfering again in the contests of Western Europe. To Bavaria she was compelled to cede the Tyrol and the Inviertel; to the kingdom of Italy, the entire Continental dominions of Venice. The whole changes to the south of the Alps, which had been the original cause of the war, were recognised. The Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg were elevated to the thrones of their respective dominions, with large accessions of territory to each: to the former, besides the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, the principality of Eichstadt, and various lesser lordships in Germany; to the latter, the five towns of the Danube, part of the Brisgau, and several other fiefs. Baden acquired the remainder of the Brisgau, with the Ortenau and town of Constance. In exchange for so many sacrifices, Austria merely received the small electorate of Salzburg and the possessions of the Teutonic Order, which, from their dispersion in different states,

were little more than a nominal acquisition. But what was of still greater importance, the Emperor Francis was forced to engage "to throw no obstacles in the way, either as chief of the empire, or as co-sovereign, of any acts which, in their character of sovereigns, the Kings of Bavaria or Würtemberg or the Elector of Baden might think proper to adopt,"—a clause which, by providing for the independent authority of their infant kingdoms, virtually dissolved the Germanic empire. The counter-stipulations were entirely illusory: Napoleon guaranteed, jointly with Austria, the independence of the Helvetic confederacy, which he held in chains; and that of the Batavian republic, which he already destined as a separate appanage for his brother Louis.<sup>1</sup> \*

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<sup>1</sup> See the Treaty in Martens, viii. 388. Jom. ii. 195. Dum. xiv. 236, and 339, 351.

Disastrous as these conditions were to the Austrian monarchy, the secret articles contained stipulations still more humiliating. By them it was provided, that Austria was to pay a contribution of forty million francs, or £1,600,000, in addition to nearly an equal sum already levied by the French authorities in the conquered pro-

148.  
Secret articles of the treaty.

\* The changes made by this treaty were as follows:—

	Population.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
Austria lost	2,975,620	1,417	17,075,000
She received	271,000	86	2,900,000
Clear loss,	2,704,620	1,331	14,175,000
Bavaria gained	631,000	526	3,490,000
Würtemberg gained	132,400	53	691,000
Baden gained	143,620	54	508,000
The Kingdom of Italy gained	1,856,000	711	10,000,000

Besides this, the sums drawn from Austria in contributions and from the sale of the vast warlike magazines which fell into the hands of the French, amounted to 85,000,000 francs, or £3,500,000.—HARDENBERG, ix. 472; and BIGNON, v. 32.

After this accession of territory, the newly-erected states stood as follows:—

	Population.	Army.	Square German Miles.	Revenue. in Florins.
Bavaria,	3,250,000	60,000	1,760	21,000,000
Würtemberg,	1,154,000	20,000	346	8,000,000
Baden,	569,000	10,000	260	6,000,000
But Austria retained	24,900,000	230,000	10,936	110,000,000

Bavaria by this means was rendered as powerful as Prussia was at the accession of the Great Frederick.—HARDENBERG, ix. 472, 474, App. and 23, 24; and *Stat. des Etats Autrichiens, par le BARON LICHTENSTEIN*.



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vinces, and the loss of all the military stores and magazines which had fallen into their hands, which were either sent off to France or sold for behoof of that power. But her government judged wisely that all these losses, how serious soever, might one day be repaired, if the nucleus of the army were preserved entire; and therefore, they redeemed, at a heavy ransom, in virtue of permission contained in the secret articles of the treaty, a large portion of stores and artillery which had become the booty of the victor, and in secret resolved to exert all their efforts to repair in silence the military strength of the monarchy. It is this system, firmly resolved on and steadily executed, which has enabled them to rise superior to all their reverses, which has brought them triumphant through all the disasters of the war, and obliterated the effect of a series of defeats which would have prostrated the strength of any other people—a memorable example of the vast effect of perseverance in human affairs, and the manner in which it can not only compensate, in nations equally as individuals, the want of more brilliant acquirements, but obtain the final mastery over the greatest efforts of transitory passion.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hard. ix.  
17, 19, 25.  
Dum. xiv.  
426, 428.

140.  
Objects of  
Napoleon  
in this  
treaty.

It is evident, from the statistical details given in the preceding note, that Napoleon had no intention, by the peace of Pressburg, of totally overthrowing the Austrian monarchy. He wished only to throw its strength to the eastward, and prevent it from coming in contact with, or feeling jealousy at, his acquisitions in Italy or Germany. He proposed to interpose a barrier of subordinate kingdoms, dependent on France, between his empire and the Hereditary States;—the kingdom of Italy to the south of the Alps, those of Bavaria and Würtemberg to the north of these mountains. Talleyrand, improving upon this idea, went so far as to propose the cession to Austria of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, as the means of giving them the command of the Danube, inducing them to extend themselves to the eastward, and throwing a

perpetual bone of contention between the cabinets of Vienna and St Petersburg. But Napoleon deemed this too hazardous for immediate execution, as precluding all hope of accommodation with Russia, with which he was extremely desirous of concluding a treaty, with a view to turning his undivided force against England.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. v.  
87. Thiers,  
vi. 342.

This treaty was immediately followed by a measure hitherto unprecedented in European history—the pronouncing a sentence of dethronement against an independent sovereign, for no other cause than his having contemplated hostilities against the French Emperor.

150.  
Sentence of  
dethrone-  
ment of the  
King of  
Naples.

On the 26th December, a menacing proclamation proceeded from Pressburg, in the 37th bulletin, which evidently bore marks of Napoleon's composition, against the house of Naples. The conqueror announced, that Marshal St-Cyr would advance by rapid strides to Naples, "to punish the treason of a criminal queen, and pre-

Dec. 27.

cipitate her from the throne. We have pardoned that infatuated king, who thrice has done everything to ruin himself. Shall we pardon him a fourth time? Shall we a fourth time trust a court without faith, without honour, without reason?—No! *The dynasty of Naples has ceased to reign*—its existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe and the honour of my crown." St-Cyr immediately received orders to march, in order to carry this decree into execution. Such was the first of those sentences of dethronement which Napoleon afterwards pronounced against many of the European monarchs, which substituted his own family for the ancient possessors in so many of the adjoining thrones, and ultimately, by a just retribution, overturned his own.<sup>2</sup>

This extraordinary severity towards a monarch who was only meditating hostilities against the French Emperor, and had certainly done less injury to his dominions than any European dynasty, was one of the most unjustifiable acts of that relentless conqueror, and at the same time descriptive of that mixture of boldness and prudence

151.  
Reflections  
on this step.

<sup>2</sup> Bign. v.  
34. Harl.  
ix. 20.

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by which his ambitious enterprises were always regulated. Let the case be put as the French themselves stated it. The ambassador of Naples at Paris, acting under the authority of his cabinet, with the dagger at their throat, and under the threat of immediate invasion, had agreed, on the 21st September, to a treaty of neutrality, which was ratified by the court, under the like menaces, on the 8th October. The arrival of the Russian and English squadron in the bay of Naples, six weeks afterwards, liberated them from their apprehensions, and the cabinet was preparing to violate the former treaty, and join in the coalition against France. Such a departure from national faith was dishonourable: it was a fair ground for hostility, and might have justified exactions of considerable magnitude; but was it a sufficient reason for dethronement? That is the point; and if it is, what European dynasty has not, fifty times over, justly provoked this severity? How often, on this principle, has Napoleon himself deserved that penalty for having violated solemn treaties, when it suited his own convenience, almost before the ink with which they were signed was dry? And what excuse is to be made for the revolutionary government of France, which so often sent its armies into the adjoining states, to proclaim war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and everywhere rouse, by its emissaries and proclamations, the democratic authorities to break through all former national engagements, upon the principle that treaties made by despots can never bind the emancipated sons of freedom? But this has in every age been the system of the revolutionary party. None so loud as they are in the condemnation of the principles, when acted on by others, on which their own entire previous conduct had been founded.

In fact, however, this unprecedented act of dethroning an independent sovereign, merely because he was making preparations for hostilities contrary to a subsisting treaty, was instigated by a different motive. Already Napoleon

had formed the secret design of encircling France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of subsidiary crowns, and of placing on all the neighbouring thrones the members of his own family. He began with Naples, because its inhabitants were the most unwarlike, and therefore the least likely to offer any resistance to the change; and because an unerring instinct led him to regard as enemies every member of the Bourbon family, wherever situated. Subsequent instances of the same rapacious policy will occur in the cases of Holland, Spain, and the kingdom of Westphalia, constituted out of the spoils of Prussia. And without a constant reference to this grand object, it is impossible to explain the extraordinary rigour which he uniformly manifested towards the inconsiderable states in his vicinity, and the comparative lenity evinced to the great military monarchies whose hostilities had always been as implacable as they were formidable.

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152.

Secret views  
of Napoleon  
in this step.

153.

Napoleon's  
return to  
Vienna,  
Munich, the  
Rhine, and  
Paris.

The remaining career of Napoleon during this memorable year was a continued triumphal procession. On the 29th December he announced the conclusion of peace to his soldiers,\* and at the same time complimented the burgher guard of Vienna on their exemplary conduct during the occupation of their capital by his troops, and, as a mark of his esteem, restored to them the city arsenal, containing, besides its arms, a number of standards taken in the wars with the Turks. He could well afford to be generous; the public arsenal had yielded to him two thousand pieces of cannon, which were already far advanced on their road to France. He arrived at Munich on the

\* "Peace has just been signed with the Emperor of Austria. You have in the last autumn made two campaigns—you have seen your Emperor share your dangers and your fatigues—I wish also that you should see him surrounded with the grandeur and splendour which belong to the sovereign of the first people in the universe. You shall all be there—we will celebrate the memory of those who have died in these two campaigns on the field of honour—the world shall ever see us ready to follow their example, or to do even more than we have hitherto accomplished, if necessary, to vindicate our national honour, to resist the efforts of those who give way to the seductions of the eternal enemies of the Continent." Almost before the cannon of Austerlitz had ceased to sound, Napoleon was contemplating a Prussian war.—BIGNON, &c. 41.

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31st December; and, on the day following appeared the proclamation in which he announced to the enraptured inhabitants the elevation of the Elector to the royal dignity. There also he was met by the Empress Josephine: a succession of fêtes of unprecedented splendour succeeded, in the course of which Eugene Beauharnais, as the deserved reward of valour, probity, and glory, received the hand of the Princess Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria. At the same time the grandson of the Elector of Baden was married to Stephanie Beauharnais, adopted daughter of the French Emperor. On this occasion Napoleon, in default of his own lawful issue, called Eugene Beauharnais to the succession of the throne of Italy. The formation of a common system of conglomeration was at the same time announced to the senate in these terms: "We reserve to ourselves the power to make known by ulterior dispositions the bonds which we propose to establish, *after our own demise*, between all the states in alliance with the French empire which, as depending on a common interest, absolutely require a common tie." Finally, a hundred days after the army had crossed the Rhine at Strassburg, the Emperor recrossed that river at the same place, and proceeded by rapid journeys, under triumphal arches, amidst applauding multitudes, to Paris, where he arrived on the 25th January. A hundred days! unparalleled in the past history of Europe for the magnitude and splendour of the events which they embraced; during which had occurred the capitulation of Ulm, the triumph of Austerlitz, the shock of Trafalgar; but destined to be eclipsed by another hundred days, in future times, fraught with still more momentous occurrences, the recollection of which will endure till time itself shall be no more.<sup>1</sup>\*

The campaign of Austerlitz is the most remarkable, in

<sup>1</sup> Bign. v.  
30, 53.  
Dum. xiv.  
237, 239.

\* The public authorities had prepared a magnificent reception for Napoleon, but he disappointed them by entering Paris in the night, unattended by any escort. He had previously sent the forty-five standards taken at Austerlitz to the senate, who deposited them with extraordinary pomp in the halls of the Luxembourg.—JOMINI, ii. 209.

a military point of view, which the history of the war afforded. In no other year were events of such magnitude crowded together, nor had achievements so vast rewarded the combinations of genius. When we recollect that in the beginning of September the French army was still cantoned on the heights of Boulogne, and that by the first week of December Vienna was taken, and the strength of Austria and Russia finally prostrated in the heart of Moravia, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the successes gained, and the celerity with which ruin was brought on the coalesced powers. The march across France and Germany, the enveloping of Mack, the advance to Vienna, the thunderbolt of Austerlitz, were all concluded in less than four months! In the first epoch of the war, Austria struggled for six years in doubtful hostility against the Republic: in the second, she brought it to the brink of ruin, and only yielded, after a desperate strife of four years, to the ardent genius of Napoleon, and the scientific combinations of Moreau: but in the third she was utterly prostrated, though supported by all the might of Russia, under Alexander in person, in two months after her troops first came into collision with those of France! The extent of these triumphs, great as it is, is less surprising than their celerity; and we are naturally led to ask where, in these disastrous days, were the heroes who so long arrested the arms of Napoleon under the walls of Mantua, and drove the troops of the Directory, at the point of the bayonet, from the banks of the Adige to the shores of the Var? Blanders undoubtedly were committed; misfortunes occurred; but they were not peculiar to this season or this campaign; and in the long records of Imperial fatuity, parallels are not wanting to the advance to Ulm or the flank-march of Austerlitz. What was it, then, which made those false steps for the first time in European history irretrievable, and rendered errors in tactics the cause, not of the loss of towns or the retreat of armies, but of the overthrow of empires and the dissolution of confederacies?

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155.

Importance  
of the valley  
of the Da-  
nube as the  
theatre of  
contest  
between  
France and  
Austria.

This astonishing result was doubtless, in some degree, owing to the French Emperor having now for the first time chosen as the theatre of war the valley of the Danube, the natural avenue to the Hereditary States, the line where neither fortresses nor mountains impeded his march, and where a great navigable river constantly furnished the means of transport for the supplies of his army. In former wars, the contest lay in corners of the empire; in the plains of Flanders, among the fortresses of Italy, or the ridges of the Alps; and a disaster, however great, led only to the loss of the immediate theatre of combat. But in the present, all these minor objects were relinquished, and the main strength of the invader was concentrated in the direct road from Paris to Vienna. By a singular infatuation, with which the Archduke Charles is no ways chargeable, as he had clearly pointed out the danger, the Aulic Council had left this wide avenue totally defenceless; and while they sent the bulk of their forces, under their best commander, to the Italian plains, on which side the empire was already protected by the fortified line of the Adige and the ridges of the Alps, they intrusted the defence of the shores of the Danube, though threatened by Napoleon in person, to an inferior army, under the guidance of an inexperienced leader. The ruinous effects of this error became manifest, not only in the magnitude of the disasters which were incurred, but in the irretrievable consequences with which they were attended. "Like a skilful player at chess, Napoleon struck at the heart of his adversaries' power while they were accumulating forces round his extremities: and when he held Vienna in his grasp, and struck them to the earth at Austerlitz, the army of the Archduke Charles, equal in numbers to his own, was uselessly employed in traversing the defiles of the Rhætian Alps.

This extraordinary success, however, was not gained without proportionate risk; and it was evident, even to the most superficial observer, that the imprudence of the

Allies in giving battle at Austerlitz had extricated Napoleon from the most perilous situation in which he had stood since the commencement of his career. At Marengo, Italy only was at stake, and his retreat, in case of disaster, was secure by the St Gothard and the St Bernard: at Campo Formio, the principal army of France was still unengaged, and Moreau with a vast force was preparing to advance to his support through southern Germany. But before the battle of Austerlitz his last reserves had arrived: the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand men, was menacing one flank, while Prussia, with an equal force, was preparing to descend upon another, and the Emperor of Russia was in his front with a host hourly increasing and already nearly equal to his own. Delay in such circumstances was ruin: advance with such arrays in his rear was impossible: retreat was the first step to perdition. Vast as the forces of France were at the commencement of the campaign, they were fairly overmatched by the banded strength of Europe: great as the talents of Napoleon were, his daring stroke at the vitals of his enemies had brought him into a situation from whence extrication, save by their imprudence, was impossible. They had nothing to do but retreat towards Poland or Hungary, and the invader must, to all human appearance, have been enveloped and destroyed. To hazard a battle when such chances were accumulating against him, after the experience they had had of the prowess of his troops, appears such an act of imprudence, that one is almost tempted to believe that Providence, as part of its great design for the government of human affairs, had struck the Allied chiefs with judicial blindness, in order that the mighty drama might end in a deeper tragedy—a still more righteous and fearful retribution.

But though this rapid advance to the heart of the empire was one of the immediate causes of the extraordinary conquests of the French Emperor, yet it was by no means the principal; and though perhaps his triumphs

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156.

Dangers of  
Napoleon  
position  
before the  
battle of  
Austerlitz



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157.

Vast growth  
of the mili-  
tary power  
of France  
during the  
peace.

might not have been so rapid, the result would probably have been the same under a more cautious system, although he had chosen any other theatre for the contest. It was the astonishing increase in the military power of France during the five years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities, which was the principal cause of the rapid overthrow of the Austrian power. Napoleon poured down the valley of the Danube with a hundred and eighty thousand men, while Massena fronted the Archduke Charles in Italy with twice the numbers which fought the battle of Marengo. Forces so vast had never before been brought into action at any period of the war. Nor was this display merely an ephemeral effort: it was from an armed body of six hundred thousand men\* that France maintained the contest, and she was capable of keeping them on foot for an indefinite period. It was at once evident, upon the commencement of hostilities, that her military power had increased more during five years of peace than nine of previous warfare: and that Austria, nearly a match single-handed for her ancient rival when she laid down her arms, was totally unequal to the contest when she resumed them.

158.

Similar  
growth dur-  
ing peace  
character-  
ised all the  
reign of  
Napoleon.

This great change is one of the most remarkable transitions of the war, and more descriptive than any other which occurred, of that profound and unceasing system of military aggrandisement which formed the leading feature in the foreign policy of Napoleon. When he sheathed his victorious sword at the peace of Lunéville, moderation,

\* Strength of the French army in August 1805 :—

Troops of the line,	.	.	.	.	341,000 men.
Light infantry,	.	.	.	.	100,130 "
Light horse,	.	.	.	.	60,554
Heavy horse, or of the line,	.	.	.	.	16,944
Artillery,	.	.	.	.	46,489
Engineers,	.	.	.	.	900
Gendarmerie,	.	.	.	.	15,691 -
Imperial Guard,	.	.	.	.	† 8,500

Besides the Coast-guard, 100,000 strong,

590,208

—See PEUCHET, 576.<sup>a</sup>

and equity breathed in all his proclamations, and he professed the most anxious desire to cultivate only the arts of peace. But in the midst of these professions, and while the Continent was in a state of profound tranquillity, he was silently but incessantly augmenting his warlike resources, increasing his levies, disciplining his forces, new-modelling his army, incorporating all lesser states with his dominions; and the fruit of these perpetual pacific advances appeared in the most decisive manner on the resumption of hostilities, when he was enabled at once to beat down powers which had previously waged a long and doubtful war with the Republic. It was on this principle that his conduct was invariably founded; every suspension of warfare was employed only in the preparation of additional military forces, or in the annexation of some minor state to his dominions; and he never appeared so terrible as when he first came to a rupture with the powers with whom he had contracted the closest alliances, and been longest on terms of the greatest apparent cordiality. Five years of Continental peace followed the treaty of Lunéville; but a hundred and eighty thousand men sprang up, as if by enchantment, to follow the standards of Napoleon on its termination. Ten years of neutrality or alliance with the cabinet of Berlin ensued after the treaty of Bâle: but at once he struck the Prussian monarchy to the earth, when at last she took up arms to resist his aggressions. For twelve years Spain laid her treasures and resources at his feet; but he rewarded that fidelity by the dethronement of her sovereign and the seizure of her dominions. He professed eternal friendship to Alexander at Tilsit; but during the five years of alliance which followed, he was preparing the five hundred thousand warriors whom he afterwards led towards the Kremlin.

It is the perception of this undeviating policy, and of the enormous additions which every interval of peace made to his warlike strength, which forms the true and

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159.

Justification  
which this  
affords of the  
British poli-  
cy during  
the war.

unanswerable vindication of the conduct of the British cabinet throughout the struggle. That he had from the very first marked out England for destruction, he has told us himself, and proved by every part of his conduct. To what advantage he could turn the shortest breathing-time in warfare, even on that element where his power, was weakest, is demonstrated by the vast increase which was shown to have taken place in the French marine on the breaking out of hostilities—an increase which, compared with its situation at the peace of Amiens, is a more signal instance of warlike resurrection than even the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz. Had any one predicted in 1800 that, before five years had elapsed, Napoleon was to have the means of assembling seventy sail of the line in the Channel, and actually to combat Nelson with a force superior to the greatest fleet England could fit out, he would have been deemed much less worthy of credit, than if he had foretold that at the same period Austria was to be prostrated in a single campaign. Peace was impossible with an enemy actuated by such a principle, and capable of turning to such account every intermission of war. And the result has abundantly proved the justice of these views. For while the military strength of France arose more terrible after every pacification on the Continent of Europe, her naval power, thus wonderfully recruited during the peace of Amiens, never recovered the unbroken warfare which followed the disaster of Trafalgar.

160.  
Great abili-  
ties dis-  
played by  
Napoleon in  
the arrange-  
ments for  
this cam-  
paign.

Doubtless the abilities displayed by Napoleon during this campaign were of the very highest order. The secrecy and rapidity of the march of so vast a body of troops across France; the semicircular sweep by which they interposed between Mack and the Hereditary States, and compelled the surrender of that unhappy chief with half his army; the precision with which nearly two hundred thousand men, converging from the shores of the Channel, the coast of Brest, the marshes of Holland, and

the banks of the Elbe, were made, to arrive each at the time appointed around the ramparts of Ulm ; the swift advance on Vienna ; the subsequent fanlike dispersion of the army to overawe the Hereditary States ; their sudden concentration for the decisive fight at Austerlitz ; the skill displayed in that contest itself, and the admirable account to which he turned the fatal cross-march of the Allied sovereigns, are so many proofs of military ability never exceeded even in the annals of his previous triumphs. At the same time, it is not to be imagined that the difference in the magnitude of the results which were obtained is to be considered as the measure of the talent displayed in this as compared with other campaigns. It was the immensity of the force now at the disposal of the French Emperor, and the incomparable discipline and organisation which it had obtained while encamped on the shores of the Channel, which was the principal cause of the difference. It is no longer a general supplying by consummate talents, as at Arcola and Rivoli, for deficiency of numbers, that we see maintaining a long, doubtful, and desperate strife ; we behold a mighty conqueror, whose power was irresistible, sweeping over the earth with the rapidity of Scythian war. In the results of this campaign were evinced more than the military talents of the general ; the previous preparations of the Emperor, the deeply matured combinations of the statesman, produced their natural results. He did not now take the field with a force which left anything to chance ; he appeared with such a host as almost made him the master of fate ; and the fruit of five years' pacific preparation appeared in the reduction of the contest to a desperate strife of a few months' duration.

Great, however, as were the abilities, and unbounded the resources of the French Emperor in this memorable campaign, it was not to them alone that he was indebted for its unparalleled triumphs. The errors of the Austrians, the infatuation of the Allied cabinets, had their full

161.  
Errors of  
the Allies  
in the plan  
of the cam-  
paign.

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share in the general result. Untaught by the disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the Aulic Council rushed inconsiderately into the field; and, leaving the Archduke Charles with eighty thousand in Italy, to combat an inferior enemy, they exposed Mack, with seventy thousand, to the shock of Napoleon at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand men, in the valley of the Danube. When that ill-fated commander found himself cut off from his line of communication with Vienna by the interposition of Bernadotte in his rear, instead of instantly taking a decisive part, and falling with his whole forces upon the enemy behind him, or retiring by the only road which was yet open to the mountains of the Tyrol, he remained for ten days paralysed at Ulm, sending out detachments, first in one direction, then in another, all of which met with superior forces and were defeated; thereby both breaking down the spirit of his own troops, and giving the invader time to envelop with his immense masses their fortified position. In vain had the foresight of the Archduke Charles, at the close of the preceding war, surrounded the heights of Ulm with a vast intrenched camp, capable of bidding defiance to, and stopping the advance of, the greatest invading force: the improvidence of the Aulic Council, by providing no magazines within its walls, had rendered these preparations of no avail; and Mack found himself, after a week's blockade, reduced to the necessity of feeding on horse-flesh, and ultimately capitulating, with thirty thousand of the best troops of the monarchy.

162.  
And their  
great im-  
prudence.

When the rapid advance of Napoleon towards Vienna threatened to separate the Russian forces from the retreating columns of the Archduke Charles, and everything depended on the destruction of the bridge of the capital, the credulous simplicity of the officer in command at that important station delivered it unscathed into Napoleon's hands, and gave him the means of interposing safely between their converging armies, and striking

tremendous blows from his central position, first on the one bank and then on the other. When the Allies were reduced to their last throw on the plains of Moravia; when everything counselled a cautious policy, and forces capable of annihilating the invaders were accumulating on all sides; when the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand undiscouraged veterans, was within sight of the steeples of Vienna, and Prussia, with an equal number, was preparing to descend upon the Danube; when, by simply retreating and drawing the enemy on, with such formidable armies in his rear, the Allies must inevitably have led him to destruction, or driven him to a disastrous retreat, their ill-judged confidence impelled them prematurely into action, and their rash flank-march, in presence of such a general and such an army, enabled him to gain a decisive victory when on the verge of destruction.\*

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But most of all is Prussia answerable for the disasters of this campaign. She was clearly warned of her danger: Mr Pitt had prefigured it to her in colours brighter than the light. The violation of the territory of Anspach had demonstrated in what manner she was regarded by the conqueror; that he contemned her menaces, despised her power, and reserved for her only the melancholy privilege

163.  
Ruinous effects of the indecision of Prussia.

\* In a memoir presented to the British government by the cabinet of Vienna, after the peace of Pressburg, the disasters of the campaign were ascribed,—1. To the failure on the part of the Allied powers to realise, in the north of Germany, those promised diversions which might have prevented Napoleon from accumulating his whole force in that country, and especially that in the electorate of Hanover, against the Austrian forces on the Danube. 2. To the unexpected violation of the territory of Anspach, which compelled the Austrian army either to fall back upon the Inn, or see itself cut off from its base of operations. 3. To the fault of General Mack, who, instead of adopting the former alternative, and retiring to form a junction with Kutusoff in the Hereditary States, remained immovable on the Iller till he was surrounded by superior forces. 4. To the delay experienced in the march of the second Russian army, for the purpose of watching the preparations of Prussia, which, until her intentions were fixed by the Emperor Alexander in person, detained it above a month in observation on the Polish frontier. 5. To the negligence of Count Auersberg in not destroying the bridge over the Danube at Vienna, which at once gave the French the command of both

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of being last devoured. Then was the time to have taken a decisive part—then was the moment to have made amends for the vacillation of ten years, and, by a cordial union with Austria and Russia, put a final stop to the progress of the enemy. No one can doubt that, if she had done so, such would have been the result. A simple declaration of war would have arrested the decisive march of Bernadotte into the rear of Mack; allowed time for the army of the latter to have retired to the Inn; permitted the Russians to join the unbroken strength of the Austrian monarchy; and compelled Napoleon, instead of a menacing offensive with superior, to have commenced a cautious defensive with inferior forces. When the boundless calamities which such a determination would, to all human appearance, have prevented to Europe are considered, it is impossible not to be filled with the most poignant regret at the temporising policy which occasioned their continuance, or to avoid the feeling, that as to Prussia more than any other power these misfortunes had been owing, so it was a most righteous dispensation which made them fall more heavily on her than on any of the states which had bravely struggled to avert them. Well might Napoleon have said with the Roman annalist—“*Nec aliud adversus validissimas gentes pro nobis utilius, quam*

banks, and exposed Kutusoff to imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed before he could effect a junction with the reserves under Buxhowden.”—See HARD. viii. 511.

There can be no doubt that these causes all conspired to bring about the enormous calamities of the campaign. But, without disputing their influence, and fully admitting the ruinous effects of the indecision of Mack, and the want of foresight of the Aulic Council in not having provided adequate magazines either at Ulm or in Moravia, it must yet, in common fairness, be admitted, that Prussia and England had an equal share in bringing about the common calamities. The vacillation of the former power from the first paralysed both Russia and England: the former, by detaining those forces long in Poland which, earlier advanced, might have changed the fate of the campaign; the latter, by preventing, from the dread of irritating so weighty a power, those important operations in the north of Germany, which would so materially have relieved the overwhelming pressure of Napoleon on the Danube. Hanover was the ill-gotten spoil which at that critical moment tied up the hands of Prussia, and brought on her the catastrophe of Jena and Tilsit.

quod in commune non consulunt. Rarus duabus tribusve civitatibus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus : ita, dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur.”\*

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\* In fact, the forces which Mr Pitt had now arrayed for this last and decisive struggle against France were of the most formidable description ; and the success with which he had triumphed over all the jealousies of the European powers, is the brightest page in his diplomatic career. After repeated failures, the great work was at length accomplished : the Continental sovereigns were united in a cordial league to stop the progress of the conqueror, and armies fully adequate to the task were assembled at their command. Disaster had at last taught them wisdom : the presence of a common danger had at that moment at least extinguished their jealousies. For the first time since the commencement of the war, Austria and Prussia stood forth, backed by Russia, for the fight, and five hundred thousand veterans, led by their sovereigns in person, were prepared to roll back to the Rhine the tide of Gallic invasion. The principles of the coalition were as just as its forces were immense ; and the powers who had suffered so much from French ambition, were bound by a secret compact neither to attempt any conquest on its original territory, nor to interfere in the internal frame of its government. Restitution of what it had reft from others, security against its aggressions in future, alone were to be insisted on.† ✓

164.  
bility di  
ayed by  
Mr Pitt in  
the forma-  
tion of this  
confederacy.

† To say that this great and equitable confederacy was unsuccessful—that its fortunes were shaken at Ulm, thrown down at Austerlitz—is no impeachment whatever, either of the justice of its principles or the wisdom of its general combinations. Mr Pitt necessarily intrusted

165.  
Its failure is  
no impeach-  
ment of the

\* “Nor has anything been more advantageous to us, in combating the most powerful nations, than that they adopt no common measures. It is rare to see an alliance between two or three states to avert a common danger : thus, as they engage singly, they are all conquered.”—TACITUS, *Agricola*, xii.

† See note, 12th January 1805, Mr Pitt to Russian ambassador.—Appendix A, Chap. xx



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the execution of its details to the Allied sovereigns<sup>f</sup> or their generals, and it was by them that the fatal errors were committed. No foresight on his part could have prevented the inconsiderate advance to Ulm, or the ruinous cross-march at Austerlitz—no efforts that he could make—and he spared none—were able to bring Prussia at the critical moment into the field. The vulgar, in all ages, are governed merely by the result, and award praise or censure according as victory is won or lost; but it is the noblest province and first duty of history to separate the accidental from the intrinsic, in estimating the merits of human conduct. Judging by this standard, it will give the highest praise in diplomatic ability to Mr Pitt for the formation of this confederacy, and the extinction of the jealousies on all sides which had so long hindered its construction, and disregard, in the estimate of that merit, its calamitous result; as much as, in weighing the military greatness of Napoleon, it will overlook the disastrous issue of his later campaigns, and award to him a higher place for his immortal conflict with superior forces in the plains of Champagne, than when triumphing on the heights of Austerlitz, or striking down the Prussian monarchy on the field of Jena.

166.  
His defective military combinations.

But though great in diplomacy and finance, Mr Pitt was little skilled in military combinations. A more vigorous warlike policy at that period, such as Mr Burke had from the first strenuously recommended, might have terminated the disasters of the war. England also must take her share of the common responsibility, not only in having, in conjunction with Russia, suggested the unhappy appointment of Mack to the command,<sup>1</sup> but also, by abstaining from all Continental hostilities till the campaign was decided, having permitted that accumulation of force by which he was overwhelmed. Great Britain, secure in her sea-girt citadel, had then five hundred thousand men in arms. Had she despatched eighty thousand of this vast force, early in the campaign to a decisive

<sup>1</sup> Hard. viii. 512.

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point; had her troops marched to the shores of Kent when the legions of Napoleon broke up from the heights of Boulogne for the Rhine, and boldly attacked the enemy in Flanders, the march of the troops which cut off the retreat of Mack would have been prevented; and Prussia would probably have been determined, by such a demonstration, to have thrown her weight into the scale in time to prevent the subjugation of Europe.

The dissolution of the great confederacy, which he had so long laboured to construct, and from which he confidently expected such important results, was fatal, however, to the master-spirit which had formed it. The constitution of Mr Pitt, long weakened by the fatigues and the excitement incident to his situation, sank at length under anguish occasioned by the dissolution of the confederacy. In vain he tried the waters of Bath; in vain he retired for a while from the fatigues of office: his constitution was worn out by the labours and the anxiety which have proved fatal to so many parliamentary leaders, and, while yet hardly advanced beyond middle life, he already felt the weakness of age. Upon a frame thus enfeebled, the disappointment and anguish arising from the prostration of the last hopes of European freedom by the defeat of Austerlitz, fell with overpowering force. From the time the disastrous news was received he hourly declined, and political distress accelerated an event already approaching from natural causes. His constitu-

167.  
His last ill-

n, though yet in middle life, was worn out by incessant exertion and overwrought excitement. In the intervals of rest, however, his thoughts were still riveted upon the fortunes of his country. After a melancholy survey of the map of Europe, he turned away, saying, "Henceforth we may close that map for half a century!"—so little did the greatest intellect anticipate that general resurrection of the principles of freedom which even then was beginning, and which his own efforts had so largely contributed to produce.<sup>1</sup> At the close of a lingering

<sup>1</sup> Gifford's  
Pitt  
347,  
Ann. Reg.  
1806, 13,  
14.

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illness, which he bore with the wonted fortitude of his character, he expired at his house at Putney, near London, on the 23d January 1806, exclaiming with his last breath, "Alas! my country!" not less the victim of devotion to patriotic duty than if he had been pierced through the heart on the field of battle.

168.

His early life, education, and first entrance into public life.

Thus perished, at the age of forty-seven, while still in the zenith of his intellectual powers, William Pitt. He was born on the 28th May 1759, and early distinguished himself by his ardent zeal and uncommon proficiency in the classical languages and mathematical studies, as well as by the quickness of his wit and repartee in society. The name of his father, the great Earl of Chatham, soon procured for him a favourable introduction to parliament; and at the age of twenty-two he made his first entrance into public life as member for the borough of Appleby, in January 1781. From the very first his powers of speaking were so remarkable, that he took his place as if it had been set apart for him as a leader of the old Whig party, to which his father had belonged. On the rupture of George the Third with the coalition ministry in 1784, the sovereign turned to him as the only man in the country capable of contending with the formidable majority which Mr Fox and Lord North then directed in parliament; and the ultimate success which his talent and intrepidity won for him in that contest, gave him the undisputed command of government, which continued almost without interruption till the time of his death, two-and-twenty years after.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tomline's Life of Pitt, i. 1, 39. *Ante*, chap. ix. §§ 34-37.

169.

Character of Mr Pitt, and his mighty achievements.

Considered with reference to the general principles by which his conduct was regulated, and the constancy with which he maintained them through adverse fortune, the history of Europe has not so great a statesman to exhibit. Called into action at the most critical and eventful period in the annals, not merely of his country, but of modern times, he firmly and nobly fulfilled his destiny: placed in the vanguard of the conflict between ancient freedom

and modern democracy, he maintained his ground from first to last, under circumstances the most adverse, with unconquerable resolution. If the coalitions which he formed were repeatedly dissolved, if the projects which he cherished were frequently unfortunate, the genius which had planned, the firmness which had executed them, were never subdued; and from every disaster he arose only greater and more powerful, till exhausted nature sank under the struggle. If the calamities which befell Europe during his administration were great, the advantages which accrued to his own country were unbounded; and before he was called from the helm, he had not merely seen its independence secured by the battle of Trafalgar, but its power and influence raised to the very highest pitch, by an unprecedented series of maritime successes. Victories unexampled in the annals of naval glory attended every period of his career. In the midst of a desperate strife in Europe, he extended the colonial empire of England into every quarter of the globe; and when the Continental nations thought all the energies of his country were concentrated on the struggle with Napoleon, he found means to stretch his mighty arms into another hemisphere, strike down the throne of Tippoo Saib in the heart of Hindostan, and extend the British dominion over the wide expanse of the Indian peninsula. Under his administration, the revenue, trade, and manufactures of England were doubled, its colonies and political strength quadrupled; and he raised an island in the Atlantic, once only a remote province of the Roman empire, to such a pitch of grandeur as to be enabled to bid defiance to the world in arms.

But these external successes, great as they were, were but a part of the lasting benefits of Mr Pitt's government. It was the interior which was the scene of his real greatness there the durable monuments of his intellect are to be seen. Inheriting from his father, the great Lord Chatham, a sincere love of freedom; early imbued with

CHAP. liberal principles; the strenuous supporter of a relaxation  
 XL. of the fetters of trade, financial improvement, Catholic  
 1805. emancipation, and such a practical and equitable system  
 of parliamentary reform as promised to correct the  
 inequalities complained of, without injustice to individuals  
 or danger to the state, he was at the same time as fully  
 alive to the extreme risk of legislating precipitately on  
 such vital subjects, or permitting democratic ambition,  
 under the name of a desire of improvement, to agitate the  
 public mind at a hazardous time by attempts to remodel  
 the institution of society. In the first instance, he was  
 rather favourable to the French Revolution, and, unlike Mr  
 Burke, yielded only a cold and reluctant assent to those  
 who proclaimed its dangers. He resolutely adhered to his  
 pacific policy as long as it was possible for him to do so;  
 and it was truly said at the time, by those who knew him  
 best, that "he was dragged into the contest with as much  
 reluctance as a man of conscientious principles into a duel."<sup>1</sup>

171.

now he was  
 not drawn  
 into the war.

But when once forced into the conflict, he espoused  
 it with all the ardour of his character. No sooner,  
 therefore, did the French Revolution become ungovern-  
 able, and it had become evident that a general social  
 convulsion was designed, than he threw the weight of his  
 influence into the opposite scale. Though an advocate  
 for a strict neutrality, till the murder of the king had  
 thrown down the gauntlet to every established govern-  
 ment, he then espoused it with the whole ardour and  
 perseverance of his character, and became the soul of  
 the confederacies which, during the remainder of his life,  
 were framed to oppose a barrier to the diffusion of its  
 principles and the ravages of its armies. The steady  
 friend of freedom, he was on that very account the  
 resolute opponent of democracy—the deadly, because the  
 unsuspected enemy by whose triumphs, in every age, its  
 principles have been subverted, and its blessings destroy-  
 ed. When the greatest intellects in Europe were reeling  
 under the shock, when the ardent and philanthropic were

everywhere rejoicing in the prospects of boundless felicity which the regeneration of society was supposed to be opening, when Mr Fox was pronouncing the revolutionary constitution of France "the most stupendous monument of political wisdom and integrity ever yet raised on the basis of public virtue in any age or country," his superior sagacity, though only after that of Burke, beheld amid the deceitful blaze the small black cloud which was to cover the world with darkness.

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Watching with incessant vigilance the changeful forms of the Jacobin spirit, ever unravelling its sophistry, detecting its perfidy, unveiling its oppression, he thenceforth directed the gigantic energies of his mind towards the construction of a barrier which might restrain its excesses: and if he could not prevent it from bathing France in blood, and ravaging Europe with war, he at least effectually opposed its entrance into the British dominions. With admirable foresight he there established a system of finance adequate to the emergency, and which proved the mainspring of the continued, and at length successful resistance which was opposed to revolutionary ambition: \* with indomitable perseverance he rose superior to every disaster, and incessantly laboured to frame, among the discordant and selfish cabinets of Europe, a cordial league for their common defence. Next to Burke, he, alone of all the statesmen of his age, from a comparatively early period appreciated the full extent of the danger, both to the independence of nations and the liberty of mankind, which was threatened by the spread of democratic principles; and continually inculcated the necessity of relinquishing every minor object, to unite in guarding against the advances of this new and tremendous enemy. And the event has abundantly proved the justice of these principles; for while liberty perished in a few months in France, amidst the fervour of revolutionary ambition, it steadily grew and flourished

172.  
He became  
the great  
champion  
against the  
French  
Revolution.

\* See Chap. XL. "On the British Finances."

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in the British empire; and the forty years which immediately followed the commencement of his resistance to democratic ambition, have proved not only the most glorious, but the freest of its existence.

173.  
Progressive  
and steady  
growth of  
his fame.

Chateaubriand has said, "That while all other contemporary reputations, even that of Napoleon, are on the decline, the fame of Mr Pitt alone is continually increasing, and seems to derive fresh lustre from every vicissitude of fortune." It is not merely the greatness and the constancy of the British statesman which has drawn forth this high eulogium; it is the demonstration which subsequent events have afforded of the justice of his principles, which is the real cause of the steady growth and enduring stability of his fame. Without the despotism of Napoleon, the freedom of the Restoration, the revolt of the Barricades, and the military government of Louis Philippe, his reputation would have been incomplete with regard to foreign transactions; without the great organic change of 1832, and the subsequent experience of democratic influence in Great Britain, his worth in domestic government would never have been appreciated. Every hour, abroad and at home, is now illustrating the truth of his principles. He was formerly admired by a party in England as the champion of aristocratic rights; he is now looked back to by the nation as the last steady asserter of general freedom. His doctrines were formerly prevalent chiefly among the great and affluent: they are now embraced by the generous, the thoughtful, the unprejudiced of every rank; by all who regard passing events with the eye of historic inquiry, or are attached to liberty as the birthright of the human race, not the means of elevating a party to absolute power. To his speeches we now turn as to a voice issuing from the tomb, fraught with prophetic warning of future disaster. It is contrast which gives brightness to the colours of history: it is experience which brings conviction to the old lessons of political wisdom. Many and eloquent have

been the eulogiums pronounced on Mr Pitt's memory; but all panegyrics are lifeless compared to that furnished by Earl Grey's administration.

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Foreign writers of almost every description have fallen into a signal mistake in estimating the policy of this great statesman. They all represent him as governed by an ardent ambition to elevate his own country, as the mortal enemy, on that account, of the French nation, and as influenced through life by a Machiavelian desire to promote the confusion and misery of the Continent, in order that England might thereby engross the commerce of the world. There never was a more erroneous opinion. For the first ten years of his political life, Mr Pitt was not only noways hostile to France, but its steadfast friend. So far from being actuated by commercial jealousy of that country, he had embraced the generous maxim of Adam Smith's philosophy, that the prosperity of every state is mainly dependent on the prosperity of those which surround it.\* Had he been influenced by the malevolent designs which they suppose, he would not have adhered to a strict neutrality when France was pierced to the heart in 1792, but, before the revolutionary levies were completed, have raised the standard to avenge the interference of its government in the American war. He was to the last degree unwilling to engage in the war with France:

174.  
Erroneous  
views of  
foreign  
writers on  
his designs.

\* In the debate on the Treaty of Commerce with France, on February 12, 1787, Mr Fox said, "France is the *natural enemy of Great Britain*; and she now wishes, by entering into a commercial treaty with us, to tie up our hands, and prevent us from engaging in alliances with other powers. All the most glorious periods of our history have been when in hostility, all the most disgraceful when in alliance with that power. It is the disgrace of the Tories that they have interfered to stop these glorious successes. This country should never, on any account, enter into too close an alliance with France; its true situation is as the bulwark of the oppressed whom that ambitious power has attacked."

"The honourable gentleman has said," observed Mr Pitt, "that France is the natural enemy of England: I repudiate the sentiment. I see no reason whatever why two great and powerful nations should always be in a state of hostility merely because they are neighbours; on the contrary, I think their prosperity is mutually dependent on each other; and as a British subject, not less than a citizen of the world, I entertain the sincerest wish for the prosperity and happiness of that great country. To suppose that one nation is unalterably



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he engaged in it with a reluctance, which all the horrors of the Revolution were hardly able to dispel. Ample evidence of this has now been obtained from the best informed memoirs of the period which have been recently published, particularly those of Lord Malmesbury and Mr Wilberforce. It was not against France, but *republican* France, that his hostility was directed: it was not French warfare, but French propagandism which he dreaded; and his efforts would have been equally persevering to resist Russia or Austria by the aid of the Gallic legions, if those insidious principles had emanated from these states. And even as it was, it was not till a very late period that he was reluctantly compelled to forego his pacific policy; and if he is blamable at all, it is for having adhered to it too long.

175.  
His errors.

If, from the contemplation of the general principles of Mr Pitt's government, we turn to the consideration of the particular measures which he often embraced, we shall find much more room for difference of opinion, and frequent cause for historic censure. Unequalled in the ability with which he overcame the jealousies, and awakened the activity of cabinets, he was by no means equally felicitous in the warlike measures which he recommended for their adoption. Napoleon has observed, that he had no turn for military combinations,<sup>1</sup> and a retrospect of the cam-

<sup>1</sup> Las Cas.  
iii. 274.

Parl. Hist.  
xxvi. 392,  
402.

the enemy of another nation, is weak and childish; having no foundation in the experience of nations, it is a libel on the constitution of human societies, and supposes the existence of diabolical malice in the original frame of man.<sup>2</sup> Nor were these sentiments merely uttered in the heat of debate; they were carried into effect in every great and important legislative measure; and this statesman, whom the Continental writers represent as the eternal inveterate enemy of France, concluded a commercial treaty between that country and Great Britain, which in liberality far surpasses anything ever proposed by the warmest modern advocates of free trade. It stipulated "a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each party in all the kingdoms of Europe." The wines of France were to obtain admission on the same terms as those of Portugal; their brandy on paying a duty of seven shillings a gallon; their oil on the same terms as that of the most favoured nation; their hardware, cutlery, and iron work on a duty *ad valorem* of ten per cent! So erroneous is the common opinion as to the principles of this great statesman!—See the Treaty in *Parl. Hist.* xxvi. 234-240.

paigns which he had a share in directing, must, with every impartial mind, confirm the justice of the opinion. By not engaging England as a principal in the contest, and trusting for land operations almost entirely to the Continental armies put in motion by British subsidies, he prolonged the war for an indefinite period, and ultimately brought upon the country losses and expenses much greater than would have resulted from a more vigorous policy in the commencement. By directing the national strength chiefly to colonial acquisitions, he succeeded, indeed, ultimately, in wresting from the enemy all their maritime possessions, and raising the commercial prosperity of the country to the very highest pitch; but this was done at the cost of a war of twelve years' duration, and an addition of above three hundred millions to the national debt: whereas, by the vigorous application of an English force, inconsiderable to what might have been raised, to the heart of the enemy's power at the outset, or when their resources were failing before the arrival of Napoleon at the helm, he would, in all human probability, have gained the same object at a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and at the same time liberated the Continent from Gallic oppression. In war-like combinations he was too much inclined to follow out the Austrian system of simultaneous operations over an extensive circle; and to waste those forces on the reduction of sugar islands, or useless descents with small bodies on the coasts of France, which, if concentrated upon the decisive point, would have accelerated by twenty years the triumphs of Toulouse and Waterloo. In justice to the British statesman, however, it must be observed, that at that period eighty years of repose, and the disastrous results of the American war, had weakened the military spirit of the nation, and dimmed the recollections of its ancient renown; and that no one deemed it capable of those vast and persevering efforts on land, which at length brought the contest to a glorious termination.

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176.

Opinion of  
the demo-  
cratic party  
in England  
of him.

“It is needless,” say the republicans, “to raise to Mr Pitt’s memory: he has raised up an indestructible monument to himself in the national debt. His name will never be forgotten as long as taxes are paid by the British people.” If, however, it is apparent that the war, both with the Republic and Napoleon, was unavoidable, and, from the principles on which it was conducted, incapable of adjustment, those burdens, generally speaking, are to be regarded as a salvage paid for the safety of the empire, and are no more chargeable on his memory than the losses sustained during a gale are on the skilful pilot who has weathered the storm. The real point for consideration is, whether these vast expenses were not unnecessarily swelled by the adoption of an over-cautious, and therefore, protracted system of warfare, and whether much of the debt might not have been avoided by contracting it in a different, and, ultimately, less burdensome form. And probably the warmest of his partisans will find it difficult to defend the practice which he so much followed, of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, giving a bond for a hundred pounds to the public creditor for every sixty advanced—a system which, although favourable to public credit at the moment, from the low rate at which it enabled him to contract the largest loans, led to an enormous addition to the national burdens in after times; prevented the return of peace from making the due diminution in the interest of the debt; and saddled the nation with the ultimate payment of above a third more than it ever received.

177.  
His private  
character.  
Funeral hon-  
ours paid  
to him.

Mr Pitt’s eloquence and talents for debate were of the very highest order, his command of financial details unbounded, and his power of bringing a vast variety of detached facts or transactions to bear on one general argument—the noblest effort of rhetoric—unequalled in modern times. He possessed that rapidity and acuteness of thought, united to richness of expression and tenacity of memory, which Cicero pronounced essential to a perfect

orator.\* He was an accomplished classical scholar, and continued through life, in all his leisure moments, the study of the exquisite remains of ancient genius. But he did this with the wise design of transferring to his own tongue the brevity and force of their expressions, not in the hopeless desire of rivalling their beauties in their own language. So successful was he in this, that many of his speeches, delivered extempore during the heat of debate, will bear a comparison with all but the finished specimens of written Greek or Roman eloquence. Kindly and affectionate in domestic life, he yet felt in all their force the passions of youth, and was far from being inaccessible to the ascendant of female charms.† But these feelings were all kept in subordination to greater objects, and accordingly in private life his conduct was irreproachable. Concentrated on national objects, he had none of the usual passions or weaknesses of the great; his manners were reserved and austere; his companions, in general, men inferior in years and capacity to himself; he had many admirers—few friends. His figure was tall and thin, his features sharp, his forehead open and thoughtful—

—————“Deep in his brow engraven,  
Deliberation sat, and sovereign care.”‡

Superior to the vulgar desire for wealth, he was careless, though addicted to no expenses, of his private fortune; and the man who had so long held the treasury of Europe and the Indies, was indebted to the gratitude of the nation for a vote of forty thousand pounds, to pay the debts which he owed at the time of his death. In this vote

\* “Nam et animi atque ingenii celeres quidem motus esse debent, qui et ad excogitandum acuti, et ad explicandum ornandumque sint uberes, et ad memoriam firmi atque diuturni.”—*De Oratore*, i. § 25.

† He was a great admirer of female dress, and so accomplished a connoisseur in it that the celebrated Lady Hester Stanhope, his cousin, who lived in his house for many years, and presided over his establishment, used to take his advice in the arrangement of her curls and drapery when she was going to a ball. In early life he was such an admirer of a captivating Devonshire beauty, that he had the gallantry to drink her health out of her satin slipper.—*Memoirs of Lady Hester Stanhope*, i. 81, 82.

‡ MILTON'S *Paradise Lost*.

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
vi. 42, 62,  
71, 138.

Mr Fox cheerfully and honourably concurred; but he resisted the motion for a monument to his memory at the public expense, upon the ground that, however splendid his abilities, or praiseworthy his integrity had been, the principles of his conduct were not such as to entitle him to the character of an "excellent statesman."<sup>1</sup>\* The monument which the House of Commons, by a great majority, voted, was placed above his grave in Westminster Abbey, already illustrated by the ashes of so many of the great and good in English history; but the historian who surveys the situation of the British empire at the close of the contest which he so nobly maintained, and recollects that the liberty of mankind was dependent on its success, will award him a wider mausoleum, and inscribe on his grave the well-known words, "Si monumentum quæris, circumspice!"

\* "When I see a minister," said Mr Fox, "who has been in office above twenty years, with the full command of places and public money, without any peculiar extravagance or waste, except what might be expected from the multiplicity of duties to which his attention was directed, exerting his influence neither to enrich himself nor those with whom he is connected, it is impossible not to conclude that he has acted with a high degree of integrity and moderation. In the course of his long administration, the only office which he took to himself was the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But I cannot concur in a motion for funeral honours upon Mr Pitt as an 'excellent statesman.' Public honours are matters of the highest importance, and we must not in such cases yield our consent if it is opposed by a sense of public duty."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 61, 62.

# APPENDIX.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

NOTE A, p. 239.

The new taxes imposed were :—

### 1. *Customs.*

Twenty per cent additional on sugar, &c. imported, .	£1,300,000	
Duty of one per cent on exports, . . . . .	460,000	
One penny a pound on cotton wool, . . . . .	250,000	
Tonnage additional, . . . . .	150,000	
		£2,160,000

### 2. *Eccise.*

Fifteen per cent on the lower, and forty-five per cent on higher teas, . . . . .	£1,300,000	
Additional duty of ten pounds a pipe on wine, . . . . .	500,000	
Fifty per cent on spirits, . . . . .	1,500,000	
Two shillings additional on malt, . . . . .	2,700,000	
		6,000,000

### 3. *Property.*

Five per cent on income and property, . . . . .	4,500,000	
In all, . . . . .		£12,660,000

The income and expenditure of the year 1803 stood as follows :—

### *Expenditure.*

Navy, . . . . .	£10,211,378
Army, . . . . .	8,935,753
Militia, &c., . . . . .	2,889,976
Ordnance, . . . . .	1,128,913
Miscellaneous, . . . . .	5,440,441
Grant to national debt, . . . . .	200,000
Exchequer bills, . . . . .	10,150,456
	£38,956,917
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded, . . . . .	20,699,866
	£59,656,783
Sinking-fund, . . . . .	6,494,000
	£66,150,783

*Income.*

Total income from taxes,	£38,600,392
Loan, . . . . .	12,000,000
Raised by exchequer bills,	20,481,000

£71,000,392

—See *Ann. Reg.* 1803, 631, *et seq.*; *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1598; and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

NOTE B, p. 246.

## FINANCIAL DETAILS OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1804.

*Expenditure.*

Navy, . . . . .	£12,350,574
Army, . . . . .	12,000,000
Militia, &c., . . . . .	6,159,000
Ordnance, . . . . .	
Miscellaneous, . . . . .	4,217,000
Extra, do. . . . .	2,500,000
Exchequer bills, . . . . .	11,000,000
Civil list, . . . . .	591,000
Additional do., . . . . .	60,000
	<hr/>
	£53,607,574
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded,	21,726,772
Sinking-fund, . . . . .	6,436,000
	<hr/>
	£81,772,346

*Ways and Means.*

War taxes, . . . . .	£15,440,000
Surplus of consolidated fund, . . . . .	5,000,000
Malt duty additional, . . . . .	750,000
Duty on pensions, &c. . . . .	2,000,000
Lottery, . . . . .	250,000
Surplus of 1803, . . . . .	1,370,000
Loan, England, . . . . .	10,000,000
Do. Ireland, . . . . .	4,500,000
Exchequer bills, . . . . .	14,000,000
Annuities loan, . . . . .	1,150,000
Permanent revenue <i>minus</i> surplus of consolidated fund, . . . . .	25,365,000

£79,825,000

—See *nl. Deb.* ii. 351, 355, and *App.* 35; and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 574, *App. to Chron.*

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

NOTE A, p. 370.

This state-paper, the most remarkable in the whole Revolutionary war, as containing the principles which were constantly maintained and finally brought to a successful issue by Great Britain, deserves to be quoted at greater length than is possible in the narrative of the text :—

“ From the report of Prince Czartoriski, and the confidential communications received from the cabinet of St Petersburg, his Majesty perceives with the highest satisfaction that the sentiments of the Emperor, in regard to the deliverance and security of Europe, and its future independence, agree entirely with his own. The King, in consequence, is desirous of entering into the fullest and most unreserved explanations on every point which relates to that great object, and to form the closest union with the Emperor, in order that, by their united efforts, they may secure the aid and co-operation of the other powers of the Continent, in proportions corresponding to their ability, to take a part in the great and important enterprise on which the future safety of Europe is entirely dependent.

“ With these designs the first point is, to fix as precisely as possible the objects which are to be kept in view by the coalesced powers.

“ It appears from the explanation which has been given of the intentions of the Emperor, with which those of the King are entirely conformable, that these objects may be divided into three heads :—1. To rescue from French domination the countries which that power has conquered since the commencement of the Revolution, and to reduce it to the limits by which it was bounded before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the territories so taken from France, such arrangements as may at once provide for their own tranquillity and happiness, and establish a barrier against the future projects of aggrandisement of that power. 3. To establish, on the restoration of peace, a system of mutual convention and guarantee for the security of the different powers, and establish in Europe a general system of public rights.

“ The first and second of these objects are announced in the most general terms; but neither the one nor the other can be considered in detail without considering the nature and extent of the means at their disposal for carrying them into execution. The first is certainly that which the wishes of the Emperor and King would wish to see established in its fullest extent, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the views which they have formed for the deliverance of Europe. If it were possible to unite to Great Britain and Russia, the two other great powers of the Continent, there seems no doubt that such an assemblage of forces would be at their disposal, as would enable them to accomplish all that they desire. But if, as there is too much reason to fear, it shall be found impossible to make Prussia enter into the views of the confederacy, it may be doubted whether it will be possible to carry on in all parts of Europe the operations necessary to secure the first object in its full extent.

“ The second object involves within itself more than one object of the highest importance. The views and sentiments of his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, in striving to bring about this concert, are pure and disinterested. Their chief



object in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France, is to re-establish as much as possible their ancient rights, and to secure the wellbeing of their inhabitants: but in pursuing that object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which, indeed, that wellbeing is mainly dependent.

"It follows from this principle, that if any of these countries are capable of re-establishing their independence, and placed in a situation where they are capable of defending it, such an arrangement would be entirely conformable to the spirit of the proposed system. But among the countries at present subjected to the dominion of France, there are others to whom such a system is wholly inapplicable, either from their ancient relations having been so completely destroyed, that they cannot be re-established, or because they are so situated, that their independence could only be nominal, and equally incompatible with their own security, or that of Europe in general. Happily the greater number stand in the first predicament. If the arms of the Allies should be crowned with such success as to despoil France of all the conquests she has made since the Revolution, it would certainly be their first object to re-establish the United Provinces and Switzerland, and the territories of the King of Sardinia and Naples, as well as the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany; but those of Genoa, of the Italian republic, including the three Legations, as well as Parma and Placentia, the Austrian Low Countries, and the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, belong to the second denomination. As to the Italian provinces which have been mentioned, experience has demonstrated that they have neither disposition nor resources to resist the aggressions of France; the King of Spain has too largely participated in the system, of which so large a portion of Europe has been the victims, to render it necessary to take into consideration the ancient rights of his family; and the last measures of Genoa, and some of the other Italian states, give them no title to appeal either to the justice or generosity of the Allies. It is evident, besides, that these little sovereignties have no means of maintaining their independence, and that their separate existence can serve only to weaken and paralyse the force, which as much as possible should be concentrated in the hands of the principal power of Italy.

"It is needless to dwell particularly on the situation of the Low Countries. The events which have taken place forbid the possibility of their being restored to the house of Austria: it follows, therefore, that some new arrangements must be made in regard to that country; and it is evident that it can never exist as an independent power. The same considerations apply to the states on the left bank of the Rhine; they have been detached from the empire, and their owners received indemnities in the interior of Germany. It appears, therefore, no ways repugnant to the most sacred principles of justice and public morality, to make, in regard to these countries, such dispositions as the general interests of Europe require; and it is evident that, after all the blood which has been shed, there exist no other means of re-establishing the peace of Europe on a durable foundation. It is fortunate that such an arrangement, essential in itself to the object which is proposed, may be made to contribute in the most powerful manner to bring about the means by which it may be effected.

"It is certainly a matter of the highest importance, if not of absolute necessity, to secure the efficacious and vigorous co-operation of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to hope that either of these powers will embark in the common cause, unless they have the prospect of an advantage to indemnify them for their exertions. For these reasons, his Majesty is clearly of opinion, that nothing could so much contribute to the general security, as by giving Austria additional strength to resist the designs of France on the side of Italy, and putting Russia in a similar

situation in the Low Countries. In Italy, reasons of policy require that the strength of the King of Sardinia should be increased, and that Austria should be placed in a situation to furnish him with prompt assistance in case of attack. With this view, it is indispensable that the territories now forming the Republic of Italy should be given to other sovereigns. In making the distribution, a proper augmentation must be given to the King of Sardinia; and his possessions, as well as those of the grand-duchy of Tuscany, which it is proposed to revive, be brought in contact with those of Austria; and for those ends, the Ligurian republic, to all appearance, must be united to Piedmont.

"Such territorial arrangements would go far to secure the future repose of Europe, by forming a more powerful barrier against the ambition of France than has yet existed; but to render that security complete, it appears necessary that there should be concluded, at the period of a general pacification, a general treaty, by which the European powers should mutually guarantee each others' possessions. Such a treaty would lay the foundation in Europe of a system of public right, and would contribute as much as seems possible to repress future enterprises directed against the general tranquillity; and above all, to render abortive every project of aggrandisement, similar to those which have produced all the disasters of Europe since the calamitous era of the French Revolution."—SCHOELL, vii. 59; JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, i. 471, 478.

In all these varied projects, there is not a syllable either about territorial acquisition to Great Britain, or the infliction upon France of any part of that system of spoliation which she had so liberally applied to other states. The whole project breathes only a spirit of justice, philanthropy, and moderation; it contemplates restitution, and restitution only where that was practicable; and where it was not, such new arrangements as the interest of the people in the territories to be disposed of, and the general safety of Europe, required. The world has since had abundant reason to experience the prophetic wisdom of these arrangements, in all cases where they were subsequently carried into execution, and to lament the deviation made from them, particularly in the final destruction of Poland and Belgium.

## NOTE B, p. 372.

## FINANCIAL DETAILS OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1805.

## INCOME, GREAT BRITAIN.

*Extraordinary.*

Malt and personal estate duties, . . .	£2,750,000
War taxes, . . . . .	8,300,000
New war do., . . . . .	1,150,000
Property tax, . . . . .	6,300,000
Surplus consolidated fund, . . . .	4,000,000
Lottery, . . . . .	300,000
Surplus, 1804, . . . . .	1,192,000
Loan, England, . . . . .	20,000,000
Carry forward,	£43,992,000

Brought forward, . . .  
*Permanent.*

Customs, . . .	£8,357,000	
Excise, . . .	20,604,000	
Stamps, . . .	3,354,000	
Land and assessed taxes,	5,309,000	
Post office, . . .	924,000	
Pensions and salaries,	49,000	
Do., . . .	61,000	
Smaller taxes, . . .	32,000	
	<hr/>	
	38,600,000	
Deduct war customs and excise, . . .	8,300,000	
	<hr/>	30,300,000
Total extraordinary and permanent income,		£74,382,000

## E, GREAT BRITAIN.

*Extraordinary*

Navy, . . .	£15,035,000	
Army, . . .		
Ordnance,		
Miscellanies,	6,450,000	
		44,947,000

*Permanent Charges.*

Interest of debt,	£19,193,000	
Sinking-fund, . . .	6,835,000	
Civil list, &c., . . .	1,337,000	
Other payments, . . .	727,000	
	<hr/>	28,092,000

Total extraordinary and permanent charges, exclusive of  
 Ireland, . . . . .

£73,039,000

—See *Parliamentary Debates*, iii. 546-550, and Appendix, 230; *Annual*  
 1805,592, *App. to Chronicle*.

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